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Buddhist Warfare

Page 30

by Michael Jerryson


  Yamazaki Ekij (1882–1961), 107, 111, 113–17

  Yangtze River, 30

  Yaodhar (the Buddha’s wife), 27

  Yen, prince of, 27

  Yeou-tö, 41

  Yi-hing, 31

  Yi-hiuan, 29–30, 43

  Yiliang, 144–45

  Yi-touan, 31

  Yodhjvasutta, 157, 159, 171

  Yogcrabhmi (Asaga), 42, 142

  yogin ascetic orders, 21

  Yu, Xue, 4, 9, 14, 131–56

  Yuan Dynasty, 37

  Yuan Tchen (779–831), 23

  Yuantong monks, 30

  Yuan-tsing, 28–29

  zazen (seated meditation), 114–15

  Zen and Japanese Culture (Suzuki), 113

  Zen at War (Victoria), 107

  Zen Buddhism, 37–38, 44, 54n113, 214, 222

  and soldier-Zen, 9, 105–29, 216

  Zen War Stories (Victoria), 107

  Zhal ngo bSod nams chos ‘phel (1595–1657/1658), 80, 87–88

  Zhao Puchu, 132–33, 143–44, 152

  Zhongshan Park (Beijing), 138–40

  Zhou Enlai, 133–34, 153n3

  Zimmermann, Michael, 60, 63, 67–68, 72nn2, 3, 211

  NOTES

  1. Trevor Ling uses the term “Buddhisms” to underline the importance that history, politics, and society have on a transnational religion such as Buddhism. For more information on this, see the introduction in Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia, ed. Trevor Ling (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 1–5.

  2. Mahinda Deegalle, “Is Violence Justified in Theravada Buddhism?” Ecumenical Review 55.2 (April 2003): 125.

  3. Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 80.

  4. Buddhist studies scholars have critically reexamined the parameters and implications of Buddhism since the mid-1990s. For examples of such work, see Donald Lopez, ed., Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Hilda Gutiérrez Baldoquín, ed., Dharma, Color, and Culture: New Voices in Western Buddhism (Berkeley, Calif.: Parallax, 2004); and Steven Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

  5. The first truth addresses the nature of suffering (Pli: dukkha), the second truth locates the origin of suffering, the third is that there is a cessation from suffering, and the fourth is the path to this cessation.

  6. For examples of variations, see the description in the Sayutta Nikya of the Pli canon, the Mahparinirvana stra, and the Angulimaliya stra.

  7. The amalgam of kwan and winyan are specific to Thailand; however, each has a different origin. The practice of venerating the kwan can be traced back to tenth-century China, whereas the propitiation of the winyan comes from early Sanskrit India.

  8. The New Testament offers an excellent example of mythic warfare in 2 Corinthians 10:4–5, “For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds; casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ.”

  9. Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 6.

  10. Bruce Lawrence and Aisha Karim, eds., On Violence: A Reader (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).

  11. Claudia Dreifus, “The Dalai Lama,” New York Times, November 28, 1993.

  12. “Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human being of life, or should look about so as to be his knife-bringer, he is also one who is defeated, he is not in communion.” I. B. Horner, trans., The Book of the Discipline (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1992), 1:123. See also a slightly abridged account in Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans., “npnasayutta,” in Sayutta Nikya, Mahvagga (Boston: Wisdom, 2000), 1773 and 1774.

  13. Michael Jerryson, “Militarizing Buddhism: Violence in Southern Thailand,” in this volume.

  14. Paul Demiéville, “Buddhism and War,” in this volume.

  15. Chatthip Nartsupha, “The Ideology of ‘Holy Men’ Revolts in North East Thailand,” in History and Peasant Consciousness in Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew Turton and Shigeru Tanabe (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984), 123.

  16. Lambert Schmithausen, “Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude towards War,” in Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History, ed. E. M. Houben and K. R. Van Kooij (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 58.

  17. Brian Victoria, Zen at War, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 88, 119.

  18. For a survey of fundamentalism in Theravda Buddhism, see Donald Swearer, “Fundamentalist Movements in Theravada Buddhism,” in Fundamentalisms Observed, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 628–690.

  19. Romila Thapar, Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 152–155.

  20. Uma Chakravarti, The Social Dimensions of Early Buddhism (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1996), 8. Thapar, Early India, 175.

  21. Durga N. Bhagavat, Early Buddhist Jurisprudence (Poona, India: Oriental Book Agency, 1939), 60.

  22. A strong analysis of this is in Elizabeth J. Harris, “Violence and Disruption in Society: A Study of the Early Buddhist Texts,” Dialogue 17.1–3 (Jan.–Dec. 1990): 35.

