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  via the Greek seaports.22

  The next phase of the war was against the Triballi, who lived on the

  river Lyginos (perhaps Rositsa). The king of the Triballi, surrounded by

  women and children, took shelter on an island called Peuke on the Danube.

  22 Arr., An. , 1.1-2.1; Polyaen., 4.3.11; Diod., 17.8.1-2; It. Alex. , 16. Bosworth 1988, pp. 28-29; Bloedow 1996; Heckel 1997, pp. 189-191; Ashley 1998, pp. 166-169.

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  On account of Arrian’s description of an island with steep banks and fast

  flowing waters, it is unlikely to have been the Peuke Island, known from

  other sources, which is situated where the Danube flows into the Black

  Sea. Perhaps it is as Illiescu presumes an island further west, nearer the

  Iron Gate Gorge. The Triballian army avoided the Macedonians, not

  daring to fight them in the open, and instead returned to areas the

  Macedonians had vacated. Alexander, who always had good reconnaissance,

  realised the Triballian tactic and launched a surprise attack on the enemy

  as it pitched camp in a wooded valley. First the Macedonian archers

  started firing arrows. In response to this the Triballi left the forest to attack

  the archers, but instead they found themselves in a trap. The Macedonian

  cavalry was positioned on both wings of the Macedonian phalanx as well

  as in the centre. The Macedonians fired missiles at the barbarians and then

  moved in for the final kill. The fleeing barbarians lost some 3,000 men,

  whereas the Macedonians reportedly lost only 11 horsemen and 40

  infantrymen. Alexander next marched to the Danube, which he reached

  three days later. There he met up with ships he had ordered to sail to the

  Danube from Byzantium via the Black Sea. This flotilla, however, turned

  out to be too weak to force a landing on the steep banks of the island

  occupied by the barbarians. To make matters worse, in the meantime a

  Getae army of 4,000 horsemen and over 10,000 infantry assembled on the

  opposite bank of the Danube. Alexander would not have been himself if he

  had not interpreted this situation as a challenge to be taken up. It is in

  relating these events that Arrian speaks for the first time of Alexander’s

  uncontrollable longing ( pothos) to cross real and imagined barriers, which

  in this case told him to cross to the other side the Danube despite the facts

  that an enemy army had gathered on the bank and that the Macedonian

  lacked enough vessels to take them there. The latter problem was soon

  dealt with by the confiscation of all local boats and construction of rafts

  out of leather tents stuffed with hay. During the night time crossing,

  perhaps somewhere between today’s town of Svishtov on the south bank

  and Zimnicea on the north side, the Macedonians managed to transport

  1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. The following day Alexander led his

  army against the Getae, who were surprised not only by the achievement

  of the Macedonian engineers but also by the quantity and quality of the

  Macedonian phalanx. The Getae did not withstand the impact of the

  Macedonian cavalry, personally commanded by Alexander, and fled to

  their weakly defended fort situated 5.5 kilometres from the Danube.

  However, when the Macedonians caught up with them, they abandoned

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  their positions and fled into the steppe. Alexander’s army captured their

  city, razed it to the ground and returned to the southern bank.23

  One cannot accept the late Roman Itinerarium Alexandri claim that

  Alexander continued his northern campaign from the Danube along the

  Black Sea coast all the way to the Sea of Azov and on the way back also

  defeated the Dacians, Getae and Maedi.24 There is no trace of this in other

  sources and besides, in the very eventful spring of 335 there would have

  been no time for such a long campaign. Instead there followed a short lull

  in the fighting whilst Alexander concentrated on diplomacy. After

  Alexander’s impressive display of military might in two victorious battles

  the Triballian king sent envoys, no doubt to establish conditions for

  capitulation. These conditions must have included the supplying of

  Alexander with soldiers for Diodorus mentions a Triballian contingent

  among detachments of Odrysians and Illyrians in a 7,000-strong North

  Balkan corps in his army that invaded the Persian Empire in 334. News of

  the Macedonian victories spread far and wide enough for Alexander’s

  camp on the Lower Danube to be also visited by envoys from other

  peoples that had not yet been conquered, including Celts from the North

  Adriatic region. Not knowing the Macedonian king’s future plans but

  seeing the speed and effectiveness of his actions, the Celts preferred to

  diplomatically demonstrate their peaceful disposition and thus avert a

  possible invasion. There is no evidence to suggest that Alexander was

  actually planning such a campaign at the time, so there probably was no

  need for serious negotiations with the Celtic envoys. Alexander must have

  nevertheless been very pleased with himself after such a successful

  campaign for he asked the Celts what they feared most; expecting of

  course that they would say it was him. However, instead they said they

  feared one day the sky would fall on their heads. Despite his obvious

  disappointment with this answer, he nonetheless agreed to an alliance and

  probably did not impose on them the same obligations as on the defeated

  Thracians or Triballi.25

  In the early summer of 335 Alexander’s army left the Danube region

  and marched south to Macedonia. On the way Alexander stopped in the

  land of the Agrianians, ruled by his ally, King Langarus. Return to the

  homeland was temporarily made impossible for news had arrived from

  territories to the northwest of Macedonia of hostile actions by the Illyrian

  ruler Cleitus, the son of Bardylis, whom Philip had defeated in 359.

