Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach

  Alternative propositions of Islamic modernism come from a group of contemporary Azerbaijani intellectuals. The most well-known are: Rafiq Aliyev (an orientalist, a director of the Center for Islamic Studies IRSHAD, and the former chairman of the State Committee of Azerbaijan Republic for Work with Religious Associations), Nariman Qasimoglu (an Arabist, translator of the Koran into Azeri, and the director of the Azerbaijan Center for Religion and Democracy), or Fazil Qazanfaroglu (Motika, 2001). Although their postulates differ, they nevertheless share some common values and ideas. The most noticeable is the critical attitude towards the non-intellectual popular Islamic tradition, in which religious and national customs overlap. A lot of Muslim intellectuals do not support Shiism, but favour a Sunni “moderate” branch. Moderate here implies an opposition to any kind of religious extremism. They are against any strictness of rituals, unreflective following of religious rulings, or blind obedience to a religious leader. For them faith is more important than religion with all its precise requirements. In the interview I had with Nariman Qasimoglu I asked about the problem of reform in religion. The Arabist has underlined that a Muslim should rely only on the Koran. The Hadith body of literature must be rejected, or set aside, but not considered as a part of Islam. If the Koran stated somewhere that additional sources of religion were needed, it would be different, he argues. In such statements, he distances himself from not only the Shia but also the mainstream Sunni tradition. In his model of religion, the Koran contains answers to all kind of problems and questions. In this sense, he said, the Koran is modern; it is the book that serves people in every century. Regarding the folk Islam, the scholar remarked:

  There is no need for any kind of mediation between God and people. I preach reform ideas. I say that saints and other mediators are of no use for religious people. We have to depart from this way. This is not religion. The role of clergy and their khutbas is negligible. Rituals have little significance for God. They are important only for traditional Muslims.

  An Azeri liberal pro-democratic activist Hikmet Haji-zadeh in our conversation presented his view on religion as being divided into two spheres: (1) religious rituals and celebrations, and (2) an agreement between God and people, according to which salvation can be achieved after death only if a believer follows general moral rules, i. e., he does not kill others; refrains from doing evil; acts in a just way. This scheme of thinking resembles an older approach to religion of Immanuel Kant: religion as cult (prayers, offerings, fasting, etc.) and as moral action (commanding people to make a change in their lives). It seems that the contemporary Muslim independent elite in Azerbaijan, regardless their personal attitudes towards specific Islamic regulations of the sharia, puts an emphasis on the second understanding. They promote a more ethical and reflexive reading of Islamic Scriptures and put an emphasis on ethical standards. A religious person shall be, first of all, engaged in moral transformation and improvement, obviously in the framework of cultural norms and values.

  It is conceivable that, in the future, propositions formulated by Muslim intellectuals will gain more publicity and popularity in the society. A couple of religious people I talked to mentioned some of the local scholars as having some impact, especially in regard to translation of Islamic literature into Azeri or Russian. Sometimes an alliance with the state serves as an effective channel of putting one’s ideas into work, as it was the case of Rafiq Aliyev during his presidency over a new institution founded by state authorities in order to exercise control over religious communities. Another prominent orientalist Elmir Kuliyev has called for transparency in the activity of religious communities. Yet, for today, apart from few exceptions, the Azerbaijani Muslim elite does not have enough power to compete with religious leaders from abroad. The Azeri believers are more inclined to search for inspiration and spiritual guidance outside Azerbaijan, especially among the “international Islamic stars,” from the past (such as Ibn Taymiyyah [b. 1263 AD]), as well as from our times (such as Adnan Oktar, known by his pen name as Harun Yahya (b. 1956). Their ideas, which will be presented later, are among the most well-known and influential in the contemporary religious discourse in Baku.

