The Darkest Days of the War- the Battles of Iuka and Corinth

by Peter Cozzens

  Grant took Paine and Mitchell from Rosecrans, who was left with three divisions to cover a front fifty miles wide. Clearly that was more ground than he could defend, and Rosecrans warned that “a speedy remedy must be applied or a bad result must be expected.”

  Grant agreed. He tried to convince Halleck to allow him to consolidate his forces, but the general in chief refused. Instead Halleck wanted the line extended to Decatur, Alabama—100 miles from Corinth by road — to keep open communications with Buell. In a measure Grant was responsible for Halleck’s posture; on August 16 he injudiciously told Halleck cavalry patrols had revealed the country to his front “to be so dry that an attack on [Corinth] is hardly to be apprehended.”16

  Armstrong’s raid caused Grant to rue that telegram. While he and Rosecrans tried to comprehend the meaning of the sudden Confederate activity, Halleck importuned Grant to send still more reinforcements to Buell. Now Grant was forced to admit he had been wrong. “I am weak and threatened with present forces from Humboldt to Bolivar, and at this point would deem it very unsafe to spare any more troops,” he told Halleck on September 1. Only if Halleck permitted him to abandon the railroad at the Alabama border and shorten his front could he possibly comply. Halleck agreed to that and more — Grant was free to terminate his line at Corinth, but he must release another division. Bragg had left Chattanooga, and the War Department was hurrying all available troops to succor Buell. Again it was Rosecrans to whom Grant turned. Gordon Granger departed for Kentucky on September 4, leaving Rosecrans with two divisions — those of Stanley and Hamilton — to meet what might be an advance on Corinth by Price’s entire army.17

  Armstrong kept the Federals guessing. He bypassed Bolivar and continued north along the railroad toward Jackson, burning bridges and tearing up track as he went. On September 1 he clashed with a strong Federal detachment near Denmark. Armstrong drew off after burning a wagon train and taking 200 prisoners. The Federal commander at Jackson, Brig. Gen. Leonard Ross, panicked. Rumors spread that Bolivar had surrendered and that the Jackson garrison was about to be surrounded by 30,000 Confederates. Ross pleaded with Grant to send heavy reinforcements to save the junction town. But Grant at Corinth had none to spare. “This point,” he told the frightened Illinoisan, “besides its importance, is very weak and should be reinforced rather than drawn from.” Ross would have to fend for himself.18

  Unbeknownst to Grant and Ross, the danger had passed. After the skirmish at Denmark Armstrong withdrew, delighted with the results of his expedition. The weak Federal response convinced him Bolivar could be easily taken “whenever an advance of our army is made.” Armstrong’s losses had been small, and morale was high. “Our commands were in the saddle for nearly forty-eight hours, and some of them longer, without food, but neither hunger nor fatigue could daunt them. They are ever ready when an opportunity offers to punish the insolent invaders.”19

  A second opportunity was to present itself far sooner than Armstrong could have imagined.

  5. Things Were Beginning to Wear a Threatening Aspect

  Bragg and Van Dorn were pushing Sterling Price to the limits of his patience— the former by insisting he prevent a junction of Buell and Rosecrans, and the latter by refusing to cooperate with him. On August 25, three days before starting from Chattanooga, Bragg exhorted Price to strike the moment the Federals to his front appeared vulnerable. “In the mean time harass your opponent by all your cavalry. Buell is falling back toward Nashville. We must keep them moving.”

  Price tried. He sent Armstrong on his raid and beseeched Van Dorn to help drive the enemy from Corinth.

  No sooner had Price written Van Dorn than another message came from Bragg. Smith was on the move toward Cumberland Gap, Kentucky, and Bragg himself was about to depart Chattanooga for Middle Tennessee, where he hoped to take “the enemy’s rear, strike Nashville, or perhaps . . . strike for Lexington and Cincinnati.” Bragg expected Price to do his part to ensure the success of the grand offensive. “Sherman and Rosecrans we leave to you and Van Dorn, satisfied that you can dispose of them,” said Bragg, who cleverly concluded with an appeal to Price’s desideratum: “We shall confidently expect to meet you on the Ohio and there open the way to Missouri.”