  23 Arr., An. , 1.2-4; Plu., Alex. , 11.5-6. Iliescu 1990; Hammond 1996, pp. 47-49; Ashley 1998, pp. 169-170.

  24 It. Alex. , 16.

  25 Arr., An. , 1.4.6-8; Str., 7.3.8; Diod., 17.17.4. Alessandri 1997, pp. 131-148.

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  Cleitus was supported by Glaucias, the king of the Illyrian Taulanti tribe

  from the vicinity of Epidamnus, as well as by the Autariatae. This posed a

  threat to Upper Macedonia, especially to Lyncestis. Alexander’s decision

  to conduct a swift counterattack suggests he wished to show he was

  particularly interested in maintaining security in this land, where

  dissatisfaction must have been smouldering ever since less than a year

  earlier he had two members of the country’s former royal family executed.

  Langarus and part of the Agrianian army attacked the Autariatae, the

  weakest tribe in the coalition, ransacked their land and made it impossible

  for them to join Cleitus or Glaucias. Alexander crossed Paionia and

  marched his army along the Erigon (Crna) to reach the Lyncestis fortress

  of Pellion, which was held by Cleitus (the exact geographic location of

  this fortress is unknown). After offering up human sacrifices the

  barbarians went to confront the Macedonians, but soon they w
ere forced to

  retreat to within the walls of their town. The following day the conducting

  of the siege was hampered by the arrival of large detachments of Taulanti.

  Alexander’s relatively small army now found itself between the forces of

  Cleitus and Glaucias, who had been constantly trying hard to trap

  Alexander in mountainous terrain. But able to rely on the excellent

  training of his men the Macedonian king skilfully turned his army around

  and marched it through the mountains occupied by the Taulanti. Surprised

  by this unexpected military manoeuvre the Taulanti did not dare to attack

  the Macedonians. The last element of Alexander’s manoeuvre was to cross

  the river Eordaicus with Macedonian archers and catapults keeping the

  barbarians at a safe distance. Arrian relates that during their retreat the

  Macedonians did not lose a single soldier. In the war, however, Alexander

  did allegedly suffer injuries after being hit by a stone and later receiving a

  blow with a mace. Once Alexander’s army was on the other side of the

  river, the armies of Cleitus and Glaucias were able to unite and form a

  single camp. Convinced that the Macedonians happy to have escaped the

  trap had headed for their homeland, the Illyrians felt so safe that they did

  not bother to fortify their very large camp and even failed to put guards on

  watch. This of course did not escape the notice of Macedonian scouts.

  Alexander was thus aware of the enemy’s carelessness and on the third

  day after his retreat he decided to attack the Illyrians. He personally

  commanded the night time river crossing of the first detachments

  comprising Agrianians, archers, hypaspists and some of his phalangites,

  after whom the rest of the Macedonian army followed. Alexander did not

  wait for all of his army to assemble and instead chose to make full use of

  the element of surprise: he ordered the Agrianians and archers to attack the

  enemy immediately. Suddenly aroused from sleep the Illyrians did not put

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  up much resistance. Many were killed in the camp, whilst others fled for

  their lives abandoning their weapons. Many of those who were not taken

  as slaves were killed during a chase that lasted all the way to the

  mountains where the Taulanti lived. After a short while Cleitus resolved

  not to defend Pellion, so he had it torched and fled to the land of the

  Taulanti.26 The victorious Illyrian campaign could not be continued on

  account of extremely disturbing news from Greece, but this was not an

  empty victory without any political consequences. After their defeat in 335

  the Illyrians did not threaten Macedonia’s border for the rest of his reign.

  There was an Illyrian contingent in the army that crossed the Hellespont

  the following spring, therefore there is also reason to presume that

  Alexander was able impose terms for peace on their rulers in a treaty that

  has not been recorded in historiography. Finally, in the 335 campaign

  Alexander had won a series of victories with very small losses and this

  without a doubt earned him the trust of his army, which at the start of this

  young ruler’s reign had been far from certain.27

  3. The destruction of Thebes

  During Alexander’s war with the Illyrians members of the anti-

  Macedonian faction that had been expelled after the Battle of Chaeronea

  secretly returned to Thebes. They were helped by allies within the city

  who were also hoping to free their country from the imposed treaty with

  Macedonia. Although the sources do not explicitly mention this, the first

  thing the returned exiles and their allies at Thebes must have done was to

  overthrow the city’s pro-Macedonian oligarchy. The exiles also managed

  to lure two Macedonians out of their garrison at the Cadmea and kill them.

