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the same advice in the same way to Cyrus the Great.22
The Macedonians stayed in Taxila for most of the spring of 326. This
was not so much because of a desire to admire the exotic surroundings or
to converse with naked philosophers as on account of an attempt, by
diplomatic means, to establish at least formal control over the rajahs of the
Punjab. Unfortunately, not all of these rulers were as willing to concede as
Abisares, Doxares and Porus – the king of the land between the rivers
Acesines (Chenab) and Hydraotes (Ravi). Another, much more famous
Porus ( Paurava), whose kingdom, bearing the same name, stretched from
the river Hydaspes (Jhelum) to the Acesines, flatly refused to cooperate.
The ancient authors exaggerate the significance of the Macedonian defeat
of this other Porus. In the sources he is presented as a powerful rajah
ruling over 300 towns and having at his disposal an army comprising
20,000-50,000 infantry, 2,000-3,000 cavalry, 300-1,000 chariots and 85-
200 elephants. Historical estimates, however, suggest that he ruled over a
territory measuring merely 15,000 km2. In 1901, at the dawn of the
industrial age, this area was inhabited by c. 1.5 m people and therefore its
population would have been much smaller in ancient times. Moreover,
Porus was now politically isolated, as most of the other rulers had taken
the invader’s side, and he had a considerably smaller army than Alexander.
It was for these reasons that he hoped to stop the invaders when they were
22 Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.63-64 (= FGrH, 134 F17a); Nearchus, ap. Str., 15.1.66;
Arr., An. , 7.1.5-2.4, 7.3.3-4; Plu., Alex. , 65. Bosworth 1998, pp. 186-196. The advice of Oibares: Aristid, p. 202-203 (Jebb), after Ctesias. Hamilton 1999, p. 181.
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Chapter VI
crossing the Hydaspes. Working in his favour was the start of the monsoon
season, in May-June 326, which took the unacquainted Europeans quite by
surprise. On top of that the snow in the mountains had started melting, so
the Hydaspes swelled and was now very difficult to cross.23
Alexander’s army, burdened with a baggage train including boats,
most probably took the easiest route from Taxila to the vicinity of today’s
Jhelum. By the time it reached the Hydaspes, possibly near modern
Haranpur, it was reinforced by 5,000 troops from Taxila and boats that had
been brought over from the Indus. However, the river at that point and at
that time measured 800 m. Moreover at the opposite end the army would
have had to confront Porus’ forces, which included elephants terrifying
Macedonian horses. Alexander therefore decided to trick the enemy so as
to catch them off their guard. He ordered large amounts of provisions to be
stocked in the Macedonian camp. This was supposed to give the
impression that his army was intending to remain there until autumn, when
the water level fell and the river could be waded across. But next, making
use of his army’s numerical superiority, he had his men carry out short
manoeuvres, each time as if they were trying to cross at a particular point
along the river. These actions forced Porus’ troops to continually prepare
themselves for battle. Moreover, the Macedonians also harassed the enemy
at night by giving out loud war cries, to which Porus initially reacted by
leading his troops out of the camp. After a time the rajah assumed that the
Macedonians were merely trying to provoke him and so ordered his troops
simply not to respond to enemy actions. His confidence may have also
been raised by a small Indian victory over the Macedonians in a skirmish
on one of the river islands.24
The Indians were gradually lulled into a false sense of security. And
then a storm broke out which further reduced their watchfulness, for an
attacked seemed highly improbably in such unfavourable conditions. But
this was the moment Alexander launched his manoeuvre against Porus.
The sources state that the Macedonian army marched and crossed the river
within a single night. However, the distance the Macedonians are said to
have covered and the difficulties they must have encountered when
crossing the wide river indicate that the manoeuvre must have taken them
an entire day and night before the two sides clashed. Craterus was left in
charge of the main camp, where the soldiers ostentatiously prepared to
23 Str., 15.1.29; Diod., 17.87.2; Curt., 8.13.2, 8.13.5-11; Arr., An. , 5.8.4, 5.94,
5.15.4, 5.21.4; It. Alex. , 111. Bosworth 1995, p. 320; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 8-11.
