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The crossing of the Hellespont commenced only after Alexander’s
return from Elaius. The passage was between Sestus and Abydos, which
had clearly remained under Macedonian control ever since the expedition
in the spring of 336. The great operation of moving the army across the
Hellespont was entrusted to Parmenion, the most experienced of the
Macedonian commanders, who had at his disposal 160 warships and an
unspecified number of merchant vessels. Even if the strait was no more
than 1.5 km wide, the transporting of 40,000 troops as well as many herds
of horses and wagons must have taken some time. Even before the ships
started sailing Alexander ordered alters to be raised for Zeus, Athena and
Heracles, and exactly the same was next done on the Asian side.
Alexander sailed with part of the fleet (of 60 ships according to Diodorus)
personally steering the flagship. Halfway across the Hellespont he
10 Arr., An. , 1.11.5. The story of Protesilaos: Paus., 4.2.7 (after the Kypria).
Instinsky 1949, pp. 9-22; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 130-134; Flower 2000, pp. 108-109;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 108-109.
From Abydus to Alexandria
115
sacrificed a bull and a liquid offering poured out of a gold bowl to
Poseidon and to the Nereids. Naturally the offerings to the sea god and
nymphs were to ensure a successful crossing of the Macedonian army, but
their form and location also corresponded to what Herodotus had written
about Xerxes’ sacrifices to the Sun on the day his army crossed over to
Europe. Again this was an allusion to the Persian wars at the start of the
fifth century and to the revenge which at that time was the main theme of
Alexander’s expedition.11 The sources do not explain why at that time the
far mightier Persian fleet was not mobilised to attack the Macedonians
crossing the Hellespont and thus thwart the entire invasion. P. Briant
assumes that at the time Darius III’s attention could have been focused on
quelling Khababash’s revolt in Egypt and some disturbances in Babylon.12
The place where the fleet landed was called the Harbour of Achaeans
in memory of the landing of the Greek force bound for Troy. The first
member of the Macedonian expeditionary force to set foot on Asian land
was Alexander himself. By doing so he was following in the footsteps of
Protesilaos. Legend stated that Achilles had hesitated and did not land first
because he knew that the first Greek to do set foot on Asian soil would die
there. Thus Alexander was once again referring to the symbolism of the
Trojan War and at the same time rivalling Achilles – for us a mythical
figure but for Alexander his real ancestor. The epic landing in Asia was
preceded by the thrusting of a spear into its soil – a gesture whose
historical veracity there is no need to doubt. Even if Arrian does not
mention it, most of the other sources do. Moreover, it is not only perfectly
consistent with the logic of Alexander’s actions but also provides
justification for his successors, the diadochi. According to both Greek and
Persian custom one of legitimate ways of getting possession of a country
was to wrest it from an enemy by force, and in the political terminology of
the day such territory was called ‘land captured with the spear’ ( doriktetos
chora). Therefore with this gesture Alexander was stating his intention to
conquer all or part of Asia and not to just plunder enemy land. It is in
reference to this that Plutarch sums up Alexander’s achievements: ‘For he
did not overrun Asia like a robber nor was he minded to tear and rend it, as
if it were booty and plunder bestowed by unexpected good fortune, after
the manner in which Hannibal later descended upon Italy, or as earlier
Teres descended upon Ionia and the Scythians upon Media.’ This was a
significant addition to the so far declared character of the expedition as
Panhellenic war of vengeance. Just as the earlier aspect of the mission had
been stressed for the benefit of the Greeks, so this new aspect was now
11 Diod., 17.16.2; Arr., An. , 1.11.6-7; Just., 11.5. Instinsky 1949, pp. 41-53.
12 Briant 2003, pp. 67-70.
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expressed more for the benefit of the Macedonian members of the
expedition. Later, Alexander’s companions, the diadochi, would claim
their right to govern parts of his empire using the argument that the land
had been conquered with the spear, and no one questioned the legitimacy
of this line of reasoning.13
After this ceremony and after sacrifices being made to Zeus, Athena
and Heracles, Alexander and his retinue headed for Troy. In 480 it had
also been visited by Xerxes, who sacrificed there a thousand oxen to the
goddess Athena. In 334 this was a small town basking in the glory of the
epic war, the ‘genuine’ or more likely fake relics of which were
enthusiastically shown to tourists. The inhabitants asked the distinguished
guest Alexander if he would like to see Paris’s lyre (whose name was also
Alexander), to which the king sarcastically replied either that he already
had it or that he would willingly listen the Achilles’ lyre, ‘the sound of
which, “singing of the fame of men”, relaxed him’. The inhabitants of
Troy did not realise that Alexander had come for a more serious purpose
than just sightseeing. Still at the start of his expedition, Alexander wished
to fulfil all the religious obligations and once again emphasise the
campaign’s pan-Hellenic character. Rulers and military commanders
frequently offered up sacrifices at Troy as this was the last (or first,
depending on where to the army was bound) Asian sanctuary on the route
to Europe, a continent which can indeed be seen from there. Alexander
visited the graves of the heroes in the town, honouring the memory of his
ancestor Achilles, another of Greek champions, Ajax, as well as of Priam.
