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  sarissai. Moreover the greater length of the sarissai meant that Greek

  hoplite spears could not anyhow reach the Macedonian phalangites.61

  These are all very hypothetical arguments, however, especially when even

  sources describing successive battles fought by Alexander tell us that the

  Macedonian phalanx incurred loses in clashes with Greek hoplites.

  Therefore even with their longer sarissai Macedonian phalangites were

  60 Feyel 1935; Polyaen., 4.2.10 in Krentz’ translation. Griffith 1979, pp. 422-423;

  Lush 2007.

  61 Markle 1982, p. 94; Borza 1990, pp. 288-289; Hammond 1994, p. 18-19. On

  deflecting arrows by the dense forest of sarissai: Plb., 18.30.3-4.

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  Chapter I

  not invulnerable. Above all the argument that armour was superfluous is

  countered by the fact that phalangite officers wore it. In accordance with

  the universal custom of that period, officers were recruited from higher

  social groups than ordinary soldiers and therefore they would have been

  able to afford to buy armour if it offered them significant protection during

  battle. This suggests that there may have been non-military reasons for not

  equipping Macedonian phalangites with abdominal armour, which, apart

  from the shield, was the most expensive item of a phalangite’s gear. It is

  therefore plausible that Philip took into account the fact that most

  phalangites could not afford abdominal armour and, what is more, on

  account of the cost of constant wars, nor could his treasury. In other words

  he realised he would have to economise on this particular expenditure.

  Having to decide between a small, at most a couple of thousand-strong,

  hoplite army and a much larger though less well armoured army of

  phalangites, Philip chose the latter. As it turned out, he made the right

  decision.62

  Thus a phalangite’s protective armour was generally limited to the

  helmet and shield. The phalangite’s helmet did not offer as much

  protection as that of the hoplites (among whom the most popular sort was

  of the Corinthian type), but it was lighter to wear and did not limit the field

  of vision so much. Both these factors would have been significant for the

  Macedonian phalanx, which had to be very mobile and flexible. The

  phalangite suspended his shield on a strap around his neck and shoulder as

  he needed to hold his long sarissa with both hands. Moreover, his shield,

  called the telamon, was much smaller than the hoplite aspis shield; the

  former measuring on average 60 cm in diameter as opposed to ca. 90 cm

  in diameter of the aspis. This reduced size meant that the shield would not

  hinder movement when marching in battle formation. Although the

  telamon offered less protection, it allowed the Macedonian phalanx to

  fight in a tighter formation than its Greek equivalent.63

  Even the shortest sarissa was more than twice as long as the hoplite

  spear, which in the 4th century measured approximately 2.1-2.2 m and

  weighed slightly over 1 kg. These two different types of weapon were

  used differently. The hoplite would grip his spear with his right hand more

  or less in the middle and when attacking the enemy he would raise it above

  his head so as to thrust it on the opponent from above. The phalangite, on

  the other hand, need both hands to hold his long sarissa. The best

  description of a phalanx attacking with sarissai is provided by Polybius:

  62 Griffith 1979, pp. 423-424; Billows 1990, p. 31; Billows 1994, pp. 12-13.

  63 Markle 1982, pp. 92-93; Markle 1999; Lendon 2005, pp. 123-124, 417-418.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  29

  ‘That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength, nothing

  can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can be easily

  understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action,

  each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth, and the

  length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but

  has now been adapted to the actual need of fourteen cubits, from which we

  must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length

  of the weighted portion of the pike behind, which serves to keep it

  couched – four cubits in all – it is evident that it must extend ten cubits

  beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it

  with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second,

  third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, but even

  those of the fifth rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in

  the first rank. Of course this is only possible when the phalanx has its

  characteristic close order as regards to both depth and breadth… This

  description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first

  rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a

  distance of two cubits from the next. From this we can easily conceive

  what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is

  sixteen deep. In this case those further back than the fifth rank cannot use

  their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. Therefore they do not

  severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the

  shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation

  from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which,

  passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those in front of and

  behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in

  the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to

  face about.’64

  Written virtually as an addendum to his account of the 197 battle of

  Cynoscephalae, Polybius’ description of a contemporary Macedonian

  phalanx includes many significant characteristics in common with the

  phalanx formation of the last of the great Argeads. The most significant

  feature mentioned is the extension of the sarissai held by five ranks of

  phalangites in front of the first rank. Of course one should not imagine that

  these pikes were held in a stationary position – in all probability each

  phalangite would be manoeuvring and thrusting his weapon in an attempt

  to get at the enemy. With five ranks taking part in the fighting that was

  two ranks more than in the Greek phalanx, and that of course gave the

  Macedonian phalanx a natural advantage. The Macedonian phalanx in

  64 Plb., 18.29-30.

  30

  Chapter I

  Philip II’s time and for most of his son’s reign was most probably eight

  ranks deep. According to the account of Callisthenes, that was, indeed,

  how many ranks there were in Alexander’s phalanx at the Battle of Issus

  in 333.65 The three ranks that did not directly engage in battle formed a

  tactical reserve which could, for instance, turn about if the enemy tried to

  attack the phalanx from behind. Ancient sources testify that various

  manoeuvres were carried out by the phalanxes of Philip II and Alexander:

