The Tactics of Aelian
Page 20
6. Again, this assumes that the formation begins in intermediate-order or 96cm per man at the very least. The members of the even-numbered files would side-step back and to the right and take up a position behind the man that had been next to them. In doing so, the formation changes from one that was in intermediate-order all around (i.e. on all sides of each man), into one where each of the files (now containing thirty-two men) was in a close-order of 48cm per man front-to-back, but occupying the same space as sixteen men in intermediate-order. In doing so, there would also be a gap equivalent to an open-order interval of 96cm per man between each file after they had merged. Whether these new files then shuffled up to lessen this gap is left untreated by Aelian.
7. Nearly every previous translation of Aelian has had trouble interpreting this passage. For example, Bingham, in his 1616 edition, included a large section in parentheses in an attempt to make sense of it. Augustus, in a note in his 1814 edition, stated ‘we have translated this sentence paraphrasically. Had we given it literally, it would have been almost intelligible’. Based upon the previous manoeuvres detailed by Aelian, the version presented here, while not closely following the original, is one of the few ways to make sense of the text.
Chapter 29
a. Arc 1613 = καθόλου.
b. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
c. Arc 1613 = πράγμα; K&R 1855 = τάγμα.
d. K&R 1855 = ἔχῃ.
e. K&R 1855 = τὸ βάθος τοῦ μήκους.
f. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
g. K&R 1855 = ὑποστολῆς.
1. See also Arr., Tact. 26.
2. As such, the units of these wings would almost be arranged in a column rather than in ranks, possibly done by doubling the depth of the files as Aelian outlines at the end of Chapter 28.
3. What these events were would be entirely dependant upon the orders that the wing had received (e.g. to hold their ground, to continue to advance so as to hit the enemy line after the other wing had already engaged, etc.) and upon the many variables that play out during the course of a battle. For example, at the battle of Leuctra in 317 BC, the Thebans and their allies deployed in an oblique line against the Spartans and their allies. The Thebans occupied a forward position on the left wing, in what Aelian would refer to as an ‘even’ formation, fifty ranks deep but with a lesser frontage. The contingents of Theban allies were arranged in an oblique line angled back and to the right of the Theban position. This deployment was adopted to draw the opposing line of Spartan allies forward (Plut., Pel. 23; Diod. Sic. 15.55.2; Polyaenus, Strat. 1.35.1). The Spartans were deployed directly opposite the Thebans (i.e. on the Spartan right wing) in a transverse formation, twelve ranks deep. The Theban line advanced, smashing into the Spartan formation at the point where their king, Kleombrotus, was positioned. Four hundred out of the 700 officers making up the Spartan front rank died in the clash, including Kleombrotus (Xen., Hell. 6.4.15; Paus. 9.13.4; Plut., Mor. 193B). This demonstrates that some of the allies on the Theban right must also have engaged the Spartans directly. Diodorus (15.55.2) states that the Boeotian right wing had instructions to slowly withdraw from the fighting, thus drawing the Spartan left wing forward.
Chapter 30
a. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
b. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
c. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
d. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
e. K&R 1855 = ἐντάσσειν.
f. K&R 1855 = ἔχοντας.
g. K&R 1855 = τὀ ὄλον.
1. See also Arr., Tact. 26.
2. This action was most likely conducted in a manner similar to the doubling of the depth of the files of the phalanx, but laterally rather than from front to back (see Chapter 28 note 5). The men of the even-numbered ranks would step forward and to the left, taking up a position in the space between the men of the odd-numbered rank ahead of them. This would result, if the men had originally been deployed in an open-order, in a formation with an intermediate-order spacing of 96cm per man between the men of each rank, but with an open-order spacing of 192cm per man between each of the ranks. Whether each reformed rank then moved forward to lessen this gap, in effect creating an intermediate-order phalanx, is unstated.
3. In Chapter 16, Aelian states that the light troops were regularly deployed in files of eight men. As such, it can only be assumed that, if an entaxis formation was ever adopted, the light troops were arranged with an interval between each man from front to back twice the size of the interval that the infantry were deployed in (i.e. if the infantry were in intermediate-order, then the light troops would be in open-order) so that the files covered the same linear distance from front to rear. It is also assumed that, if the light troops were inserted between the files of infantry, then enough space between the files would also be left for the light troops to use their weapons unless the formation was strictly for the purpose of marching. (See Plate 16.)