The offering given to Priam was to avert his anger from Alexander as on
his mother’s side the Macedonian was a descendent of Neoptolemus, the
one who had murdered the old king after the fall of Troy. At Achilles’
grave Alexander expressed envy that the Greek champion had had Homer
to praise his deeds. Later literary tradition has Alexander laying a wreath
on the grave of Achilles, and Hephaestion laying a wreath on the grave of
Patroclus, thus drawing an obvious parallel between the mythical friends
and Alexander and his closest companion. At the temple of Athena
Alexander left his panoplia as a votive offering to the goddess and in
return took some armour that had allegedly been kept there since the
Trojan War. These valuable mementos Alexander had carried before him
into battle. Thus Athena, the guardian of the Greeks at Troy, became the
13 Diod., 17.17.2; Just., 11.5; It. Alex. , 18; Plu., mor. , 330d; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.
Wilcken 1967, p. 83; Instinsky 1949, pp. 23, 31-38; Schmitthenner 1969, pp. 32-38;
Green 1974, p. 166-167; Briant 1980, p. 40; Briant 1993, p. 13; Mehl 1980;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 38-39; Flower 2000, pp. 119-120. Historicity of this event put
in doubt by Zahrnt 1996; contra Seibert 1998, pp. 56-57.
117
deity leading Alexander against his enemies.14 Strabo erroneously dates
Alexander’s visit to Troy after the Battle at Granicus. He states that the
Macedonian king returned to Troy the status of a city and exempted it
from the obligation of paying tributes. Later, in a letter sent to Troy,
Alexander was to have promised to convert it into a great city. The
expansion of Troy was actually achieved through synoikism by
Lysimachus after Alexander’s death.15 The Macedonian king’s stay at
Troy in all likelihood was not limited to a few hours only as while he was
there some of the region’s notables visited him. Arrian names one of them:
Chares, an Athenian commander of mercenaries who had been granted
property at Sigeion by Artaxerxes III. He was one of the numerous lords of
the Troad, some of whom decided to side with Alexander.16 The sources
remain silent as to the impact Alexander’s Trojan visit had on Greek
public opinion but it certainly raised the city’s status in the Hellenistic era.
Still in the 4th century Troy became the centre of a confederation of Troad
cities, focused on the Sanctuary of Athena Ilias. Soon also Hellenistic
rulers – Alexander’s companions and their successors – funded the raising
monumental edifices there.17
Once the entire Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont,
Alexander joined his soldiers at Arisbe, whence the army marched briskly
east towards Daskyleion, the capital of the Hellespontine Phrygia. On the
first day the Macedonians reached Percote (today Urumbey) on the
Hellespont. On the second day they bypassed Lampsacus and camped by
the river Practius, which flowed into the Marmara Sea. The following day
Alexander’s army reached Hermotus, this time circumventing the city of
Colonae but accepting the surrender of the town of Priapus, where a
Macedonian garrison was left. The examples of Lampsacus and Colonae
show that Alexander was deliberately avoiding large cities that had no yet
declared their allegiance. His priority was clearly to find a quick solution
on the battlefield. Thus by merely posing a threat, Alexander wished to
lure the satrap Arsites out into open territory and in a pitched battle score a
major victory at the very start of his campaign. Of the two roads from
Lampsacus to Granicus, Alexander’s army would have probably chosen
the easier route to the north of the marshy lake Ece Göl, then across a plain
14 Diod., 17.17.2-3, 17.17.6-18.1; Plu., Alex. , 15.7-9; Plu., mor. , 331d-e; Arr., An. , 1.11.7-8, 1.22.2; Ael., VH, 9.38, 12.7; Just., 11.5; It. Alex. , 18. Bosworth 1988, p.
39; Stewart 1993, pp. 83, 249, n. 62; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 144-145; Erskine 2001, pp.
105-106, 226-234.
15 Str., 13.1.26. Debord 1999, pp. 427-429.
16 Arr., An. , 1.21.1. Hornblower 1994, p. 220.
17 Erskine 2001, pp. 230-234.
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already marching in battle formation. Modern scholars in general claim the
two armies clashed in May. Considering the facts that Alexander’s army
had left Macedonia in early spring (March) and that it generally advanced
rapidly, the Battle of Granicus must have occurred in early May. E.