  the last ranks turning round to face the opposite direction; moving aside to

  let through charging chariots or feigning
a retreat from the battlefield. We

  also know that the Macedonian phalanx was able to fight in both loose and

  tight formations, depending on what the situation required. If we add to

  this the ability of phalangites to expertly use diverse weapons, it becomes

  very apparent that these skills were acquired through persistently long and

  rigorous training. The above-mentioned sources (Diodorus and Polyaenus)

  recount intensive exercises with weapons and 30-stadion marches fully

  armed, with provisions and other necessary equipment. Such training not

  only developed physical strength and endurance, but also made the

  phalanx act as a single unit automatically and reliably able to follow the

  commander’s orders even in the thick of battle. In fact Philip required such

  toughness and staying power not just form the phalangites but from all his

  soldiers. Polyaenus recounts an anecdote about Philip dismissing a

  mercenary officer, Dokimos of Tarentum, for taking a warm bath, which

  apparently even Macedonian women would not do after giving birth to a

  child.66

  Philip’s phalanx comprised large units called taxeis ( taxis in the

  singular), each including approximately 1,500 soldiers. At the start of his

  Asian campaign Alexander had eight such units. During his reign

  particular taxeis were recruited from particular regions. We know of taxeis

  being recruited from the Upper Macedonia regions of Tymphaea, Orestis

  and Lyncestis as well as Elimeia. We do not know if the whole

  Macedonian army was recruited on a territorial basis, but it is certain that

  at the time of his expedition to Asia Alexander respected this rule,

  allocating troops sent on by Antipater to army units recruited from the

  same region. Respecting soldiers’ territorial loyalty was a way of building

  a sense of unity, solidarity and pride in the Macedonian army. Smaller

  military units called lochos comprised 240-256 soldiers. The smallest

  65 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35. Griffith 1979, p. 420.

  66 Cawkwell 1978, p. 34; Manti 1992, pp. 37-38; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171-174; Hanson

  1999, p. 150; Corvisier 2002, pp. 102-105. Polyaen., 4.2.1.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  31

  military unit, called the dekas, in Philip II’s time comprised ten soldiers,

  whereas under Alexander the number was increased to 16.67

  On account of the significant reduction in armour Macedonian

  phalangites could not be categorized like the hoplites of the Greek phalanx

  as a classical heavy infantry. Yet despite this formal dissimilarity, the

  Macedonian phalanx performed exactly the same role in the battlefield as

  the Greek phalanx, only the Macedonian phalangites generally performed

  their task better. One of the significant organisational differences between

  Greek hoplite phalanxes and those of Philip II was the elimination of

  supply trains and a reduction in the number of army servants. In the

  Macedonian army there was a servant to every cavalryman and one

  servant to every ten phalangites, whereas in the Greek army every hoplite

  was usually accompanied by his own servant who actually took no part in

  the fighting. The limited number of servants greatly enhanced the

  Macedonian army’s mobility and logistical capabilities. Unable to rely on

  supply trains and servants to be employed as porters, the phalangites were

  forced to greatly limit the amount of camp equipment they took on

  expeditions. Moreover, given that similar numbers of soldiers were

  involved, the Macedonian army required more or less half as much food as

  a Greek army – regardless of whether they were fighting on behalf of their

  own polis or as mercenaries serving the Persians. Without the supply trains

  the Macedonian army was able to move surprisingly quickly and stay in

  occupied territories for much longer, living, as was the military custom of

  those times, off the enemy’s land, i.e. plundering or commandeering food

  and other property.68

  The Greek armies of the 4th century included elite groups of heavy

  infantry of which the most famous was the so-called Theban Sacred Band,

  founded in 378. This fairly small unit of just 300 hoplites, according to

  ancient sources, comprised specially selected pairs of homosexual lovers.