Chapter 31
a. K&R 1855 = δεῖ συντάγματα.
b. Rob 1552 = ἀντικαθιστάναι.
c. K&R 1855 = τῶν ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς.
d. K&R 1855 = προσάγειν.
e. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
f. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
g. Rob 1552 = ἐπὶ.
h. K&R 1855 = λόχος.
i. K&R 1855 = προάγοντες.
j. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
k. Rob 1552 = προεῖχεν.
l. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
m. K&R 1855 = οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατὰ ζυγὰ προαγέτωσαν, εἶτα μεταβαλλέσθωσαν.
n. K&R 1855 = ἀποκαταστήσῃ εἰς τὰ ἴδια.
o. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
p. K&R 1855 = οὕτω.
q. K&R 1855 = ἀνιέναι τὰ.
r. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
s. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
t. K&R 1855 = καθεστῶτα.
u. K&R 1855 = τοῦτ’ ἔστιν.
v. K&R 1855 = περισπασμὸς γένηται, ἔτι δεῖ.
w. K&R 1855 = τοῦτ’ ἔστιν.
x. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
y. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
z. K&R 1855 = μέρη.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 10.10–12, 12.1–8.
2. The concepts contained within this chapter, and some of those that follow, are more readily understood by first examining a military principle known as ‘fronts and flanks’. When a formation is all lined up facing in one direction (for example, towards an enemy or an instructing officer), they are facing to the front. The right flank of the formation is known as the right, the left flank is known as the left, and the rear of the formation (away from the enemy or instructor) is known as the rear. When facing forward, the relative positions of these angles of facing correlate with the facing of the individual men in the formation (i.e. the front is also their front, the left is also their left, the right is also their right, and the rear is also their rear). (See Figure 5.)
Things become more complicated when part of the phalanx changes its facing in respect to the enemy or instructor (e.g. if it undertakes a wheeling). If a formation wheels to the right (as in Aelian’s first example in this chapter) the positions of the front, the left, the right and the rear remain unchanged. However, from the perspective of the men within the formation, the facings become somewhat different, as their own perception of facing has shifted by 90 degrees. Consequently, the front becomes their left, the left becomes their rear, the right becomes their front, and the rear becomes their right. (See Figure 6.)
Figure 5: The ‘fronts and flanks’ when the army is facing towards an enemy.
Formations that have whe
eled to the left (as in Aelian’s second example) also experience this change in perspective, but in the opposite direction: the front becomes their right, the left becomes their front, the right becomes their rear, and the rear becomes their left. (See Figure 6.)
For formations completely turned about (i.e. those who have about-faced and are looking away from the enemy or instructor, as in Aelian’s third example) the perspective from within the formation completely reverses, so that the front becomes their rear, the left becomes their right, the right becomes their left, and the rear becomes their front. (See Figure 7.)
Unfortunately, Aelian does not differentiate between the two different perspectives on facing within his text, despite clearly using different perspectives throughout the passages of the chapter. In some cases, Aelian merely uses the definite article ‘the’ (e.g. ‘the men turn to the right’) without detailing whether this is meant to be taken as a reference to the direction or their direction. In other instances, Aelian refers to turning either ‘to the shield’ or ‘to the spear’ without considering which way the soldiers are facing before they turn and elaborating on this detail to the reader. This can lead to some confusion when reading the passage in its original form. Consequently, while not following the original text to the letter, this edition will use, where required, a standard format of giving the direction of facing, first based upon the direction of the entire army line, followed [in brackets] by the direction from the perspective of the men within the formation; e.g. ‘they turned to the front [i.e. their right]’. Coupled with an understanding of the concepts outlined above, this will make the direction that the formation is turning/facing/ wheeling in Aelian’s passages more readily understood.
Figure 6: The ‘fronts and flanks’ when a formation has turned to the left or right.
Figure 7: The ‘fronts and flanks’ when the army is facing away from an enemy.
