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chasing the defenders into the city. Arrian explains this as a desire to give
the Halicarnassians a chance to surrender and thus spare the city. Such
reasoning is rather unconvincing in a situation where the decision whether
or not to surrender rested with Memnon, not the city’s inhabitants. The
battle had shown the defenders’ determination to fight. For this reason and
on account of the lateness of the day Alexander most probably decided not
to risk turning a hard-fought victory into defeat in an all-out assault on the
city.49
Nevertheless the scale of inflicted losses and the serious damage to the
fortifications made putting up further resistance pointless; another
Macedonian assault could well have resulted in the city’s capture and the
loss of all the armed forces gathered there. That is why that same night
Memnon and Orontobates resolved to evacuate Halicarnassus. At
approximately midnight the wooden towers on the walls, the ammunition
sheds and the houses closest to the walls were all set ablaze. Behind this
49 Diod., 17.26-27.4 (principal source); Arr., An. , 1.22; Curt., 5.2.8, 8.1.36. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 138-139; Green 1974, pp. 197-199; Bosworth 1980, pp. 147-148;
Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ashley 1998, pp. 208-209.
From Abydus to Alexandria
143
screen of smoke and flames Memnon evacuated weapons from the military
magazines and some of the soldiers to the island of Kos. The remaining
soldiers occupied the Salmakis fortress and the citadel on the Zephyros
rock. At dawn Alexander saw the smouldering ruins of Halicarnassus and
two strongholds still very much in enemy hands. A long and costly siege
was at most only a partial success. On the one hand, thanks to advanced
Macedonian siege techniques and the immense energy and determination
of Alexander and his soldiers the city of Halicarnassus was taken, which
no doubt gave the Macedonians some satisfaction. On the other hand, the
military situation in Asia Minor did not change significantly for in Caria
Memnon was still holding a military base, although with much reduced
harbour. Alexander decided not to try and capture the two fortresses.
Instead he ordered the city to be razed to the ground, sparing only the
Mausoleum and temples. One can assume that for a time Halicarnassus as
a city was dead, perhaps the synoikism was dissolved and the inhabitants
moved back to their original settlements. Alexander left Ptolemaios in
command of 3,200 soldiers to guard the two Persian fortresses, which
were surrounded by moats and embankments.50
The siege of Halicarnassus had dragged on until at least the middle of
autumn. The onset of winter did not mean a break in the hostilities, but
Alexander did expect the intensity of the fighting to lessen for a while. For
this reason he sent back to Macedonia – under the command of his
bodyguard, Ptolemaios the son of Seleucus – those soldiers who had
recently married, so that they could spend the winter with their wives.
Arrian claims that this act, more than any other, won the Macedonian
troops over to Alexander. The campaign must have cost many more lives
than the ancient authors record for the officers sent back to the homeland
together with the newly-weds were ordered to raise as many infantry and
cavalry reserves as possible. One of the officers, Cleander, was dispatched
to Peloponnesus to levy mercenaries at Cape Tainaron, the main recruiting
centre in Greece.51
The rest of the army was divided in two. Parmenion together with the
baggage train, one ile of hetairoi, the Thessalian cavalry and Corinthian
League detachments headed for Sardis. His next objective was Phrygia.
This region’s satrap, Atizyes, had fought at Granicus but managed to
escape and now took refuge in his satrapy. Phrygia had undergone
intensive Iranian colonisation and therefore Macedonian occupation of this
50 Diod., 17.27.5-6; Arr., An. , 1.23. Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 145-
146; Ashley 1998, p. 209; Heckel 2006, p. 235, s.v. Ptolemy [5].
51 Arr., An. , 1.24.1-2; Curt., 3.1.1. Heckel 1992, p. 286.
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Chapter IV
territory would deprive the Persians of a major recruiting ground. 52
Alexander and the bulk of the army now moved east to Lycia and
Pamphylia. This campaign no doubt lasted until the start of 333 and its
objective, according to Arrian, was to occupy the coastline. Obviously this
could not have meant the occupying of the entire myriad of natural
harbours in this province, but only the cities that had furnished ships to
Memnon and that could provide him with a base. The late season in the
year paradoxically worked to the advantage of the Macedonians for,
although it somewhat hindered troop movement, it more importantly
deprived enemy seaports of the protection that would otherwise have been
provided by the powerful Persian fleet. The construction of ancient ships
was too weak to withstand the waves of a rough sea, therefore military
vessels suspended all operations from November to March. Thus in the
winter Memnon’s predominance at sea had very little significance.
