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  Assyrian king, Assurbanipal. On this tomb there was engraved a message,

  reputedly in Assyrian: ‘These are still mine – what I ate, and my wanton

  love-frolics.’ This was an allusion to the Assyrian king’s love of

  banqueting and sexual promiscuity. In all probability the inscription was

  invented by the ancient Greek authors to contrast an unmanly and

  debauched Sardanapalus with the energetic and chaste Alexander.79 From

  Anchialos the Macedonian army marched 20 km further west to the

  coastal city of Soli. Here Alexander founded a democratic system of

  government, installed a garrison and charged the inhabitants an

  extraordinarily high fine of 200 talents. He also took hostages, for which

  reason three quarters of the fine soon filled the royal treasury. This drastic

  action indicates that Alexander’s finances were in a critical state at the

  time. This is further confirmed by the fact that when after the Battle of

  Issus the Macedonian army had acquired a lot of booty, Soli was relieved

  from paying the rest of this fine. Military operations in western Cilicia

  were ended with a seven-day campaign in the mountains around Soli that

  were inhabited by independent and fairly primitive tribes. However, this

  did not complete the conquest of Cicilia. Balacrus, whom Alexander had

  appointed satrap of Cilicia, had to continue the pacification of the Taurus

  mountain region and was indeed killed in fighting with the highlanders.80

  78 Arr., An. , 2.5.1; Diod., 17.32.2; Curt., 3.7.6-7; Plu., Alex. , 20.4. Chronology: Bosworth 1980, p. 192. Topography: Seibert 1985, pp. 64-65.

  79 Arr., An. , 2.5.2-4; Plu., mor. , 330f. Bosworth 1980, pp. 193-195; Hammond

  1996, p. 94; Nawotka 2003, p. 86.

  80 Arr., An. , 2.5.5-6; Curt., 3.7.2-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 195; Debord 1999, p. 164.

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  Meanwhile war flared up again in a region that had seemed to have

  been conquered: Caria. Its Persian satrap Orontobates, supported by the

  citadels in Halicarnassus, managed to recapture several cities, including

  Myndus and Caunus. In September or October 333 the Macedonian

  generals Ptolemaios and Asander finally defeated Orontobates in a major

  battle. Among those killed were the Persian satrap himself as well as 700

  Persian infantry and 500 cavalry. The victory restored Macedonian control

  of the coastline in the Ceramic Gulf, thus depriving Pharnabazus’ still

  powerful navy of harbours in that part of Asia Minor. At the end of his

  stay in western Cilicia Alexander held a military parade as well as

  gymnastic and musical competitions before leading his army back to

  Tarsus.81 The time he spent on operations of secondary importance in

  western Cilicia and the division of his forces into two indicate that

  Alexander was quite unaware of the manoeuvres by the main Persian

  forces, which at this stage posed a very serious threat to his army.

  Darius III gave instructions for his army to gather at Babylon.

  According to the ancient authors the size of this army ranged from

  312,000 (Curtius Rufus) to 500,000 (Justin) or even 600,000 (Arrian and

  Plutarch). Of course all these figures are grossly exaggerated, in keeping

  with the tradition of ancient historians to always overstate the size of

  Persian forces. The first to do so was Herodotus, who claimed the army of

  Xerxes which in 480 invaded Greece comprised as many as 1,700,000

  soldiers. On the other hand, one cannot doubt that the Persian army was

  considerably larger than the Macedonian force. Curtius provides a detailed

  breakdown of Darius III’s army including (on information originating

  from Callisthenes) 30,000 Greek mercenaries. Even if this figure is also

  exaggerated, one can be certain that Greek hoplites were the primary force

  in the Persian infantry. Although the other figures given by Curtius will

  also not be accurate, the lack of a contingent from eastern Iran, the land of

  the famous Persian cavalry, should not be doubted. It cannot be explained

  by the sheer geographic distance of the east Iranian satrapies to the

  battlefield as over one and half years had elapsed from Alexander’s arrival

  in Asia Minor to the point when his army reached Issus. Even in ancient

  times in one and a half years such distances could be covered several times

  over. But it seems most probable that Darius only decided to personally

  lead his army against Alexander after Memnon’s death, and it would have

  only been then that the Persian side’s whole strategic concept of the war

  81 Arr., An. , 2.5.7-8; Curt., 3.7.3-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 197; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 147-

  149; Debord 1999, p. 461.

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  161

  changed. This would have left too little time for the entire imperial army to

  be mobilised.82

  The Persian forces most probably set out from Babylon in September,

  after the hottest part of the Mesopotamian summer ended and the harvest

  had filled granaries to provide the soldiers with sufficient provisions.

