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meant a right to plunder and the selling of captives as slaves. But this

  war’s official mission was Panhellenic revenge for Persian crimes against

  the Greeks and in this context no other city, except for perhaps Athens,

  was more ideologically symbolic than Miletus. This city had led the Ionian

  37 Arr., An. , 1.18-19 (principal source); Diod., 17.22.1. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 131-

  133.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  137

  revolt of 499 and six years later it was captured by the Persians, destroyed

  and its people deported to Asia. A repetition of the Theban solution here

  could have led the Greek public to draw on very obvious parallels with the

  actions of the maligned Xerxes. Alexander therefore had no option but to

  forgive Miletus for taking the wrong side in the war. A visible sign of the

  grace of the new ruler was his acceptance of the title, though not the

  responsibilities, of Stephanephoros, the eponymous official in Miletus,

  who gave the name to a year.38

  Despite the important role it had played in the siege, Alexander

  decided to disband his fleet after the capture of Miletus. This surprising

  and controversial decision Alexander justified by the fact that his ships

  would be unable to compete out at sea with the much stronger Persians

  and that he could defeat the enemy fleet by capturing the seaports of Asia

  Minor with his land forces. This was a risky assumption as it is difficult to

  imagine how Alexander’s army could have held all the important centres

  along the coastline. Indeed, a year later Alexander saw it fit to start

  rebuilding his fleet. Nevertheless, capturing the seaports could

  significantly hinder the Persian fleet as ancient ships needed to moor next

  to the land at night for the oarsmen to rest and were unable to carry large

  supplies of food and water. Therefore their effective fighting range did not

  exceed 30 nautical miles from their bases. However, the real reason for

  disbanding the fleet was no doubt the lack of financial resources, a

  problem which is indeed mentioned in the sources. Even the relatively

  small number of 160 ships with approximately 32,000 sailors and oarsmen

  would have probably cost Alexander 160 talents at month, for it was the

  royal treasury that had to cover these costs rather than the cities that

  actually provided the ships. Up to that point ancient authors do not record

  any really significant amounts of captured booty. It has been estimated that

  the keeping of the army and fleet cost Alexander 450 talents a month,

  which greatly exceeded the funds he had at his disposal. That is most

  probably why Alexander decided to take only enough ships to transport his

  men and equipment, whereas the Athenian contingent no doubt served

  primarily as guarantee of Athen’s loyalty.39

  38 Arr., An. , 1.19; Diod., 17.22; Plu., Alex. , 17.2; Milet i.3.122.ii.81. Bosworth 1980, p. 141, Bosworth 1988, p. 250; Romane 1994; Graeve 2000.

  39 Arr., An. , 1.20.1; Diod., 17.22.5. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 134, 143; Bosworth 1980,

  pp. 141-143; Bosworth 1988, p. 47; Badian 1985, p. 428; Romane 1994, p. 69;

  Briant 1996, p. 845; Ashley 1998, pp. 91-92; Le Rider 2003, pp. 103-108, 115-117.

  138

  Chapter IV

  3. From Halicarnassus to Cilicia:

  the campaign in Asia Minor

  The capture of Miletus did not end Persian resistance on the south-western

  coast of Asia Minor. The most important Persian fortress in the region was

  Halicarnassus, which Alexander could not leave to the rear of his army for

  fear of it becoming the base for a counteroffensive in Ionia. Here Memnon

  managed to raise a large army of mercenaries, no doubt partly composed

  of garrison detachments that had escaped from other cities in Ionia and

  Aeolis. Additional help could also be provided by the crews of Persian

  ships. Control of the seaport also meant that the fortress had a constant

  supply of provisions. Memnon’s tactic was in all likelihood to try and

  wear out Alexander’s army in a hard, protracted siege so that later, with

  Halicarnassus still in Persian hands, the Asia Minor counteroffensive

  could be launched. Although the city had existed since the start of the 9th

  century, the Halicarnassus the Macedonians saw in 334 was really the

  creation of Maussolus, who in 370 moved his capital there from Mylasa.

  Maussolus greatly increased the city’s size by populating it with the

  inhabitants of neighbouring towns that had been incorporated into

  Halicarnassus through synoikism. One of the reasons why Maussolus

  transferred his capital to Halicarnassus was the desire to have greater

  control over the Greek seacoast and island states, something which the

  inland Mylasa could not provide. The city’s most important feature was its

  defensibility. It overlooked the bay and Maussolus had over 5 km of

  massive walls built for its protection. Citadels were built at the end of the

  two peninsulas on both sides of bay: the one on Zephyros rock was also

  the satrap’s palace, whereas the other on the Salmakis peninsula was

  simply a military stronghold. There were jetties extending from both

  peninsulas that further narrowed the entrance into the bay and made the

  city easier to defend from the sea, though this was not that significant in

  334 as the Persian fleet dominated the sea anyway. Whilst waiting for

  Alexander’s army to arrive, Memnon carefully strengthened weak points

  in the city’s fortifications. Before the fighting began he also sent his

  family to Darius’s court, ostensibly on his own initiative to ensure their

  safety, but more likely than not this was the Great King’s guarantee that

  his Greek commander would remain loyal.40

  The Macedonian army reached Halicarnassus by the end of summer or

  in early autumn, having occupied on the way the coastal cities of Caria.