3. In other words, these files then turn to the front [i.e. their left] so that the whole formation is once again facing to the front.
4. This ‘wheel’ would be conducted in a similar manner to the epistrophē detailed in Chapter 24 (i.e. pivoting around the right hand man, who acts like the hinge on a gate). Thus it seems clear that the ancient manoeuvre of wheeling is not the same concept as the modern military drill movement, where a moving formation changes its direction by simply turning around a pivot point on either the left or right-hand side while each man retains his position and interval within the formation. This modern movement is more like the epistrophē. The ancient wheel appears to have only been done in a very compact order, most likely to limit the amount of space required to conduct such a manoeuvre and to lessen the distance that each man has to travel through the change of direction. As such, a ‘wheel’ could not have been conducted while the formation had its pikes lowered and can only have been undertaken with the weapons held vertically (see Chapter 32). Although unstated, it can only be assumed that, once the ‘wheel’ had been completed, the formation then opened its intervals to assume the spacing of the original formation.
5. In other words, the whole formation turns about and faces the way they had come. They then wheel in the same manner as the epistrophē, using the man at the front left corner of the formation as the pivot point.
6. In other words, the whole formation, which is facing to the rear at this stage, about-faces to once again look to the front. Thus, all of the men are back in their original position.
7. So as to be facing towards the front.
8. In many of the editions of Aelian, this passage is very hard to follow. Based upon the details that Aelian provides for returning a formation from a wheel to the right, the version presented here, while not closely following the original, is one of the few ways to make sense of the text.
9. Here, Aelian discusses the process of turning the formation about 180 degrees by wheeling to the right twice.
10. This is on the right-hand side of the formation. For the men who have about-faced, it would actually be the file on their left.
Chapter 32
a. K&R 1855 = κέρας.
b. Rob 1552 = βουληθῶμεν.
c. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
d. K&R 1855 = διαστήματα συντηρήσαντες.
e. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
f. K&R 1855 = ἔλθωσι.
g. K&R 1855 = πυκνώσεως.
h. K&R 1855 = ἄνω τὰ δόρατα.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 12.8–9.
2. For the different terms for the facing of the formation depending upon the perspective, see Chapter 31 note 1.
3. Following the details that Aelian provides for closing to the left or right, it is assumed that the central files of each wing hold fast while the remainder of the unit undertakes a closing to their respective left or right sides.
Chapter 33
a. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
b. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
c. K&R 1855 = τῶν ἐξελιγμῶν.
d. Rob 1552 = ὀνομάτων τῶν; Arc 1613 = ὀνομάτων.
e. K&R 1855 = μέντοι.
f. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
g. K&R 1855 = τε.
h. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
i. K&R 1855 = ἡ χρεία καὶ τοῦτον.
j. K&R 1855 = χρησαμένους.
k. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
l. K&R 1855 = ἐμποιεῖ.
m. K&R 1855 = γὰρ.
n. K&R 1855 = κατάπληξιν.
o. K&R 1855 = διωγμὸν τοῖς οὕτως.
p. K&R 1855 = ἀκολουθεῖν.
q. Rob 1552 = ὑπ᾿ ἀυτων τῶν.
r. K&R 1855 = γίνεται δειλία.
1. The battle of Chaeronea took place in 338 BC.
2. For the way in which the different forms of counter-march are conducted, see Chapter 27.
Chapter 34
a. K&R 1855 = πεζὰς.
b. K&R 1855 = πρὸς.
c. K&R 1855 = περίστασις.
d. K&R 1855 = ἄν.
e. K&R 1855 = ἀντιστῇ.
f. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
g. K&R 1855 = καὶ.
h. Rob 1552 = παριππασεων καὶ χρεμετισμῶν.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 12.10; Arr., Tact. 27.
Chapter 35
a. From this point, K&R 1855 differs considerably from either Rob 1552 or Arc 1613. The passage that is found in K&R 1855 is reproduced below. It is merely a summarized version of many elements of the following chapters, which are missing from K&R 1855 in their entirety.