  Four days passed with no word from Van Dorn. Price followed the fortunes of Armstrong and pushed his own preparations. On the night of September 1 he read a dispatch that was the closest thing to a direct order that Bragg had yet issued to Price or Van Dorn: “Buell’s whole force in full retreat upon Nashville, destroying their stores. Watch Rosecrans and prevent a junction; or if he escapes you follow him closely.”

  Price concluded to tarry no longer. With or without Van Dorn he would march against Rosecrans’s army. On September 2 Price informed the Mississippian of his decision, saying he felt Bragg’s “order requires me to advance immediately . . . . I hope nothing will prevent you from coming forward without delay with all your disposable troops.”1

  It was a gracious exhortation, but Price held no real hope for a favorable reply. Instead he concentrated on his own plans. He assigned Little the mission of advance guard and on September 5 edged his division forward fifteen miles from Saltillo to Baldwyn. Maury took his place at Saltillo.

  Before pushing on, Price paused to gather wagons and to write Van Dorn one final, indignant letter. The Mississippian had replied to Price’s letter of September 2 in a manner that mocked Bragg’s desires. Van Dorn told Price he would not be ready to march from Holly Springs, where he was concentrating his army, until September 12. More concerned with keeping Grant and Rosecrans separated than with preventing them from reinforcing Buell, he declined to attack Corinth with Price. Instead he suggested Price meet him at Grand Junction to maneuver Rosecrans out of Corinth, which he intimated was too strong to assault. Bragg’s immediate needs were of little moment. “Do not leave me and go east if you can avoid it,” he begged. “We can do more together west of the Tennessee, for awhile at least. We should try and shake them loose from all points in West Tennessee; then march to join Bragg, if necessary.”

  Price was incredulous; Bragg’s orders were at last clear and unambiguous, and he intended to follow them. A move toward Holly Springs would uncover the Memphis and Ohio Railroad, upon which he depended for supplies, and take him far from Rosecrans, whom Bragg wanted him to watch.2

  Price correctly placed Rosecrans at Iuka. Although Halleck had permitted Grant to abandon the country east of Corinth, Grant felt obliged to maintain a presence near Tuscumbia until Paine and Mitchell completed their crossing of the Tennessee River and Rosecrans was able to draw off the excess property they left behind. At the same time both Grant and Rosecrans recognized that, given the vulnerability of the railroads to depredations by Rebel cavalry, the most reliable line of supply for the Army of the Mississippi was the Tennessee River. The best river landing was thirty-five miles east of Corinth at Eastport. Rosecrans considered it imperative to protect Eastport as long as possible, and so he deployed a brigade from Stanley’s division at Iuka to shield the river town. The remainder of the division he hoped to draw off to Corinth. Rosecrans also decided to leave outposts at Jacinto, Rienzi, and Danville to warn of a Rebel approach.3

  An urgent telegram from Bragg, dated September 6, removed any doubt Price may have had about the wisdom of refusing Van Dorn. Reporting the Federals had evacuated Alabama and were falling back fast toward Nashville, Bragg was sure Rosecrans would follow; consequently, Price “should move rapidly for Nashville” to keep Rosecrans from uniting with Buell.

  Price made his final preparations. Bragg, of course, was wrong about Rosecrans, mistaking the crossing of Paine and Mitchell for a transfer of the entire Army of the Mississippi. Price acted on the assumption that Bragg was right, but he nonetheless was prepared to do battle in Mississippi should Rosecrans remain at Iuka. On September 8 he advanced his headquarters to Guntown. Weary of his futile exchange of letters with Van Dorn, Price told Major Snead to inform the Mississippian’s adjutant that he “expect
ed to move immediately against Iuka in accordance with order just received from General Bragg, who again instructs him to follow Rosecrans.”4

  * * *

  Thursday, September n, dawned bright, hot, and dry. Reveille sounded long before daylight, and the troops spent the morning loading wagons. The effort was badly organized. It took six hours to pack down the munitions and stores, leading General Little to complain to his diary that there was “great inefficiency somewhere.” His ire, however, ranged wider than mere frustration with the quartermaster corps. Little was dead set against a march on Iuka. That morning he had risen, sick and angry, and tried one last time to try to dissuade Price from his plan, which Little argued would leave the interior of Mississippi open to a Federal coun- terthrust. But Price was not to be persuaded, not even by Little.5

  Perspiring and caked with dust, at noon the soldiers of the Army of the West filed onto a confusing web of trails that laced together the wild, uncultivated country between Baldwyn and Corinth. Fourteen thousand strong they marched in the direction of Marietta, a small village eight miles east of Baldwyn. Armstrong’s cavalry screened them. The roads converged and then branched unexpectedly, and by late afternoon many of Little’s regiments were badly entangled.