  23. Balkrishna Gokhale addresses this in “The Early Buddhist View of the State,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 89.4 (Oct. 1969): 731.

  24. Tambiah takes a distinct stance on early Buddhism’s perspective on violence, explaining, “Kings must be good killers before they can turn to piety and good works.” Stanley J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 522.

  25. Gokhale, “The Early Buddhist View of the State,” 734.

  26. Balkrishna Gokhale, “Dhamma as a Political Concept,” Journal of Indian History 44 (Aug. 1968): 251.

  27. I. B. Horner, trans., The Book of the Discipline (Suttavibhanga) (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1992), 1:74.

  28. Chakravarti, Social Dimensions of Early Buddhism, 150.

  29. Thus, from the not giving of property to the needy, poverty became rife, from the growth of poverty, the taking of what was not given increased, from the increase of theft, the use of weapons increased, from the increased use of weapons, the taking of life increased—and from the increase in taking of life, people’s life-span decreased.

  “Cakkavatti-shanda Sutta: The Lion’s Roar on the Turning of the Wheel,” in The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dgha Nikya, trans. Maurice Walshe (Boston: Wisdom, 1995), 399, 400.

  NOTES

  1. Paul Demiéville’s article was initially published as “Le bouddhisme et la guerre: Post-scriptum à l’Histoire des moines guerriers du Japon de Gaston Renondeau,” in Mélanges publiés par l’Institut des Hautes Etudes chinoises (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), 1:347–385.

  2. They are nearly the same as the five yamas, or “abstentions,” of the Yoga stras (II, 30–32), the five vows (vrata) of the Jain layperson (H. von Glasenapp, Der Jainismus [Berlin, 1025], 202), and the Brahmic dharmastras (Baudhayana, II, x, 18; Manu, VI, 92)—but not the Hebraic Decalogue.

  3. Mahprajprmitopadea: Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom (Louvain, 1949), 790.

  4. How else should one explain the case of a Sui Buddhist colonel who, before becoming a monk, was known as Tche-yen? In 621, he carried suspended from the end of his bow a bag with which to filter water, so as to not kill any insects (Siu Kaoseng tchouan, T. 2060, xx, 602b).

  5. Mochizuki, Bukkyo daijiten, 2931 and what follows; see below, n. 31.

  6. Abhidharmakosa-sostra, trans. La Vallée Poussin, ch. IV, 152; cf. my Concile de Lhasa, I, 224n2. Not everyone shares this opi
nion; cf. Abhidharma-mahavibhasa, T. 1545, CXVIII, 617c:

  If this is required by the king, that we commit murder, is murder then a sin? Some say no, for, they say, we are constrained to do it by the other’s strength, not by our own intention. And yet, even in this case, there is the sin of murder; at least we resolve to forgo our own life rather than ever harming that of another: this is the only instance wherein sin is not involved.

  7. Mö-tseu, “Against Aggression”; Tchouang-tseu, ch. X; Pascal, ed. Brunschvicg, v, 293; La Bruyère, ed. Cayrou, XII, 119.

  8. Tchouang-tseu, ch. X, ed. Wieger, 278.

  9. Abhidharmakosa; Mahprajprmitopadea, trans. Lamotte, 794.

  10. We find interesting remarks on prehistory and the universality of the interdiction of killing in the article by G. Bataille, “What Is Universal History?” Critique 111–112 (Aug.–Sept. 1956): 759–761.

  11. V. Y. C. Shih, “Some Chinese Rebel Ideologies,” T’oung Pao 54 (1956), 175. The author makes a huge mistake when he supposes that the explanation of such a doctrine must be sought in Mazdaism or in Manichaeanism and when he adds that “the conception of killing as a way to give another salvation is foreign to every system of thought, and not just to the one of Buddhism.”

  12. In the Vinaya, we see a malevolent divinity (Marakayika devata) breathe to Mrgalan dika the idea that killing those who attempt suicide saves them: “You save those who are not saved” (atinne taresi). This idea is particularly characterized as heretical (mithya-di). Cf. Vinaya Pli, vol. III, 69, trans. I. B. Horner, 118; T. 1421, II, 7c; T. 1462, x, 744c.