Περὶ δὲ πορειῶν μέλλοντες λέγειν τοσοῦτον προεροῦμεν, ὅτι ἡ μέν τις ἐν ταῖς πορείαις ἐπαγωγὴ λέγεται, ἡ δὲ παραγωγή. καὶ ἐπαγωγὴ μὲν λέγεται, ὅτ’ ἂν τάγμα τάγματι ὑποτάσσηται, οἷον τετραρχίας ἡγουμένης αἱ λοιπαὶ τετραρχίαι ταύτῃ ὑποτάσσωνται ἢ ξεναγίας ἡγουμένης αἱ λοιπαὶ ξεναγίαι ἐπακολουθῶσι, καὶ καθ’ ὅλου, ὅτ’ ἂν σύνταγμα συντάγματι ἕπηται, ὥστε τοῖς τοῦ προηγουμένου συντάγματος οὐραγοῖς τοὺς τοῦ ἑξῆς συντάγματος ἡγεμόνας συνάπτειν. ἡ δὲ παραγωγή ἐστιν, ὅτ’ ἂν ἡ φάλαγξ πορεύηται τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐκ τῶν εὐωνύμων ἔχουσα ἢ ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν. κἂν μὲν ἐκ τῶν εὐωνύμων μερῶν ἔχῃ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, εὐώνυμος παραγωγὴ καλεῖται, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν, δεξιὰ παραγωγή. ἐάν τε δὲ ἡ πορεία ἐν ἐπαγ�
�γῇ γίνηται, ἐάν τε ἐν παραγωγῇ, ἐν μονοπλεύρῳ ἢ διπλεύρῳ ἢ τριπλεύρῳ ἢ τετραπλεύρῳ τάγματι βαδιεῖ. μονοπλεύρῳ μέν, ὅτ’ ἂν ἕνα φοβῇ, διπλεύρῳ δέ, ὅτ’ ἂν δύο, τριπλεύρῳ δέ, ὅτ’ ἂν τρεῖς, τετραπλεύρῳ δέ, ὅτ’ ἂν πάντοθεν οἱ πολέμιοι ἐπιτίθεσθαι μέλλωσιν. γίνονται δ’ αἱ πορεῖαι ποτὲ μὲν μονοφαλαγγίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ διφαλαγγίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ τριφαλαγγίᾳ ἢ τετραφαλαγγίᾳ. ἀκόλουθόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ φάλαγγος πῶς λέγεται ἀμφίστομος, καὶ ἐν πορείαις πῶς λέγεται διφαλαγγία ἀμφίστομος καὶ ἀντίστομος καὶ ἑτερόστομος καὶ ὁμοιόστομος.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 11.2–7; Arr., Tact. 28.
2. The basics of the paragogē formation are given in Chapter 36. The entire phalanx marches in one long column, with all of the file-leaders making up a single long file on the side that a perceived threat is expected to come from. The ouragoi would form the column furthest away from the expected threat, and all of the other ranks would be positioned in their regular order in between. Should the enemy appear, the column would only need to halt and turn to face the enemy, and the battle-line would be fully deployed, with the officers in the front rank and the ouragoi to the rear, ready for battle. If the threat was expected to come from both sides, then the phalanx would be divided in half and would march in two parallel columns, with both of the diphalangarchia marching with their file-leaders on the outside and their ouragoi towards the centre. Should the enemy appear from both directions, both columns would turn outwards and be ready for battle. If the threat was expected to come from three directions (e.g. left, right and front), then the phalanx would be divided into three and march in a square horse-shoe shape not unlike the Greek capital letter pi (Π). In this instance, the two columns on the wings would march with their file-leaders on the outside and the ouragoi in the centre (i.e. the same as with the double column), while the forward formation would march with its file-leaders to the front and the ouragoi to the rear (i.e. towards the centre of the formation). Should the enemy appear, the formations on the wings would turn out to face the enemy while the front formation simply retained its position so that all threats could be met at once. In some instances, the central division also marched in column but was positioned forward or aft of the wings in a squarish ‘Y’ shape. If the threat was expected from all sides, then the phalanx would be divided into four and would march in a quadrilateral column or hollow square, with each of the phalangarchiae marching with their file-leaders to the outside and the ouragoi towards the centre. The lines would then be able to turn out to meet an attack from all directions.