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  Chapter IV

  the start of a long diplomatic correspondence between the two rulers. All

  the major sources mention this exchange of letters, but the way in which

  they present Darius’s successive proposals and Alexander’s responses to

  them is so convoluted that any attempt to reconstruct these events can only

  be hypothetical. One can only be certain that Darius wrote to his adversary

  on three occasions and that on each occasion he increased his offer. The

  ancient authors all agree that in the letter received by Alexander at

  Marathus Darius demanded the release of the captured members of his

  family. According to Arrian, who gives the most detailed account of this

  first diplomatic exchange, Darius also accused Philip and Alexander of

  breaking their alliance with Persia and unjustly invading the country,

  whereas the outcome of the Battle of Issus he attributed to the will of the

  gods. In response Alexander recalled real and imagined wrongs committed

  by Persians against Greece and Macedonia, accused Darius of lacking the

  legitimacy to rule and finally declared himself – by right of being

  victorious in battle – to be the rightful monarch of Asia, in other words,

  the Persian Empire. In a much more general manner Curtius also relates

  this exchange of views regarding responsibility for the war as well as other

  rival claims and there is no reason to doubt that the two monarchs referred

  to each other in this way. Alexander’s letter was not addressed exclusively

  to Darius but also to a much wider audience. His use of the arguments of

  Panhellenic propaganda (Persian crimes in Greece) and his questioning of

  Darius’s right to the Persian throne must have been directed more to public

  opinion. In this letter Alexander for the first time so openly declares his

  aspirations to the Persian throne. He refers to himself as the ‘king of Asia’,

  which could only mean the ruler of the Achaemenid empire, reserving for

  Darius at most the position of vassal. We know that at the moment of

  writing this was far from the case as Darius still had control of most of the

  empire, but it is the declaration itself that is important. For the first time

  Alexander openly announced that he intended to capture the Achaemenid

  throne and that this was his real war aim. Both Arrian and Curtius mention

  Darius’s offer of peace and friendship in return for the freeing of his

  family, but only Curtius also mentions the offer to pay a ransom, which

  would have been quite natural in such situations. This last offer in the

  peace negotiations is also mentioned in other sources and there is every

  reason to believe that it was actually made. What we do not know is the

  actual size of the ransom for the only sum mentioned in the sources –

  10,000 talents in Itinerarium Alexandri – was probably copied from a later

  offer made by Darius. Nevertheless, the amount offered must have been

  vast because this was, after all, a ransom for the family of the Great King.

  An exceptionally important part of Darius’s letter was his offer of peace

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  and friendship since this was a de facto recognition of Alexander as a king

  equal to ruler of Persia. In other words, Darius was resigning from the so

  far maintained Achaemenid political theory that placed the Great King

  above other monarchs and states. On the other hand, there is no mention

  made of any territorial concessions, which at first sight might seem strange

  in light of the war so far and the loss of much of Asia Minor. However,

  this was only Darius’s first offer and he must have wanted to reserve some

  concessions so that they could be used at a later stage in the negotiations.

  Alexander rejected all of Darius’s proposals and responded with a letter

  that was deliberately insulting. The impression seems to be that on this

  occasion, as in later diplomatic exchanges, Alexander was trying to

  provoke his adversary to confront him again militarily, so that the war

  could be ultimately resolved on the battlefield. Moreover, in light of

  inconsistencies in the sources regarding Darius’s offers, one cannot reject

  outright the idea suggested by Diodorus that Alexander kept the Persian

  monarch’s real letter hidden and revealed to those around him a forgery

  which concentrated mainly on who was responsible for the war. The real

  offer might have been so beneficial to the Macedonian side that its

  rejection would have angered those of Alexander’s soldiers and officers

  not interested in the continuing of the war after having already gained so

  much. The genuine letter would have been kept hidden by the royal

  secretary and not revealed until after Alexander’s death. If that were the

  case, our sources could have combined elements of one version of the

  Great King’s letter with the other. However, this is only a hypothesis, as

  there is not enough primary evidence to prove or disprove it.114

  The Macedonian army left Marathus most probably at the start of

  January 332 and headed south along the Phoenician coast. The next

  Phoenician state they entered after Aradus was Byblos (Gubal, today Jbeil

  in Lebanon), and it too capitulated without resistance. The decision to

  surrender must have been made by the council of elders as the last king of

  Byblus, Ainel (Enylus in Arrian’s Greek transcript), was still commanding

  the Byblos squadron of ships in Autophradates’s fleet.115 Soon afterwards,

  under pressure from his subjects, the king of the next Phoenician state,

  Sidon (today Saida in Lebanon), was also forced to capitulate. However,

  despite his capitulation, King Abdashtart III (in Greek sources Straton) of

  114 Arr., An. , 2.14; Curt., 4.1.7-14; Diod., 17.39.1-2; Just., 11.12; It. Alex. , 39-40.

  Tarn 1948, i, pp. 36-37; Wilcken 1967, pp. 106-107; Griffith 1968; Lane Fox 1973,

  p. 180; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 222-227; Bosworth 1980, pp. 227-233; Mehl 1980,

  pp. 185-186; Briant 1980, pp. 51-64; Bloedow 1995; Hamilton 1999, pp. 70-71.

