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coins that had been produced at Tarsus for the satrap Mazaeus towards the

  end of Persian rule in Cilicia indicates that Alexander had simply taken

  over the same mint and the same staff now used the same dies to strike the

  new coins. Naturally the issuing of coins is above all an economic

  enterprise; one which was made possible thanks to the capture of

  considerable amounts of precious metal at Issus. On the other hand, one

  cannot but also associate it with the historic importance of the Battle of

  Issus itself. After this great victory Alexander began speaking more openly

  about his intention to rule over the entire Achaemenid Empire. From the

  propaganda point of view this was therefore a good moment to issue a new

  coin that stressed this claim.104

  5. Phoenicia. Syria and Palestine

  After an all-night flight the defeated king of Persia arrived at a place called

  Onchai (exact location today unknown) somewhere on the Amik Plain in

  western Syria (today Turkey, near Antakya – in Antiquity Antioch on the

  Orontes). He had gathered troops on the way, so that at Onchai there were

  with him either 4,000 Greek mercenaries (according to Curtius) or 4,000

  troops in all (according to Arrian). The king and these soldiers next made a

  forced march east to cross the Euphrates at Thapsacus and thence to

  Babylon. Despite the defeat, Darius had absolutely no intention of

  surrendering. 105 We know that, apart from the soldiers accompanying

  Darius, also large numbers of other Greek mercenaries had survived the

  104 Curt., 3.12.13; Arr., An. , 2.12.1-2; It. Alex. , 36; St. Byz., s.v. IssÒj. Heckel 1992, pp. 260-261; Salazar 2000, pp. 186-187, 194; Le Rider 2003, pp. 161-169.

  105 Arr., An. , 2.13.1; Curt., 4.1.1-3; Diod., 17.39.1. Bosworth 1980, p. 222;

  Atkinson 1980, pp. 267-268; Seibert 1985, p. 70.

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  Battle of Issus. Unfortunately the sources give us inconsistent information

  regarding the size of the groups and the routes they took to rejoin the rest

  of the Persian army. At least 8,000 commanded by the Macedonian

  Amyntas as well as the Greeks Aristomedes, Thymondas and Bianor

  reached the city of Tripoli (in Lebanon), where Persian ships were

  stationed. From there they sailed to Cyprus, where they divided into two

  groups. 4,000 of these soldiers next sailed with Amyntas to Egypt, which

  seemed to be an easy prey after the country’s satrap Sabaces had been

  killed at Issus. In Egypt Amyntas, claiming to have been appointed by

  Darius III the new satrap or overall commander of troops, succeeded in

  capturing the important fortress of Pelusium. Next he sailed up the Nile to

  Memphis, defeated the city’s garrison in a pitched battle and allowed his

  soldiers to plunder the area around the Egyptian capital. It was then that

  Mazaces, who had genuinely been appointed Sabaces’s successor as satrap

  of Egypt, launched a sally out of the beleaguered city and slaughtered

  Amyntas’s dispersed soldiers.106 Another 8,000 Greek veterans of Issus,

  no doubt including the remaining 4,000 mercenaries that had originally

  sailed to Cyprus, eventually turned up in Crete, where they entered the

  service of King Agis III of Sparta in his conflict against pro-Macedonian

  party on that island.107

  The rest of the Persian army that had survived the Battle of Issus made

  its way into the interior of Asia Minor, where it continued the war against

  Alexander. In the winter of 333/332 a significant number of Iranian

  detachments together with their commanders, including the highest

  ranking official in Persia, the hazarapatiš Nabarzanes, gathered in

  Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and Cilicia. Some scholars presume that these

  Persian forces were acting on the Great King’s orders and that their

  mission was to cut Alexander’s supply lines, recapture territories right up

  to the coast so as to re-establish contact with the Persian fleet and even to

  retake Sardis. Unfortunately, the ancient sources do not provide evidence

  that could univocally lead us to such a conclusion. There is even no

  evidence that there was any coordination between the actions of the

  various Persian commanders. This would have indeed been extremely

  difficult considering the means of communication between forces in those

  times, that is, by using runners who would have had to have constantly cut

  across enemy occupied territory. The Persian commanders did, however,

  levy fresh troops in Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, and next entered Lydia.

