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a counteroffensive was the large-scale production of coins at the mint in
Sinope; this money was needed to pay the soldiers. Thanks to these coins
we know the names of the chief Persian commanders: Mithropastes,
Hydarnes and the satrap of Caria Orontobates. No doubt on the Great
King’s instructions, these generals were preparing to cut Alexander’s line
of communication with the Asia Minor coast and thus themselves gain
access to the Persian fleet. Before he left Celaenae or – according to
Arrian – later in Gordium, Alexander received envoys from Athens who
requested him to release their fellow citizens who had been captured at
Granicus. These prisoners were, however, much too valuable as hostages
ensuring Athens’s continued loyalty at what was still a very uncertain time.
Therefore Alexander promised the envoys that he would release the
captives but only once the war was ended.60
From Celaenae Alexander’s army marched across Phrygia to Gordium,
where it was supposed to meet up with Parmenion’s corps. The 290-km
journey must have taken the soldiers about a month, though they were
marching on the well built Royal Road. Taking into account the several
month long campaigns in Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia as well as the trek
across Phrygia, one can assume that Alexander reached Gordium no
earlier than in May 333. The fact that the sources record no incidents
during the march across Phrygia suggests that the area had already been
pacified by Parmenion. Alexander’s complicated itinerary so far as well as
the actions undertaken on his instructions by his commanders suggest that
occupying the entire coastline to deprive the Persian fleet of a base was
not the Macedonian king’s only objective. The aim of this campaign seems
also to have been the conquest of the whole of southern and central
Anatolia, which, despite their defeat at Granicus, was still in Persian
hands.61
Gordium, situated on the river Sangarius, on the border between both
Phrygias (Great Phrygia and Hellespontine Phrygia) and onetime capital of
60 Curt., 3.1.1-10 (principal source); Arr., An. , 1.29.1-3, 5-6. Magie 1950, p. 983;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 172-174; Atkinson 1980, pp. 80-84; Seibert 1985, pp. 54-56;
Briant 1996, p. 851. The career of Antigonus Monophthalmus: Briant 1973;
Billows 1990; Heckel 1992, pp. 50-56.
61 Arr., An. , 1.29.3; Diod., 17.27.6; Curt., 3.1.11. Bosworth 1980, p. 174; Seibert
1985, p. 56; Debord 1999, p. 455.
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149
the Phrygian state, was long past its former glory. First destroyed by the
Cimmerians at the start of the 7th century and then again by Cyrus the
Great in 547/546, it was now rebuilt but its previous political importance
was gone. In Persian times it was not the residence of satraps but of lower
ranking officials. The city itself was quite large, archaeologists have
established that it covered an area of 100 hectares, but now it was chiefly a
centre for local crafts and trade. The district that at the time of the
Phrygian state had been inhabited by powerful political elites, in
Alexander’s day was the site of workshops.62 The most important edifice
in the Gordium acropolis was the temple of the Phrygian deity called
Basileus (King). The Greeks and Macedonians associated him with Zeus,
therefore the father of Heracles, the mythical ancestor of the Argeads. It
was there, or according to certain authors in a palace in that acropolis, that
Gordias’s legendary cart was kept. Gordias was the father of Midas, the
founder of the Phrygian dynasty. According to legend, Gordias was a
simple peasant who once whilst ploughing received a sign from Zeus in
the form of an eagle landing on the yoke of his oxen. The famous cart was
fastened to the yoke by an intricate knot (or knots) of cornel bark with the
ends of the fastening hidden. Legend also had it that whoever managed to
untie this knot would become ruler of Asia. Towards the end of his stay in
Gordium Alexander went to the acropolis to examine the famous cart.
Though according to popular 4th-century legends the Phrygians’ original
homeland was Macedonia, one need not suppose that this was why
Alexander decided to go there. He could have simply wanted to see the
cart out of curiosity, according to Arrian, driven by an insurmountable
urge ( pothos). Assuming that the Gordian knot legend originated from the
time of the Phrygian monarchy, i.e. at the start of the first millennium, the
word ‘Asia’ would have had its original Hittite meaning, referring to the
north-western part of Asia Minor, in other words, more or less the area
covered by the Phrygian monarchy. With time the meaning of the word
was extended to encompass the entire continent, and in the political sense
the Achaemenid Empire (see Chapter V.3). Bearing in mind his intention,
officially declared at the Hellespont, to conquer the Persian Empire and
the fact that he always attached great importance to symbols and
prophesies, Alexander could not but rise to the challenge, especially when
he was accompanied by a crowd of Macedonians and local inhabitants.
With the ends concealed, the knot was impossible to untie, so Alexander
was forced to resort to an unconventional solution. The sources provide us
with two versions as to what happened next. A version originating from
62 Arr., An. , 1.29.5; Just., 11.7.3. Bosworth 1980, p. 175; Mellink 1988, pp. 228-
231; Voigt, Young 1999, pp. 191-241.
