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would have been to the south of the 250 mm isohyet where the lack of
water meant a shortage of grass and therefore also a shortage of fodder for
animals. By then a couple of months had passed since the harvest and all
the grain and straw would have been long ago transported to the towns.
Therefore the only way for the Macedonians to get hold of food for the
soldiers and fodder for the horses and pack animals would have been to
rob the granaries of fortified towns, which would have required even more
effort and time. It is therefore quite understandable why Alexander chose
to take a northerly route across the foothills of the Armenian highland,
most probably along an ancient Babylonian military road. It may not have
been an ideal route for soldiers but it was better than marching through
central Mesopotamia. In the summer the temperatures in the north of this
country are and were almost 10oC lower, the wells and what rivers there
were (the Balikh and the Khabur) provided enough water and the pastures
supplied enough food for the animals. According to Eratosthenes –
referring to the notes of Macedonian surveyors ( bematists) – Alexander
selected the shortest route between Thapsacus and the Tigris. The army
5 Arr., An. , 3.7.1-2; Curt., 4.9.12; It. Alex. , 54. Engels 1978, pp. 65-66; Bosworth 1980, pp. 285-286; Atkinson 1980, p. 382; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 66-67. The alleged
secret dealings of Mazaeus: Lane Fox 1973, p. 227.
King of Asia
217
covered the 2,400 stades (430 km) to reach the other great Mesopotamian
river in the second half of September 331.6
In that time Darius III had managed to gather another army for the
decisive battle against the Macedonian invaders. For the first time in 200
years the king of Persia was cut off from the Mediterranean Sea and
therefore from the Greek mercenary recruitment market. Now there were
only around 4,000 left in his service, which was as many as had retreated
with him from Issus. In an attempt to compensate for the shortage of
hoplites the Persians provided their Asian infantry with better weapons
modelled on the Macedonian example, i.e. longer spears and swords.
However, if only because there had not been enough time to train, this
experiment did not prove to be successful and the infantry failed to have a
discernable impact on the battlefield. The fundamental force in the army
amassed by Darius III was, as usual, the Persian cavalry. The long time the
Great King had to prepare enabled him to bring over the best horsemen of
the empire from eastern Iran: the cavalry of Bactria and of Sogdiana as
well as allied Scythian detachments. With their excellent horses, good
training and flexible armour the east Iranian riders were of comparable
military value to the Macedonian hetairoi and Thessalian cavalry. On the
other hand, Darius’s 200 chariots with 2/3 m scythes to cut or terrify the
enemy were an exotic anachronism. Fifteen war elephants were brought
over from India. All the ancient authors cite huge numbers of soldiers in
the Persian army: 200,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry according to
Curtius, 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry – Justin, 800,000 infantry
and 200,000 cavalry – Diodorus, 1,000,000 soldiers – Plutarch,
Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, or even 1,000,000 infantry and 400,000 cavalry
according to Arrian. Even the lowest of these figures given by Curtius is a
gross exaggeration but, despite this, Alexander’s army was certainly
numerically inferior to that of the Persians. It has been estimated that he
had approximately 47,000 men. The weakness of Darius’s army was its
disparate ethnicity which hindered communication and effective command.7
The Persian army gathered at Babylon. The reason for this was no
doubt not only Mesopotamia’s agricultural potential, which was well able
to adequately feed such an army, but also strategic considerations. Darius
probably assumed that Alexander would follow the example of Cyrus the
Younger and march to Babylon directly from Thapsacus. That would have
6 Eratosthenes, ap. Str., 2.1.38; Arr., An. , 3.7.3; Curt., 4.9.13-14; It. Alex. , 54.
Engels 1978, pp. 67-70; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 68-69.
7 Arr., An. , 3.8.3-6, 3.11.7, 3.12.5; Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.2-4, 4.12.13; Plu.,
Alex. , 31.1; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.12; Just., 11.12; It. Alex. , 55.
Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 75-90; Bosworth 1988, pp. 76-78.
