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  commanded by Alexander of Lyncestis; they may have still believed King

  Alexander of Macedonia had been killed by barbarians. The following day

  all became clear when a huge Macedonian army of 30,000 infantry and

  3,000 cavalry personally commanded by Alexander started pitching camp

  outside the walls of Thebes. The Macedonian monarch was hoping that the

  mere show of strength would incline the Thebans to start negotiations for

  capitulation. Despite verbal support from various states, above all Athens,

  the Thebans were alone and able to deploy no more than 7,000 hoplites

  from among the citizens plus some armed metoikoi and liberated slaves.

  And as if this situation was not bad enough, the Macedonians were joined

  by the mortal enemies of Thebes, Phocians, Plataeans, Thespians and

  Orchomenians, all eager to avenge the destruction of their towns and other

  wrongs inflicted upon them by Thebans in the past. Their and Thessalian

  presence at Thebes gave Alexander’s intervention semblance of a just war

  waged by the united Greeks against those who breached the Panhellenic

  29 Din., 1.18-21; Diod., 17.8.2-9.1; Plu., Dem. , 23.1-2; Arr., An. , 1.7.4, 1.10.1, 2.15.2; Fron., Str. , 2.11.4; Just., 11.3.9. Bosworth 1980, pp. 233-234; Bosworth

  1988, pp. 194-195; Heckel 1997, pp. 191-192; Habicht 1999, pp. 14-15; Faraguna

  2003, p. 103.

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  103

  treaty of Corinth. Units of Theban cavalry and light infantry first launched

  an attack on the encamped Macedonians which after the initial shock was

  repulsed with ease. Alexander chose to delay his attack and give time for

  the besieged to think. However, among the gathered Thebans voices to

  continue the armed struggle prevailed. Alexander still tried to weaken their

  resolve by announcing that any Theban went over to his side would fully

  benefit from the Greek universal peace. In response the Thebans declared

  that anyone from the enemy camp who wished to fight for Greek freedom

  together with the Thebans and the Great King could come over to their

  side. Plutarch adds that the Thebans replied to Alexander’s demand for the

  handing over of their anti-Macedonian politicians by proposing that in

  return for peace the Macedonians should hand over their highest ranking

  officers Antipater and Philotas.30

  In the war of words the Thebans triumphed. The well aimed ridicule,

  their spiteful mockery of the universal peace and the long preparations for

  the anti-Persian campaign of united Greek states under the Macedonian

  king’s command in defence of Greek freedom touched a raw nerve.

  Alexander was livid but that now also meant that the fate of Thebes was

  sealed. Three days after the exchange of words the preparations for

  storming the city were finished and the fighting began. Basically two

  extant sources relate what followed: the rhetorical and pro-Theban account

  of Diodorus and Arrian’s very concise description based on the account of

  Ptolemy, who was very seriously wounded in the fighting and therefore

  unable to witness the entire battle. It is indeed the brevity of

  Arrian/Ptolemy’s report that arise suspicion, especially when it is

  compared with Arrian’s extensive descriptions of Alexander’s army’s

  much less important manoeuvres during the war in the north a few pages

  earlier. By being so laconic in his description of the battle, Ptolemy gives

  the impression of not wishing to expose all its aspects. For instance, unlike

  other sources, it does not mention the heroism of the Thebans defending

  their homeland against an enemy numerically many times superior. It is

  certain that the most intensive fighting was at the palisade cutting the

  Cadmea off from the main Macedonian forces and that the Theban

  hoplites confronted their enemy outside those walls. Thanks to their

  numerical superiority the Macedonians were able to fight the Thebans in

  the field and simultaneously attack the palisade. The first attack on the

  palisade by a detachment of Ptolemy’s phalangites, archers and Agrianians

  was repulsed, while the numerically inferior but extremely well trained

  30 Diod., 17.9.1-5, 17.11.2; Plu., Alex. , 11.6-8; Arr., An. , 1.7.4-11; Just., 11.3.

  Bosworth 1988, p. 32; Hammond 1996, pp. 58-60; Hamilton 1999, p. 30; Poddighe

  2009, pp. 107-108.