  115 Arr., An. , 2.15.6, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.15. Moscati 1968, p. 26; Atkinson 1980, p.

  279; Dąbrowa 1988, p. 59; Sartre 2001, pp. 42-43.

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  Sidon did not gain Alexander’s trust perhaps because he was a son of the

  king appointed to the throne by Artaxerxes III after the quelling of the

  rebellion of Sidon. Therefore Alexander had him removed from power and

  most probably executed. The ancient sources devote a great deal of

  attention to the matter of the succession to the Sidonian throne. There is a

  tale that in Hellenistic and Roman times would become a classic example

  of the omnipotence of Tyche, the goddess of fortune, who could

  unexpectedly topple people from the highest positions of authority and

  raise others from the depths of obscurity. Having deposed Abdashtart,

  Alexander learned that there was no rightful successor to the throne and so,

  wishing to maintain the same political system as before, he asked his

  closest companion Hephaestion to find an appropriate candidate. Well

  born Sidonians informed Hephaestion of Abdalonymus, who was the only

  surviving male member of the royal dynasty but a mere gar
dener. The

  ancient authors with relish portray a scene of officials and soldiers

  approaching this humble man at work in a garden, have him dressed in

  ceremonial robes, presented before Alexander and then installed on the

  throne. Regardless of whether or not this colourful description of events is

  true, we know for certain that Abdalonymus did become king. Moreover,

  he was the first Asian to be included among Alexander’s Companions.

  Abdalonymus’s greatest contribution to posterity happened years later

  when he commissioned the famous marble Alexander Sarcophagus. One

  of the longer sides depicts Alexander and his companions fighting the

  Persians at the Battle of Issus. The other side presents a lion hunt, which is

  often interpreted as one of outings the newly nominated king of Sidon

  organised in the Lebanon hills to entertain his benefactor and hetairoi.116

  In the winter of 332 Alexander reached the last of the major

  Phoenician cities – Tyre. This would have been in February for we know

  from Curtius’s account that at the time the inhabitants of Tyre were

  celebrating the feast of Melqart-Baal and other sources state that this feast

  was always held in that month. The victorious Macedonian march was

  supposed to stop at this city until summer. Initially there were no signs of

  the trouble that lay ahead. King Azemilcus was away with his Tyrian

  squadron supporting Autophradates’s fleet, so his son headed a delegation

  – appointed either by the people’s assembly (according to Arrian) or, more

  probably, by an aristocratic council of elders. They greeted Alexander with

  116 Arr., An. , 2.15.6; Ath., 12.41; Curt., 4.1.15-26; Diod., 17.47 (Diodorus mistook

  Tyre for Sidon); Plu., mor. , 340c-e (Paphos is the setting of the story); Just.,

  11.10.8-9. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 180-181; Atkinson 1980, pp. 278-283; Grainger

  1991, pp. 30-31, 34-35; Stewart 1993, pp. 294-306; Heckel 1997, p. 199; Sartre

  2001, pp. 44, 72; Nawotka 2003, pp. 128-129.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  185

  a heavy gold crown as a sign of surrender and with food for the soldiers as

  a sign of hospitality. Alexander accepted these gifts, but also announced to

  the Tyrians that he wished to lay an offering at the temple of Heracles,

  which is the name the ancient authors give to the god of Tyre, Melqart-

  Baal. The sources do not fully explain why Alexander made such a request

  let alone why he was so unyielding about it. Ultimately this request led to

  a siege that lasted many months and ended with the destruction of Tyre.

  Modern historians often suggest that, by entering the town with troops to

  lay offerings at the temple, Alexander wanted to test the sincerity of the

  Tyrian declaration and confirm its submission. However, this is not the

  only possible explanation of the events that happened in February 332, all

  the more so as one cannot point to any sensible strategic considerations

  that would have forced Alexander to impose on the Tyrians an

  unconditional surrender even at the cost of a many month long and costly

  siege. This major conflict could also have been started by a cultural

  misunderstanding which both sides were subsequently unable to stop from

  escalating. As many other incidents in his life demonstrate, Alexander had

  a very scrupulous habit of offering sacrifices to gods, particularly those

  with whom he felt a close affiliation. And this was particularly true with

  regard to his mythological ancestor Heracles. According to Tyrian

  religious principles, on the other hand, no one but the king could lead a

  procession to lay offerings to the city’s god. Therefore, if they allowed

  Alexander to lead such a procession, they would have to recognise him as

  their king and thus renounce the sovereignty they had so jealously guarded

  for centuries. Trying to find a way out that would leave their status of

  sovereignty intact but also not offend the powerful Macedonian ruler, the

  Tyrians suggested that Alexander should lay his offerings at a different,

  allegedly even older temple of Melqart located in Old Tyre on the

  mainland and therefore beyond the main city of Tyre. This refusal, albeit

  polite, provoked one of Alexander’s famous outbursts of anger. Now in a

  quite different, indeed demanding tone he gave an ultimatum: they would

  comply with his request or else he would have the city stormed. After

  some hesitation, the Tyrians rejected the ultimatum but offered in return to

  stay neutral and allow neither Macedonian nor Persian troops into the city.

