Early Buddhist Meditation

by Keren Arbel

  Thus, this sutta delineates a gradual elimination of mental obstructions and cognitive misconceptions. First, one uses the power of thinking for abandoning certain misconceptions but subsequently even this wholesome type of thinking – which has both a relative value and serious limitations – must cease in order to see the nature of experience clearly. There are various modes of conceptuality, from the grossest ones, in which we conceive (maññati) reality from erroneous perspectives, to wholesome discursive thinking, to more subtle forms164 where the defilements do not hinder our seeing, such as the perception of impermanence and not-self (anicca-saññā, anattā-saññā).165 Anne C. Klein has made an observation about the Buddhist path that is applicable to the early teachings as well; she notes that the uniqueness of the Buddhist path is in harnessing conceptual thinking for experiencing non-conceptual state.166

  We should bear in mind, however, that even if we argue that conceptual thinking must cease for liberation to occur, the thinking process will resume its activity after the liberation event. We can imagine that after one has seen the advantages, disadvantages and limits of the thinking process, by seeing directly its origination and cessation, thinking will no longer have the same delusive power. It is conceivable that since a liberated person will not ascribe trueness to this mental phenomenon, he or she will employ thinking and reflecting only wholesomely and beneficially, and only when the need arises. If we assume that thinking is a manifestation of wanting, we can speculate that a liberated person will have thoughts only when there is a need to respond to a situation or question. Otherwise, his mind will not produce any thoughts at all.

  It appears from what I have discussed thus far that there are different types of vitakka and vicāra. What I seek to examine further is the nature of vitakka and vicāra in the first jhāna: what kind of thinking and reflecting can occur in this attainment and why? These questions are quite difficult to answer due to the absence of clear textual explanation. However, I do think it is possible to offer some reflections based on the texts, and in the following discussion, I shall offer three such reflections on the nature of vitakka and vicāra in the first jhāna.

  As previously noted, vitakka and vicāra can be wholesome and beneficial (kusala) to the attainment of liberation. This is contrary to unwholesome mental proliferation (papañca), which is always an unbeneficial mental activity. According to the Dvedhāvitakka Sutta, thoughts of renunciation (nekkhamma vitakka), of non-ill-will (abyāpāda vitakka) and of non-cruelty (avihiṃsa vitakka) are thoughts that can lead to nibbāna. These types of thoughts, contrary to other thoughts, can lead to the development of wholesome inclinations of mind:

  Bhikkhus, whatever a bhikkhu frequently thinks and reflects on, that will become the inclination of his mind. If he frequently thinks and reflects on thoughts of renunciation, he has abandoned the thought of sensual desire to cultivate the thought of renunciation… If he frequently thinks and reflects on thoughts of non-ill will… on thoughts of non-cruelty, he has abandoned the thought of sensual desire to cultivate the thought of cruelty to cultivate the thought of noncruelty, and then his mind inclines to thoughts of non-cruelty.167

  The Dvedhāvitakka Sutta also affirms that these types of thoughts do not lead to affliction; they aid wisdom, do not cause difficulties and lead to nibbāna.

  Having said that, how are we to understand the existence of thoughts in the first jhāna? This is hard to answer. I believe that vitakka and vicāra of the first jhāna cannot be considered as tantamount to ordinary thinking and reflecting. I would suggest that developing thoughts of renunciation, of non-ill-will and of non-cruelty is preliminary to the attainment of the first jhāna. Their development is one of the means by which one can let go of kāma and other unwholesome states. This is the prerequisite for entering into this attainment.

  While I think that vitakka and vicāra of the first jhāna designate some form of conceptual, intentional and dualistic perception, I would also suggest that this type thinking cannot be regarded as ‘ordinary thinking process’ that is mostly chaotic, excursive and excessive. Put differently, I would suggest that there is no ‘train of thoughts’ while one is in the first jhāna. This was made quite clear in the Dvedhāvitakka Sutta, where the Buddha explains that after he developed wholesome thoughts, he also understood that

  [t]his thought of renunciation has arisen in me. This does not lead to my own affliction… it aids wisdom, does not cause difficulties, and leads to nibbāna. If I excessively think and reflect upon this thought even for a night, even for a day, even for a night and day, I see nothing to fear from it.