  Little reached Marietta an hour and a half after sunset. He was in passable health, but his men were exhausted. Most camped in a swamp near Twenty Mile Creek with only their blankets to protect them from the rank air and mucky ground; others simply lay down on the road, and a fortunate few made camp beside a clear stream. A storm came up during the night, and by morning all were drenched and equally miserable. It rained off and on all day, and the infantry covered only eleven miles. At Price’s behest Armstrong rode on toward Iuka. Little encamped a mile east of Bay Springs, a decrepit village with only a gristmill to brag on. There he was joined by Maury, who had marched his division over the Saltillo-Bay Springs road. Sick again, Litde retired to an ambulance. In his diary that night he speculated that a battle seemed likely at Iuka.6

  Grant and Rosecrans also expected a fight. Civilian scouts from Charles Hamilton’s division, which was posted at Rienzi, had detected the movement of Little from Saltillo to Baldwyn. Two days later, on September 8, patrols from Col. Edwin Hatch’s Second Iowa Cavalry ran into troopers from Armstrong’s brigade along Twenty Mile Creek. Deserters began to drift in bearing news that Price and Van Dorn had combined for a strike toward Kentucky. An escaped prisoner from an Ohio regiment told Rosecrans he had overheard two angry civilians, whose farms had been sacked, threaten to bushwhack the Yankees responsible. Price had admonished them to go home; he “would rectify matters in a week or two.”

  Rosecrans was concerned but confident. As “things were now beginning to wear a threatening aspect,” he removed his headquarters from Iuka, where he had gone to supervise the crossing of Paine and Mitchell, to Camp Clear Creek. Grant had given him the division of Thomas A. Davies and two brigades of Charles McArthur’s division from his own army to help hold Corinth, and Rosecrans counted himself secure there. He doubted Price could muster 12,000 men and thought the Rebels were “playing a game of bluff.” Grant was less certain. “For two days now I have been advised of the advance of Price and Van Dorn on this place,” he wired Halleck from Corinth on September 9. “Should the enemy come I will be as ready as possible with the means at hand. I do not believe a force can be brought against us that cannot be successfully resisted.” Yet Price’s movements baffled him. “With all the vigilance I can bring to bear I cannot determine the objects of the enemy,” Grant confessed to Halleck the same day. “Everything threatens an attack here but my fear is it is to cover some other movement.” Rosecrans’s cavalry reported Price’s departure from Baldwyn promptly, but the knowledge did little to clarify the uncertainty in the Federal high command. Grant became more convinced that Corinth was about to be attacked; Rosecrans was just as certain the whole thing was a heavy-handed demonstration.

  Perhaps, but Grant was not inclined to take chances. On September 11 he ordered Rosecrans to gather his forces at Corinth in anticipation of an attack Grant thought would come within forty-eight hours. Rosecrans returned from Iuka on September 12, bringing with him Col. John Fuller’s Ohio brigade of Stanley’s division. Col. Robert Murphy’s brigade was left behind to protect the stores at Iuka.7

  At Bay Springs Price was still unsure where Rosecrans was or what he was doing. He predicated his marching orders for September 13 on the assumption that Rosecrans’s army, rather than just Murphy’s lone brigade, was at Iuka and that Rosecrans was about to cross the Tennessee River at Eastport. Not wanting to lose him, Price exhorted Little to make better time in the morning. Armstrong would ride on ahead before dawn, and General Maury was to march over the old Natchez Trace, east of Little’s division. The day’s objective for both divisions was Peyton’s Mill, a hamlet twelve miles south of Iuka.

  Price had his troops on the road at 3:00 A.M. The recent rain had settled the dust but not broken the hot spell. The soldiers shuffled past houses sacked and burnt by the Yankees and forded streams long dry. By mid-morning the temperature reached ninety degrees, and only a low ceiling of dark clouds and a light breeze made the march bearable.