  Weighed down by huge baggage trains the Persian army needed two

  months to cover the 900 km distance from Babylon to Cilicia, where in

  November the battle against the Macedonians would be fought. The

  crossing of the Euphrates itself lasted five days. Curtius Rufus colourfully

  contrasts the elaborate Persian procession with the simplicity and

  toughness of the Macedonian army. According to custom, the Persian

  army would start marching at dawn. At the head of the column the sacred

  fire would be carried on silver alters. This most characteristic of Persian

  military rituals was also practiced in the Sassanid era, a thousand years

  later. Following the flame there would be magi singing religious songs,

  and behind them 365 youths dressed in purple. Both their number and the

  colour of their attire were symbolic. Their number signified the days in the

  Persian year and alluded to cosmic nature of the monarch’s authority,

  whereas purple was the colour of warriors. Behind them travelled Ahura

  Mazda’s (Jupiter’s, according to Curtius) chariot drawn by white horses

  and Mithra’s (the Sun’s according to Curtius) horse. Next came a squadron

  of cavalry and behind it marched the guard of 10,000 ‘immortals’ and

  15,000 specially selected horsemen, the so-called ‘Kinsmen’ who were not

  necessarily the monarch’s relatives but nevertheless granted this honorary

  title by the Great King. Then came the Royal bodyguards called the

  doryphoroi (‘spearmen’) or at other times the melophori after the apple-shaped ( melon) butts of their spears. Behind the bodyguards rode the Great

  King wearing his ceremonial cloak and tiara, surrounded by 400 ‘relatives’.

  The monarch’s chariot was gilded and adorned with symbols of Ahura

  Mazda and Mithra (Ninus and Belus according to Curtius) as well as the

  Achaemenid eagle. Following him were 30,000 infantry, the royal horses,

  and in carriages the monarch’s mother, wife and children as well as 360

  Royal concubines. Archers escorted the Royal treasure chests, which were

  carried by 600 mules and 300 camels. And following on behind were the

  courtiers, the servants and the rest of the army. To sum up, Darius III’s


  82 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.18.2); Curt., 3.2.2-9; Diod., 17.31.2; Just.,

  11.9.1; Arr., An. , 2.8.8; Plu., Alex. , 18.6; POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) F44, col.

  2.2/3. Atkinson 1980, pp. 99-108; Vogelsang 1992, pp. 219-221.

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  marching army had as many aspects of a procession celebrating the sacred

  nature of the Persian monarchy as it did of a military operation.83

  The great Persian army eventually reached Sochoi, situated somewhere

  in northern Mesopotamia in a place unknown to modern historians but

  definitely on the eastern side of the Amanus Mountains, behind which

  Parmenion’s corps was stationed. Darius now prepared for battle. In order

  to increase his army’s mobility he despatched most of the baggage trains

  and courtiers to Damascus. According to the ancient authors, Alexander’s

  command was unaware of the Persian forces up until they were just a few

  days’ march away from the Macedonian army. Unbelievable as this may

  seem, this might well have been the case. Once his army progressed

  beyond Caria, Alexander ceased being anyone’s liberator; beyond that

  boundary population was more sympathetic to the legal Persian authorities.

  The sources describe this attitude quite unambiguously in the cases of the

  inhabitants of Soli and Issus. That is why it now became difficult for the

  Macedonians to acquire reliable information about the enemy, and this

  nearly led to their undoing. Darius, on the other hand, was kept very well

  informed by his loyal subjects about the whereabouts of the Macedonian

  invader.84

  Having returned from western Cilicia, Alexander marched his army

  further east across the coastal plain to the south of Tarsus without re-

  entering the city. Soon afterwards he further divided his army into two. He

  ordered Philotas to continue advancing with the cavalry across the Aleian

  Plain to the river Pyramus (today Ceyhan), whereas he himself proceeded

  with the infantry and the royal ile of cavalry to the seaside town of

  Magarsus (today Karataş). This town was actually the port to the city of

  Mallus and it lay where in Antiquity the river Pyramus flowed into the

  Mediterranean Sea. The only reason for Alexander’s visit mentioned in the

  sources was to offer sacrifices at the local temple to Athena. Alexander’s

  soldiers built a bridge (at an unknown place) to get across the Pyramus and

  then his army proceeded to Mallus. One can suppose that it was in this city

  or in its vicinity that Alexander’s army was reunited with Philotas’s corps.

  There the Macedonians also quelled some disruptions, perhaps fighting

  between a democratic pro-Macedonian faction and a pro-Persian faction.

  Alexander did not force the inhabitants of Mallus to pay tributes, not

  because he was reverting to his previous policy of liberating Greek cities

  but for the ideological reason that he was supposed to be related to them.

  83 Curt., 3.3.8-25. Engels 1978, pp. 42-43; Atkinson 1980, pp. 120-133; Boyce

  1982, pp. 286-287; Seibert 1985, pp. 68-69; Nylander 1993, pp. 150-151.

  84 Arr., An. , 2.5.5, 2.6.1; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.2); Diod., 17.32.2-3; J., AJ, 11.8.3.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  163

  Legend had it that the city was founded by colonists from Argos, which

  was also the homeland of Heracles, the mythological ancestor of the

  Argead dynasty. However, as in the case of Soli, Mallus was obliged to

  supply ships. The next stop on Alexander’s itinerary was Castabalum,

  which lay a day’s journey from Mallus. It was there that Parmenion’s

  corps joined up with the main Macedonian army.85

  While he was still at Mallus Alexander learned that Darius was

  encamped in Sochoi. In response to this news he summoned a council.