  But with excessive thinking and reflecting, I might tire my body, and when the body is tired, the mind might become disturbed. When the mind is disturbed, it is far from being imperturbable. So I steadied my mind internally, quieted it and unified it and made it imperturbable.168

  Here we find the notion that there is a difference between thinking and reflecting (vitakka and vicāra) and excessive thinking and reflecting (anuvitakka and anuvicāra). I propose to interpret ‘excessive thinking and reflecting’ as referring to what we call ‘thinking’ in ordinary language. That is, ‘ordinary thinking’ is mostly excessive since one fuels the arising thoughts with identification and clinging. However, I suggest that in the first jhāna, thoughts arise and pass away but without being continually fuelled by desire, aversion and other unwholesome mental states. In this jhāna attainment one begins to de-condition the tendency to sustain the thinking habits of commenting on and interpreting experience (that is, thinking about the present) and the tendency to think about the past and the future.

  The Buddha further points at the drawback of excessive thinking and reflecting (even wholesome thinking): when one is occupied with excessive thinking and reflecting, the body is stressed and the mind is disturbed. A disturbed mind cannot see clearly the whole spectrum of phenomena since it is occupied solely by the content of his thinking (again, even if the content is wholesome). The aim of cultivating wholesome thoughts (such as thoughts of renunciation, of non-ill-will and of non-cruelty) is not the content, but for inclining the mind into an attitude of renunciation, an attitude of non-desire and an attitude of non-aversion to whatever is experienced. When these mental attitudes have been developed, there is no need for developing further these types of thoughts. Thus, my suggestion is that we should interpret the existence of vitakka and vicāra in the first jhāna as wholesome ‘residues’ of a previous development of wholesome thoughts. They denote the ‘echo’ of these wholesome thoughts, which reverberates in one who enters the first jhāna as wholesome attitudes towards what is experienced. This is the reason, I believe, that vitakka and vicāra are said to accompany jhānic pīti and sukha.

  The Sakkapañha Sutta of the DN gives us another way to understand the nature of vitakka and vicāra in the first jhāna, which complements the earlier suggestion. This sutta draws a causal connection between vitakka and chanda, between thinking and intention. It reads, ‘[W]hen vitakka exists, chanda exists, when vitakka does not exist, chanda does not exist.’169 Chanda has several meanings. It can be translated as ‘intention’, ‘will’ or ‘desire’, depending on the context. It can be wholesome170 or unwholesome.171 Thus, kusala chanda (‘wholesome intention’) is closely connected to sammā saṅkappa (‘right intention’), one of the Eightfold Path factors. Since MN II.28 states that the second jhāna is where wholesome intentions (kusala saṅkappa) cease without any remnant, (aparisesā nirujjhanti) together with vitakka and vicāra, the implication is that in the first jhāna, wholesome intentions are still present.172 In the context of the first jhāna, vitakka and vicāra seem to express the existence of right attitude and right intention. It should be noted that intention, just like thinking, is conceptual and dualistic. Both intention and thinking describe a relation between the mind and an object. In other words, they both have an intentional attitude towards something. We should bear this point in mind since the ‘liberative reason’ for which both wholesome inte
ntions and conceptual thinking cease when one enters into the second jhāna, will become clearer here as well as in the chapter on the second jhāna.

  My last reflection on vitakka and vicāra in the first jhāna will point at the shortcoming of vitakka and vicāra in the context of Buddhist meditation theory. The Dantabhūmi Sutta of the MN gives us interesting information which connects the jhānas with the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas:

  Having thus abandoned these five hindrances, imperfection of the mind that weakens wisdom, he abides observing the body as the body, ardent, fully aware, and mindful, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abide observing feelings as feelings… mind as mind… dhammas as dhammas, ardent, fully aware, and mindful, having put away covetousness and grief for the world.173

  This description delineates the practice of observing body, feeling, mind and dhammas when the hindrances are abandoned, which clearly refers to the first jhāna (it becomes evident in the next paragraph of the same sutta). It expresses the notion that there is a transition from gross observation of the satipaṭṭhānas when the hindrances are still present in the mind, to a more subtle observation, when they are abandoned. That is, in the first jhāna one observes phenomena without desire, restlessness, aversion and so on. However, this sutta makes it very clear that this type of observation – observation that occurs while one is in the first jhāna – is only preliminary to a more refined observation of phenomena, namely, an observation without thinking and intending. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