  Conclusion

  After the Soviet atheistic repressions of religion finally came to an end, religious traditions entered into intense competition with each other as well as with alternative ideological systems. Already in the late 1980s first symptoms of Islamic revival appeared, although they were not the focus of the main research interests. Gradually, however, the international Islamic discourse and activities rooted in the Azerbaijani society and became a hot and controversial public issue. This chapter presented short characteristics of the main Islamic branches and actors that compete with each other over their interpretation of Islamic ideas and concepts. This religious revival encompasses on the one side religious branches that for a long time had been typical of the Azerbaijani context, on the other—some new branches that are taking roots in this country for the first time in its history (e. g. Salafism). Although Azerbaijan has always been a place of religious diversity attracting various sects and missionaries, contemporary pluralism has some novel features that resemble the international trends observed also in other corners of the world. Global Islamic movements—with their cosmopolitan appeal and huge financial and institutional resources—are at the same time raising doubts and protests from the conservative parts of the Azerbaijani society, and are attracting increasing groups of people to take on a “religious path.” The next chapters will consider this issue of religious pluralism from another perspective. I will try to show how do ordinary people handle this sudden religious diversity, how they respond to the challenges of religious pluralism. What are the factors that make a particular Islamic tradition more attractive than others? And, for whom is a given religious model appealing? How does the process of interaction between religious interpreters and the faithful develop? Ultimately, the question is—how is religion (in its diverse manifestations) shaped and constantly modified in the negotiations between various actors who are situated in a specific context? I will also touch the issue of the possible outcomes of this inter-religious competition. If the Islamic revival continues, religious leaders, preachers, and activists will have more influence on society, mainly on the younger generation looking for guidance in life. It will have unpredictable implications on all aspects of social life—on social norms and values, on gender relations and the role of women, on aspirations of the youth and their career paths. It will also influence state policies, both internal and in foreign relations. Thus, it is fascinating to observe this process from various perspectives to see who is likely to win this battle of ideas.

  Chapter 6

  Choosing Religion: Strategies and Discourses

  In the 1990s in the Caucasus and Central Asia an acute feeling of longing for spirituality was widespread. Regardless of previous religious experience in family circles, people began to explore new possibilities in the religious sphere. Traditional religiosity associated with rituals and “part-time” religious engagement of “cultural Islam” ceased to be sufficient for many. People eagerly turned to new religious sources: novel print and electronic publications, missionaries and their khutbas, religious TV channels as well as attractive TV serials or Islamic radio stations. New possibilities emerged for those willing to travel abroad to get in touch with Muslims from other countries. Scholarships were offered for local youth to study theology in Arab countries, Turkey or Iran.

  Contrary to what many social scientists had assumed, this outburst of religious pluralism did not lead to confusion and scepticism, but to a visible rise in religiosity. Religious alternatives did not pose a danger to Islam, but instead led to more religious awareness. This chapter will elaborate on the processes related to modern pluralism in the postsocialist context. It is very interesting to observe how people are trying, in different ways, to find their paths in life, and to take advantage of opportunities brought by globalization. In Baku I was particularly looking
into various types of strategies that people employ in dealing with competing religious options, competing worldviews and identities proposed by the main religious branches. Which religious option is attractive for whom, and why is it so? What makes certain religious practices and obligations appealing to people in the current context? What kind of factors influence religious choices? What are the discourses related to being a Muslim and how are they mutually intertwined? These are some of the questions that I was posing to myself when I was exploring Islamic diversity in Baku and talking to “religious Muslims” or religious leaders as well as during my visits in mosques or pirs.

  6.1Pluralism and Religiousness: The Peculiarity of Azerbaijan

  An increase in options available for believers or potential believers that began on a large scale after the fall of the Soviet Union has occurred simultaneously with an unexpected religious growth, often referred to as a religious revival. Is it a coincidence, or is pluralism in the religious sphere positively associated with religiosity? It has been a hot issue in the sociology of religion for a few decades. While there are a lot of theoretical arguments on both sides, empirical analyses are more scarce. In this chapter, I will present some practices that hopefully will provide some insight into mechanisms that mediate between pluralism and religious engagement.

  The coexistence of diverse Islamic models means more choices for people, not more threats. In such social environments, it is much easier to choose and follow a religious tradition that responds to one’s background, needs, interests, and aspirations. Therefore, more people engage in religious life than it would be in a monopolistic situation, which is less sensitive to socio-cultural and economic diversity. The second factor that influences religiosity is that a choice made among many alternatives requires justification and a polemical attitude. To be able to defend one’s decisions, people look for more knowledge and arguments and often have to prove their rightness by appropriate religious behavior. They also have more opportunities for discussing their views, as they are being constantly challenged by others. Apart from this, under the impact of a pluralistic situation Islamic culture experiences inner changes, such as innovations and adaptation of religious traditions to a new context. During my fieldwork, I have identified two types of competition involving religious actors. The first type is a competition between religions and secular ideologies. The second is a struggle with other participants of religious market, no matter whether they represent the same religion (in this case Islam), or different. Analysing the case of Azerbaijan, I mostly concentrate on the intra-religious market, consisting of a variety of Islamic traditions, as the inter-religious competition is at a negligible level at present.

  The observation of basic processes in the Caucasus, which my own research confirms, leads to a conclusion that the prediction of the market theory of religion in that specific context is right, but the factors postulated by the model do not explain religiosity in Azerbaijan correctly. On the one hand, an increase in options available to believers, that began after the fall of the Soviet Union, has occurred simultaneously with religious growth, as the theory predicts. On the other hand, political restrictions have not diminished religious fervour, which is against the theoretical explanation. For that reason, I will discuss here the particularities of Azerbaijan that can account for the religious revival.

