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504-506; Borza 1990, pp. 207-208; Hammond 1994, pp. 30, 120-122; Carney
1987, p. 41; Carney 2000, pp. 62-64; Carney 2006, pp. 12-16; Corvisier 2002, pp.
91-93.
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Chapter I
climax of which was the siege of Olynthus. Athenian indecision,
procrastination and finally inadequate help sealed the fate of the city,
which was stormed and destroyed by Philip in 348. The conquest of
Thrace and Chalcidice allowed Philip to grant generous allotments of land
to his hetairoi and other veterans, which increased the number of
Macedonia’s potential army recruits, and among the beneficiaries ensured
feelings of gratitude to the king. Philip’s and Alexander’s commitment to
founding settlements in freshly conquered land is attested in 4th-century
inscriptions from that area.48
The primary reason Philip II of Macedonia got involved in Greece’s
internal politics was the Third Sacred War, which like all the sacred wars
was fought in defence of the Delphic Shrine of Apollo, to whom Philip
showed particular reverence since the start of his reign. The war’s
outbreak may be seen as an outcome of the political chaos in Greece
towards the end of the first half of the 4th century, when after the death of
the great Theban general Epaminondas at the Battle of Mantinea in 362
none of the contemporary major powers were strong enough to impose full
hegemony. Many Greek states also experienced internal strife ( stasis), in
which foreign powers got involved. This is what affected the tiny polis of
Delphi. In 363 a group of supporters of neighbouring Phocis were expelled
from Delphi on the instigation of Thebes and her allies in the
Amphictionic Council, which was in charge of Apollo’s sanctuary. In 357
the Amphictionic Council passed a motion (probably raised by Delphi and
supported by Thebes and her allies) imposing a heavy fine of 500 talents
on the Phocians, who were charged with farming land belonging to
Apollo, i.e. the Delphic sanctuary. The Phocians did not pay the fine, for
which they were condemned at the next gathering of the Amphictionic
Council in 356. It was then that the Phocian political leaders Philomelus
and Onomarchus, having secured the backing of Sparta, which had also
been burdened with an equally heavy fine for crimes perpetrated against
Thebes, managed to persuade the Phocian League to invade Delphi and
take over her treasures and the sanctuary. Indeed, that was what happened,
as a consequence of which Philomelus’s troops also massacred Locrian
soldiers who had come to defend Delphi. This lawlessness was accepted
by Athens and Sparta, which by de facto supporting the Phocians wanted
to punish Thebes and use the fact the latter would be preoccupied with the
48 Momigliano 1975, p. 132; Kienast 1994, pp. 24-27; Borza 1990, pp. 212-216;
Hammond 1994, pp. 31-40; Spawforth 2007, p. 92. Inscriptions: Syll.3 332, SEG
36.626, 40.542; see Errington 1998.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
23
Delphic conflict to achieve their own political objectives. In October 356
the Amphictionic Council declared war on the Phocians.49
A relatively weak Phocian militia was augmented with mercenaries
hired for money that had been stolen from the Delphic sanctuary. Taking
the Amphityonic Council’s side in this armed conflict were the Boeotian
League, Thessaly and other smaller states which wished to punish the
sacrilegious plunderers. In 355, chiefly supported by Thessaly, Thebes
defeated the Phocians at the Battle of Neon. Erroneously considering this
victory the end of the conflict, Thebes, for Persian money, now sent her
best commander Pammenes and 5,000 hoplites to Asia Minor. Meanwhile
the new Phocian leader Onomarchus raised a new mercenary army and
restarted the war. Philip’s aforementioned victory over the Phocians at the
Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 gave him control of Thessaly, but it, too,
did not end the Sacred War, for there were other Greek states on the
Phocian side. Among them was Athens, where Demosthenes, the leader of
an anti-Macedonian party and one of the greatest orators of Antiquity, was
now rising to prominence. However, Philip’s subsequent victories in
Thrace and on the Chalcidice Peninsula forced Athens to finally try and
secure a status quo through the Peace of Philocrates (thus named after the
head of the Athenian delegation to the King of Macedonia) in 346. Soon
afterwards Philip ended the Sacred War by occupying Phocis without a
battle and accepting the capitulation of the Phocian army from their leader
Phalaikos. The Amphityonic Council ordered the Phocians to disarm and
remain disarmed until they had repaid the last instalment of their
reparations for the plunder of Delphi. Philip, on the other hand, was
rewarded for his services by being granted the Phocians’ seat at the
council. On top of that he was awarded the privilege of having precedence
in consulting the oracle ( promanteia). This prestigious right had
previously belonged to the Athenians, who were now also being punished
for their sacrilege. These were the rewards for thirteen years of building up
Macedonia’s strength which ratified Macedonia’s position of a fully
fledged Greek power. A tangible sign of Philip’s new status was the
emission of gold coins, which historians first date immediately after the
Peace of Philocrates.50
49 Buckler 1989, pp. 5, 9-29.
50 Cawkwell 1978, pp. 62-68, 77-113; Montgomery 1985, pp. 42-44; Buckler
1989, pp. 30-142; Hammond 1994, pp. 45-49, 90-108; Corvisier 2002, pp. 222-
236.