  Summary

  Having said that and before we turn the attention to the nature and liberative value of the second jhāna, let me summarize my argument succinctly. Having explored the liberative value of the first jhāna, I have argued that only by entering the first jhāna one actualizes internally the ‘middle path’. In other words, the first jhāna is the experiential actualization of a midpoint between asceticism174 and indulgence, between sensual pleasure and bodily pain. This unique pleasurable experience allows the mind to let go of a rooted and basic tendency: the tendency to be attracted to sensual pleasures (kāma). This transformation becomes possible only by attaining a different type of pleasure and joy, a pleasure and joy which are wholesome and not connected to desire for sense pleasure and other unwholesome states. This is jhānic pīti and sukha.

  I have also argued that the entrance into the first jhāna occurs through the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas, the development of the qualities of the seven factors of awakening to some degree, the abandoning of the five hindrances and the development of discernment (viveka). Viveka, from which pīti and sukha of the first jhāna are born, arise through the observation of phenomena as prescribed in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. I suggested that the cultivation of the quality of discernment enables the mind to change its inclinations and to let go of our basic unwholesome tendencies and desires. This letting go (vossagga) is the proximate cause for entering the first jhāna. Further, I have also observed that entering the first jhāna marks a transition from gross observation of the satipaṭṭhānas to a more subtle one: the practitioner can now observe phenomena without being hindered by unwholesome emotions and intentions. The next chapter will continue with exploring the nature and liberative significance of the second jhāna.

  Notes

  1 E.g., MN I.174: bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati.

  2 MN I.246–7: Na kho panāhaṃ imāya kaṭukāya dukkarakārikāya adhigacchāmi uttarimanussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanavisesaṃ. Siyā nu kho añño maggo bodhāyā”ti. Tassa mayhaṃ aggivessana etadahosi: abhijānāmi kho paṇāhaṃ pitusakkassa kammante sītāya jambucchāyāya nisinno vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharitā. Siyā nu kho eso maggo bodhāyāti. Tassa mayhaṃ aggivessana satānusāriviññāṇaṃ ahosi: esova maggo bodhāyāti.

  3 E.g., MN I.181: so iminā ca ariyena sīlakkhandhena samannāgato, iminā ca ariyena indriyasaṃvarena samannāgato, iminā ca ariyena satisampajaññena samannāgato. See also MN I.356–7, where when one has gone through the gradual process of cultivation virtue, restraint of the senses, moderation in eating, wakefulness, possessing seven good qualities and then he attains the jhānas at will, which are the basis for the three types of knowledge. Note that the fourth jhāna is the basis for attaining liberation.

  4 E.g., MN I.181: nisīdati pallaṅkaṃ ābhujitvā, ujuṃ kāyaṃ paṇidhāya, parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā. See also MN III.3.

  5 This gradual description occurs, for example, in MN I.179ff, I.268–70, I.271–7, I.346ff, III.1–5; III.33–6; III.134–6; DN I.63ff, III.270; AN II.208ff, V.206.

  6 E.g., MN III.136: so ime pañca nīvaraṅe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe.

  7 SN V.198: katamañca bhikkhave, samādhindriyaṃ: idha bhikkhave, ariyasāvako vossaggārammaṇaṃ karitvā labhati samādhiṃ, labhati cittassekaggataṃ. So vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ. Paṭhamajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. See also SN V.197, and V.225.

  8 Vossagga is from the Sanskrit verb ava + sṛj: to let go, abandon, relax, to give up etc.

  9 SN IV.367.

  10 E.g., MN I.11: satisambojjhaṅgaṃ bhāveti vivekanissitaṃ virāganissitaṃ nirodhanissitaṃ vossaggapariṇāmiṃ. See Also DN III.226; MN II.12; MN III.88; AN II.16. Gethin calls it the viveka-nissita formula and points out that it is employed on eighteen occasions: fourteen involve its application to the bojjhaṅgas, two to the factors of the path, one to the indriyas and one to the balas (2001, 163). He concludes that ‘in the Nikāyas, the formula is in the first place to be associated with the bojjhaṅgas alone’ (Gethin 2001, 165).