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Chapter V
been why he moved the great Persian army out of Babylon north towards
Nineveh, so that this time he could make full advantage of his excellent
east Iranian cavalry on the extensive Mesopotamian Lowland plain. But of
course the two armies did not meet there for the Macedonians chose to
march across northern Mesopotamia to the Tigris. Darius therefore was
also forced to move his army east across the Tigris and find another
suitable site for the decisive battle.8
It was sometime during Alexander march from Tyre to Gaugamela that
messenger delivered to him a third letter from Darius with yet another
peace proposal. According to Curtius and Justin, despite the previous two
flat refusals (see Chapter IV.5), Darius was given the opportunity to yet
again turn to Alexander in a conciliatory tone without losing face on
account of the death of his wife Stateira. On receiving the sad news Darius
is said to have responded by thanking Alexander for the humane treatment
of his family and at the same time renewed his peace offer. Plutarch and
Diodorus, on the other hand, maintain that Darius’s wife died after he had
sent the last peace proposal. Then again Plutarch and Justin write that
Stateira died in childbirth. If the expected child was Darius III’s, his wife’s
death could not have been later than in the summer of 332. Many of the
sources mention the romantic tale of a loyal eunuch who fled back to
Darius and informed him of his wife’s death but also of the noble way in
which Alexander treated his family. On receiving the news Darius was to
pray to the Persian gods for victory, so that he could have it in his power
to show equal magnanimity towards the Macedonian king; if, on the other
hand, he were to be defeated, he asked the gods to let no man other than
Alexander sit upon the throne of Cyrus, as he was his only worthy
successor.9
Regardless of when Stateira actually died, Alexander certainly received
the peace proposal some time before Gaugamela but when he was already
in Mesopotamia. Despite all his preparations and the Persian army’s
numerical superiority, Darius must have been aware of the very grave
danger of losing another battle and for this reason he made a very
generous offer. In doing so he showed a great sense of responsibility for
the state, which did not allow his emotions to get the better of him after
Alexander’s last very insulting letter. An offer to cede land, especially on
such a large scale, was virtually unheard of in the history of Achaemenid
diplomacy and Darius was resorting to this measure in exceptional
8 Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.6-7. Marsden 1964, pp. 15-19; Badian 1985, p. 434;
<
br /> Seibert 1985, pp. 93-95; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 67-69.
9 Plu., Alex. , 30; Plu., mor. , 338e; Curt., 4.10.18-11.22; Diod., 17.54.7; Just., 11.12; It. Alex. , 57; Arr., An. , 4.20.1-3; Karystios, ap. Ath., 13.80.
King of Asia
219
circumstances: he was trying to avoid the invasion of Iran, the very
heartland of the Persian Empire, and Babylonia, its richest province. In
return for peace he was offering Alexander his daughter’s hand in
marriage, land right up to the Euphrates and the unbelievably high sum
30,000 talents. By accepting this offer Alexander would make a territorial
gain that was far greater than any of Philip II’s war aims. When Alexander
received the offer he only controlled part of the territories to the west of
the Euphrates and right up to his death the Macedonians failed to gain
absolute control of this vast area. The sky-high ransom would cover all the
king’s imaginable expenses for many years. Therefore Darius’s offer
provoked a major debate in the Macedonian command over whether or not
to accept it. In reputedly saying that he would accept the offer if he were
Alexander, Parmenion was no doubt expressing the views of many
Macedonians. The ruler’s famous response was to say that would also
accept it if he were Parmenion. As usual, Alexander was determined to
seek a solution on the battlefield and therefore rejected the peace offer. By
then there could be no doubts that he was not after any concessions from
Darius but instead he wanted rule over the entire Achaemenid Empire.10
2. The revolt of Agis III
On several occasions during his campaign against Darius III Alexander
received news of disturbing events in Greece. The greatest source of
trouble was Sparta, in whose dual monarchy the more important role was
played by the ambitious Agis III of the Eurypontid dynasty. He became
king in 338, having previously ruled as regent during the absence of his
father, Archidamus III. He ascended the throne at a time when Sparta had
never been weaker. After its victory at Chaeronea Philip II’s army
triumphantly marched into the Peloponnesus, confiscated territory from
Sparta and gave it to her neighbours (see Chapter II. 3). That same year his
father Archidamus III had been killed at the Battle of Manduria in Apulia
in Italy. He had been there as the commander of a mercenary force
employed by the wealthy Spartan colony of Tarentum in its war against
the Lucanians. All this happened in the lifetime of a single Spartan
generation that had earlier experienced a catastrophic war against Thebes,
the collapse of hegemony in the whole of Greece but especially in the
Peloponnesus and the loss of Messenia after 300 years of Spartan rule.
10 Diod., 17.54; Curt., 4.11; Plu., Alex. , 29.7-8; Just., 11.12; Constantinus
Porphyrogenitus, De sententiis, 195. Griffith 1968, p. 36; Bosworth 1988, pp. 75-
76; Bernhardt 1988, p. 196 ; Bloedow 1995, pp. 109-110; Briant 1996, pp. 855-859;
Stoneman 1997, pp. 37-38.
220
Chapter V
Agis III devoted his entire reign in trying to restore Sparta to previous
position of power. During his regency and in his first years as king of
Sparta he steered clear of the main political disputes by not taking
anyone’s side in the 339-338 war, not participating in the League of
Corinth and not allying itself with either Thebes or Macedonia in 335. In
338 Sparta’s suffered at the hands of Philip but her intransigent attitude to
Macedonia earned her respect in Greece.11
Agis attempted to bring Sparta back into the main political arena in
333 when the Persian offensive in the Aegean was at its most successful.