  Most probably the following day they appealed to the gathered Theban

  populace to break their treaty with Macedonia. The mood in many Greek

  states at the time was favourable to such ideas. Despite the adroitness with

  which he had forced some and just persuaded others to renew their

  commitment to the universal peace they had originally agreed with his

  father, Alexander was still a new and as yet untried force in Greece.

  Moreover, the mildness with which in the autumn of 336 he had treated

  the states that had tried to renege the Macedonian treaty did not allow

  those states to foresee the consequences if they attempted to go back on

  their word again. In a society that valued age and experience Alexander’s

  26 Arr., An. , 1.5-7; Diod., 17.8.1; Plu., mor. , 327a; It. Alex. , 16. Bosworth 1982, pp.

  65-73; Hammond 1996, pp. 49-58; Pająkowski 2000, pp. 158-164.

  27 Diod., 17.17.4. Bosworth 1988, p. 32; Hammond 1996, pp. 54-58; Ashley 1998,

  pp. 174-175.

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  youth was an opportunity for politicians like Demosthenes to win over

  crowds by calling him a boy. Yet another factor were the covert activities

  of Persian diplomacy. Orators mention vast sums which Demosthenes

  received from Darius III – Demosthenes’ mortal enemy Aeschines

  mentions 70 talents and Dinarchus speaks of as many as 300 talents. One

  cannot assume these sums mentioned in political speeches against

  Demosthenes to be accurate, but there can be no doubt that Persian money

  was handed to anti-Macedonian politicians in order to make diversionary

  actions in Persia’s favour. Allegedly after the capture of Sardis documents

  got into Alexander’s hands listing the amounts of money given to Greek

  politicians by the Persians. We know that some of the money that the

  Persians gave to Demosthenes was passed on to Thebes. In all likelihood

  Demosthenes also used this money to purchase weapons and armour, so

  that all that city’s citizens, even those who did not belong to the hoplite

  class, could fight. As one would expect in a society without mass media,

  Greece most probably learned of events that occurred during North Balkan

  campaign from the spring to the early autumn of 335 from rumours. And

  the rumour was that Alexander, already absent from Macedonia for several

  months, had been wounded or even killed by the Triballi. Demosthenes

  was eager to spread such stories, though he himself would not have

  invented them. From the legal point of view, childless Alexander’s death

  would have automatically terminated the Treaty of Corinth and ended

  Macedonian hegemony.28

  It was in such an atmosphere that the words of the Theban exiles

  would have been well received. Anti-Macedonian politicians in the city

  council presented a plan to wage war on Macedonia to the assembly and it

  was accepted. The first action of this war was to surround the Macedonian

  garrison at the Cadmea citadel with a double palisade thus cutting it off

  from the Macedonian army if and when it came. The Thebans were

  preparing to destroy the garrison but they ran out of time. Meanwhile they

  turned to Athens, Argos, Elis and the states of Arcadia for help. Influenced

  by the anti-Macedonian party and its leader Demosthenes, the Athenians

  resolved to send military reinforcements to Thebes. These troops, however,

&nbs
p; did not manage to set out from Attica to Boeotia before it was too late. It

  was also probably then that emissaries were sent to Darius III who were

  later captured by the Macedonians after the Battle of Issus. It seems the

  Aetolian League and Sparta also considered opposing Alexander militarily.

  28 Din., 1.10, 1.18; Aeschin., 3.239; Diod., 17.8.6; Plu., mor. , 327c-d, 847c; Plu.,

  Dem. , 20.5, 23.1-2; Arr., An. , 1.7; Just., 11.2. Wilcken 1967, pp.70-71; Bosworth 1980, pp. 73-75; Bosworth 1988, pp. 194-195. Rumors in Greece: Lewis 1996, esp.

  pp. 75-96.

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  In Elis there was most probably a coup because of which Macedonia’s

  supporters were forced to leave the state and it was only after Alexander’s

  defeat that they could return. The Arcadian League sent its army to the

  Isthmus and officially stayed neutral for this part of the war until more

  became known. Thus the situation in Greece was developing in a way that

  could lead to another Chaeronean Coalition and, what was worse, this time

  financed by the Great King. Antipater’s diplomatic efforts did stop the

  Peloponnesians from marching north to help the Thebans but Alexander’s

  intervention now became essential.29

  Cutting short his Illyrian campaign, Alexander marched his army

  across the western lands of Upper Macedonia, Eordaia and Elimeia to

  reach Thessaly within seven days. From Thessaly the Macedonians

  marched south through the Thermopylae pass to reach Boeotia six days

  later, in the second half of September 335. This, typically for Alexander,

  very rapid advance generally surprised his enemies because at such a rate

  contemporary communications could only forewarn them of the

  approaching army by a matter of hours, not days. And this is what

  happened this time as well. The Thebans had not only failed to block

  Thermopylae pass, which would have enabled them to stop the invasion

  until the reinforcements arrived, but also only learned of Alexander’s army

  when it had already reached Onchestus in Boeotia. Initially the Thebans

  deluded themselves this was Antipater’s corps or a Macedonian army