The Darkest Days of the War- the Battles of Iuka and Corinth

by Peter Cozzens

  Brig. Gen. Lewis Henry Little (State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia)

  Before taking ill, Little had moved the division ten miles north, from Tupelo to Saltillo. Maury remained at Tupelo. Both places had good water, and the Confederates enjoyed better health than the Federals at Corinth. Idleness might have lowered their resistance to disease, but Hébert kept his troops occupied with incessant drilling, cleaning, and parading—a numbing routine that left the men busy but restless.5

  For a time it had looked as if the monotony might be broken. Braxton Bragg had decided to take the offensive and in late July began moving the Army of the Mississippi out of Tupelo. His immediate objective was neither the Federals at Corinth nor Buell’s Army of the Ohio but, rather, the city of Chattanooga. The agent of change in Bragg’s thinking was Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Department of East Tennessee. Smith had the unenviable task of defending one of the most difficult positions in the Confederacy with a paltry force of 9,000. It was his duty to keep open the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad and the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad (the latter a continuation of the Memphis and Charleston line) through the mountainous, sparsely settled, pro-Union counties of East Tennessee. Guerrillas ravaged the railroads in the eastern reaches of the department, and Buell menaced them from the west. To meet both threats, Smith dispersed his small command along a 180-mile front, from Chattanooga to the Cumberland Gap.

  By July it seemed the march of Buell’s army along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad toward Chattanooga would overwhelm the attenuated Confederate defenses. Smith’s options were limited. To abandon Chattanooga was unthinkable. Its loss would sever rail communications between Virginia and the West and open the door to a Federal advance on Adanta. Four of the South’s eight arsenals would be vulnerable to capture, as would much of the Confederacy’s munitions and raw materials. In late June Bragg sent McCown’s division from Price’s army to help hold Chattanooga. That calmed Smith, and to contemplate the fate of the department he went on leave in the Smoky Mountains. There his thinking became as thin as the mountain air. Smith had despaired to Bragg, and to anyone else who cared to listen, that he could not defend his department; now he suddenly concocted a plan to enlarge it. In early July he told Bragg that he intended to advance. Where, or against whom, he had not decided — perhaps against the Federal garrison at Cumberland Gap or into the fertile farm country of Middle Tennessee. The raider John Hunt Morgan helped clarify Smith’s intentions for him. Morgan had been raiding with impunity in Kentucky—ample proof, he wrote back, that the state could be Smith’s for the taking.

  While Buell drew closer to Chattanooga, and before Bragg had committed himself to the city’s defense, Smith began to shift troops away from Chattanooga for a Kentucky expedition. Impatient to start, Smith tried to force a decision on Bragg. On July 19 he warned Bragg that “Buell with his whole force, is opposite Chattanooga, which he is momentarily expected to attack.” Then, neglecting to mention he had stripped the city’s defenses, Smith urged Bragg to hurry along, for “the holding of Chattanooga depends upon your cooperation.”

  Nobody needed to remind Bragg how important Chattanooga was. He acceded to Smith’s disingenuous demand less out of credulity than from ambitions of his own. Bragg still entertained thoughts of attacking Buell from behind, but he had given up on Tupelo as too remote to make an effective staging area. Chattanooga, on the other hand, offered not only a strong base but also several routes from which to strike at Buell and perhaps regain Middle Tennessee, a move that would be immensely popular with the army and with Richmond. Playing at diplomacy, Bragg and his generals speculated that the recapture of Nashville — or perhaps even a drive through Kentucky to the Ohio River—might induce England and France to recognize the Confederacy.

  Bragg waited until his troops were boarding trains before informing Richmond of his plans and of the reasoning behind them. On July 23 he wrote the War Department that it was imperative to frustrate the Federal thrust into East Tennessee. To do so he would concede the initiative in northern Mississippi. If the chance offered itself, he would “in conjunction with Major General Smith, strike a blow through Middle Tennessee, gaining the enemy’s rear, cutting off his supplies and dividing his forces, so as to encounter him in detail.”6

  Richmond had little to say in response. In late June Secretary of War Randolph had suggested to Bragg that he simply “strike the moment an opportunity offers.” Randolph had nothing more to add now, and President Davis merely expressed his confidence that Bragg and Smith would be able to work together. Randolph and Davis did, however, concede the need to rationalize Bragg’s department. Bragg had complained that the division of Mississippi into two departments was “exceedingly inconvenient. The only communication for me east or west passes through Van Dorn’s command.” Taking this as an implied request for greater authority, Richmond reconfigured Department Number Two to include the entire states of Mississippi and Alabama, northwestern Georgia, that portion of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River, and the Florida panhandle.

