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command 20,000 foot soldiers and 2,000 cavalry as well as considerable
freedom to act as there were no immediate threats. The final outcome of
this war was resolved by the stance of the strongest Greek polis, Athens,
and by a serious strategic mistake made by Agis in not marching his army
north. If he had done so, he would have also gained not the just moral
support of states in central Greece but also their military backing. After its
defeat at Chaeronea Athens not only did not fall into decline but, having
entrusted its finances to the outstanding politician and economist Lycurgus,
experienced a period of rapid economic growth. State revenues gradually
rose to reach a record sum of 1,200 talents a year. This allowed for the
modernisation of the city’s fortifications, the building of more ships and a
reform of the ephebia system, which ensured that new generations of
recruits received better army training. In 331 there was a very intensive
debate in Athens concerning the conflict between Agis and Macedonia.
The most explicit opinion in support of Athens joining the war against
Macedonia is speech No. 17 – erroneously attributed to Demosthenes but
delivered possibly by Hypereides – which accuses Alexander of arrogance
and breeching the resolutions of the universal peace. Arguing for peace
were not only the usual pro-Macedonian politicians but also Demosthenes,
known up until then as the greatest anti-Macedonian firebrand. These
politicians reminded the Athenians of the promise made at Corinth and of
the favours Alexander had bestowed upon Athens, if only, for example,
releasing their compatriots who had been captured at Granicus. It is easy
to calculate that if Agis’s army had been joined by 8,000-10,000 Athenian
hoplites with additional detachments of mercenaries and cavalry, his
forces would have at least matched those of Antipater. Therefore the
decision of Athens to stay neutral proved a fatal blow to the Spartan king’s
aspirations.16
Having defeated Corragus, Agis now turned against Megalopolis. The
siege of this large and well fortified city required a lot of time and
precluded simultaneously conducting an offensive against Macedonia.
From the political perspective this could not but raise the justified
15 Arr., An. , 3.6.3. Borza 1972, p. 236; Briant 2002, pp. 49-50.
16 [D.], 17; Aeschin., 3.162, 164-165; Din., 1.34-35; Diod., 17.62.7; Plu., mor. ,
818e-f. Badian 1967; Bosworth 1988, p. 202; Habicht 1999, pp. 20-25; Blackwell
1999, pp. 56-65; Faraguna 2003, p. 106; Poddighe 2009, p. 115.
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suspicion that for Agis the freedom of other Greeks was at most of
secondary importance to his clearly first objective of imposing Sparta’s
hegemony over its neighbours. The precious moment when Macedonia
was weak and vulnerable was irretrievably lost. As the Spartans remained
idle beneath the walls of Megalopolis, Antipater mobilised an army of
Macedonians and allied Greeks numbering as many as 40,000 soldiers.
With this army he now marched against Agis and his army at Megalopolis,
which was half the size of his forces. The better quality and greater
experience of the Agis’s mercenaries and Spartan soldiers meant that,
despite their numerical superiority, the Macedonians had a very hard fight
on their hands. Apart from their rhetorical style, the battle’s descriptions
by Diodorus and Curtius Rufus show that for a long time the final outcome
hung in the balance. It was only resolved once the Spartan side ran out of
strength to cope with the enemy’s greater numbers. Among the casualties
of the Battle of Megalopolis was the valiant but not very prudent King
Agis as well as 5,300 of his soldiers and 3,500 men on the Macedonian
side.17
Jealous of the fame of this victory, Alexander tried to depreciate its
importance by calling it the war of mice. Aware of this aspect of his
monarch’s character and of the delicacy of Greek inter-state politics,
Antipater chose not to personally decide on how those responsible for the
war should be punished and deferred the matter to the synedrion of the
League of Corinth. After Agis III’s death his younger brother, Eudamidas
I, became the new king of Sparta and it was with him that the post-war
peace negotiations were made. The debate, held once the delegates of the
League of Corinth had assembled, lasted a long time and eventually came
to no definite conclusion. It was as if everyone was trying to avoid being
held responsible for the passing of a harsh sentence. Sparta’s allies,
Achaea and Elis, which had together with the Spartan army besieged
Megalopolis, were made to pay a fine of 120 talents in compensation to
that city. The Tegeans were pardoned, except for those politicians who
were responsible for the city’s alliance with Agis. However, the synedrion
failed to name a punishment for the main culprit in the breaking of the
universal peace – Sparta. Perhaps that was because a punishment that was
too mild may have displeased the victor, Macedonia, whereas the League
of Corinth would have been too weak to impose a severer penalty. The
preceding months clearly showed how few states were ready to confront
Sparta in defence of the universal peace. Thus a decision was made to
simply demand 50 hostages from Sparta and leave the ultimate decision
17 Diod., 17.63; Curt., 6.1.1-16; Paus., 1.13.6, 3.10.5; Just., 12.1. Blackwell 1999,
pp. 66-69.