  40 Ar., An. , 1.20.2-3; Diod., 17.23.4-6; Vitr., 2.8.10-11. Bean, Cook 1955; Ruzicka

  1992, pp. 34, 137-138; Debord 1999, pp. 303, 375-376, 385-386.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  139

  We may assume that at least Iasus went over to Alexander’s side of its

  own accord for Gorgus, a prominent citizen of that city, remained in

  Alexander’s circle for years and in the Macedonian command reached the

  important post of hoplophylax (warden or arms).41 Correctly expecting

  Halicarnassus to put up a stiff resistance, Alexander had his army pitch

  camp 5 stades (900 m) from the city’s walls. Immediately on the first day

  the Macedonians attacked the fortifications, to which the defenders

  responded with a sally from the Mylasa gate. Both the attacks were

  unsuccessful but a certain pattern in the fighting already emerged.

  Halicarnassus could not be taken without siege engines and until those

  arrived, the only option was to impose a blockade. In the meantime

  Alexander tried to capture Myndus situated on the eastern edge of the

  Bodrum peninsula. Apparently someone had promised to secretly open the

  gate, but the night-time attack failed. The collaborator had either changed

  his mind or been discovered. The defenders put up a stiff resistance and

  were supported by soldiers shipped over from Halicarnassus 16 km away.

&
nbsp; It turned out that without siege engines and ladders, which the

  Macedonians had also failed to take, the town could not be taken.

  Alexander ordered a retreat to the camp outside Halicarnassus.42

  However, even before the siege began in earnest Alexander did have a

  significant political success. He was offered the support of Maussolus’

  sister Ada (I), who had ruled Caria in the years 344/43 – 341/40. Persians

  only recognised as satraps the male members of the Hecatomnid dynasty.

  That is why Artaxerxes III did not intervene when control of Caria was

  wrested from Ada by her brother Pixodarus, the same one who in 337 had

  tried to become Philip II’s ally by offering the hand of his daughter Ada (II)

  to Arrhidaeus in marriage. After Pixodarus’ death Darius nominated Ada’s

  (II) eventual Iranian husband Orontobates to be the next satrap.

  Meanwhile Maussolus’ sister had to make do with just the fortress at

  Alinda (later renamed Alexandria ad Latmum). With the arrival of the

  Macedonian army in Caria Ada sensed the opportunity. She surrendered

  Alinda to Alexander and offered to recognise him as her son. This was in

  accordance with a Near Eastern tradition of extending paternal or maternal

  terminology to include people beyond the biological family if it served the

  legitimisation of rule over conquered territories. Ada’s support could

  prove to be of key importance in also gaining the support of the Carian

  people whilst their satrap Orontobates was at war with the Macedonians.

  Alexander therefore accepted the Carian princess’s kind offer. He left her

  41 Ephippus, FGrH, 126 F5. Heisserer 1980, pp. 169-203; Debord 1999, pp. 146-

  148.

  42 Arr., An. , 1.20.4-7.

  140

  Chapter IV

  in control of Alinda and after the capture of Halicarnasus nominated her

  satrap of Caria, though he gave actual command of the regional army to

  the Macedonian Ptolemaios. This division of power formed a certain

  pattern that was also visible in Alexander’s later nominations. Whilst

  giving military control to Macedonians, Alexander entrusted civilian

  control to oriental rulers who knew local conditions, customs and the ins

  and outs of the Achaemenid administration. According to an anecdote

  passed on by Plutarch, Ada took up her new maternal role in all

  seriousness. Every day she sent Alexander treats and offer him the services

  of the very best bakers and cooks. According to this tale Alexander

  naturally declined these offers, putting physical exertion always above the

  delights of the table.43

  Alexander continued a military technique practiced under Philip II

  whereby siege engines were first dismantled, transported in component

  parts – usually by sea – and within a relatively short space of time

  reassembled just outside the besieged city’s walls. The Macedonians were

  fortunate in that the Persian fleet failed to capture their shipment of siege

  engine parts. After Halicarnassus the same siege engines were also used at

  Tyre and Gaza. They belonged to a new generation of machinery that had

  been constructed with the benefit of experience gained from the great

  sieges at the end of Philip II’s reign. Their chief constructor was Diades –

  the apprentice and from 334 successor of Philip II’s master engineer,

  Polyeidus of Thessaly. 44 Among his inventions was a drill called the

  trypanon, which had a roof to protect it against missiles cast down by the

  defenders as it was brought up against a city wall. Wall fragments could

  also be dislodged with the korax or ‘raven’. One of the most difficult and

  refined of the available technical constructions was the mobile siege

  tower.45

  Once the machines were reassembled a series of attacks on the city

  commenced. The accounts of these attacks given by Arrian and Diodorus

  differ from each other substantially. As with his description of the siege of

  Miletus, Arrian considerably downplays the difficulties Alexander must

  have encountered and gives the impression that the siege was a short

  struggle easily won by the Macedonians. We can almost be certain that

  this was not the case, for why then would Alexander have spent so much

  43 Arr., An. , 1.23.6-8; Diod., 17.24.2-3; Plu., Alex. , 22.7-8; Plu., mor. , 127b, 180a, 1099c. Berve 1926, no. 674; Wilcken 1967, pp. 93-94; Bosworth 1980, pp. 152-154; Bosworth 1988, pp. 229-230; Hornblower 1982, pp. 45-51; Ruzicka 1992, p.