24 Arr., An. , 5.8.4-10.4; Curt., 8.13.11-16; Plu., Alex. , 60.1-2; Polyaen., 4.3.9; Fron., Str. , 1.4.9; ME, 53-58. Seibert 1985, p. 156; Bosworth 1995, pp. 262-272;
Hammond 1996, pp. 208-210; Heckel 1997, p. 212; Heckel 2009, p. 48.
Expedition to India
309
cross the river. Meanwhile Ptolemy commanded a diversionary group that
was sent downstream, whereas Alexander personally led 6,000 of the best
infantry and 5,000 cavalry 150 stades (27 km) to a camp upstream where
the flow of the Hydaspes turned and the army could not be seen from the
other side on account of river islands in between. The detachments
included hypaspists, two taxeis of phalanx, Agrianians, archers,
Companion and east Iranian cavalry. At a prearranged place the boats
hauled over from the Indus were already waiting for them. The army
crossed the river at night in torrential rain. There was no shortage of drama
as the Macedonians mistakenly landed on a large island separated from the
other side by a tributary of the Hydaspes. They were forced to wade across
this other river with the water almost up to their necks. By the morning,
however, the whole corps was on the eastern shore and only then was it
spotted by Porus’ scouts.25
Informed of this landing, Porus still had no certainty whether this was
the main force or perhaps just another diversion. To confront the enemy he
therefore sent his son (or brother) in command of a unit that may have
included 60 (Aristobulus), 100 (Curtius Rufus) or 120 (Ptolemy) chariots
as well as 1,000-4,000 cavalry. These slender forces were instantly
defeated by Alexander’s cavalry, especially as the chariots were all but
immobilised in the mud and rendered virtually useless. Among those who
perished were Porus’ son and 400 horsemen. The survivors fled back to
their camp.26 Porus now knew that Alexander had crossed the Hydaspes.
The rajah’s main force comprised elephants and now, apart from the few
left to defend the camp against an eventual attack by Craterus’ soldiers,
these proceeded to confront the invader, accompanied by the remaining
chariots and cavalry as well as elite infantry units – which Arrian quite
implausibly claims numbered as many 30,000 men. Alexander
undoubtedly had a qualitatively and numerically superior cavalry, whereas
Porus would have had more infantry. The two armies clashed on mud-free
sandy terrain which allowed for the use of cavalry and chariots. The
elephants were positioned at equal intervals in front of the Indians with the
purpose of crushing the enemy infantry. But by then the Macedonians
were aware of what
these animals could do in battle and had therefore
prepared a tactic to combat them. Fearing the losses the elephants would
inevitably inflict, Alexander ordered his infantry to hold back until the
25 Arr., An. , 5.11-13; Curt., 8.13.17-27.2; Plu., Alex. , 60.3-7; Polyaen., 4.3.9; Fron.
Str. , 1.4.9; ME, 58-59. Devine 1987, pp. 96-99; Bosworth 1995, pp. 273-281;
Bosworth 1996a, pp. 12-15; Holt 2003, pp. 49-50.
26 Arr., An. , 5.14.1-15.2 (after Aristobulus and Ptolemy), Curt., 8.14.1-8; Plu.,
Alex. , 60.7-8.
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enemy’s cavalry were defeated. As usual he personally took command of
his cavalry on the right wing, while Coenus commanded the cavalry on the
left wing and Seleucus as well as some subordinate offices took charge of
the phalanx in the centre. The battle was begun by mounted east Iranian
archers, who attacked the Indians from the Macedonian right wing. Next
the cavalry units commanded by Alexander and Coenus entered the fray.