  106 Curt., 4.1.27-33; Diod., 17.48.2-5; Arr., An. , 2.13.1-3. Parke 1933, p. 199;

  Bosworth 1980, pp. 222-223.

  107 Arr., An. , 2.13.2; Diod., 17.48.1; Curt., 4.1.39-40. Badian 1961, p. 26; Atkinson

  1980, p. 291.

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  The Macedonian satrap of this district, Antigonus, did not have a large

  force, but by skilfully exploiting the region’s network of roads he was able

  to separately defeat each of the three Persian armies in turn. After these

  victories his army entered Lycaonia, while another Macedonian

  commander, Calas, invaded Paphlagonia. These battles did not mark the

  final defeat of the Persians in Asia Minor, large parts of which the

  Macedonians never managed to conquer. Nevertheless, thanks to the

  exceptional military talents of Antigonus the crisis in the region was

  overcome and Alexander no longer had to fear his land connections with

  Macedonia being cut.108

  It was also in 332 that the fate of the Persian fleet was sealed and that

  of the Aegean Sea campaign with it. In the spring Pharnabazus lost

  successive squadrons of Phoenician kings returning to their homeland on

  news of the advancing Macedonian army. Most switched their allegiance

  to Alexander’s winning side, whereas the ships of Tyre hurried to save

  their beleaguered city. That same spring the squadrons of the Cypriot

  kings also suddenly sailed away from Pharnabazus’s fleet and joined

  forces with the victorious Macedonian land army. Unrest spread across the

  Greek islands of the Aegean. When a fleet of 160 ships commanded by

  Hegelochus and Amphoterus led to a Macedonian occupation of Tenedos,

  fighting started between pro-Macedonian and pro-Persian factions on

  Chios. Pharnabazus managed to intervene in time. He imprisoned the

  supporters of Macedonia and left a small detachment of troops to keep the

  island secure for the pro-Persian politicians Apollonides and Athenagoras.

  However, thanks to secret allies within the city, Hegelochus and

  Amphoterus occupied Chios, arresting not only the pro-Persian politicians

  but also Pharnabazus. Soon they also captured a pro-Persian tyrant of

  Methymna in Lesbos, who sailed into the port of Chios with five ships

  quite unaware that it was now in Macedonian hands. Then in the summer

  of 332 the Macedonian flotilla sailed to Lesbos, where the sources report

  that only the tyrant of Mytilene, Chares, put up resistance with the 2,000

  mercenaries the Persian commanders had left behind. After a short siege

  Mytilene capitulated on such terms that Chares and the mercenaries were

  allowed to sail to Imbros. Chares’s resistance had been short-lived on


  account of the pro-Macedonian stance of most of the inhabitants of this

  largest of the poleis on Lesbos; it was for this stance that in 331 Alexander

  rewarded Mytilene with financial compensation and land in Asia Minor

  closest to the Island of Lesbos. The Macedonians went on to capture the

  large island of Kos, while other islands not named in the sources now also

  108 Diod., 17.48.5-6; Curt., 4.1.34-35, 4.5.13. Goukowsky 1975, p. 263; Billows

  1990, pp. 41-46; Briant 1996, p. 851; Debord 1999, pp. 462-465.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  179

  went over to their side. In November or December 332 Hegelochus could

  report to Alexander that the war in the Aegean was over. The Macedonian

  king ordered the captured leaders of the pro-Persian oligarchies to be sent

  back to their home states to be punished; only Apollonides of Chios and

  his companions were kept interned in Elephantine in southern Egypt.109

  Immediately after the Battle of Issus Alexander dispatched Parmenion

  to Damascus to capture the baggage train that was stationed there. Curtius

  presents a very detailed and dramatic account that is not contradicted by

  any of the much more concise accounts of other authors. Parmenion set off

  with a small number of soldiers and after a forced march reached

  Damascus on the fourth day. On the way he had capture a courier bearing

  a message from the commandant of Damascus to Alexander with an offer

  to give up the treasures. Unfortunately this messenger next escaped, which

  made the Macedonians fear this was just a trap and the Persian general

  uncertain whether his offer of capitulation was accepted. That was why the

  Persian baggage train left Damascus in the middle of a ferocious blizzard.

