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  Meanwhile Mazaeus barred the Macedonians’ way to the Persian camp

  with an elite squadron of 3,000 cavalry. Alexander sent an advance guard

  of horsemen (most probably mercenaries) commanded by the Macedonian

  Menidas, but they dared not attack Mazaeus. Mazaeus, on the other hand,

  24 Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 14; Polyaen., 4.3.26. Bernard 1990, pp. 517-

  521, 524; Briant 2003, p. 80.

  25 Arr., An. , 3.7.6; Curt., 4.10.1-7; Plu., Alex. , 31.8; Plin. Nat. , 2.180; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 3. Bosworth 1980, p. 287; van der Spek 2003, pp.

  292-295.

  26 Curt., 4.10.8-17; Arr., An. , 3.9.1; Polyaen., 4.3.18.

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  also did not engage the enemy and instead withdrew to Gebel Maqlub

  (1,040 m), which overlooks the Nauqûr plain. Fear of the mighty Persian

  army almost verged on panic in Alexander’s camp. Yet Mazaeus did not

  make use of this opportunity to deliver a pre-emptive strike. Instead the

  following day he withdrew from the mountain and returned to Darius’s

  camp. Alexander not only managed to calm his soldiers down but also

  took the opportunity and occupied the strategically important position in

  the hills that the enemy had vacated. There he set up the last camp before

  the battle and fortified it, so that his soldiers could rest and build up

  strength in relative safety before the decisive clash.27

  The exact date of the Battle of Gaugamela was for a long time the

  subject of controversy among modern historians for it cannot be

  unequivocally deduced from the information provided by the ancient

  authors. Plutarch, for instance, states that it happened on the 26th day of

  the month of Boedromion, which cannot be easily converted into a date in

  our calendar system. Fortunately, thanks to the entry in an exceptionally

  accurate Babylonian astronomical diary, we can now be certain that the

  battle took place on 1st October 331.28 Already on the preceding day the

  Macedonian army stood in battle formation ready to confront the Persians,

  who were aligned for battle thirty stades (5.5 km) away. Alexander’s high-

  ranking officers advised him to attack at once, but instead this time he

  listened to Parmenion’s advice: he delayed the fight so as to first assess the

  battlefield and seek out any traps the enemy might have prepared. In the

  evening, however, it was Parmenion and other more senior officers who

  were persuading Alexander to attack Darius’s army at night. They argued

  that the element of surprise would even out the chances against a

  numerically larger army. Perhaps behind Alexander’s proud response that

  he did not wish to steal a victory there was, as Arrian assumes, not only an

  unwillingness to risk so much in a night-time battle but also a desire to

  prove to Darius his inferiority as a warrior in the open field and the light of

  day. Perhaps he wished to exclude all factors other than quality of

  command and sheer fighting ability. The rest of the night Alexander and

  his circle of companions spent on religious ceremonies. We know that

  sacrifices were also made to Phobos, the god of fear, panic and flight from

  the battlefield who accompanied Ares the god of war. They went to sleep

  27 Curt., 4.12.1, 4.12.4-5, 4.12.14-19; Arr., An. , 3.9.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 80;

  Heckel 1992, pp. 362-363.

  28 Plu., Alex. , 31.8; Plu., Cam. , 19.5; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 15-16.

  Questions pertaining to the date: Dąbrowa 1988, p. 74; Hamilton 1999, p. 81.

  Fixing the date: Grzybek 1990, pp. 42, 58-59; Bernard 1990, pp. 515-528; Hauben

  1992, p. 149; Le Rider 2003, pp. 267-268.

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  just before dawn. The rest of the Macedonian army slept throughout the

  night. The Persians, on the other hand, spent the entire night on watch for

  fear of an attack on their very large but unfortified camp. The Persian

  camp fires were said to have been visible on the plain right up to the

  horizon.29

  Thanks to information contained in the book of Aristobulus, who had

  accompanied Alexander on that expedition, we know that after the battle

  the Macedonians found in the Persian camp the Great King’s written

  dispositions for the day including the positioning of his forces. Darius

  personally commanded the centre. He was guarded by the melophori, the

  elite aristocratic cavalry called the royal ‘kinsmen’ as well as detachments

  from India, Babylonia, Sittacene, the Uxians, Carians, Mardi and now a

  not so numerous detachment of Greek mercenaries. The war elephants and

  50 scythed chariots were also aligned in the centre. The right wing

  included contingents from Syria, Armenia, Cappadocia and northern

  Mesopotamia, Media, Parthia, Hyrcania as well as allies from Scythia and

  another 50 scythed chariots. The arrangement of the Persian left wing

  shows that a lesson from previous engagements had been learned. Here

  Darius positioned his strongest units – the excellent east Iranian cavalry

  (Bactrians, Dahae and Arachosians), Scythian allies as well as Persians

  and Susians – for he realised they would most probably be facing

  Alexander, who usually commanded his hetairoi on the Macedonian right

  wing. Here too he positioned the remaining 100 scythe bearing chariots. It

  is worth noting that Darius’s army included contingents from countries

  that had already been conquered by Alexander. At least some of the

  soldiers from these countries had obviously not given up hope of the Great

  King and rightful ruler of the Persian Empire ultimately being victorious.