  144; Brosius 1996, pp. 21-22; Debord 1999, pp. 139-140, 160.

  44 Diod., 17.24.1; Ath. Mech., 10-15.9; Vitr., 10.3-8. Marsden 1977.

  45 Ath. Mech., 14.4; Vitr., 10.3.7.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  141

  time camped outside Halicarnassus? Despite his oratorical style, Diodorus’

  account seems much more plausible as it most probably was based –

  directly or indirectly – on an account given by one of the city’s defenders,

  and therefore someone not inclined to glorify Alexander. 46 The

  Macedonians began by filling up the moat. Next they brought up the siege

  towers and roofed battering rams. This way they managed to create an

  opening in the wall through which they tried to enter the city. However,

  amid the rubble the defenders, ably commanded by Memnon, were able to

  repulse the attackers. In the night Memnon organised a sally beyond the

  walls to set fire to the siege towers. The initially surprised Macedonian

  guards did manage to put out the flames in time and there ensued a

  ferocious battle beneath the walls in which Memnon’s soldiers were

  supported by city’s defenders raining down missiles on the Macedonians

  from the walls.47 Later on the siege engines toppled two of the city’s

  towers, but Memnon managed to get a new wall raised behind the rubble

  and thus seal off the breach. Nor did he idly observe further Macedonian

  attempts to breach the walls but instead raised a wooded tower on the

  other side from which catapults fired missiles at the attackers. Soon

  afterwards another battle began beneath the walls. The ancient authors

  claim that this mêlée was started accidentally by two drunken

  Macedonians who decided to raid the city on their own and got into a fight

  with some Halicarnassian volunteers, to which gradually soldiers from

  both sides joined. The scale of this incident and the sheer improbability of

  it being started without the prior knowledge of commanders on either side

  suggest that it may have in fact been another raid by the defenders which

  was noticed by the Macedonian drunks, who then raised the alarm.

  Alexander’s personal intervention eventually forced the defenders to

  retreat into the city. Nevertheless it was Alexander who now requested a

  truce so that the bodies of fallen Macedonians could be taken away, which

  in Antiquity signified the acknowledgement of a lost skirmish. Despite the

  opinions of the Athenian mercenary commanders Ephialtes and

  Thrasybulus, Memnon did allow the bodies of the fallen to be taken away.

  Arrian, who glorifies Alexander, naturally fails to mention this episode.48

  The following day the siege engines were moved up to the improvised

  wall behind the breach. During a successive raid the defenders had

&n
bsp; managed to burn down one siege tower and several siege sheds.

  Nonetheless the defenders’ situation was worsening on account of

  46 Bosworth 1980, p. 147.

  47 Diod., 17.24.3-25.5; Arr., An. , 1.20.8-10. Bosworth 1988, p. 48.

  48 Diod., 17.25.5-6; Arr., An. , 1.21.1-4. Lane Fox 1973, p. 138; Bosworth 1980, p.

  146; Romane 1994, pp. 72-73; Ober 1996, pp. 56-61; Wheeler 2007, p. 212.

  142

  Chapter IV

  persistent Macedonian attacks against ever weaker fortifications. It was for

  this reason the Memnon summoned a war council to decide what to do

  next. He accepted the suggestion of the Athenian Ephialtes to launch yet

  another sortie but this time with a much larger number of men. Ephialtes

  himself was put in charge of two thousand of the best soldiers, half of

  whom were given torches. At daybreak the mercenary hoplites personally

  commanded by Ephialtes formed a deep phalanx and attacked the

  Macedonians while the torchbearers set fire to the machines. Once again

  Alexander’s swift intervention saved the engines from destruction, but in

  the battle that now raged between the old and new walls Ephialtes and his

  men were decidedly gaining the upper hand. With missiles raining down

  on them from the walls, the Macedonians were forced to retreat. Making

  use of the moment, Memnon sent another unit of men to attack. Alexander

  was saved from defeat by a detachment of veterans that now entered the

  fray. Once the valiant Ephialtes, who had been fighting at the very front of

  the phalanx, was slain, the defenders of Halicarnassus were forced to

  retreat. They suffered heavy casualties, especially when a bridge they were

  fleeing across to return to the city collapsed. Arrian states that on that day

  Memnon lost 1,000 men, whereas Alexander lost only 40. The latter figure

  is of course unacceptable when one considers that the battle lasted hours

  and the Macedonian casualties included the commander of the king’s

  bodyguards, the commander of the archers as well as other officers.

  Though victorious on the battlefield, Alexander stopped his soldiers from