  Bragg in turn reorganized the department he was about to abandon, dividing it into three districts. He gave Brig. Gen. John Forney command of the District of the Gulf, with orders to defend Mobile. He kept Earl Van Dorn and his 16,000 troops in Vicksburg and created the District of the Mississippi around them. Deprived of his department, Van Dorn had to content himself with a district. Bragg elevated Price to an equal footing with Van Dorn. He gave him the District of the Tennessee less out of regard for his abilities than from an absence of other suitable candidates. It was an expansive command, comprising northwestern Alabama and northeastern Mississippi as far south as Tupelo, and one that Price lacked the resources to defend adequately; he had only his Army of the West, augmented by a few hundred men from outlying garrisons.

  Perhaps because he considered northern Mississippi “infinitely less important” than East Tennessee, Bragg failed to give clear and precise orders to his district commanders or to leave one of them in charge in his absence. The closest he came to naming an interim successor was to tell Van Dorn that his rank would give him command whenever he and Price might join forces. Where two generals as willful as Van Dorn and Price were concerned, such negligence as Bragg displayed was inexcusable — and bound to produce friction.

  Bragg had no real instructions for Price beyond exhorting him to hold the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and keep Grant and Rosecrans from reinforcing Buell. How he might accomplish that was left to Price to divine. Bragg also told Price that he and Van Dorn might later conduct a joint offensive into western Tennessee to complement his own and Smith’s drives farther to the east, but he left Price no specific orders on the subject.

  Bragg had little to offer to Van Dorn, either. The day before he left Tupelo, Bragg asked the Mississippian to “consult freely and cooperate with Major General Price. It is expected that you will do all things deemed needful without waiting for instructions from these headquarters. General Price will be instructed to the same effect.” Even this minimal guidance was expressed as simply “the wish of the commanding general.”7

  General Hardee, whom Bragg had placed temporarily in command of the Army of the Mississippi, anticipated problems. Before leaving Tupelo, he warned Thomas Snead to watch for trouble. Having just learned that Van Dorn had staged an expedition against Baton Rouge, Hardee “feared it would lead Van Dorn into other adventures which would over task his strength, and that Van Dorn would then call on General Price to help him.” This Price must not do, as “the success of General Bragg’s movement into Tennessee and Kentucky depends greatly upon his (Price’s) ability to keep Grant from reinforcing Buell Say to General Price that I know that General Bragg expects him to keep his men well in hand, and ready to move northward at a moment’s notice.” Hardee’s furtive words of caution to Snead were the only meaningful orders given the defenders of Mississippi.8

  Problems arose at once. Price interpreted Bragg’s desire tha
t he keep Grant and Rosecrans occupied to mean he should move against them. On July 29, as the last of Hardee’s army departed Tupelo, he called in the scattered outposts of his district and set about assembling his army for a march against Corinth or Grand Junction, Tennessee. Price recognized that even a diversionary movement would fail without the combined strength of his and Van Dorn’s army, and so on July 31 he wrote Van Dorn soliciting the cooperation Bragg had said he could expect. The Federals, Price told Van Dorn, had weakened their forces in northern Mississippi and western Tennessee in order to reinforce Buell. Price thought Grant had only 15,000 men at Corinth and fewer than 10,000 at Bolivar, Tennessee. If that were true, then he and Van Dorn not only could retake Corinth but might also unite with Bragg somewhere in Middle Tennessee. “This will be our opportunity,” he exhorted Van Dorn, “and I am extremely anxious that we shall avail ourselves of it.”9

  Price was mistaken about the number of Federals he faced. Scouts and patrols from Frank Armstrong’s cavalry had grossly miscounted the enemy. Rosecrans had spread his army across northeastern Mississippi and into Alabama to defend the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and protect Buell’s flank, but he nonetheless could gather his forces rapidly. Paine’s First Division was then at Tuscumbia, Alabama, near the Tennessee River; Stanley’s Second Division lay encamped at Clear Creek; Hamilton’s Third Division had been advanced to Jacinto, eleven miles southeast of Corinth; Davis’s Fourth Division was guarding the track between Corinth and Tuscumbia; and the Fifth Division, now led by Gordon Granger, was twelve miles south of Corinth at Rienzi. Grant, in turn, had parceled out to garrison Corinth, Bolivar, Jackson, and Memphis more than three times the number of troops Price calculated.