In face of these attacks Porus tried to regroup his cavalry but there ensued
confusion in the ranks and the Indian horsemen were eventually forced to
retreat behind the infantry and elephants. Now the foot soldiers clashed.
After an unsuccessful counterattack by the Indian cavalry, Porus’ army
found itself surrounded. At first the elephants inflicted heavy losses on the
phalanx but as the Macedonian noose round the Indian army tightened it
got increasingly easier to get at the pachyderm animals and their drivers
with arrows, javelins and sarissae. Wounded elephants or ones deprived of
their mahouts panicked and trampled the soldiers around them, mainly the
encircled Indians for the Macedonians on the outside were free to move
out of the frightened elephants’ way. The battle ended with the slaughter
of Porus’ troops for Alexander – as by then frequently in India – strove to
eliminate his enemies physically. Among those killed were two of Porus’
sons and all his commanders as well as a very large part of his army.
According to Diodorus, the Macedonian side lost 280 horsemen and 700
foot soldiers, whereas Arrian gives a court propaganda version in which
230 horsemen and only 80 infantry were supposed to have died. Porus’
engagement with Alexander’s forces allowed Craterus to get his men
across the Hydaspes and join in the slaughter.27
Porus stood out from the other Indians on account of his good looks,
his height (reputedly over 2 m tall) and the fact that he fought mounted on
the largest of his elephants. He had been wounded several times in the
clash but not leave the battlefield while his men were still fighting.
Alexander most probably spared him his life not only because he had
fought courageously and with dignity, but also because of his good looks.
Porus’ physical attractiveness may well have been an important factor
when we bear in mind the tragic fate the Gaza commander, Batis, who
distinguished himself with valour but was, unfortunately, far from the
perceived ideal of male beauty (see Chapter IV.5). According to the most
popular version of events given by the ancient authors, the wounded Porus
was persuaded to get off his elephant and surrender to Alexander. The
Macedonian is said to have asked the captive what he wanted, to which
27 Arr., An. , 5.15.5-18.3; Diod., 17.87.4-89.3; Curt., 8.14.9-30; Plu., Alex. , 60.9-11; Polyaen., 4.3.22; ME, 60-62. Scullard 1974, pp. 65-70; Devine 1987, p. 91, 100-113; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 16-20; Strauss 2003, pp. 140-142.
Expedition to India
311
Porus reputedly gave the famous reply basilikos, which may be interpreted
that he wished to be treated as a king or that he wished Alexander to
behave like a king. Either way, Alexander was so impressed with this
attitude that he allowed Porus to continue ruling his kingdom – of course
now as his vassal – and even extended its borders. Consciously or
unconsciously, Alexander thus acted in accordance with the Indian code of
conduct, showing that he was Dharmavijayi, a ‘conqueror through
righteousness’.28
After the battle Alexander had the bodies of the fallen buried and the
survivors rewarded. Sacrifices were also made and games were organised.
One of the victims of the battle of the Hydaspes was Alexander’s favourite
horse Bucephalus, which died of exhaustion and old age before the
fighting was finished. A more dramatic version (originating from Chares,
Alexander’s court-marshal) states that Bucephalus died as a result of
wounds incurred during the battle. Alexander commemorated his horse by
naming one of two towns he founded on the Hydaspes Bucephala. The
town was most probably founded on the western bank of the river,
whereas a town called Nicaea (Victory City) was founded on the eastern
bank, on the site of the battle. Tracing their exact location is no longer
possible but we know that at least Bucephala still existed in the first
centuries of A.D./C.E.29
Victory over Porus was also commemorated with the issuing of large
silver coins weighing approximately 40g. These were more probably
somewhat inexact dekadrachms (10 drachma pieces) rather than 5-shekel
pieces. The reverse presents a horseman wearing a Phrygian helmet with a
crest and plume. In one hand he is holding a spear and in the other an
object that has been interpreted to represent lightning. Such a Phrygian
helmet has been found in tomb II at Vergina. Some historians believe that
the helmet at Vergina had belonged to Alexander and this is one of the
reasons why numismatists assume the warrior on the coin to represent
Alexander. The lightning held in the horseman’s hand resembles Apelles’
most famous depiction of Alexander and in both cases this may well be an
allusion to the king’s ancestor, Zeus. It may well also be a suggestion of
equivalence between Alexander and Zeus. The obverse of the coin
28 Arr., An. , 5.18.4-19.3; Plu., Alex. , 60-12-16; Plu., mor. , 181e, 332e, 458b; ME, 60-61; Them., 7.88d. Without basilikos answer: Diod., 17.88.4-89.6; Curt.,
8.14.31-46; Just., 12.8. Narain 1965, p. 163; Bosworth 1995, pp. 305-311.