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Chapter IV
Aristobulus states that Alexander removed a pin that was slotted through
the cart’s shaft and this way also separated the yoke from the shaft. The
other version, belonging to the Vulgate and therefore originating from
Cleitarchus, states that Alexander cut the knot with his sword completely
(Arrian, Curtius) or partially (Plutarch, Justin); in the Plutarch and Justin’s
version Alexander merely wished to find the ends of the binding bark
which enabled him to next untie the knot. Arrian himself was unable to
decide which version of separating the yoke from the cart was more
plausible, therefore today scholars can only conclude that the version
where Alexander cut the knot with his sword, being so much more vivid
and characteristic of the young king’s impetuous nature, was generally
preferred by the ancient authors. Whichever version was true, Alexander
and his companions returned from that site convinced that a prophecy had
been fulfilled, as was confirmed that very night by Zeus with thunder and
lightning. The following day a grateful Alexander offered sacrifices to the
gods.63
It was at Gordium that, after a long trek across Asia Minor, the newly-
married men returned from their winter stay in Macedonia. Accompanying
them were new reserves: 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from Macedonia
and as well as 200 horsemen from Thessaly and 150 from Elis. This was
the first of three batches of reinforcements from Macedonia and Greece
that Alexander would receive in 333. The constant need for new troops
resulted not only because of larger numbers of soldiers l
eft on garrison
duty in newly and not necessarily completely conquered territories but also
because of losses incurred as a result of the war. Apart from those killed in
the actual fighting, which the sources inform us about, there must have
also been losses which the sources ignore, for instance, as a result of
wounds after which soldiers were incapacitated and perhaps eventually
died. Moreover, it should be noted that if in European campaigns in early
modern times twice as many soldiers died from diseases than were killed
in battles, then proportion must have been at least similar in Alexander’s
day. This problem would have been compounded in the Macedonian army
by the state of ancient medicine, which may have been adequate for
treating wounds but virtually helpless against diseases. Finally, the
63 Arr., An. , 2.3; Curt., 3.1.14-16; Plu., Alex. , 18.2-4; Just., 11.7; Marsyas, FGrH, 135/6 F4. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 262-265; Bosworth 1980, pp. 194-188; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 46-47; Zahrnt 2001; Squilace 2005, pp. 211-213. Alexander’s visit and the
legend of origins of the Phrygians: Fredricksmeyer 1961. Pothos as curiosity:
O’Brien 1992, p. 50. Asia in this context: Schachermeyr 1973, p. 192; Atkinson
1980, p. 87; Oost 1981, pp. 265-266; Nawotka 2004.
From Abydus to Alexandria
151
necessity to recruit more soldiers in 333 was also of course associated with
the impending confrontation with the great army of Darius III.64
The Persian counteroffensive of 333 began with the arrival of spring.
Darius III now appointed Memnon the commander-in-chief of the entire
war and further strengthened his position with additional funds for him to
be able to maintain the great fleet and mercenary army. Memnon almost
certainly realised the futility of trying to confront the superior Macedonian
army in a pitched battle and that is why he reverted to his original plan
once proclaimed in Zeleia to the satraps of Asia Minor and consisting of
shifting the war to Greece. The first step to this end would be an
occupation of the Aegean archipelago, which would provide Memnon with
a base for operations in Greece. This would also make it possible to next
occupy the Hellespont and thus effectively cut Alexander off from
Macedonia. War in Greece and a serious threat to Macedonian security
would force Alexander to return to Europe. A similar manoeuvre had been
successfully conducted by Persia 60 years earlier, when they skilfully
applied diversionary tactics in Greece to effectively stop the Spartan King
Agesilaus’ military operations in Asia Minor. From his base on the Island
of Kos Memnon set sail with 300 ships north towards the largest island
poleis. At least some of these were ruled by oligarchies that towards the
end of Philip II’s reign had switched to his side and joined the League of
Corinth. Now in face of Memnon’s formidable fleet they quickly changed
sides again. Chios switched allegiance without a struggle. Four of the five
states on Lesbos surrendered instantly: Antissa, Methymna, Pyrrha and
Eresus. In the largest state Mytilene, however, the garrison of mercenaries
that had been sent there by Alexander and the citizens decided to resist.
Memnon therefore cut the city off from the other states by constructing a
double stockade stretching to the sea on either side and also blocked the
seaport with his ships, thus depriving the defenders of any hope of
receiving help. He then managed the lure the much weaker Mytilenean
fleet into a sea battle which his navy easily won. Memnon also had time to
concentrate on things other than the siege of Mytilene. The Greek states of
the Cyclades came over to his side, others he was able to win over with
bribes. The pro-Macedonian camp was now beset by terrifying rumours of
an imminent invasion of Euboea.65
64 Arr., An. , 1.29.4. Bosworth 1980, pp. 174-175; Ruffin 1992; Salazar 2000, pp.
68-72.