According to Arrian thirty cities surrendered to Alexander without a
struggle; the author actually mentions Hyparna, Telmessus, Pinara,
Xanthus, Phaselis and Patara with its important harbour. But our sources
do not tell us the exact route taken by the Macedonian army. Bearing in
mind Alexander’s war objectives and the winter conditions, which would
have made crossing the mountains between Lycia and Pisidia very difficult
if not impossible, it is most likely that the Macedonians chose the seacoast
route. Though it only became apparent a year later, one of the
consequences of the Lycian campaign was the acquisition of the Lycian
fleet.53
It is likely that Alexander stayed at Phaselis until the end of the
334/333 winter. It was reportedly there that he received news of the real or
only supposed treason of the last son of Aeropus of Lyncestis, Alexander,
an experienced officer and commander of the Thessalian cavalry, which
was the second most important cavalry formation after the hetairoi.
Parmenion captured a Persian called Sisines, whom as a trusted envoy,
Darius III had ostensibly sent to the satrap Atizyes. Sisines, however,
revealed that the real objective of his mission was to reply to secret
correspondence that had been sent by Alexander of Lyncestis via the
Macedonian fugitive Amyntas. Sisines was supposed to tell Alexander that
Darius pledged to give the traitor 1,000 talents of gold in return for the
assassination of his namesake, the Macedonian king. After discussing the
matter with his friends, the king instructed Parmenion to have Alexander
of Lyncestis arrested and imprisoned. The arrestee was eventually
executed without trial shortly after the end of the Philotas affair.
52 Arr., An. , 1.24.3. Bosworth 1980, pp. 155-156; Debord 1999, p. 449.
53 Arr., An. , 1.24.3-6, 2.20.2. Keen 1996; Debord 1999, pp. 449-450.
From Abydus to Alexandria
145
Command of the Thessalian cavalry, which remained pa
rt of Parmenion’s
army, was most probably taken over by Philip, the son of Menelaus, who
had up until then commanded the allied Peloponnesian cavalry. This
version of how the treason was discovered is given by Arrian, whose
source was Ptolemy, and it is indirectly confirmed by Justin. Diodorus,
however, gives a different version in which the arrest occurred many
months later, shortly after the Battle of Issus, and Alexander received
news of the planned assassination in a letter from Olympias. Arrian’s
version is also unconvincing because it includes a lengthy episode in
which the Macedonian king discovers the evil intentions of Alexander of
Lyncestis through mysterious omens. This seems to suggest that Arrian
himself had doubts about Sisines’s alleged mission and therefore tries to
further justify the arrest with signs from the heavens. Whatever the truth, it
is at this time that the sources fall silent about Alexander of Lyncestis.
Moreover, even if he was only arrested after the letter from Olympias,
there is no reason to doubt that Parmenion had actually sent Sisines with
his story to Alexander. One way or another, Alexander, the son of Aeropus,
was certainly out of favour with the king by 333.54
Alexander’s next step in his campaign in the coastal provinces of Asia
Minor was the occupation of Pamphylia. The first objective in this
province was the city of Perge. Some of the army with supply wagons
travelled along a road specially built by Thracian soldiers over Mount
Climax, while Alexander and rest of the army took the road along the
coast of the Gulf of Antalya. When the winds blew from the south, parts of
this road would be flooded by the sea. However, when Alexander’s army
reached these sections the winds changed direction and blew from the
north, thus allowing the army to pass. This of course was interpreted by
Alexander and his soldiers as a sign that the gods were favourable to
them.55 In Pamphylia Alexander took Perge and next headed for Side. On
the way he received envoys from Aspendus with whom he made an
agreement that in return for a lump sum payment of 50 talents and a herd
of horses specially bred for the Great King he would not station soldiers in
their city. After capturing Side and installing a local garrison, Alexander
learned that Aspendus was not intending to keep its part of the deal. At
stake were not only prestige and the money from the tribute but also the
strategic significance of Aspendus, which lay at the estuary of the river
54 Arr., An. , 1.25.3-9; Just., 11.7.1; Diod., 17.32.1, 17.80.2; Curt., 7.1.5-9. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 143-148 (questions Arrian); Bosworth 1988, pp. 50-51; Heckel 1992,
pp. 357-359; Hammond 1996, pp. 88-89.
55 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F31; Arr., An. , 1.26.1-2; Plu., Alex. , 17.6-9 (quoting Menander, fr. 751); J., AJ, 2.16.5; App., BC, 2.149; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.
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Eurymedon. For these reasons Alexander immediately led his army to that
city. At the mere sight of the Macedonians the Aspendians again changed
their mind. This time the terms and conditions of capitulation were much
harsher: the previously agreed war contribution was doubled; now there
was also an obligation to pay tributes; the city was put under the control of
the local satrap and now it was also obliged to submit hostages. Being
situated in Pamphylia, Aspendus was clearly not included in the declared
restoration of freedom that applied to the cities of Ionia, Aeolis and Caria,
and as a polis that had broken a treaty it could not expect much mercy
from its conqueror.56 It was most probably then that Alexander nominated
Nearchus, a trusted companion since his early youth, satrap of Lycia.57
From Aspendus the Macedonian army returned to Perge and thence it
headed for Phrygia. The first and perhaps greatest obstacle was the city of
Termessus (today Gülük). Situated some 40 km to the north-west of Perge
in Pisidia, Termessus guarded a pass into the Maeander valley. On account
of the inaccessible Pisidian Mountains surrounding it, the city had not
been subjugated to the rule of Persian satraps and now its inhabitants also
had no intention of allowing the Macedonians to pass through their land.