29 Chares, ap. Gel., 5.2.1-5 (= FGrH, 125 F18); Str., 15.1.29; Arr., An. , 5.19.4-20.1; Curt., 9.1.6, 9.3.23; Diod., 17.89.6, 17.95.5; Plin. Nat. , 6.77, 8.154; Plu., Alex. , 61; ME, 62; Ps.-Callisth., 3.3.6; Just., 12.8. Bosworth 1995, pp. 311-316; Fraser 1996,
pp. 161-162.
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Chapter VI
portrays a horseman armed with a long spear fighting a warrior mounted
on an elephant. In all probability this is a depiction of Alexander’s clash
with Porus at the battle of the Hydaspes at the moment when the defeated
rajah was retreating but still fighting. Only 24 such coins have been found,
most of them in a treasure discovered in Iraq in 1973, which has led some
historians to believe that they had been struck in nearby Susa after
Alexander’s return from India or in Babylon in the year of his death. The
high artistic quality of the images on both sides of the coin suggests the
work of experienced Greek engravers. However, the careless manner in
which the coins were struck indicates that they may have been struck
&nb
sp; elsewhere. F. Holt therefore argues that the coins were most probably
struck in Alexander’s camp in India by inexperienced Indian minters. If
this was the case, they were most probably commemorative coins
produced and issued to Alexander’s men soon after the battle of the
Hydaspes.30
After the victory, Alexander’s army was allowed to rest for 30 days. In
that time Craterus supervised the fortifying of the newly founded towns of
Bucephala and Nicaea – though these fortifications eventually failed to
withstand the weathering caused by the monsoon. Meanwhile Alexander
led a campaign against mountain tribes living somewhere to the north of
the Hydaspes battlefield. The most probable objective of this campaign
was to ensure the area was safe for the logging of timber necessary for the
construction of ships that would take the army down river to conquer the
valleys of the lower Indus. The sources mention exotic beasts that
inhabited these forests: giant snakes and rhinoceroses. The giant snakes
were most probably large Indian pythons, which had been quite unknown
to the Greeks and are frequently mentioned in accounts of Alexander’s
expedition. One of the most fantastic tales is the account of Maximus of
Tyre, in which the author describes a snake 5 plethra (150 m) long. Taxiles
reputedly personally showed Alexander this snake inside a cave.
Onesicritus describes the same snake as being 70 cubits (c. 35 m) long and
having eyes like Macedonian shields or, in different versions, 80 and 140
cubits long. Heeding the request of the Indians, Alexander prudently
refrained from disturbing the creature.31
30 Holt 2003, especially pp. 118-130, 139-161.
31 Arr., An. , 5.20.1-4; Str., 15.1.29; Diod., 17.89.4-90.3; Curt., 9.1.4-5, 9.1.8-13;
Max. Tyr., 2.6.d-e; Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.28 and ap. Ael., NA, 15.21. Bosworth
1995, pp. 316-319; Karttunen 1997, pp. 184-186, 221-225; Malinowski 2003, pp.
197-198.
Expedition to India
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3. Hyphasis – the end of the expedition