  Parmenion sent three ilai of cavalry after this train which caught up with it

  and forced it to return to Damascus. Vast amounts of treasure fell into

  Macedonian hands, including 2,600 talents, 7,000 pack animals and

  30,000 captives. The greatest beneficiary was of course Alexander himself.

  But the captured treasures of Issus and Damascus also enriched many of

  the soldiers; according to Plutarch, the Thessalian cavalry in particular had

  deliberately been sent with Parmenion to reward them for their valour in

  the battle. Alexander received from Damascus a precious container which

  Darius had allegedly used to keep perfumes; henceforth Alexander used it

  to hold his copy of the Iliad and it accompanied him everywhere he went.

  A real or fictitious letter from Parmenion cited by Athenaeus states that

  among the captured royal servants there were: 329 female musicians, 46

  wreath makers, 277 cooks, 29 cooking specialists, 13 dairy specialists, 17

  drinks specialists, 70 pourers of wine and 40 perfumers. Among the

  relatives of satraps and Persian notables captured at Damascus was a

  Persian woman renowned for her exceptional beauty and Greek education

  called Barsine, an Achaemenid after her father, Artabazus, and

  successively the widow of first Mentor and next of Memnon. Now she

  became Alexander’s concubine; the fruit of their relationship was a son

  called Heracles, who was born around 327 but was never recognised as

  Alexander’s legitimate heir. Also captured at Damascus were ambassadors

  sent to the Great King by Greek states obviously in the expectation of

  Alexander’s defeat and of gaining some political benefits for themselves

  109 Arr., An. , 3.2.3-7; Curt., 4.5.14-22, 4.8.13; IG xii.2.6. Bosworth 1980, pp. 266-269; Heisserer 1980, pp. 96-111, 118-139.

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  out of it. The envoys from Athens and Sparta were to be kept under guard

  in the Macedonian camp up until Darius III’s ultimate defeat. The Theban

  delegates, on the other hand, were released both on account of Alexander’s

  qualms about destroying their city as well as because Thebes and

  Macedonia were officially at war and so their pro-Persian stance was fully

  justified.110

  The main Macedonian forces most probably stayed for some time near

  Issus. It was then that Alexander carried out the administrative measures

  and soon afterwards also made the first appointments concerning Syria.