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  Theban hoplites were for a long time able to hold off the Macedonian

  phalanx. Then Alexander ordered a reserve detachment commanded either

  by Perdiccas (according to Diodorus) or Antipater (Polyaenus) to launch a

  direct assault on a part of the city’s fortifications that were left unmanned.

  Bearing in mind the concentration of Theban soldiers around the palisade,

  there would have most certainly been more than one unmanned section of

  the city’s walls, while numerical superiority made it easy for Alexander to

  deploy troops in another section of the front. News of the city’s wall being

  breached was immediately spread by the Macedonians, which provoked

  panic in Theban ranks at the Cadmea. Making use of this confusion the

  trapped Macedonian unit broke out of their garrison and attacked the

  Thebans from behind. The Macedonians gave chase to the Theban soldiers

  now fleeing in disarray to their city. The battle for the city was over and

  instead began the indiscriminate slaughter of defenders and unarmed

  civilians. The only Thebans not to be massacred were the cavalry, which

  had not taken part in the fighting and now managed to escape from the

  captured city.31

  Apart from the Macedonians, Phocians and soldiers from smaller

  Boeotian cities hostile to Thebes participated in the slaughter. 6,000

  Thebans were massacred, but this was a costly victory for the Macedonian

  army, which lost 500 men – much more than had been killed during the

  entire north Balkan campaign. A large difference in losses between the

  defeated and victorious side was typical in ancient warfare for when one

  side fell into disarray the other side could and would kill many with

  impunity. Therefore the relatively large numbers of Macedonians killed

  seems to confirm Diodorus’s version of a lengthy and heroic resistance put

  up by the Thebans. Along with the slaughter, there was looting and rapes.

  Plutarch relates an anecdote about a woman called Timoclea who was

  raped by a captain of the Thracian mercenaries but later managed to kill

  her oppressor. Alexander, who had always had a good understanding for

  what we would today call public relations, ordered the woman to be set

  free, all the more so when it turned out that she was the sister of

  Theagenes, the commander of the Sacred Band who had fallen at

  Chaeronea. Similar mercy was not shown to other Thebans. Alexander did

  not wish to personally pass sentence on this city and left the decision – as

  both Arrian and Diodorus claim – to his Greek allies. On account of the

  lack of available time it is doubtful that he summoned the synedrion of the

  League of Corinth; instead a council was probably held at the Macedonian

  31 Diod., 17.11-12; Arr., An. , 1.8; Plu., Alex. , 11.4-5; Polyaen., 4.3.12. Lane Fox 1973, p. 87; Bosworth 1980, pp. 79-84; Bosworth 198
8, pp. 32-33; Flower 2000, p.

  96.

  The New King

  105

  camp outside Thebes, comprising representatives of neighbouring anti-

  Theban states. The defeated were reminded of their earlier offences,

  especially their collaboration with Persia during the great war of 480-479,

  for which at the time the city was already condemned to be demolished.

  Added to this were additional charges regarding the destruction by Thebes

  of other Greek cities and its current contacts with the Great King. There is

  no doubt that Alexander could have rejected the extreme demands of the

  city’s Phocian and Boeotian enemies just as Sparta had rejected the

  demands of her allies to destroy Athens after the Peloponnesian War.