  Bragg, too, was misinformed regarding Federal troop strength and dispositions, and he based his advice to Price on poor intelligence. Thinking Grant had sent nearly all of Rosecrans’s army to Buell, Bragg decided Price might do more for him than merely hold the remaining Yankees in check. An aggressive drive by Price would threaten Buell’s rear and perhaps induce him to fall back into Middle Tennessee. From Chattanooga on August 2 he exhorted Price to action: “Rosecrans commands Pope’s army. Nearly the whole force at Corinth should be moved this way. The road is open for you into Western Tennessee.”10

  Price was in a quandary. Although he felt compelled to act, Price was certain he could not move alone. And as Hardee had predicted, Van Dorn answered Price’s call that he come north with a request instead that Price send him a brigade to support his badly stalled campaign against Baton Rouge.

  Van Dorn had arrived at Vicksburg on June 28 to find a Federal brigade at work on a river canal that would bypass the city’s heavy batteries. He took command with typical dash, telling his men, “Let it be borne in mind by all that the army here is defending the place against occupation. This will be done at all hazards, even though this beautiful and devoted city should be laid in ruins.”

  The Mississippian’s gallant intentions went untested. The Federals gave up on canal digging and retired to Baton Rouge. Neither the river flotilla of Commodore Charles Davis nor Adm. David Farragut’s fleet, which had effected a junction above the city, could move against Vicksburg without an army to support them. District commander Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler at New Orleans had no troops to spare, and so they retired.

  Not content to watch the Federals leave, Van Dorn sent Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge to retake Baton Rouge. It was another quixotic Van Dorn enterprise. Without naval support, the Confederates never had a chance. After losing half his command to extreme heat and bad water on the march, on August 5 Breckinridge attacked and was repelled with heavy loss by fire from Federal warships. Frustrated in his efforts against Baton Rouge, Van Dorn instead fortified Port Hudson, forty miles upriver.11

  On August 4, the day before Breckinridge came to grief at Baton Rouge, Price told Van Dorn he could not reinforce him because Bragg expected him to advance into western Tennessee. “Every consideration makes it important that I shall move forward without a day’s unnecessary delay,” said Price. “I earnesdy desire your cooperation in such a movement, and will, as I have before said, be glad to place my army and myself under your command in that contingency.”

  Price’s anxiety grew. On August 4 he wrote Bragg’s chief of staff apologetically: “I am extremely impatient to begin a forward movement, and am bending every energy to do so without any unnecessary delay. I am ordering forward the entire disposable force in the district. I expect to begin my march within a week or ten days.” Then Price learned he would be moving alone. Having ignored Price’s appeal of July 31, Van Dorn responded to his telegram of August 4 with an emphatic “No"—his army was in no condition to leave the District of the Mississippi. Price implored Bragg to intervene. He did, in a manner, but stopped short of ordering Van Dorn to cooperate with Price.

  Bragg and Smith had worked out their differences in a meeting at Chattanooga and agreed on a basic plan for the coming campaign. While Bragg waited in Chattanooga for his artillery and wagon trains to come up, Smith would eliminate the small Federal garrison holding the Cumberland Gap. Together they would coax Buell into batde on ground of their choosing, then march north and occupy Kentucky. With their flank thus turned, any Federals remaining in western Tennessee and northern Mississippi would be compelled to retreat, presumably with Van Dorn and Price in pursuit.