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regarding the punishment to Alexander, to whom Sparta could send its
own delegates. Negotiations regarding the hostages were conducted by
Antipater and apparently the ephor Eteocles arranged it in such a way that
instead of 50 boys the Spartans offered to hand over 100 women and
elderly people. The ancient sources do not agree as to whether or not the
hostages sent to Antipater were next passed on to Alexander. Nevertheless,
defeat in a war that was supposed to return Sparta to its former position of
a major power and the considerable losses at a time when its number of
citizens was already falling made that state politically passive for the rest
of the 4th century.18
The chronology of Agis’s revolt and particularly the Battle of
Megalopolis are the subject of considerable controversies. Curtius states
that the war in the Peloponnesus ended before the Battle of Gaugamela,
therefore the Battle of Megalopolis could have taken place at the end of
September 331. In recent decades, however, historians have estimated that
the battle was actually fought in the spring of 330, and with speed with
which news travelled in those times Alexander would have learned of the
outcome no earlier than in May that year. Such a chronology of events has
been used as a basis for interpreting Alexander’s actions over the seven
months from his victory at Gaugamela to the burning down of the palaces
at Persepolis. Awaiting news from the Peloponnese is used to explain his
long stay in Susa. Though the sources do not mention it, Alexander is also
said to have sent Antipater 3,000 talents to raise mercena
ries. Finally the
destruction of Persepolis is supposed to be a gesture of Panhellenic
revenge calculated to win Greek public opinion over to the Macedonian
side.19 It is not hard to notice that this interpretation of Alexander’s actions
and intentions is purely hypothetical. The only documentary evidence it is
based on comes from a passage in Aeschines’s Against Ctesiphon, which
states that when in the summer of 330 he delivered this speech, the Spartan
hostages were still waiting to be sent to Alexander. But Aeschines does
not state when the Battle of Megalopolis actually took place and none of
the sources claim that the Spartan hostages were shipped east immediately
afterwards. Conversely, we know that the synedrion of the League of
Corinth was very slow in making any decisions and Aeschines allows us at
18 Plu., Ages. , 15.4; Plu., Agis, 3.3; Plu., mor. , 235b; Diod., 17.73.5-6; Curt., 6.1.17-20; Paus., 3.10.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 203; Kulesza 2003, pp. 296-297.
19 Curt., 6.1.21. Late chronology of the battle of Megalopolis and its consequence:
Cawkwell 1969, pp. 170-173; Badian 1985, pp. 445-447; Hammond, Walbank
1988, pp. 72-83; Bosworth 1988, pp. 203-204; Badian 1994; Carlier 1995, p. 155;
Hammond 1996, pp. 159-161; Blackwell 1999, p. 54, n. 67; Faraguna 2003, p. 105.
But see: Nawotka 2003b, pp. 70-71.
King of Asia
225
most to speculate that Antipater was tardy with reintroducing Macedonian
hegemony to the Peloponnesus. Therefore there are no fundamental
reasons why we should reject the traditional chronology of Agis’s Revolt
from the spring to the autumn of 331 as stated by Curtius. It was also most
probably only after the Battle of Megalopolis that Antipater sent
Alexander 15,000 soldiers to make up for the troops the king had lost
during the autumn campaign of 331.20
3. The battle of Gaugamela
Alexander’s army marched from the Euphrates to the Tigris virtually
unhampered by the Persians. Mazaeus’s forces, which were much weaker
than the Macedonian army, limited their actions to burning anything that
could be of use to the enemy, but this was not enough to stop the march.
Alexander learned from a captured Persian scout that Darius III’s army
was already on the other side of the Tigris and this made it easier for him
to plan subsequent manoeuvres for his own army. Curtius’ remark that the
Macedonian army’s march lasted only four days cannot be true for the
distance they covered was at least 430 km. It is very likely that this
erroneous information simply results from a mistake made by a medieval
copyist and that Curtius had actually stated the march lasted 40 days,
especially as we are told that Alexander crossed the Euphrates in the
month of Hekatombaion (July/August) and that he was on the eastern side
of the Tigris by 18th September. Therefore the march was fairly slow.
Plutarch cites after Eratosthenes an anecdote about how out of boredom
the Macedonian soldiers using clods of earth, fists and sticks fought a
mock battle between two groups, one side pretending to be the Persians.
On learning of this battle, the king instructed the leaders of the two groups
to fight each other as Alexander and Darius. The soldier representing
Alexander won and the rest of the Macedonian army interpreted this as a
good omen.21
Despite Darius III’s order, Mazaeus did not try to stop the invading
army on the Tigris, apparently because he thought the river could not be
crossed. We do not know whether Darius really wished to prevent the
Macedonians from crossing the Tigris but failed or whether, conversely, it
20 Aeschin., 3.133. Borza 1972, p. 236; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 285; McQueen
1978; David 1981, p. 114; Wirth 1993, pp. 190, 219-221; Bloedow 1995a, pp. 24-
25; Heckel 1997, p. 202; Briant 2002, p. 18; Kulesza 2003, p. 296; Heckel 2006,
pp. 7-8, s.v. Agis.
21 Eratosthenes, ap. Plu., Alex. , 31.2-5 (= FGrH, 241 F29); Curt., 4.9.14-15 ; Diod., 17.55.1-2 ; Arr., An. , 3.7.4; It. Alex. , 55. Atkinson 1980, pp. 382-383.
