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  also had to consider logistical problems: in Antiquity an army as large as

  his could not last long without new supplies of food, fodder and water.

  The delivery of new provisions was not feasible at Sochoi, which was not

  situated close to a river let alone near the coast. Even with the necessity of

  bringing the provisions in on wagons and pack animals the local resources

  of northern Mesopotamia and western Syria could not feed the great army

  for long; that is why one way or another Darius had to move his soldiers

  on from Sochoi. It was also no doubt for logistic reasons that the decision

  was made to send the main baggage trains 300 km away to Damascus; this

  way two parts of the great army did not have to seek provisions in the

  same area. Another factor may have been ideological: a representative of

  the heroic Persian monarchy could not idly wait for a numerically inferior

  enemy to take the initiative. According to Murison’s attractive theory, the

  decision to move could have been made when intelligence reports came in

  regarding the movements of the Macedonian army. Perhaps having learnt

  that the enemy’s army had divided into two detachments, those of

  Alexander and Parmenion, the Persians decided to launch a surprise attack

  and deal with each of them separately. The manoeuvre was indeed

  surprising. Darius’s army left Sochoi and marched north along the River

  Karasu Valley passing the southern Amanus mountain range. The Persians

  eventually crossed the mountains by passing through the so-called Amanic

  Gates. This could have been one of two passes: Bahçe, which today has

  road and rail links running through it, or Hasanbeyli, which is situated a

  bit further south. This 150-km march of the Persian army was not noticed

  by the Macedonian scouts. However, Darius failed, if such was his

  intention, to attack Parmenion’s corps when it was alone for it had in the

  meantime rejoined the main Macedonian army. It also turned out that there

  would be no battle between the two armies on the extensive Cilician

  Lowlands for the previous day the Macedonians had headed south.

  Apparently the Persian army had entered Cilicia the same night the

  Macedonians entered Syria and thus they passed each other by a few

  dozen kilometres. The Macedonian field hospital at Issus fell into the

  hands of the Persians, who realising the failure of their manoeuvre now

  vented their frustrated anger on the Macedonian patients. Some of the sick

  soldiers were murdered while others had their hands hacked off and next,

  having been shown the sheer size of the Persian army, they were allowed

  to escape, no doubt in the hope that their terrifying tales would break the

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  Macedonian will to fight. Indeed, these mutilated soldiers were the first to

  inform Alexander that the Persians were now behind his army.88

  The Persian strategy had surprised Alexander, who was now cut off

  from his bases in Cilicia and the rest of Asia Minor. When we also

  consider the superiority of the Persian fleet, which could cut off the supply

  of provisions by sea, it becomes apparent that the Macedonian army was

  now in a trap and the only way out of it was to defeat Darius III in a battle.

  Alexander must have certainly been aware of the threat from the Persian

  fleet for it was then that he performed the ceremony of driving his chariot

  into the sea to pay homage to the sea gods Poseidon, Thetis, Nereus and

  Nereids. Indeed, the Persians needed no more than an undecided draw on

  the battlefield to further extend their strategic advantage.89 Fortunately for

  the Macedonians, the Persian command also planned to rout their enemy

  in a pitched battle. Having obtained information from the captured

  Macedonians and the local population about where the enemy was located,

  Darius sent his army south in the direction of the coastal plain around

  Myriandrus and Syria, where there was a greater possibility of fighting a

  battle in open territory. He was now aware that the coastal plain of

  Iskenderun Bay was too narrow for him to make full advantage of Persian

  numerical superiority. During a day’s march his army got no further than

  the river Pinarus and there the Persians set up camp. Meanwhile Alexander,

  having realised that the Persian army was no longer in Cilicia, summoned

  a war council and declared his decision to confront the enemy in battle.

  Arrian relates a speech Alexander is supposed to have given on this

  occasion in which he drew attention to the tactical advantages of fighting

  the battle in a confined space and of the superior combat quality of the

  Macedonian soldier over feeble Asiatic slaves and mercenaries with no

  real incentive to fight for Darius. He is also said to have mentioned the

  rewards (booty) to be gained from defeating the Great King. Finally he

  referred to historic examples, particularly Xenophon’s recorded

  experiences of how in 401 Greek mercenaries victoriously marched from

  Babylon to the Black Sea. Although speeches related by ancient author are

  usually little more than demonstrations of a given historian’s rhetorical

  talents, here one should not doubt that Alexander did actually gave a

  speech. There was a tradition for commanders and politicians to deliver

  88 Curt., 3.8.3-5, 3.8.13-13; Arr., An. , 2.7.1; Plu., Alex. , 20.4-5. Wilcken 1967, pp.

  100-101; Murison 1972; Hamilton 1974, p. 67; Engels 1978, pp. 45-46; Bosworth

  1980, pp. 199-201, 203; Bosworth 1988, p. 59; Seibert 1985, p. 59; Dąbrowa 1988,

  p. 50; Hammond 1996, p. 95.