  However, he chose to accept the decision, as Polybius says, in order to

  strike fear into the hearts of Greeks before his departure for Asia. Formally

  only carrying out the resolution of his allies, Alexander ordered the

  destruction of the whole of Thebes with the exception of the temples, the

  poet Pindar’s house and the Cadmea citadel, where a Macedonian garrison

  remained. With the exception of the priests, people bound by ritualised

  friendship ( xenia) with Macedonians and Macedonia’s political supporters,

  the approximately 30,000 Thebans who survived the slaughter were sold

  as slaves. The sale of such a vast number of slaves could only lower their

  unit price, but for Alexander, who was beset with financial problems, the

  440 talents he in this way received was of great use and perhaps helped

  reduce the debt he had inherited after his father. The rural territories

  belonging to Thebes were divided up among Boeotian poleis allied to

  Alexander. The Macedonian king also had the cities of Orchomenos and

  Plataea, which had been destroyed by Thebes, rebuilt and surrounded with

  defensive walls because these cities were in particular considered to be

  Macedonia’s mainstay in Boeotia.32

  The ruthless destruction of Thebes deeply shocked Greece. The orators

  lamented and Cassander’s proclamation to rebuild Thebes in 316 gained

  him a lot of popularity. Despite a prohibition that was imposed on all allies

  the same day as the sentence on Thebes was passed, Athens and Akraiphia

  accepted refugees from that city. To Greeks the destruction of Thebes was

  a terrible act but one, according to contemporary rules of war, which was

  quite legal and even just. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 334 a

  bronze chandelier looted from Thebes was accepted as an offering from

  Alexander to the temple of Apollo at Cyme. Aeschines argued that the

  destruction of Thebes was just at the Athenian court of law, which would

  32 Clitarch., ap. Ath., 4.148d-f (= FGrH, 137 F1); Plb., 38.2.13; Diod., 17.13.5-

  14.4; Plu., Alex. , 11.10-12.6; Plu., mor. , 259d-260d, 1090c; Arr., An. , 1.8-9; D.

  Chr., 2.33; Ael., VH, 13.7; Plin., Nat., 7.109; Just., 11.3-4. Wilcken 1967, pp. 73-74; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 87-88; Bosworth 1980, pp. 84-91; Bosworth 1988, pp.

  195-196; Hamilton 1999, pp. 30-32; Le Rider 2003, pp. 41-42.

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  indicate that even there many were of this opinion. Rejoicing at Thebe’s

  destruction of the personified Mt. Kithairon in Alexander Romance echoes

  the same opinion albeit shrouded in mythological garb. Besides, there

  were many hypocrites among the Greeks. For instance, for all his

  lamenting over the fate of Thebes, the orator and Alexander’s political

  opponent Hypereides was not discouraged from purchasing a Theban

  female captive for 20 minas, one who later became his mistress.33

  As a political move the destruction of Thebes was a success for

  although it certainly did not earn Alexander the love of the Greeks, it did

  force them to respect him. Just like Philip’s destruction of Olynthus, so too

  Alexander’s destruction of Thebes served as a fierce reminder to the

  Greeks, ensuring peace and pro-Macedonian order during his Asian

  campaign. Meanwhile a hasty delegation of noted pro-Macedonian

  politicians from Athens instantly arrived to congratulate Alexander on his

  victories over the Triballi and Illyrians as well as his quelling of the

  Theban uprising, even though Athens had actually actively encouraged it.

  In response the Macedonian king demanded the handing over of prominent

  anti-Macedonian politicians and generals on the charge of being

  responsible for Chaeronea, hostility to Philip and himself as well as

  inciting Thebes to rise. They were to be judged by the synedrion of the

  League of Corinth. The sources give several versions of this list of

  Macedonia’s enemies but all of them include the names of Demosthenes,

  Lycurgus, Polyeuctus and the general Charidemus. The fate of Thebes

  made it obvious that Alexander’s demands had to be treated with the

  utmost seriousness and so a heated debate ensued in Athens. Phocion

  advised those mentioned on the list to selflessly take their lives for the

  sake of their motherland and so that the city of Athens could be spared.

  Demosthenes, as could well be expected, was of the opposite opinion and

  likened the idea to sheep handing over their sheepdogs to the wolves. But,

  like Philip sometime before him, Alexander was not looking for a

  showdown with Athens and his heavy demands should be regarded more

  as a bargaining tool to pacify Greece as fast as possible at a very small

  cost to Macedonia. To that, waging war on Athens would have undercut

  the Panhellenic stance of Alexander on the eve of the expedition to Persia.