  We even know of an Egyptian official called Samtutefnacht, who left an

  account of his stay in Darius’s camp and of the subsequent crushing defeat

  of the Persians.30

  The Macedonian battle positions are well known because on this

  subject the ancient authors agree. The right wing was held by the

  Macedonian cavalry officially commanded by Parmenion’s son, Philotas,

  but de facto command of this section of the Macedonian frontline

  belonged to Alexander. Extended even farther to the right were

  29 Arr., An. , 3.9.3-11.2; Curt., 4.12.24-13.17; Plu., Alex. , 31.8-32.1; Diod., 17.55.6-56.1; It. Alex. , 57-58.

  30 Aristobul., ap. Arr., An. , 3.11.3-7 (= FGrH, 139 F17); Curt., 4.12.5-13. Treson 1931 (Samtutefnacht’s stele); Marsden 1964, p. 44; Seibert 1972, p. 131;

  Schachermeyr 1973, p. 269; Bosworth 1980, pp. 297-299; Vogelsang 1992, pp.

  222-223; Hammond 1996, pp. 141-143; Briant 2003, p. 78.

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  detachments of Agrianians, slingers, Macedonian archers, Greek

  mercenary cavalry and infantry, Paionian cavalry and Macedonian

  prodromoi (scouts). The centre was, as usual, held by the Macedonian

  phalanx with the hypaspist foot guard positioned between its right flank

  and the whole army’s right wing. The left wing was commanded by

  Parmenion and included javelin throwers, Thracians, Cretan archers,

  Achaean mercenary infantry as well as allied and mercenary Greek and

  Thessalian cavalry. Auxiliary units were positioned at the extremities of

  both wings at slanting angles to the rest of the front line so as to prevent

  the army from being outflanked.
Alexander positioned a second line

  behind the front line of infantry. The Greek mercenaries, Thracians and

  Illyrians in the second line were of less military value but they held an

  important position in the eventuality of the numerically far superior enemy

  surrounding the Macedonians. The positioning of the entire Macedonian

  army took on a strange trapezoidal shape which was dictated by the danger

  of being outflanked on one or both sides. Considering the large numerical

  difference between the two armies and the flat terrain being attacked from

  behind must have seemed inevitable to Alexander.31

  The battle could not begin at dawn for the commander-in-chief of the

  Macedonian forces, having spent almost the entire night preparing for the

  fight, was fast asleep, and no one could or perhaps dared to wake him.

  Parmenion ordered breakfast to be given to the soldiers and only after they

  had consumed it did he venture to rouse Alexander, having to shake him

  several times. Only then did the king deliver a speech of encouragement to

  his soldiers and ordered the battle to commence. Alexander’s seemingly

  strange behaviour was no doubt based on the sober calculation that since

  the enemy was to the east, by attacking too early the Macedonians would

  have the sun in their eyes. In that respect the later in the day they attacked,

  the better. Nevertheless contemporary Babylonian sources state that the

  battle began in the morning, or at least before noon.32

  At the start it became apparent that the Persian lines extended so far

  beyond the Macedonian formations that Alexander’s right wing found

  itself directly opposite the Persian centre commanded by Darius.

  Alexander therefore ordered his wing to move further right, in response to

  which the Persians began a corresponding manoeuvre to their left.

  However, the much more numerous and therefore slower moving Persian

  31 Arr., An. , 3.118-12.5; Diod., 17.57.1-5; Curt., 4.13.26-32; Fron., Str. , 2.3.19-20.

  Bosworth 1980, pp. 300-304; Bosworth 1988, p. 81; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 93-94;

  Hammond 1996, pp. 143-145.

  32 Curt., 4.13.17-25; Diod., 17.56; Plu., Alex. , 32.1-4; Just., 11.13; Sachs-Hunger

  1988, no. 330, verso 15. Atkinson 1980, p. 418.

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  detachments could not keep up with Alexander’s smaller but faster units.

  Worse still, by moving further left the Persians were leaving the terrain

  specially prepared for the chariots, and Darius was clearly hoping that

  these would play an important role in breaking through the enemy’s front

  line. Moreover, the Macedonians were now moving away from the places

  where the Persians had secretly dug ditches against their cavalry. For these

  reasons the Great King ordered first the Scythian cavalry and next also the

  Bactrian cavalry to attack the enemy and stop this manoeuvre. Alexander

  sent a detachment of Greek mercenary cavalry to counter this attack and

  soon afterwards other cavalry detachments were sent as well. The

  excellently trained and armoured east Iranian and Scythian cavalry

  inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, so, wishing to quickly resolve the

  conflict, Darius now sent in his chariots. Although this archaic formation

  did inflict some losses among the enemy’s frontline troops, it did not have

  a very significant impact on the ultimate course of the battle since the

  chariots operated unsupported by the Persian cavalry. As the chariots sped

  towards them, the soldiers in the phalanx were ordered to stand apart and

  let them through. At the same time javelins were hurled at the passing

  chariot horses and immediately after that the slingers and Agrianians

  finished off the charioteers with impunity.33

  Gaugamela was the first recorded battle in history where a European

  army encountered elephants. The Greeks had known about these animals

  since the previous century but this knowledge was still very hazy –

  Aristotle’s research into the subject marked a breakthrough but that was

  only made possible as a consequence of Alexander’s expedition. The only

  source to mention them being used in the Battle of Gaugamela is the

  anonymous Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, whose author claims that the