The terrain was shaped in such a way that there was only one road leading
through a narrow valley between two mountains at an altitude of 1,000 m.
This road the Termessians easily blocked, but deceived by the sight of the
Macedonians appearing to be calmly bivouacking, they returned to their
city leaving behind only some guards to keep watch. Alexander then
launched a surprise attack with Macedonian archers, light infantry and
some specially selected hoplites. Next he led his army through this
dangerous zone. Despite Strabo’s claim, the Macedonians did not take the
city of Termessus for they lacked the necessary siege equipment. 58
However, the fight with the Termessians inclined the inhabitants of
another Pisidian city called Selge, who were bitter enemies of their
neighbours the Termessians, to offer an alliance with the Macedonian king.
Alexander willingly accepted their offer and next marched his army for
Sagalassus, which was situated 80 km to the north and belonged to a chain
of fortresses stretching all the way to Celaenae. Thanks to the farming of
fertile valleys this was a large and prosperous city. Its Pisidian inhabitants
had the reputation of being good soldiers and their defensive position was
all the more difficult to capture on account of it being located on a 200-
56 Arr., An. ,1.25.5-27.4; It. Alex. , 26. Debord 1999, p. 451-452; Nawotka 2003a, p.
30.
57 Arr., An. , 3.6.6. Bosworth 1980, p. 284; Heckel 1992, p. 228.
58 Arr., An. , 1.27.5-8; Str., 14.3.9. Magie 1950, pp. 263-264; Bosworth 1980, pp.
169-170.
From Abydus to Alexandria
147
300 m ridge. Moreover, they were now supported by a detachment of their
kinfolk, the Termessians, who had already once been defeated by
Alexander. At the start of the battle of Sagalassus, the Pisidians initially
had the upper hand. They successfully repulsed an attack by the
Macedonian archers and even killed their commander, Cleander. However,
they were unable to withstand an attack by the Agrians and a much better
armoured phalanx. Approximately 500 Pisidian soldiers were killed and
the rest fled from the battlefield. The escape of those lightly armoured
barbarians was made easier because, though better in battle, Macedonian
armour was heavier and this made it harder for the soldiers wearing it to
keep up. Moreover, the mountainous terrain precluded the use of cavalry.
However, the Macedonians were able to capture the city and the
occupation of the rest of Pisidia posed not further major problems.59
Alexander’s army next set its course for Phrygia to meet up with
Parmenion’s corps. Their route cut across the Anatolian Plateau from
Sagalassus via what is today the city of Isparta, thence west to the north-
eastern shore of the salt lake Ascania (Burdur Gölü) and next north to
reach Celaenae, some 30 km to the north west of the said lake, on the fifth
day. Being the residence of the satrap of Phrygia, the city had a garrison
comprising 100 Greek mercenaries and 1,000 Carian soldiers, whose
armour and training were traditionally considered equal to those of the
Greek hoplites. These soldiers abandoned the city and instead decided to
defend just the acropolis. Arrian grossly exaggerates in calling it
impenetrable for it was connected to the ridge of a neighbouring mountain
to the southeast. Alexander occupied the city and began beleaguering the
acropolis. However, the good fortifications and without doubt the
defenders’ fighting skills made the siege a prolonged affair. The defenders
offered to capitulate if a relief force did not arrive within 60 days. And that
is what eventually happened. Alexander left a garrison of 1,500 soldiers at
Celaenae. As satrap of Phrygia he appointed Antigonus ‘Monophthalmus’
(the One-Eyed), who had so far commanded the allied Greek infantry.
Antigonus – who in 333 was around 49 and therefore much older than
Alexander – became a leading figure in the Diadochi period after the
king’s death. His nomination as satrap was the first really important
appointment in his career and it was only now that he was able to show his
considerable leadership and administrative skills as well as charisma
which would later distinguish him from all the other Diadochi. His satrapy
was of key strategic importance in Asia Minor as it encompassed the
junction of major routes including the Royal Road, which any army
59 Arr., An. , 1.28; Plu., Alex. , 18.1; It. Alex. , 26. Magie 1950, p. 1139; Bosworth 1980, pp. 159-172; Debord 1999, p. 454.
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wishing to control this part of the continent had to use. One has to
remember that so far only a small part of Asia Minor – the Aegean coast
and a few inland regions in the west of this vast peninsula – was in
Macedonian hands. The Persian generals were now raising an army in the
north of Asia Minor. Bearing indirect testimony as to their preparations for