24
Chapter I
5. Philip II and Alexander’s Macedonian army
The dominance Philip II gained over Greece and much of the Balkan
Peninsula followed by Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire would
not have been possible without a powerful army. Philip built his army
virtually ex nihilo and continued building it throughout his reign. The
number of Macedonian soldiers Philip deployed in the 358 pitched battle
against the Illyrians included 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry,51 which,
considering the battle’s significance, must have represented the
Macedonian state’s full military might. When 24 years later Alexander led
12,000 phalangites and 3,500 cavalry into Asia, he left another 12,000
infantry and 1,500 cavalry in Europe. Such a massive rise in numbers over
a time of just one generation was only possible thanks to territorial
expansion and therefore also a population expansion allowing for a larger
number of army recruits. On the other hand, the Macedonian army’s
expansion also reflected Philip II’s revenues, for all these soldiers, be they
Macedonians or mercenaries, had to be paid.
The basic type of military formation in Philip II’s army was the
Macedonian phalanx, which differed quite considerably from the similarly
named Greek phalanx. Diodorus describes how this infantry was formed
as follows: ‘Having strengthened the army units and properly equipped the
soldiers, he constantly organised armed exercises. He also invented a form
been made to interpret this passing comment as referring to the fact that
Philip had his soldiers arm themselves in accordance with his own
stipulations from their own private funds.53 This, however, is an over
interpretation of Diodorus’ text, in which he clearly states that Philip
provided the equipment for his men. In all probability in 359 Philip II
made a breakthrough in military history by deciding that his troops would
be supplied with arms at the state’s expense. This was of course a huge
burden for the royal treasury, but – as later events in his reign showed – it
was one the state was able to bear. This was so especially when we
consider that a thus equipped army resulted in future victories, which in
turn gave the monarch additional revenues in the form of loot, tributes,
slaves (who were always an easily sellable commodity), taxes and various
other assets that could be gained from conquest. In this way Philip was
able to create a fully armed infantry out of all sorts of recruits, be they
even serfs or people simply not rich enough to buy their own hoplite
51 Diod., 16.4.3.
52 Diod., 16.3.1-2 after Philip’s contemporary Ephorus; see Hammond 1994, p. 25.
53 Griffith 1979, pp. 420-421.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
25
panoplia.54 The fact that the king was able to provide armour for each
infantryman meant that the creation of an army was limited only by the
availability of men in the recruiting age, which in populous Macedonia
could be tens of thousands of recruits. By contrast, in a typical polis the
figure would not even be in thousands but more often than not in
hundreds, for the number of adult males usually ranged between 230 and
1250.55
The most basic and famous element of the Macedonian phalangite’s
weaponry, one which distinguished them from the soldiers of other
contemporary formations, was a spear or pike called the sarissa.56 Though
no complete sarissa has survived to this day, accounts from ancient
sources, iconographic images and quite numerous metal remnants of
various types of sarissai have provided considerable information about
this spear. We know that the shaft was made of very hard and elastic
cornel-wood ( cornus mas), which grew in abundance in Macedonia. The
philosopher Theophrastus, who was a contemporary of Philip II and
Alexander and knew Macedonia well, states that the longest sarissai of
that period measured 12 cubits. Unfortunately it is difficult to determine its
precise length in modern measurements as a cubit (the length of a forearm)
could vary between 44 and 52.5 cm. Most historians estimate that the
sarissa in Philip II and Alexander’s day measured between 4.5 and 5.5 m.
According to Polybius, the spear’s length was extended in the Hellenistic
period to approximately 16 cubits (over 6 m), which increased its range
but diminished the Macedonian phalanx’s manoeuvrability.57 The infantry
used three quite different types of sarissa. The lightest version weighed
approximately 3 kg. It was also one of the two shorter versions, measuring
4.5 m, and had a relatively light iron spearhead. The other shorter version
was of the same length, but as well as having a longer spearhead and
ferrule (together measuring c. 0.5 m) it also had a metal spike at the base.
Thus it weighed approximately 5.35 kg. The longer version of sarissa
measured 5.5 m and its wooden shaft was considerably thicker than in the
shorter types so as to reduce its vibrations when in use. The spearhead was
with a ferrule and – as in the other shorter version – the butt end also had a
metal spike. On account of its additional length and thickness it weighed c.