  The success of such a grandiose design depended partly on preventing further accretions to Buell’s army. Consequently, Bragg told Van Dorn it was “very desirable to press the enemy closely in West Tennessee.” Despite the obvious importance of at least a diversionary movement in northern Mississippi, Bragg only suggested to Van Dorn that he join Price, which was tantamount to allowing the Mississippian a free hand. Perhaps to induce Van Dorn to cooperate, Bragg reminded him that “of course when you join Price your rank gives you command of the whole force.” Bragg wrote Price the next day, enclosing a copy of his letter to Van Dorn. “The details of your movements I must leave to your own judgment and intelligence, relying on your patriotism for a cordial co-operation.”12

  Cooperation, no matter how cordial, was no substitute for unified command. Nor were polite suggestions. Unlike Price, Van Dorn had no enthusiasm for an attack on Corinth. Anxious to clear the Mississippi Valley and unconcerned with protecting Bragg’s flank, Van Dorn preferred to launch an attack farther to the west. And he was not above lying to get his way. Apparently unaware that Bragg had shared with Price his letter to him, Van Dorn distorted its content, telling Price that Bragg wanted him to take the offensive “toward Grand Junction and Memphis.” But even that would have to wait. Breckinridge was languishing outside Baton Rouge, his force “too feeble to make a decisive result.” Perhaps Price could spare a brigade to help him? In any case, Van Dorn concluded, it would be at least two weeks before he would be ready to move.

  Van Dorn’s message was delayed almost as long in reaching Price. Hearing nothing from Van Dorn in the interim and learning that earlier reports of Rosecrans’s departure from his front were in error, Price grew despondent. When Bragg, who was still in Chattanooga without any clear timetable for his own offensive, counseled him not to “depend much on Van Dorn; he has his hands full,” Price shelved his plan. “Believing I could not advance successfully without [Van Dorn’s] cooperation, I determined to await either that or the weakening of the enemy’s force in front of me and to meanwhile perfect my preparations to move.”13

  Although he entertained no hopes of assaulting the Federals without Van Dorn, Price did what he could to harass them. He called upon Frank Armstrong to take his recently organized cavalry brigade and slash at Grant’s line of communication and bring back information about his dispositions.

  On August 22, at the head of i,6oo troopers, Armstrong rode from Baldwyn to Holly Springs, where he was joined by the Seventh Tennessee Cavalry from Van Dorn’s army. Together they pushed up the Mississippi Railroad past Grand Junction to threaten Bolivar. Along the way Armstrong detached Col.
William Falkner with 400 Mississippi partisan rangers to distract Rosecrans with a raid on Chewalla, ten miles northwest of Corinth.14

  A nasty skirmish near Bolivar between Armstrong and the Federal garrison threw the Federal high command into a panic, taxing Grant at a time when he had litde interest in the work at hand. Expecting trouble from the Confederates, he had sent his wife, Julia, and the children home two weeks earlier. Now he missed them terribly. “I wish I could be there or any place else where I could be quiet and free from annoyance for a few weeks,” he wrote Julia on August 18. “From present indications you only left here in time. Lively operations are threatened and you need not be surprised to hear of fighting going on in Grant’s army.” Six days after his family left, Grant sent his ailing friend and chief of staff, John Rawlins, home on convalescent leave.

  Alone now, Grant was tired and genuinely perplexed. Falkner’s presence near Chewalla led Grant to fear an imminent attack on Corinth. Rumors spread that Price himself was marching on the town. Grant called in his outposts and evacuated the large hospital at nearby Farmington. Overnight the sick and wounded were loaded into wagons for the bone- grinding ride to Corinth. So great was the haste that nonessential supplies were abandoned.

  Grant’s alarm was understandable. He knew of Bragg’s departure for Chattanooga but was uncertain how many troops had remained behind with Price at Saltillo and Tupelo. Grant thought 20,000; Rosecrans credited reports that gave Price 12,000 men.15

  In northeastern Alabama Don Carlos Buell also knew Bragg was concentrating against him, and he importuned Grant ceaselessly for reinforcements. Grant pleaded that the weakened and dispersed condition of his forces precluded him from helping, but Buell persisted. Not that he could be expected to do otherwise. Halleck had told him plainly that the administration was “gready dissatisfied” with the slowness of his march toward Chattanooga. It was common knowledge that Smith had struck out for Kentucky, and Halleck and Buell feared that Bragg was poised at Chattanooga to do similar mischief. With the majority of Confederate forces in the West threatening Buell, Grant was compelled to yield to Buell’s demand, endorsed by Halleck, that he loan him two divisions.