  In the opinion of Greek military theorists, this guaranteed that each soldier

  would rather get himself killed in battle than show himself up in front of

  his lover as a coward. Apart from the sexual orientation, purely physical

  attributes were also taken into consideration and each such soldier

  underwent thorough infantry and cavalry training so as to make the Sacred

  Band a fully professional unit whose military value could at least be

  compared to that of today’s commando units. They were commanded by

  67 Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4; Diod., 17.57.2; Curt., 4.13.28; Arr., An. , 3.16.11.

  Milns 1976, pp. 89, 103-105; Errington 1990, pp. 242-243; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171-

  172; Sekunda 2007, pp. 330-331.

  68 Fron., Str. , 4.1.6. Garlan 1994, p. 689; Hanson 1999, pp. 149, 174-176; van

  Wees 2000, p. 109; Carney 2006, pp. 67-68.

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  Chapter I

  the very best Theban commanders: Epaminondas, Pelopidas and

  Pammenes. In pitched battles the Sacred Band would be positioned

  opposite the strongest section of the enemy’s frontline. Its task was to

  break through the ranks of this part of the enemy’s phalanx and kill the

  enemy’s leader, at which point the battle was usually victoriously ended.

  There are also known cases of the Sacred Band carrying out military

  operations on its own.69 Historians presume that here too the Theban

  example inspired Philip, who, according to Theopompus, decided to form

  an elite infantry battalion comprising the tallest and strongest

  Macedonians. In Philip’s time they were called the pezhetairoi (‘foot

  companions’) and modelled on the aristocratic cavalry hetairoi

  (‘companions’), which no doubt served to raise the new battalion’s

  prestige and sense of self-esteem. The pezhetairoi served as the royal

  guards and the elite unit must have been created early on because,

  according to Demosthenes, it was already present in 350. Alexander,

  wishing to win over the infantry, extended the prestigious name

  pezhetairoi to refer to the whole phalanx, whereas the elite unit,

  comprising by then most probably 3,000 soldiers, was re-named

  hypaspists. The new name was derived from the word aspis, the hoplite

  shield, which suggests that the hypaspists were armed similarly to the

  hoplites. In the Macedonian army, especially under Alexander, the

  hypaspists were entrusted with performing the most difficult and

  physically demanding tasks such as the capturing of cities or crossing

  mountainous barriers, while in the battle they often covered the exposed

  right flank of the phalanx.70

  The continuous stress on creating a strong Macedonian infantry did not

  mean the Macedonian cavalry was neglected. On the contrary, Philip II

  greatly enlarged and enhanced this part of his army. During his reign the

  number of cavalrymen rose from approximately 600 at the time of his first

  battle in Illyria to 3,500 by the en
d of his reign. These figures only refer to

  the Macedonian cavalry, but from 352 Philip II and Alexander also had at

  their disposal large cavalry units recruited from Thessaly and other

  countries. The Macedonian cavalry comprised two basic formations: the

  hetairoi or Companion cavalry, originating from the traditional aristocracy

  who had formed the core of the Macedonian army before Philip’s rise to

  power, and the prodromoi or Scouts. The hetairoi wore abdominal armour

  69 DeVoto 1992.

  70 Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F348; D., ap. Phot., s.v. pez◊tairoi; EM, s.v.

  pez◊tairoj; Hsch., pezeta∂roij; Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4. Milns 1976, pp. 89-96;

  Griffith 1979, pp. 414-418; Errington 1990, pp. 244-245; Billows 1990, p. 32;

  Ashley 1998, p. 40; Lendon 2005, p. 125; Thomas 2007, pp. 78-79.

  Childhood, Family, Macedonia

  33

  and helmets, and in terms of protective as well as offensive gear they were

  better equipped than most of the opposing cavalries they encountered in

  Philip II and Alexander’s time. The prodromoi, on the other hand, were a

  typical light cavalry. They also had good horses and a high military value

  equivalent to that of the Thessalian cavalry. Thessalian horsemen wore

  less armour than the hetairoi and instead of the sarissa, each rider had two

  javelins and a curved sword. The light cavalry also included contingents

  from Thrace and Paionia.71

  The fact that another verified name for these mounted scouts is

  sarissophoroi allows us to assume that their chief weapon was the sarissa.

  This was also a weapon of the hetairoi. Iconographic sources show that

  unlike the Sarmatian cavalry or Macedonian infantry the Macedonian

  cavalry held the sarissa with just one hand, not both. This was possible

  because the sarissa used by the cavalry, alternatively called the xyston,

  was shorter (4.5 m, and some historians even believe it to have been no

  longer than 3 m) and lighter than its equivalent used in the infantry.

  Another difference in the cavalry version was an iron sleeve in the centre

  of the shaft. Its purpose is not entirely clear and one cannot be certain that