  The first significant feature of pluralism in Azerbaijan, which makes it distinctly different from a well-researched North American case, is its sudden and recent reappearance. The long era of communist repressions and restrictions directed against religious expression did not end with a victory of scientific atheism and agnosticism. When Azerbaijanis entered an epoch of political upheavals, in a short period of time religious public activities became visible. The rapidity of this change certainly influenced the process of religious revival in the society. Although its thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this book, some aspects which directly influence people’s choices will be discussed later. I will only signal here the problem of religious authority. The isolation of Muslim societies in the Soviet empire from religious centres had disastrous consequences for Islamic knowledge among average Muslims as well as among those who were regarded as religious specialists. The lack of native erudite scholars or other knowledgeable people that could become respected religious leaders in the 21st century made people searching for Islam turn towards foreign experts. This demand for “true” religious knowledge enabled foreign missionaries to enter into competition with the local Azerbaijani clergy.

  Another difference between America and Azerbaijan concerning pluralism is the issue of freedom. Azerbaijani constitution nominally guarantees democracy, strict separation between religion and state, and freedom of religion. Similar situation is in other newly independent republics in Central Asia. According to Article 48 of the Azeri constitution, freedom of conscience belongs to the basic rights of citizens of Azerbaijan:

  Everyone enjoys the freedom of conscience.

  Everyone has the right to define his/ her attitude to religion, to profess, individually or together with others, any religion or to profess no religion, to express and spread one’s beliefs concerning religion.

  Everyone is free to carry out religious rituals, however this should not violate public order and contradict public morals.

  Religious beliefs and convictions do not excuse infringements of the law.

  The formal rules concerning freedom of choice are often evoked by state officials who claim that Azerbaijan is a democratic country with a strict separation between religion and state. Nonetheless, in spite of formal secularism, two official institutions, the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) and the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations (SCWRO), constantly engage in controlling and regulating religious activities in the country. The process of implementation of religious regulations, which follows the initial period of freedom for all kinds of religious activists, characterizes not only Azerbaijan, but most post-Soviet countries. As a result, state governors manage to shape the religious situation by favouring and supporting certain forms of religion over others. Although regulations take different forms in particular republics, the trend is clear—to promote religious branches and groups that are willing to cooperate with the state, or at least to keep their activities out of the political arena. This problem will be discussed in more details in the chapter devoted to state’s responses to pluralism. Here, the key issue is the fact that changes in the level of religious freedom over the last twenty years have not lessened religious engagement in the society. Survey data from the region show more or less a continuous rise in the number of actively religious people, despite new forms of interference on the part of state authorities. Since this observation is at odds with the economic model of religious activity, which predicts that religiosity grows when there are no regulations of religious sphere, it deserves some more attention.

  What else might account for the positive relationship between pluralism and religious vitality? I would argue that an important factor is the diversity of options proposed by religious traditions belonging to one religion. The major competition in Azerbaijan is not between Islam and other religions, but between groups representing different Islamic brands. The appeal of Islam is more acceptable to a society which for centuries was attached to that religion and cultivates the collective memory around the notion of Muslim traditions. Even if the self-identification as a Muslim person does not imply any religious activity nor any knowledge of religious prescriptions, the fact that Islamic groups evoke recognizable symbols is persuasive to the Azerbaijani society. For people who actively seek religion it is easier to identify themselves with traditions of their ancestors, although often in a new version (as “true,” or “real” Islam). On the other hand, the array of ideas and symbols associated with different Islamic groups is so wide that a real competition emerges. The fight is even more intense because every religious community has to find a way to justify its superiority over other propositions. Cha
ves and Gorsky (2001, p. 277) have even proposed a hypothesis that more sociologically adequate understanding of competition in the religious field would involve a recognition that there may be more competition among groups within one denomination than there is across denominations. My observations support this suggestion. An ideological fight among Islamic sects all over the post-Soviet space is very intense indeed, and, in Azerbaijan, more people change affiliation within Islam (e. g., from Shiism to Sunnism or vice-versa) than between religions.

  Another factor that enhances the level of competition, and thus increases levels of religious participation is the challenge of a “powerful religious competitor—the doctrine of scientific atheism” (Froese, 2004, p. 65). In this struggle, religions could not ignore “scientific” arguments, and thus some religious groups incorporated a clear discourse about the compatibility between modern science and religion to refute atheists’ attacks. In the ongoing process of transformation, some Islamic traditions succeed in creating an image of modern religious ideology that is attractive to many young, educated, urban segments of the society. A habitus of “modern and religious Muslim man” is an ideal of many people from Baku with whom I spoke.