  89 POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) fr. 44, col. ii. Tarn 1948, i, p. 24; Green 1974, p.

  226-227; Briant 1996, p. 43.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  167

  speeches to an assembled audience when important decisions were made,

  so it is difficult to imagine that Alexander would have simply ordered his

  soldiers to march towards superior enemy forces without words of

  encouragement or explanations. Arrian’s account of what Alexander said

  is presented in reported speech and therefore one cannot accuse him of

  showing off with flowery language, which often occurs when ancient

  author’s claim to cite someone directly. Besides, Alexander’s fairly

  obvious arguments are confirmed in other accounts of a speech to his

  soldiers before the battle by Curtius Rufus and Justin.90

  Having spoken to his officers, Alexander ordered the soldiers to have

  their dinner and at the same sent a unit of riders and archers to survey the

  Syrian Gates, through which his army now had to return. The Macedonian

  army occupied the mountain passes at around midnight, there the soldiers

  rested among the rocks for the remainder of the night. Much later Cicero,

  as a governor of Cilicia fighting highlanders, would as also pitch camp

  there. Here too Alexander made sacrifices to the gods of the land where he

  would engage in battle against Darius. At dawn the army proceeded

  through the Syrian Gates, marching in a broad column stretching to both

  sides of the narrow valley with the infantry first and the cavalry, which

  was less useful in mountainous terrain, following on behind. Then when

  the
valley opened out, Alexander ordered his men to proceed in battle

  formation as if to expect the Persians to attack at any moment. Parmenion,

  commanding as usual the left wing, received categorical instructions to

  keep to the coastline, so that the Persians would not be able to outflank

  them. Callisthenes relates that Alexander had his army proceed for the last

  40 stades (7.2 km) towards the enemy in battle formation. Polybius, who is

  a harsh critic of this historian and eyewitness, notes that the unevenness of

  the Cilician terrain would have sooner or later disrupted the line of the

  phalanx and thus greatly weakened its military value against the enemy.

  Therefore perhaps battle formations were made at a later stage; both

  Curtius Rufus and Diodorus claim they were not drawn up until the

  Persians were 30 stades away. One should also remember that Alexander’s

  army needed a lot of time to get through the mountain pass (7.5 hours

  according to Engels’s estimate), which suggests that the battlefield was not

  90 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.3-4); Plu., Alex. , 20.5-6; Diod., 17.33.1; Arr., An. , 2.7; Curt., 3.10.3-10; Just., 11.9.3-4. Wilcken 1967, p. 101; Bosworth

  1980, p. 204.

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  far from the Syrian Gates if the two armies managed to clash that same

  day in November 333.91

  The battle known in historiography as the Battle of Issus was actually

  fought some distance away from that town at one of the short rivers

  flowing from the Amanus Mountains into the Iskenderun Bay, which the

  sources call Pinarus, on a narrow stretch of lowland measuring 14 stades

  (2.5 km) in width. The very limited topographical information that can be

  derived from the ancient sources as well as the hydrological changes that

  must have occurred in this part of the Mediterranean coast over the

  centuries do not allow us to identify with any reasonable certainty which

  of today’s watercourses was once called Pinarus. Therefore it is very

  difficult to accurately locate where the battle took place. Three possible

  locations have emerged from an academic debate that has lasted over a

  century: Deli Çay, Kuru Çay and Payas. At 20 km from Iskenderun, Payas

  is the southernmost of these rivers. Kuru Çay flows into the sea 3 km

  further north, and it is another 8 km to the Deli Çay. The attention of

  modern scholars was first drawn to the Deli Çay because it is the largest of

  these rivers, the generally level terrain to the south would have made a 40-

  stade march in battle formation possible and the gently sloped and low 2-3

  m banks would not have precluded the cavalry charge described by Arrian.

  On the other hand, the sources in no way suggest that Pinarus was the

  largest river in the area, the Macedonians probably marched in battle

  formation for a shorter distance than 40 stades and the coastal plain at Deli

  Çay stretches for 7.5 km, which is much more than the 14 stades described

  by Callisthenes. Moreover, the distance from Deli Çay to the Syrian Gates

  is much too great to imagine that the Macedonian army could have

  descended the mountains, reached this river and fought a battle all on the

  same day. Inspections of the region by more recent historians (Hammond

  and Lane Fox) have suggested that the Payas best fits the descriptions

  given by the ancient sources. Its banks are steeper but the plain around it is

  just 4 km wide which is much closer to the 14 stades mentioned by

  Callisthenes than the 7.5 km at the mouth of the Deli Çay.92

  91 Plb., 12.17-20; Arr., An. , 2.8; Diod., 17.33.1; Curt., 3.8.24; Cic., Att. , 5.20.3.

  Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Bosworth 1980, pp. 206-207, 219; Bosworth 1988, p.