He sent two diplomatic missions to Darius III, no doubt to offer an alliance
against Macedonia. The Spartan envoys from these missions were
subsequently captured together with Theban refugees, Athenian envoys
and the Persian baggage train outside Damascus. Agis himself learned of
the Macedonian victory at Issus when he was at Siphnos negotiating with
the Persian commanders Autophradates and Pharnabazus the terms and
conditions of financial and military support for his actions. Despite these
negotiations, which are recorded in the sources, they were not immediately
followed by any discernable cooperation between the Persians and the
Spartan king. In 333 he remained passive, which left the limited
Macedonian forces to concentrate on fighting the Persians in the Aegean
Sea. The fact that the Persian commanders gave Agis III a subsidy of no
more than thirty talents reflects the state of their finances after Issus. To
this Autophradates added ten ships. But even this made a difference, for
after receiving this help Agis sent mercenaries commanded by his brother
Agesilaus to wage war in Crete, which Arrian euphemistically calls
restoring order. When in 332 this Spartan expedition was joined by the
8,000 mercenaries that had survived Issus and by the remnants of the
Persian fleet, their success on the island was great enough to force
Alexander to respond in the spring of 331 by dispatching there a
Macedonian squadron commanded by Amphoterus. Nothing is known as
to how successful this Macedonian mission was, though it obviously failed
to stop mercenary detachments being subsequently shipped from Crete to
the Peloponnesus.12
War erupted on the Greek mainland in the spring of 331. Macedonia,
governed by Antipater, was simultaneously threatened by the revolt of
Memnon, the governor of Thrace, and by Agis III’s insurrection. There is
no evidence in the sources that the two revolts were coordinated but we do
11 David 1981, pp. 110-113; Kulesza 2003, pp. 284-296.
12 Arr., An. , 2.13.4, 2.15.2-5, 3.6.3; Diod., 17.48.1-2; Curt., 3.13-15, 4.1.39, 4.8.15.
Badian 1967, pp. 175-179; Bosworth 1988, pp. 187-200; Wirth 1993, pp. 212-213;
Blackwell 1999, pp. 53-54; Kulesza 2003, p. 296.
King of Asia
221
know that they occurred at a time when anti-Macedonian sentiments were
running high. For now Macedonian supremacy was even more feared in
association with the possibility of there no longer being an Achaemenid
monarchy to counterbalance it. Antipater personally took charge of dealing
with Memnon’s revolt, which also had the support of Thracian tribes, and
he sent most of his forces to confront these rebels. The ancient authors do
not provide us with any details concerning the military campaign but we
can assume that an agreement was eventually reached between the two
Macedonian leaders because Memnon held his position as governor for
some time. A few years later we know he sent Alexander some Thracian
reinforcements to India. In all probability Antipater acted as Philip II
would have done and made some concessions so as to be able to next
concentrate all his forces on whom he rightly considered to be the more
dangerous enemy.13 That same spring in 331 Agis III started military
operations at the head of a large mercenary army, having managed to gain
the support of many Peloponnesian states, including Tegea, almost all the
poleis of Arcadia, Elis and Achaea except for Pellene
. The only states not
to back him were those which had Macedonian garrisons or were
themselves bitter enemies of Sparta, such as Argos or Megalopolis. The
states of Aetolia provided Agis with non-military aid. The Athenians did
pass a resolution to send its fleet to help the Spartan king, but the pro-
Macedonian politician Demades ensured that this resolution was never
realised. The coalition Agis managed to form posed the greatest threat to
Macedonian hegemony in Greece in Alexander’s entire reign. The start of
the war augured well for Agis for in the Peloponnesus he defeated a
Macedonian corps commanded by Corrhagus. 14 News of what was
happening in the Peloponnesus reached Alexander during his second stay
in Tyre. One cannot doubt that the possibility of Antipater being defeated
would have led to the collapse of the Argead hegemony over Greece, next
the invasion of Macedonia and finally an end to the unfinished war in Asia,
for in such an eventuality even Alexander would not have been able to
stop his soldiers from returning home. Yet whether it was because he had
so much faith in Antipater’s military talent or whether it because he was
eager not to delay his confrontation with Darius, Alexander did not decide
13 Aeschin., 3.133-134; Diod., 17.62; Curt., 9.3.21. Some scholars argue for
coordination between Memnon and Agis III: Badian 1967, pp. 179-180; Hamilton
1974, p. 78; Blackwell 1999, pp. 54-55. Contra: Heckel 1997, p. 202; Briant 2002,
p. 49.
14 Aeschin., 3.165; Din., 1.34; Diod., 17.62.6-8; Curt., 6.1.20; Plu., mor. , 818e-f;
Just., 12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 201; Badian 1994, pp. 268-271; Habicht 1999, pp.
20-21; Blackwell 1999, pp. 55-56, 58.
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Chapter V
to send back any of his land forces. Instead he despatched an allied
Phoenician and Cypriot fleet and by diplomatic means ensured that Athens
would remain neutral.15
At the time the insurrection was at its most successful. After most of
the Peloponnesian states had joined Spartan king, he had under his