  Next he marched his army closer towards the Persians until he reached the

  city of Myriandrus, whose exact location is unknown. We only know from

  Xenophon’s Anabasis that the city lay 5 parasang (27 km) from the Syrian

  Gates, therefore somewhere in the region of today’s city of Iskenderun and

  c. 140 km from Mallus. It took the Macedonian army five days to cover

  this distance. The ancient sources do not concur as to what Alexander’s

  actual plan was. Arrian states that objective of the march was to attack the

  Persian army where it was stationed. Curtius Rufus, on the other hand,

  states that Alexander accepted Parmenion’s advice to seek confrontation in

  a mountain pass where the terrain would not allow the Persians to make

  use of their numerical advantage. However, although the Battle of Issus

  did indeed take place in an area where numerical superiority failed to work

  in the Persians’ favour, Alexander’s actions contradict Curtius’s

  explanation. Not only did he not secure all of the mountain passes into

  Cilicia but, what is worse, he himself actually went through one of them to

  the other side, where he expected to find the Persian camp. Therefore the

  first version seems more probable, that is, an offensive plan to seek out the

  enemy forces and attack them where they were stationed. That was why

  Alexander crossed over to the other side of the Amanus Mountains. On the

  way Alexander’s army passed through Issus, which had previously been

  occupied by Parmenion. This fairly small town was in a place known

  today as Kinet Hüyük, on a low (20 m) hill half a kilometre from the sea

  and 7 km to the north west of today’s town of Dörtyol. The Macedonians

  set up a field hospital at Issus for their wounded and sick soldiers; thus the

  army was now free to move much faster. It has been estimated that

  Myriandrus was over 30 km from Issus and the Macedonian army covered

  that distance within one day. After this forced march, the Macedonian

  army had to stop over at Myriandrus on account of a violent storm. It was

  also there that Alexander received the disturbing news that Darius’ army

  was no longer at Sochoi and had now reappeared behind them. At first he

  could not believe this to be true, but the crew of a thirty-oar ship was sent

  85 Arr., An. , 2.5.8-9; Curt., 3.7.5; Str., 14.5.17; It. Alex. , 31. Bosworth 1980, pp.

  197-198; Huttner 1997, pp. 91-92.

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  out to reconnoitre and later it confirmed that the Persians were now indeed

  camped on the coast behind Alexander’s army.86

  Sochoi was situated on a broad plain that would have been ideal for the

  massed Persian cavalry if the Macedonians had crossed one of the

  mountain passes. The reason why the Great King left this strategically

  advantageous position and moved into mountainous Cilicia, where the

  terrain did no allow him to use his army’s numerical superiority is one of

  the greatest puzzles of the Macedonian-Persian war. Curtius’s suggestion

  that the Great King decided to move into Cilicia on receiving news of

  Alexander’s illness is quite unconvincing on account of the chronological

  sequence of events. Alexander’s illness lasted some time and was then

  followed by the Macedonian campaign in Cilicia, which in a way can

  explain the Persian army’s haste. Arrian writes about Darius’s drawn out

  stay at
Sochoi and uncertainty as to what Alexander was planning on

  account of the surprisingly long time he was spending in Cilicia as well as

  the imprudent advice of his Persian flatterers. The sycophants convinced

  the Great King that Alexander was too fearful of the mighty Persian army

  to advance any further. They encouraged Darius to engage Alexander in

  battle in Cilicia, for even there the excellent Persian cavalry was capable

  of defeating the Macedonians. Arrian and Plutarch show that the

  Macedonian fugitive Amyntas who knew Alexander well assured the

  Great King that the impetuous young ruler would be eager to fight. One

  only had to wait for him to turn up wherever a prepared Persian army was

  stationed. In Curtius’ account this were some anonymous Greek

  mercenaries who offered Darius this more sensible advice badly received

  by the Persian courtiers. We know that the Great King did not heed the

  sober words of the real expert or experts, but the sources do not tell us why

  he took the decision he did other than making some general comments

  about fate and a propensity to follow bad advice.87

  There is no reason to doubt the reports of sensible advisors in the

  Persian camp, even if Curtius Rufus’s account of mercenaries giving

  advice is probably erroneously borrowed form the incident between

  Charidemus and Darius at the Babylon conference. It is possible that one

  of the reasons why such advice was rejected – mentioned here by Curtius

  and also referred to in descriptions of councils in the Persian camp –

  concerned the mistrust held by the Iranian aristocracy towards the Greeks,

  86 X., An. , 1.4.6; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (=Plb., 12.17.2, 12.19.4); Arr., An. , 2.6.1, 2.7.1-2; Curt., 3.7.9-10. Engels 1978, pp. 47-51; Bosworth 1980, pp. 199-202; Bing 1993.

  87 Arr., An. , 2.6.3-7; Plu., Alex. , 20.1-4; Curt., 3.7.1, 3.8.1-11. Atkinson 1980, p.

  170.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  165

  whom they suspected of treason or at least being more concerned with

  their personal interests than with those of the Persian state. The Great King