  60. Date: Arr., An. , 2.11.10.

  92 Most important works arguing for identification of the Pinarus with these three

  rivers are: for Deli Çay – Janke 1910; Seibert 1972, pp. 98-102; Atkinson 1980, pp.

  471-476; for Kuru Çay – Bosworth 1988, p. 60; for Payas – Lane Fox 1973, pp.

  169-170; Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Hammond 1992, pp. 395-396; Hammond

  1996, pp. 97-101.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  169

  Descriptions in the ancient sources of the battle fought between the

  two armies in the afternoon of the same day the Macedonians had passed

  through the Syrian Gates are not entirely clear. This results not only from

  the fact that ancient authors were mainly interested in the personality of

  Alexander but also because of the inherent chaos of battles in Antiquity,

  where even the participants on the ground (and not for instance observers

  from city walls or some other raised position) had a problem with

  understanding what was actually happening. Already Polybius noted that

  the description provided by Callisthenes, who was a contemporary to these

  events, is unreliable on account of it not being compatible with the

  battlefield’s topography. For the above reasons the following description

  of the course of the Battle of Issus is also hypothetical. We know that the

  Persians first positioned some cavalry and light infantry on the southern

  bank of the Pinarus while the bulk of the Persian army assembled on the

  northern (right) bank. Before the battle commenced the Persian cavalry

  and light infantry returned to the right bank to join the main forces. The

  Greek mercenary infantry was positioned in the centre with the Persian

  cavalry to their right accompanied by a local infantry. Taking up positions

  at both wings of this formation were the kardakes – probably an Iranian

  heavy infantry though no doubt of much lower quality than hoplites.

  Indeed, apart from including them in the order of battle, the sources make

  no mention of the kardakes in the actual fighting. This might mean that

  they simply fled from the battlefield or alternatively that the ancient

  authors were only concentrating on particular participants, above all

  Alexander but also the Greek soldiers fighting on both sides. The left

  Persian wing extended at an angle to the rest of the front line far into the

  slopes of the mountains surrounding the coastal plain. The Great King

  took up a central position but nearer the left wing and was surrounded by

  bodyguards and elite cavalry. The Persian plan was most probably to stop

  the Macedonian phalanx in the centre with the mercenary hoplites, have

  the local infantry positioned on the hillside tie down as many of the

  Macedonian troops as possible through diversionary tactics and then use

  their cavalry on the right wing to deliver the decisive blow.93 On the

  opposite side Alexander arranged his phalanx eight ranks deep and

  positioned it in the centre. Mercenary detachments were positioned behind

  the phalanx. Parmenion was given command of the left wing, with

  comprised the allied cavalry, Thracian foot soldiers and light infantry.

  Alexander himself took command of the right wing, comprising the

  93 Plb., 12.17.6-18 (after Callisthenes); Arr., An. , 2.8.5-9, 2.8.11; Curt., 3.9.1-6.

  Bosworth 1980, pp. 208-209; Atkinson 1980, pp. 203-208; Hammond 1996, pp.

  101-103; Briant 1996, pp. 819-821; Sabin 2007, pp. 134-135.

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  Macedonian and Thessalian caval
ry. And it was with this force that he had

  planned to resolve the final outcome of the battle. But before it even began,

  Alexander learnt that most of the Persian cavalry was positioned opposite

  Parmenion’s weaker detachments on the left wing, so he reinforced it with

  his Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalians moved to the other wing from

  behind the Macedonian formations, so that the Persians would not notice

  the change. Against the local infantry facing his right wing Alexander

  positioned two squadrons of cavalry as well as some Agrianians and

  slingers.94

  These last Macedonian units had the greatest fortune for the local

  infantry on the Persian side did not take up the fight and just fled. Thus the

  all-important Macedonian right wing faced no danger. The infantry who

  were now no longer needed there moved to reinforce the phalanx in the

  centre.95 The rest of the Macedonian army had the much more difficult

  task of attacking the Persians across the river Pinarus. They were greeted

  by a shower of arrows – so dense that they collided with one another in the

  air, as Diodorus with some artistic licence would have us believe. But the

  sources do not tell us how effective this hail of missiles was. The left

  Macedonian wing was unable to make progress against the massed Persian

  cavalry, which managed to repulse Parmenion’s attack and then chase his

  squadrons over to the southern side of the river. Here both sides were

  engaged in intensive fighting up until the Persian frontline collapsed on

  the other wing. 96 In the centre the mercenary hoplites attacked the

  Macedonian phalanx before it had finished crossing the river. As the

  Macedonians tried to ascend the fairly steep and brambly bank, parts of

  their phalanx line got disjoined. This the Greek mercenaries exploited

  mercilessly by concentrating on those sections in particular. On this

  occasion the Greek hoplites fought with a far greater doggedness than was

  normal for mercenaries. This was because the phalanx symbolised

  Macedonian military dominance in Greece and therefore the mercenaries