  11 Vossagga has various meanings in the Nikāyas (e.g., S V 395; A IV 266; MN III 88). In this context, it seems that vossaga refers to some degree of ‘relinquishment’ or ‘letting go’, and not to complete and final ‘relinquishment’ (i.e., nibbāna). In other words, it refers to relinquishment of what is needed for attaining the jhānas. I also suggest that the four jhānas become the basis for further letting go that will incline the mind to the attainment of liberation.

  12 MN III.92–4.

  13 MN III.94.

  14 At MN I.435, there is a slightly different description of the way one enters the first jhāna: ‘with detachment from the foundation [of attachment] (upadhivivekā), with the abandoning of unwholesome states, with tranquilizing all coarse bodily [activities]’ (sabbaso kāyaduṭṭhullānaṃ paṭipassaddhiyā), one enters and abides in the first jhāna. Here the Buddha describes the first jhāna as the outcome of abandonment of all that causes suffering – upadhi, the foundation of saṃsāra and the cause of dukkha. See also MN I.454, MN II.260.

  15 Note, that the term nimitta is the usual term that designates ‘object’, that is, an object of meditation (e.g., SN V.156 and MN I.273) or the object of the senses (e.g., SN III.10).

  16 Liberation occurs when the various obstructions of mind are abandoned, and when the seven factors of awakening mature and are fulfilled: ‘and what bhikkhus is the path crushing the army of Māra? It is the seven factors of awakening’. See, for example, SN V.99 (katamo ca bhikkave, mārasenappamaddano maggo? Yadidaṃ sattabojjhaṅgā) and SN V.329.

  17 Gethin has observed concerning the term vossagga that ‘its basic import of “release” or “letting go” as a term for the final goal of nibbāna or liberation seems clear’ (Gethin 2001, 166).

  18 E.g., DN I.73, DN I.157 and AN III.428–9.

  19 MN III.136: so ime pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe. See also MN I.276; MN II.226–7; MN III.4; SN V.94, AN III.63–4; DN I.73–85; DN I.124–5; DN I.206–10.

  20 Vism IV.104–5. Buddhaghosa considers the nīvaraṇas as specifically obstructing the unity of mind that tries to c
oncentrate on the chosen meditation object.

  21 See MN I.323 and SN V.127 where the Buddha states that the five nīvaraṇas are the cause and condition for lack of knowledge and vision (ñāṇa-dassana).

  22 SN V.92: evameva kho bhikkhave, pañcime cittassa upakkilesā yehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ cittaṃ na ceva mudu hoti na ca kammaniyaṃ na ca pabhassaraṃ pabhaṅgu ca, na ca sammāsamādhiyati āsavānaṃ khayāya. Katame pañca: kāmacchando… vyāpādo… thīnamiddhaṃ… uddhaccakukkuccaṃ… Vicikicchā bhikkhave, cittassa upakkileso. Although here these obstructions are called upakkilesa, it is the usual list of the five nīvaraṇas.

  23 See, for example, MN III.3 and MN III.136.

  24 See also SN V.225, which explains that after one has confidence (saddha) – whose energy (viriya) is aroused and mindfulness (sati) is established – he will gain samādhi and ‘oneness of mind’ (cittassekaggataṃ), though I do not see such ‘oneness’ as meaning absorption, only calm collectedness. See further discussion in chapter 4.

  25 MN III.3: so pacchābhattaṃ piṇḍapātapaṭikkanto nisīdati pallaṅkaṃ ābhujitvā ujuṃ kāyaṃ paṇidhāya parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā, so abhijjhaṃ loke pahāya vigatābhijjhena cetasā viharati. Abhijjhāya cittaṃ parisodheti, byāpādapadosaṃ pahāya abyāpannacitto viharati sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī. Byāpādapadosā cittaṃ parisodheti thīnamiddhaṃ pahāya vigata thīnamiddho viharati ālokasaññī sato sampajāno, thīnamiddhā cittaṃ parisodheti uddhaccakukkuccaṃ pahāya anuddhato viharati ajjhattaṃ vūpasantacitto. Uddhaccakukkuccā cittaṃ parisodheti. Vicikicchaṃ pahāya tiṇṇavicikiccho viharati. Akathaṅkathi kusalesu dhammesu. Vicikicchāya cittaṃ parisodheti.