6.2 kg. These measurements have been arrived at on the basis of excavated
metal parts of the sarissa and reconstructions of the spear made by
54 Errington 1990, pp. 238-239; Billows 1994, pp. 13-14.
55 Ruschenbusch 1985.
56 On sarissa mostly after Markle 1982.
57 Thphr., HP, 3.12.2; Plb., 18.29.2. Griffith 1979, p. 421; Mixter 1992; Noguera
Borel 1999.
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Chapter I
archaeologists. There were several reasons why the sarissa was weighted
down by a metal spike at the base. Firstly, it counterweighted the
spearhead and ferrule, thanks to which the phalangite could grasp the spear
further back with 2/3 or even 4/5 of the spear in front of him. Thus the
range of phalangite sarissai was considerably greater than that of the
spears of their opponents. The metal spikes could also be fixed in the
ground when the sarissai were used against cavalry attacks. Finally, if a
sarissa was broken in battle, a phalangite could continue fighting with the
rest of the shaft by using the spear’s pointed butt as a replacement
spearhead.
The phalangite’s weaponry was supplemented with a sword or dagger.
Macedonian swords excavated at Vergine are about 55 cm long and their
shape indicates that they were used for both cutting and thrusting. In battle
the sword was a reserve weapon to be resorted to once the sarissai were
broken and of no further use. The sword was also used when the phalanx
formation was broken as the sarissa, unlike hoplite spears, was not
suitable for man-to-man fighting. Swords were also naturally used when
storming city walls in situations where sarissai were totally ineffective.58
Archaeologists examining an ancient cemetery at Vergine have
uncovered the graves of ordinary Macedonian soldiers who had most
probably served in the phalanx and were buried with elements of their
fighting gear. One of the reasons why these finds are so significant is the
fact that they date from immediately after the reign of Alexander the Great
and therefore provide us with an insight into how soldiers of that time
were equipped, many of whom would have served under Alexander’s
command. The graves contain the spearheads of both sarissai and hoplite
spears, though the latter actually outnumber the former by approximately
three to one. No doubt to a certain extent this reflects proportions in which
both types of weapon were used in Alexander’s army. The phalangites
would have been trained to use both the sarissa and the hoplite type of
spear, just as they would have been taught to use the sword and no doubt
also the javelin. All sorts of weapon were used depending on the situation
and the sarissa was in all probability reserved for pitched battles. The lack
of spearheads of an indisputable sarissa type to be found during the
excavation of Olynthus has even led some scholars to believe that
originally Philip’s phalanx was armed with ordinary hoplite spears and
that the sarissa was introduced only towards the end of his reign.59
58 Markle 1982, pp. 101-102.
59 Markle 1978; Markle 1982, pp. 98-99.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
27
No source actually states that Macedonian phalangites did not wear
abdominal armour, but, on the other hand, nor is such armour mentioned
in any of the major sources. It is not
mentioned either in the inventory of
the Macedonian soldier’s gear inscribed at Amphipolis during the reign of
Philip V or in Polyaenus’ description of how Philip II trained his phalanx:
‘Philip used to train the Macedonians before battles, making them take
their arms and march for 300 stades [54 km] carrying their helmets,
shields, greaves, sarissas, plus – in addition to their arms – a stock of
provisions and all the utensils necessary for daily life.’ It is difficult to
treat the exclusion of such an important item as body armour from both
lists as a mere coincidence and it is therefore fair to assume that in all
probability, with the exception of officers, most 4th- and early 3rd-centrury
phalangites did not wear metal body armour. Some of them at least,
however, are very likely to have worn non metal armour, e.g. linen or
leather corselets.60 Various explanations are given by military historians
for this. Some are of the opinion that this was Philip’s decision reflecting
new trends in Greek armies. Certain sources suggest that after the
Peloponnesian War there was a discernable trend in reducing the amount
of protective armour worn by hoplites, some of whom went into battle in
leather jerkins instead of the heavy and expensive bronze armour. This
could have been a result of hoplites imitating the highly effective peltast
mercenaries, who did not wear armour. It could also simply mean that
people were now being recruited to serve in the phalanx who could not
afford a full set of armour. Another possible reason could have been the
sheer advantage of dispensing with armour that weighed from over a
dozen to 20 kg during long marches. Thus alleviated soldiers had a far
greater ability to surprise the enemy and perform much more flexibly in
the battlefield, for such phalanx could carry out the more complex
manoeuvres; ones for which the armies of Philip and Alexander were
famous. Finally, armour was superfluous when arrows and javelins raining
down on the Macedonian phalanx could be deflected by a dense forest of