  Thus ultimately the pro-Macedonian orator Demades, allegedly for five

  33 Orators: Aeschin., 3.133; Din., 1, passim. Other reference to public opinion:

  Diod., 19.54.2; Plin., Nat. , 34.14; Arr., An. , 1.9; Plu., Alex. , 13; Idomeneus, ap.

  Ath., 13.58 (= FGrH, 338 F14); Plu., mor. , 849d ; Ps.-Callisth., 1.46a. Exiles: Diod., 17.14.3; Plu., Alex. , 13.1; Paus., 9.23.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 196; Heckel

  1997, p. 193; Flower 2000, p. 97; Nawotka 2003a, p. 30; Faraguna 2003, pp. 103-

  104; Poddighe 2009, p. 108.

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  107

  talents given to him by politicians on Alexander’s list, helped negotiate a

  compromise in which the accused would only be punished if their guilt

  was proved according to Athenian law. Only Charidemus was forced to

  leave Athens, and he headed for Darius III’s court. The whole incident

  changed Athenian politics for a long time. Politicians of the anti-

  Macedonian camp realised erstwhile efforts to start a military conflict with

  a powerful Macedonia had been ill-conceived and could only result in a

  catastrophic defeat. Thus while Alexander lived, Athens maintained a cold

  peace with Macedonia. Instead the Athenians concentrated on building up

  their finances and arming themselves for a confrontation with Macedonia

  at a later stage.34

  If Athens with her powerful fleet and legendary defensive walls was

  suing for peace with Macedonia, smaller Greek states must have been

  doing the same with even greater anxiety. Arcadia recalled its troops from

  the Isthmus and threatened to punish with death anyone inciting actions

  against Macedonia. Expelled supporters of Macedonia now returned t
o

  Elis. Requests for forgiveness were also sent to Alexander by the Aetolian

  tribes, which was tacit signal that the Aetolian League, disliked by

  Macedonia, no longer existed.35

  The situation in Greece was now under control and the Macedonian

  army could return north. The Greek uprising had caused the campaign

  against Persia to be delayed by another year, but at least Alexander’s

  soldiers could return home in the autumn (October) in time for the Zeus of

  Olympus feast, which was celebrated over nine days in Dion. Apart from

  sacrifices, the festivities included dramas and competitions. Diodorus

  describes a lavish banquet arranged by Alexander for friends, officers and

  ambassadors which was held in a tent capable of fitting a hundred

  banqueting couches. The army was rewarded with the meat of the

  sacrificial beasts. It also must have been in the autumn of 335 that

  Alexander reputedly received special advice from two of his most

  important officers, Antipater and Parmenion. Both men suggested that

  before his departure for Asia Alexander should marry and conceive an heir

  to the throne. Bearing in mind that this king had the habit of personally

  leading his army into battle and that after the purges of 336-335 their were

  no other Argead claimants to the Macedonian throne, there is every reason

  to accept that Alexander’s advisers were right to express such concern

  34 Aeschin., 3.161; Diod., 17.15; Plu., Dem. , 23.3-5; Plu., Phoc. , 17; Arr., An. , 1.10; Just., 11.4; Suda, s.v. 'Ant∂patroj. Bosworth 1988, pp. 196-197; O’Brien 1992, p.

  54; Rubinsohn 1997, pp. 117-118; Habicht 1999, pp. 15-18; Flower 2000, p. 97;

  Brun 2000, pp. 74-77; Heckel 2009, p. 29.

  35 Arr., An, , 1.10.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 196.

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  over the state’s future. However, there is another aspect to this story in that

  both Parmenion and Antipater had unmarried daughters – historians

  believe there were five in all. If Alexander were to marry one of these

  daughters, the bride’s father would naturally guarantee for himself great