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was always his intention fight Alexander’s army in open territory to the
east of the Tigris. Either way, the only obstacle encountered by the
Macedonians was the strong current of the Tigris, though in September the
level of water after the hot summer months would have anyhow been low.
Modern historians have not been able to establish for certain the place
where Alexander’s army crossed the Tigris. Taking into account the
topography of the territory covered by the Macedonians after they had
crossed the Tigris we can only assume that it was probably somewhere
near today’s city of Mosul in Iraq or a bit further north. Once the army
reached the eastern bank, Alexander allowed his soldiers to rest for a
couple of days before they marched into battle. It was at this time
(according to Curtius) or a few days later (Arrian) that the allied Paionian
cavalry commanded by a member of that tribe’s royal family, Ariston,
defeated a squadron of Persian cavalry.22
The army of Darius III set up camp near Gaugamela, the place where
the last pitched battle between the two kings was fought. The ancient
sources, however, generally call this the battle of Arbela (today called
Irbil/Hawlir) after a large town some 90 km to the south east in modern-
day Iraqi Kurdistan. We know that Gaugamela was a large village on the
river Boumelos (today called Gomil stream), a western tributary of the
Khazir, which flows into the Greater Zab, which in turn flows into the
Tigris. The name Gaugamela is preserved in a modern-day village called
Gaumal but its actual site is today’s Tell Gomel on the Nauqûr plain to the
north of the Gebel Maqlub range and 35 km to the east of the Tigris.
Darius selected as a battlefield a broad plain where he could take full
advantage of the numerical superiority of his cavalry and most effectively
use his chariots. It because of the chariots that Persian soldiers levelled out
the field where they expected to fight the Macedonians. Darius made a
serious mistake in not fortifying his camp at Gaugamela. It was for this
reason that his army spent the night before the battle armed and on guard
in case the enemy suddenly attacked. The lack of sleep could not but have
had detrimental effect on Darius’s soldiers on the day of the battle.23 Apart
22 Curt., 4.9.15-10.1; Diod., 17.55.3-6; Arr., An. , 3.7.5-8.2; It. Alex. , 55. Atkinson 1980, pp. 384-385; Heckel 1992, pp. 354-355.
23 Arbela/Gaugamela: Diod., 17.62.1, 17.64.1; Arr., An. , 3.11.5, 6.11.6; Str., 16.1.3,
16.1.4, 17.1.43; Marmor Parium, FGrH, 239 F106; Anonymi Chronicon Oxyrynchi, FGrH, 255 F1.7; Lib., 18.260; Amp., 16.2.5; Curt., 4.9.9, 5.1.2, 6.1.21, 9.2.23;
Plin., Nat. , 6.41; Polyaen., 4.3.6, 4.3.17; Fron., Str. , 2.3.19; see Nawotka 2003, pp.
86-87. Topography: Marsden 1964, pp. 18-21; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 270, n. 311;
Seibert 1985, pp. 129-130; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 70-72; Bernard 1990, pp. 520-521;
Hamilton 1999, p. 80. Arr., An. , 3.8.7; Plu., Alex. , 31.8.
King of Asia
227
from that, morale in the Persian camp might not have been very high.
/> Fragments of tablets found at Babylon state that on 18th September –
presumably in response to news of the Macedonians crossing the Tigris –
panic erupting in the camp of the ‘ruler of the world’, Darius III. On the
other hand, Polyaenus also reports of soldiers panicking in Alexander’s
camp on the Tigris. It appears that there was nervousness on both sides in
face of what they knew to be a momentous event that would decide their
fates.24
On the third day (20th September 331) after crossing the Tigris the
Macedonians saw a lunar eclipse. Sacrifices were immediately made to the
Sun, Moon and Earth. Egyptians seers as well as Alexander’s personal
soothsayer, Aristander, interpreted this phenomenon as a bad omen for the
Persians. Indeed, astronomers in Babylon also regarded the eclipse as a
portent that their own side would be defeated. Alexander’s soldiers, initially
disturbed by the eclipse, were much relieved by the seers’ interpretation. It
was with this new found optimism among the men that on the morning of
21st September the Macedonian king ordered his army to march.25 After a
slow and cautious march of four days, the Macedonians encountered the
enemy. This time Alexander personally led an attack on the enemy’s
cavalry. From the captives he learned that Darius’s camp was situated 150
stades (27 km) away. The Macedonians also managed to chase away
Mazaeus’s riders, who were continuing their ‘scorched earth’ tactics, and
thus Alexander’s men got hold of some intact supplies of grain. With
logistical problems settled for the nearest future, the Macedonian army set
up a fortified camp and stayed there for four days. The Macedonian
baggage train and soldiers who were unfit because of wounds or disease
remained there for the battle as well. It was in that time that a letter from
Darius to the Greeks in Alexander’s army was intercepted. In this letter
Darius urged the Greeks to hand the Macedonian king over to the Persians.
On the advice of the cautious Parmenion the message in this letter was not
disclosed to the soldiers so as not to put any ideas into their heads.26