  Arrian mentions a certain Menon, son of Cerdimmas, whom he appoints

  satrap of Coele-Syria, whereas Curtius states this same territory was put

  under the control of Parmenion. In all probability both these sources are

  using terminologies from later eras: Curtius is referring to the Koile Syria

  of Hellenistic times, when it denoted the entire Syrian-Palestinian coast,

  whereas Arrian is referring to the Early Roman Empire period, when

  Coele-Syria exclusively denoted the north-western part of Syria. Therefore

  we can assume that Menon was made military commander of northern

  Syria, whereas Parmenion was given military control of the central and

  southern coastal regions, a responsibility he soon passed on to

  Andromachus. Sometime in 332 there also appears an Iranian satrap called

  Arimmas, who is put in charge of civilian administration.111 Alexander’s

  armies no doubt set off south towards Phoenicia before the end of 333. By

  choosing this direction, i.e. to conquer the Persian satrapy of Ebirnari

  (‘Beyond the River’, i.e. Euphrates) and later Egypt, Alexander may have

  made the most important strategic decision of his life. After his victory at

  Issus, Alexander was afforded the rare luxury in politics of having the

  freedom to choose from a number of options. Instead of heading for

  Phoenicia, he could have pursued Darius III, who was then fleeing to

  Babylon. If successful, this other option – incidentally much more in

  keeping with Alexander’s impulsive nature – could have ensured a swift

  victory in the war against the Great King. Some modern historians have

  criticised Alexander for not opting for this rapid strategic solution. But

  here we should only note that Alexander’s strategy of conquering Syria

  110 Curt., 3.12.27-3.13.17; Arr., An. , 2.15.1-5; Diod., 20.20.1; Curt., 10.6.11;

  Polyaen., 4.5.1; Ath., 13.87; Plu., Alex. , 21.8-9, 24.1-3, 26.1; Plu., Eum. , 1.7; Paus., 9.7.2; Just., 13.2.7; Plin., Nat. , 7.108; It. Alex. , 41. Brunt 1975; Carney 2000, pp.

  102-105.

  111 Arr., An. , 2.13.7, 3.6.8 (followed by It. Alex. , 38); Curt., 4.1.4, 4.5.9. Bosworth 1980, pp. 224-225; Sartre 2001, p. 90.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

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  and Egypt first and defeating Darius later not only proved successful but

  also minimised the risks of enemy diversions behind his line.112

  The route the Macedonian army took most probably ran through the

  Syrian Gates to the valley of the river Orontes (today Asi), thence via the

  river Eleutherus valley between the Amanus Mountains and Lebanon to

  the Mediterranean coast. When the Macedonian army entered Phoenicia,

  Alexander was greeted with a gold crown handed to him by Straton –

  according to Arrian, the son of Gerostratus, the ruler of Aradus (which the

  Phoenicians called Arwad – today, Ar-Ruad in Syria). By then Straton had

  probably already decided to take over the throne from his father for

  Curtius describes him as the king of Aradus and in fact there are coins

  from that land with this legend. It is even poss
ible that Straton made this

  decision while his father’s ships were still part of Autophradates’s fleet

  and the arrival of the Macedonian army gave the young pretender an

  excellent opportunity to switch sides in the conflict for his personal gain.

  Aradus was the northernmost Phoenician state and that is why the

  Macedonians entered its territory first. In Persian times Phoenicia was not

  a single administrative region (satrapy or province) but a collection of

  small separate states individually subordinate to the satrap of Ebirnari.

  These states had considerable autonomy. There were native monarchs

  ruling as vassals of the Great King but also as the highest priests to the

  local gods. The power of the monarchs was shared with councils of elders,

  comprising the wealthiest Phoenicians. For most of the Persian period

  relations between the autonomous Phoenician states and the central

  authorities were exemplary. The naval might of the Achaemenid Empire

  was based on the excellence of the Phoenician fleet. However, in the 4th

  century these relations somewhat soured, most notably when Tabnit

  (Tennes in Greek), the ruler of the largest Phoenician city-state, Sidon,

  rebelled against Artaxerxes III, as a result of which the city was destroyed

  and reputedly as many as 40,000 inhabitants slaughtered. When the

  Macedonian army entered Phoenicia there was no longer any city-state

  that dominated the others politically. Straton, the king of the first

  Phoenician state to side with the conquering Macedonians was officially

  confirmed as ruler of his kingdom by Alexander.113

  When the Macedonian army was in the city Marathus (today Amrit in

  Syria, 11 km to the south of Tartus), which was part of the kingdom of

  Aradus, a messenger brought Alexander a letter from Darius III. This was

  112 Badian 1985, p. 432; Ashley 1998, pp. 237-238.

  113 Arr., An. , 2.13.7-8, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.6; It. Alex. , 38. Moscati 1968, pp. 24-29; Bosworth 1980, p. 226; Atkinson 1980, p. 270; Seibert 1985, p. 80; Grainger 1991,

  pp. 5-34; Maier 1994, pp. 319-330.

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