Grzybek, who has radically revised the dates of battles in Alexander’s time,
has calculated that the Battle of Granicus took place on 8th April 334. This,
however, seems improbable if we consider that the army would have left
Macedonia at the start of spring and therefore in late March.18
The Persian authorities would have known of Alexander’s expedition
for some time, perhaps as early as the moment it left Macedonia. However,
this time, unlike in 336-335, the Great King did not nominate a general to
conduct the defensive war and instead entrusted the task to the region’s
satraps just as if this was merely a local conflict. The reason for this was
most probably a simple underestimation of the danger: Alexander had yet
to prove himself abroad as a commander and the previous Macedonian
expeditionary force had been easily defeated by barely 5,000 Greek
mercenaries, even if commanded by the brilliant general Memnon of
Rhodes. Darius’ contempt of Alexander may be reflected in the former’s
spurious letter quoted in the Alexander Romance in which Darius
addresses Alexander as a spoiled child and has his ambassadors deliver
him toys. On the ground meantime the Persian army assembled to the east
of the river Granicus, thus blocking the road to Zeleia. Its strongest
formation was the cavalry, comprising over 10,000 men, as stated by
Diodorus, rather than 20,000 as Arrian claims. The army’s composition
included Iranian military settlers from the western satrapies, contingents
from Paphlagonia, Hyrcania and Cilicia as well as detachments
commanded by nobles from satrapies in Asia Minor. Arrian claims that
there were approximately 20,000 mercenaries on the Persian side, but that
is highly unlikely as such large mercenary armies were raised only very
occasionally after a long period of preparation and under the personal
command of the Great King. It is clear that no such preparations had been
made prior to the Battle of Granicus and therefore we should accept that
only a small fraction of those 20,000 troops were mercenaries, whereas the
vast majority were local detachments of little military value. Diodorus’
claim that the Persians had 100,000 infantry and Justin’s estimate that the
entire Persian army numbered 600,000 men obviously belong to the realm
of fantasy. There can be no doubt that the Persians had a far weaker
infantry than the Macedonians but that their cavalry was numerically
superior. Before the battle the Persian commanders held a council at Zeleia
18 Arr., An. , 1.12.6-13.1. Foss 1973, pp. 495-496; Higgins 1980, p.132; Seibert
1985, pp. 30-32; Harl 1997, p. 313; Grzybek 1990, pp. 61-66.
From Abydus to Alexandria
119
presided over by the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Arsites, who was
also the overall commander of the Persian army by right of the fact that the
enemy was on his territory. As an experienced commander who knew this
particular enemy well Memnon was also invited to join, but not, as was
erroneously for a long time believed, as the commander of Greek
mercenaries. Memnon arrived at Granicus at the head of cavalry
detachment he had mustered, like other aristocrats, on his own estate. This
is certain because in their accounts of the battle our sources clearly report
him commanding such a cavalry unit. Although Memnon was undoubtedly
the best possible commander of infantry, the Greek mercenaries at
Granicus were commanded by a Persian called Omares.19
During this conference Memnon pointed to the disproportionate
strength of the Macedonian infantry when compared with the Persian
infantry and the fact that the enemy was personally commanded by King
Alexander whereas the Persians had no royal commander. For these
reasons he suggested that the Persian army should avoid battles and
instead retreat, employing a policy of destroying food and fodder for
horses on the way and eve
n destroying towns. Next he suggested that the
war should be moved into Europe. Such advice indicates not only a sober
appraisal of the military might of the opposing forces but also good
intelligence on the enemy’s provisions for men and horses. According to
the calculations of D.W. Engels, a pioneer of research into ancient
logistics, the transporting of one day’s provisions (food and fodder) for the
Macedonian army required the employment 1,100 pack animals. In
Antiquity the transporting of an army’s provisions was possible for more
or less ten days. Afterwards provisions had to be replenished, either by
ship or by living off the enemy’s land. Of course there is no way of
knowing how Memnon’s suggested tactics would have worked, but at that
time of year, before the harvest, when food was difficult to come by,
especially for such a large army, there is good reason to believe that this
scorched earth policy would have considerably hindered Alexander’s
actions and at least delayed the first really decisive battle, in the meantime
compelling him do disperse his army into foraging parties. Memnon’s
advice, however, was rejected by Arsites, who declared that he would not
allow a single house to be burnt down in his satrapy. Other Persians
19 Diod., 17.18.2, 17.19.4-5; Arr., An. , 1.12.8-10, 1.15.2, 1.16.3; Just., 11.6; Ps.-
Callisth., 1.36. Badian 1977, p. 283; McCoy 1989, pp. 414-417; Briant 1996, pp.
718, 840-841; Debord 1999, p. 430; Heckel 2006, pp. 162, 183; Sabin 2007, pp.
130-131; Heckel 2009, pp. 29-30. Erroneous opinion of Memnon commanding
mercenary soldiers is popular even today: Worthington 2004, p. 54; Matthews
2008, passim.
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supported this view, declaring (according to Diodorus) that Memnon’s
decision was below their dignity or (according to Arrian) quietly
suspecting that Memnon wished to prolong the war and thus be nominated
overall commander by Darius III. One has to note that Alexander and his
army also helped Memnon’s credibility to be undermined by sparing his