65 Arr., An. , 2.1.1-2; Diod., 17.18.2, 17.29; Fron., Str. , 2.5.46. Burn 1952, pp. 82-83; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 152-153; Hamilton 1974, p. 63; Hammond 1996, pp. 89-90;
Debord 1999, pp. 457-459.
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Chapter IV
News of Memnon’s successes demonstrated all too vividly just how
dangerous Alexander’s decision to disband his fleet in the autumn of 334
really was. He could now only passively look on as events in the Aegean
unfolded. His attempt to defeat the Persian fleet by depriving it of ports in
Asia Minor had so far failed. It is possible that Alexander extended his
stay at Gordium for more than initially intended because of what was
happening in the Aegean and uncertainty as to whether or not he would
have to return to Macedonia.66 It was then that his strategy changed; allied
states were instructed to start rebuilding ships, which were next to join up
at the Hellespont with the remnants of the squadron Alexander had kept
after his capture of Miletus. Hegelochus was appointed commander of the
Hellespontine region and Alexander’s trusted officer, Amphoterus the
younger brother of Craterus, was appointed his subordinate commander of
the fleet. They were entrusted with what was at that stage the quite
impossible mission of liberating Lesbos, Chios and Kos. For this purpose
they were given 500 talents. Another 600 talents was sent to Antipater,
thanks to which a second Macedonian squadron of ships was assembled
for the defence of Greece. The ships were sent from Euboea and the
Peloponnesus and the fleet was commanded by Proteas.67
We will of course never know whether or not the much delayed steps
to build a Macedonian naval force would have been able to stop the
Persian counteroffensive, had Memnon lived longer. As it happened,
during the siege of Mytilene Memnon fell ill and died. If there was a
turning point in this phase of the conflict between Alexander and Darius, it
would be the death of Memnon, a man trusted by the Great King and
endowed with a strategic perception and tactical skills that no
contemporary could match, apart from Alexander. On his deathbed,
Memnon appointed as acting commander, until a further decision was
made by the Great King, his brother-in-law Pharnabazus. The new
commander was assisted by another Persian aristocrat Autophradates.
Initially nothing changed in the way the Persian forces prosecuted the war;
under the new command the Persians vigorously attacked Mytilene. Soon
the inhabitants decided to capitulate, but they secured for the mercenary
garrison the right to freely leave the city. Pharnabazus’ terms for
capitulation were as follows: an annulment of the city’s alliance with
Alexander; the return of exiles, who were to receive back half of their
previously owned property; the acceptance of Persian suzerainty and,
under the pretext of saving the vanquished citizens’ face, a restoration of
66 Murison 1972, pp. 404-405.
67 Arr., An. , 2.2.3-4; Curt., 3.1.19-20. Atkinson 1980, pp. 92-95; Heckel 1992, pp.
6-12.
From Abydus to Alexandria
153
the provisions of the King’s Peace of 387/386 even though they had never
really applied to Lesbos. One of t
he former exiles was appointed tyrant of
Mytilene and a Persian garrison was now installed in the city, which was
commanded by Lycomedes of Rhodes and no doubt comprised Greek
mercenaries. Pharnabazus also ordered the defeated city to pay a
contribution, which was the first sign that in the Aegean the Persians were
beginning to have financial problems. Their monthly expenditure
exceeded 300 talents and now there were no more tributes coming in from
Asia Minor.68
After the settling of these affairs at Mytilene the Persian commanders
split up: Autophradates continued the conquest of other Greek islands,
while Pharnabazus sailed with the mercenary army to Lycia. This could
have led to the opening of a new and important front in Asia Minor for the
army of the Persian satrap Orontobates was still stationed in neighbouring
Caria. However, before this could happen, command of Pharnabazus’
mercenaries was taken over by Memnon’s nephew Thymondas, sent by
Darius III to bring these troops over to the royal army. As a consolation,
Pharnabazus was officially appointed to the post previously held by
Memnon. So Pharnabazus now rejoined Autophradates and, commanding
100 ships, together they sailed for the island of Tenedos (today Bozca
Ada). The island capitulated on similar terms to those that had been
imposed on Mytilene. Hegelochus, the Macedonian commander of the
Hellespontine region, still did not have enough ships to be able to help
allies. This success was important insofar as it gave the Persian fleet a base
just off the coast of the Troad from which access to the Hellespont could
be easily controlled. And in those times it was via the Hellespont that all
the most important trade routes ran, for instance, the transport of Black
Sea grain to Athens. Meanwhile the ships of Autophradates, operating
from the island of Samothrace, posed a serious threat to Macedonia. Coins
provide evidence that Autophradates’ army actually landed in the Troad. It
was in the late summer or early autumn of 333 that they also landed in
Ionia and fought a victorious battle against detachments from Ephesus.