  13. The suicide epidemic served as an occasion (nidana) to forbid murder by the Buddha. It had also been caused by an excess of meditation on impurity (asubha-bhavana), followed by an excessive disgust with existence for the bhikus. In most of the Vinaya texts, it is not suicide alone that is condemned. It is murder, be it killing with one’s own hands those who attempt suicide or having them killed by a third party, or even yet counseling them to kill themselves, encouraging them to do it, and giving them the means to do it, etc. (Vinaya Pli, vol. III, 68, trans. I. B. Horner, 123; Dharmaguptaka, T. 1428, ii, 57b–c; etc.). Moreover, the Vinaya of the Mahisasaka (T. 1421, ii, 7b–c) put in the Buddha’s mouth, before forbidding murder, defined as prjika, the interdiction of suicide, defined as sthltyaya. Additionally, in this Vinaya text, monks are not only made to kill by their compatriot Mrgalandika (Migalandika), they kill themselves also. This is seen also in other Vinaya texts.

  14. “In the Vinaya it is said that suicide is not a sin of murder,” declares the Mahprajñprmitopadea, trans. Lamotte, 740–742. I think we need to understand here: “Suicide is not a sin [as serious as the sin] of murder.” Mr. Lamotte thinks that “Buddhism never condemned suicide per se.” In an essay on suicide in his Recherches sur l’histoire du boudisme (Kyoto, 1927), 363, Matsumoto Bunzaburo recalls that upon their arrival in Japan Christian missionaries had caused a sensation by banning suicide. But, suicide was a great honor for the Buddhist samurais. Nevertheless, the missionaries sought to convert them (suicide is still seen in Japan, even nowadays, as an expression of either honor, patriotism, or love). This Japanese professor thinks that it is a question of late departure, contrary to the original spirit of Buddhism. This would be to a certain extent my feeling also. However, a deeper examination of the texts would be necessary—particularly the Vinaya texts—which is a project I have not undertaken here. In Thailand, suicide is explicitly forbidden to Buddhists in a booklet drawn up by the church’s supreme patriarch and published in 1928 with a preface by the king. K. E. Wells, Thai Buddhism (Bangkok, 1939), 210.

  15. On suicide as sthltyaya, see n. 12 above. Cf. Samantapsdik, T. 1462, x, 752c (I do not have the Pli review in front of me): suicide is a duskrta, except in the case of a deathly ill monk who, in order to spare those caring for him unnecessary pain, starves himself and stops taking his medication. He must however be certain that he has reached the end of his long life and that he is in possession of the fruit of the Path, “as if in the palm of his hand.”

  16. The Vinaya of the Mahsakas, T. 1421, n, 8a: A sick monk who has been counseled by his brothers to let himself die in order to avoid further suffering is told that his perfect possession of the la will not result in a lesser rebirth. He retorts that committing suicide which is anyway condemned by the Buddha as a sthltyaya, would prevent him from continuing to cultivate brahmacary; and perhaps he may have a chance to get better, which would allow him to expand his brahmacary. A bit further on in the same text, some laypeople who had been tortured by outlaws and were suffering terribly are counseled by some bhiku. They too refuse to commit suicide, for, they say, the suffering one endures in this world teaches how to cultivate the karma of the Buddhist Path.

  17. A large number of these have been documented by Lamotte in his Treatise, 740n1.

  18. Le dogme et la philosophie du boudisme (Paris, 1930), 48.

  19. Sayutta Nikya, vol. III, 119–124; Samyuktgama, T. 99, XLII, 346b–347b; a slightly different version is in Ekottargama, T. 125, XIX, 642c–643a. Moreover, the Vinayas specify that, in the case of an urging toward suicide, or of the murder of a person desiring suicide, there is prjika even if the “suicide” is released from all desire (vtrga; T. 1428, I, 576c), even if he is la-sampanna or has obtained the fruit of the Path (T. 1421, II, 7c–8a). The only rightful urging that one might make to a person desiring suicide is to think of the Three Jewels without ever stopping until one reaches the natural end of one’s life (T. 1462, x, 752b).

  20. Mahprajñramitopadea, trans. Lamotte, 741.

  21. Bodhicaryvatra, III, 21 (bhaveyam upajvyo ‘ham), VIII, 120, trans. Finot; La marche à la lumière (Paris, 1920), 40, 117.

  22. Ibid., VIII, 103, trans. Finot, 115. Cf. my article “L’esprit de bienfaisance impartiale dans les civilizations de l’Extrême-Orient,” Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge 455 (Aug. 1952): 5.