  Using such an argument in negotiations with Alexander was exceptionally

  unfortunate, as Miletus had discovered one and a half years earlier. Only

  one of the ancient authors, Curtius, claims that at this stage Alexander

  tried to continue the negotiations; in his version Alexander once again sent

  messengers to the Tyrians, but they had now decided on war and so killed

  the messengers. Ancient accounts also relate (after Chares) that when

  ordering the start of the siege, Alexander mentioned that he had had a

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  dream in which Heracles took him by the hand and led him to Tyre.

  Alexander’s soothsayer interpreted this to mean that the city would be

  taken but only after a long hard struggle as foretold in the twelve labours

  of Heracles.117

  Apart from the force of religious conviction, the Tyrians’ decision to

  refuse the ultimatum was also based on a faith in the strength of their fleet

  and the natural impenetrability of their city. For this great city with an

  estimated population of 50,000 inhabitants was located on an island very

  close to the shore and on more than one occasion it had proved able to

  withstand even very large land armies. Phoenician mastery of the art of

  siege warfare as well as of constructing fortifications was among the most

  advanced of its day, whereas its fleet, with new five-row type ships, was at

  least equal to that of the Greeks. Along the edge of the Tyrian island there

  was a 45-metre wall of cemented together stone. In the past only a sea

  blockade had been able to force Tyre to negotiate, but at the start of 332

  the Persian fleet largely supported by Phoenician ships still prevailed in

  the Aegean, and this must have certainly given the Tyrians a false sense of

  security. The inhabitants were also counting on support from their

  powerful colony Carthage, whose delegates were incidentally present at

  the metropolis on account of the Melqart festival. Citizens unable to carry

  arms were now shipped off to Carthage, not only for their own safety but

  also to make food supplies in the city last longer for the defenders.

  Diodorus attributes the Tyrians with the intention of holding the

  Macedonian army tied down for as long as possible so that Darius could

  have enough time to raise a new army. But perhaps these were just the

  author’s own speculations or those of the source he derived the

  information from, for in 332 there is no evidence of any coordination

  between the actions of Darius III and the defence of Tyre. Instead of

  concentrating his forces and launching an attack on Alexander from

  behind, the Great King
wasted his time on ineffective diplomacy and as a

  consequence not only lost Phoenicia but also Egypt.118

  The island of Tyre was just four stades (700 m) from the shore.

  Moreover the water in the strait between the island and the coast was very

  shallow except for the part right next to the island, which was five metres

  117 Arr., An. , 2.15.6-16.8, 2.18.1; Curt., 4.2.1-7, 4.215-17; Diod., 17.40.2-3; Plu.,

  Alex., 24.6; Just., 11.10; It. Alex. , 42. Wilcken 1967, p. 109; Moscati 1968, pp. 26-27, 30-41; Edmunds 1971; Lane Fox 1973, p. 181; Green 1974, pp. 247-248;

  Atkinson 1980, pp. 298-299; Bosworth 1980, p. 235; Bosworth 1988, p. 65;

  Bloedow 1998, pp. 270-276.

  118 Diod., 17.40.3; Arr., An. , 2.18.2, 2.21.4; Just., 11.10. Sartre 2001, pp. 73-74.

  Population of Tyre: Hammond 1996, p. 113.

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  deep. That is why Alexander instructed his men to construct a mole from

  the mainland. Perhaps he was inspired by the tyrant of Syracuse Dionysius,

  who in 397 had his engineers construct a causeway to capture the Sicilian

  Punic fortress of Motya. Ultimately, this Macedonian engineering venture

  also proved to be successful; today Tyre is connected permanently to the

  mainland by this mole (a tombolo in fact) in time expanded with accretion

  of sand. However, its construction and thus the capture of Tyre proved

  much more difficult than Alexander had originally supposed. The king did

  not just encourage his men with speeches recorded by the ancient authors

  but is even said to have himself carried baskets with soil used to create the

  mole. Initially the builders made rapid progress. Tree trunks were hauled

  down from Mount Lebanon to create stakes that were easily driven into the

  muddy seabed. These palisades delineated the mole’s outline and protected

  the subsequently deposited rocks and stones from the effects of the waves.

  The houses of Old Tyre were demolished and their masonry was used as

  building material for the causeway. Initially merely amused by the

  Macedonian efforts, the Tyrians changed their mind once the mole’s

  structure started to emerge out of the water and came up ever closer to