  The infantry converged on Peyton’s Mill at 5:00 P.M. Wagons were still several miles behindz, so the men set about cooking what rations they carried with them. Watching his troops huddled about their campfires, General Little grew hopeful. He liked their spirit and good humor the night before what he was certain would be a battle at Iuka. “God grant us victory,” he wrote in his diary before retiring to his ambulance.

  Little’s wagons rolled into camp at 8:30 and parked. The men threw themselves on the bare ground to sleep, and the camp fell silent. At 10:30 P.M. the warm stillness of the night was broken by the rattle of beating drums. Dirty and exhausted, the men grounded their knapsacks and fell into line. Word spread that Frank Armstrong’s cavalry had met the enemy at Iuka but needed infantry support to take the town.8

  The news cheered the men. Back onto the road they filed at 11:00 P.M., “old men and young boys, rich planters on blooded horses and Negro laborers on foot; farmers and clerks; grizzled hunters and tough keelboat men; prosperous merchants and plain backwoodsmen,” remembered a Texan. “On they came, glutting narrow roads, overflowing into the forest; undulating, talking in smooth drawls or emitting shrill, terrifying cries — as strangely assorted and colorful an army as ever human eye rested upon.”

  As the excitement wore off, the men became aware of their fatigue and discomfort. Few had done any real marching since abandoning Corinth in May. Several hundred of Maury’s men had drawn new shoes just before leaving Tupelo, and their feet were now painful welts. Troops by the score slipped from the ranks and melted into the forest to sleep.

  Somewhere near the head of the column was Henry Little. His stomach was weak and fever gripped his body. Fleas had made a home in his clothing. Little had expended his last reserves of strength mounting his horse. Now the gentle rocking of the saddle lulled him into a deep sleep, and the horse walked on, guided by the light of a full moon and the silhouettes of the marching soldiers.9

  * * *

  Soldiers of both armies agreed on the merits of Iuka, Mississippi. It was “a pretty little village,” recalled a Missourian. A member of the Eighth Wisconsin remembered Iuka as “the first place we had seen in the South that looked anything like a business town. Wealth, affluence, and southern grandeur were plainly visible. Houses built in the most improved style. Gardens beautifully arranged and blooming. It seemed a pity to see such a beautiful village become the prey of contending armies.”10

  Iuka enjoyed a national reputation for its abundant mineral springs. Invalids came to bathe in the restorative, sulphur-tinged waters and relax in surrounding hotels. Named for a Chickasaw chief who had made his village beside the springs, Iuka grew rapidly after white settlers took the Indian lands, expanding in a long strip on either side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which laid track
through the town in 1857. Merchants flocked to Iuka with the tourists, and by i860 the permanent population of Iuka was nearly 1,500.

  Besides the railroad four good wagon roads served the town. The East- port and Fulton Stage Route entered Iuka from the northeast. The Iuka and Corinth Stage Route connected Iuka and Corinth from the west. Two roads led into town from the south: the Jacinto road and, running parallel to it a mile and a half to the east, the Fulton road. Like that surrounding Corinth, the country around Iuka consisted of vast swamps, rolling hills, sharp ravines, indifferently plowed fields, bottomland pastures, and forests of oak and pine.11

  * * *

  Frank Armstrong relished a good fight. Born in the Indian Territory to a Regular Army father, Armstrong accepted a direct commission after graduating from Holy Cross Academy in Massachusetts. He fought for the North at First Bull Run but resigned three weeks later to serve on the staff of Ben McCulloch. After Pea Ridge the soldiers of the Third Louisiana Infantry elected him colonel; it was as commander of the Third that the twenty-six-year-old Armstrong attracted the notice of General Price. His performance at Bolivar two weeks earlier affirmed Armstrong’s worth, so that Price had no misgivings about turning him loose against the garrison of Iuka, a day’s march ahead of the infantry.

  Armstrong struck at 8:00 A.M. on September 13. His troopers captured thirty pickets before Col. Robert Murphy mustered enough men to drive them off. All morning Armstrong’s men probed the Federal defenses for weaknesses. Three times they attacked, capturing a handful of prisoners on each occasion. The Yankees counterattacked and took two prisoners themselves, a captain and a private whom they hustled back to headquarters for interrogation. Both confessed that Price was one day away with the rest of the army—"a very strong hint to us,” said an officer of the Eighth Wisconsin, “that it was best to retire in good order.”