  23. Abhidharmakoa, trans. La Vallée Poussin, ch. IV, 153.

  24. Ibid., 8.

  25. Ibid., 154.

  26. Definition by Jiun (Shingon sect, 1718–1804) cited by Sato Kenichi in the journal Recherches sur le Zen 10 (June 28, 1929): 76. Cf. Abhi-dharma-mahvibhs, T. 1545, CXVIII, 617a12–617b:

  How can there be a sin of murder when only things exist [dharma: that is to say, the skandha, the dhtu, and the yatana] and when living beings [sattva] do not exist?—There is the sin of murder insofar as we have the notion [samjñ] of a living being, although such a being does not exist. In fact, according to the bhadanta Vasumitra, the skandha-dhtv-yatana can give rise to the notion of the self [tman], to the notion of a living being [sattva], to some notions of life [jva], of a person who was born [jantu], of a person who is fed [posa], of the individual [pudjala], and it can even give rise to the notion of a permanent person, who is happy and pure [along the lines of a Brahmic tman]; and in this sense, there is the sin of murder in destroying them. According to the bhadanta [dharmatrta], the [so-called] living being only exists in a conventional manner [samvti], but the sin of murder exists in an absolute manner [paramrtha]. …—What do we call then “killing a living being”? Is it a question of past, future, or present skandha? Past skandha have already been destroyed [niruddha]; future [skandha] have not yet come [angata]; the present skandha are limitless [sthiti]. We do not see in all this the possibility of murder. Of what, therefore, does murder consist?—It consists of killing future skandha, not the past or even the present ones.—But how does one kill future skandhas, which have not yet come to be?—Murder consists in preventing, while we are in the present, the gathering of future skandha, to obstruct the conditions for the creation of another group of skandha. … —But present skandha are without duration; they self-destruct, without needing to be murdered. In these conditions, what is murder?—Murder consists in cutting short the effectiveness of the skandhas, the effectiveness on the strength of which the present or past skandhas, even though they are limitless and self-destruct, have no less the power to be continu
ed one after another in future skandhas. And, in this sense, there is the sin of murder even regarding present skandhas, insofar as murder prevents them from continuing one after another in future skandhas.

  27. Mahprajñpramitopadea, trans. Lamotte, 864.

  28. Fan-wang king, number ten of forty-eight light precepts, T. 1484, II, 1005c. We might here refer back to J. J. M. de Groot’s translation, Le code du Mahayana en Chine (Amsterdam, 1893), 46 and passim.

  29. Eleventh light precept, ibid., 1005c.

  30. Thirty-third light precept, ibid., 1007b. The Vinaya Pli, vol. IV, 103 (trans. Horner, 374), also forbids monks from watching battles.

  31. This is a variant on the list of the “ways” to kill (prayoga) which we find in the Vinaya of the Small Vehicle.

  32. The first of ten serious precepts, defined as prjika X, ibid., 1004b. Ranked third of the four prjikas in the Vinaya of the Small Vehicle; murder is ranked here number one.

  33. Above, 20 and passim.

  34. Bibliography in M. Eliade, Yoga (Paris, 1936), 304 = Le Yoga (Paris, 1954), 405.

  35. J. Bloch, trans., Les inscriptions d’Asoka, 13th ed. (Paris, 1950), 125.

  36. Lhasa Council, 1:223.

  37. See Paul Demiéville, “La situation religieuse en Chine au temps de Marco Polo,” in Oriente Poliano (Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente).

  38. See, for example, La guerre et les chrétiens, 39th book of La Pierre-qui-Vire, Yonne (1953).

  39. On the organization of military service during the Tang dynasty, see the treatment of E. G. Pulleyblank in his The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), ch. 5.

  40. T. 245–246. Cf. H. W. de Visser, Ancient Buddhism in Japan (Leiden, 1928), 1:116 and passim.

  41. Cf. A. F. Wright, “Fo-t’u-têng,” H.J.A.S. 11 (1948): 325, 339–340.

  42. The date of Fou Yi’s memorial is not clear; there is contradiction among the sources.

  43. Kouang hong-ming tsi, T. 2103, VII, 134a–c; Fa-lin, P’o-sie louen, T. 2109, I, 482a; Kieou T’ang chou, LXXIX, 4b–5a. Cf. Ogasawara Sensh, “Fu I, an Anti-Buddhist in the Tang Dynasty,” Journal of History of Chinese Buddhism 1.3 (Oct. 1937): 84–93; Lhasa Council, 1:223; A. F. Wright, “Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 12.1 (Jan. 1951): 41; J. Gernet, Les aspects économiques du boudhisme dans la societé chinoise du Vème au Xème siècle (Saigon, 1956), 28–29.

 

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