  Macedonians stopped the animals from advancing on them by scattering

  sharp metal objects before them. Whether or not this unconfirmed story is

  true, we can be certain at Gaugamela the military impact of the elephants

  was even smaller than that of the scythed chariots.34

  No doubt as he observed the situation develop on his right wing the

  Great King also ordered his soldiers to attack the enemy on other sections

  of the front. The Persians had the greatest success on their right wing.

  Here too the scythed chariots acting in tandem with the Messagetae

  cavalry were much more effective. The commander of this wing was the

  satrap Mazaeus and he managed to get the Macedonians outflanked and

  33 Arr., An. , 3.13; Curt., 4.15.1-4, 4.15-17; Diod., 17.57.6-59.1; Polyaen., 4.3.17; It.

  Alex. , 59-61. Bosworth 1988, pp. 81-88; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 96-97; Hammond

  1996, p. 145; Ashley 1998, p. 267.

  34 Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151, F1.13. Scullard 1974, pp. 37-52, 64.

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  pinned down by his troops. Some of his cavalry now broke through a gap

  that had appeared as a consequence of the Macedonia centre and right

  wing shifting further right and now headed straight for Alexander’s camp

  rather than attacking the back of Macedonian phalanx. The Persian

  captives joined the fight and the poorly armed Thracian detachment

  guarding the camp was soon defeated. Legend would later have it that

  Darius’s mother, Queen Sisigambis, chose to stay with Alexander instead

  of making use of this opportunity to escape. It was at this critical moment

  that the advantage of the unusual alignment of the Macedonian forces

  became apparent: the second Macedonian phalanx positioned behind the

  first turned around and attacked its own camp thus recapturing it.

  Although some of the Bactrian cavalry was now confined to fighting

  round the camp, the situation on the Macedonian left wing continued to be

  dire. Parmenion sent successive messengers to Alexander with urgent

  pleas for help, but none came for the battle’s outcome now hung in the

  balance in the Macedonian centre and on the right wing.35 The sources are

  very vague about what happened in the centre, saying only that

  Macedonian phalanx advanced victoriously on the enemy. They focus

  much more on what Alexander was doing. As at Issus, the Macedonian

  king’s objective was to reach Darius with his hetairoi and he was now

  leading a charge in that direction. Macedonians who had fought in that

  battle later claimed that an eagle was flying above their king, which was

  obviously a sign of the impending victory. The fiercest fighting erupted

  between the Companion cavalry and the royal ‘kinsmen’ gathered around

  the Great King. Although we can assume Arrian’s claim that Darius was

  the first to flee is simply a product of Macedonian propaganda, there is no

  way of knowing the veracity of the opposite claim that he wanted to die

  b
ut was forced to withdraw by his entourage. Regardless of which version

  is closer to the truth, Darius did once again leave the battlefield at a time

  when his army was still fighting in a still equal struggle with the invading

  enemy. The Great King’s escape resulted in the collapse of resistance in

  the section he had commanded.36

  At first Alexander tried to chase Darius but he was hindered by the

  general confusion and the clouds of dust that limited visibility. Indeed,

  Darius made skilful use of these circumstances and under the cover of dust

  clouds he led the detachments retreating with him in a quite unexpected

  35 Curt., 4.15.2-3, 4.15.5-13; Diod., 17.59.5-8; Plu., Alex. , 32.5-8; Arr., An. , 3.14.5-6; Polyaen., 4.3.6. Bosworth 1988, pp. 82-84; Hammond 1996, pp. 146-147;

  Ashley 1998, pp. 267-268.

  36 Arr., An. , 3.14.1-4; Diod., 17.60.1-3; Plu., Alex. , 33.2-8; Curt., 4.15.19-33; Just., 11.14; It. Alex. , 62. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 237; Bosworth 1988, p. 83.

  King of Asia

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  direction. According to Arrian and later quoting after him the Itinerarium

  Alexandri, Alexander stopped the pursuit after yet another of Parmenion’s

  messengers reported to him with urgent pleas for help. The Macedonian

  king turned round and rushed to save the left flank of his army, which was

  now on the verge of total defeat. However, it is possible that Arrian’s

  account simply reflects the unsympathetic stance towards Parmenion

  originally held by Alexander’s court historian, Callisthenes, who had

  every reason to present the old general as an incompetent commander who

  panicked instead of facing the enemy himself. Historians point to the

  physical difficulties a messenger sent by Parmenion would have had in

  locating let alone reaching Alexander in the most intensive heat of the

  battle. Anyhow, news of the Great King’s withdrawal now spread among

  the Persian soldiers and particular ‘national’ groups started withdrawing

  from the battle in order to get back to their countries. In fact Alexander