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Early Buddhist Meditation

Page 15

by Keren Arbel


  26 E.g., MN III.3 and MN III.136.

  27 SN V.95: pañcassa nīvaraṇā tasmiṃ samaye na honti. Sattabhojjhaṅgā tasmiṃ samaye bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchanti. Note that in the Chinese and Sanskrit versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, the section about the contemplation of dhammas contains an observation of only the nīvaraṇas and the seven bojjhaṅgas. This might indicate that these two contemplations are the oldest.

  28 See MN I.464, which states that only when pīti and sukha of the first jhāna are attained, the hindrances do not invade the mind and remain.

  29 SN V.93: ime kho bhikkhave, satta bojjhaṅgā anāvaraṇā anīvaraṇā cetaso anupakkilesā bhāvitā bahulīkatā vijjāvimuttikiriyāya saṃvattantīti. See also V.126.

  30 SN V.97: pañcime, bhikkhave, nīvaraṇa andhkaraṇā acakkhukaraṇā aññāṇkaraṇā paññānirodhikā vighātapakkhiyā anibbānasaṃvattanikā.

  31 MN I.60. This type of contemplation, of seeing that the mind is free from hindrances, accords well with the instruction in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta of seeing the non-arising of the hindrances and the presence of the seven factors of awakening. See also SN V.127 where the Buddha explains that the nīvaraṇas are the cause and condition for the lack of knowledge and vision.

  32 SN V.93.

  33 See SN V.124ff, where only when the defilements are not present one can see realty as it actually is and the seven factors of awakening can manifest and realized.

  34 PED, 638.

  35 Vism IV.93. The Niddesa classified three types of viveka: k āya-viveka, citta-viveka and upadhi-viveka (Nd I 140) while the Paṭisambhidāmagga II 220 lists five types of viveka.

  36 MMW.

  37 SN V.301: so vatāvuso bhikkhu cattāro satipaṭṭhāne bhāvento cattāro satipaṭṭhāne bahulīkaronto sikkhaṃ paccakkhāya hīnāyāvattissatīti, netaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati. Taṃ kissa hetu: “yaṃ hi āvuso cittaṃ dīgharattaṃ vivekaninnaṃ vivekapoṇaṃ vivekapabbhāraṃ.

  38 The Sutta Nipāta seems to connected viveka with (1) insight into the danger of sensual pleasures, (2) with seeing (dassin) and (3) with the attainment of liberation. E.g., Sn 772, 822, 851, 915 and 1065. See also paviveka at AN I.241.

  39 See also AN III.423 which states that sammā-diṭṭhi needs to be fulfilled before sammā-samādhi (i.e., the four jhānas).

  40 MN I.60.

  41 See, for example, Sayalay 2005, 133 and also Snyder and Rasmussen 2009, 28.

  42 Kv XVIII 8, p. 572. According Tse-Fu Kuan, this view was advocated also by the Sarvāstivādins but was negated by the Sautrāntikas (Kuan 2005, 299–300). Vism also points out that when entering the first jhāna, one is secluded from sense pleasures as object. Vism IV.83–4 points out that when entering the first jhāna one is secluded from sense pleasures as object. This statement might mean that one can have experience of sense objects without any desire.

  43 E.g., MN I.295. Note that Kuan has maintained that since the Kaṇṭaka Sutta points out that sound (sadda) is a thorn (kaṇṭaka) for the first jhāna, it means that ‘sound is not heard by one who attains the first jhāna’ (Kuan 2012, 50). However, this conclusion is a bit strong for what is actually said in the sutta, meaning that certain things might agitate one who practices certain meditation (for example, if one practices restraining the senses, restless motion of sights is a thorn). This does not mean that one does not hear in the first jhānas or that moving sights are not present when one practices restraint.

  44 E.g., MN III.114.

  45 AN III.411.

  46 AN III.411: apica kho bhikkhave nete kāmā, kāmaguṇā nāmete ariyassa vinaye vuccanti.

  47 AN III.411: Saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo, nete kāmā yāni citrāni loke. Saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo Tiṭṭhanti citrāni tatheva loke. Athettha dhīrā vinayanti chandanti.

  48 Tse-Fu Kuan has observed that the Sauntrātikas objected to the Sarvāstivādins and the Theravādins claims that the five classes of consciousness related to the body are absent in one who attained the jhānas, and consequently that bodily feelings are also absent (Kuan 2005, 299). Note that DN I 73f describes the bodily feelings one feels while abiding in the jhānas: so vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. So imameva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena abhisanteti1 parisanneti paripūreti parippharati. Nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti.

  49 See, for example, MN I.504.

  50 See also MN I.293, where it is stated that when one abandons the five indiriyas (which are the five sense bases), then one can know the four arūpa samāpattis. That is, it seems that these five faculties are still in operation when one attains the four rūpa jhānas. See AN III.428, which states that for entering the first jhāna one has to clearly see the danger in kāma.

  51 See SN IV.236.

  52 Sukha that lead to desire (rajanīya) is ‘ordinary’ sukha. See MN I.85.

  53 MN II.261–2: Aniccā bhikkhave, kāmā tucchā mosadhammā. Māyākatametaṃ bhikkhave, bālalāpanaṃ. Ye ca diṭṭhadhammikā kāmā, ye ca samparāyikā kāmā, yā ca diṭṭhadhammikā kāmasaññā, yā ca samparāyikā kāmasaññā, ubhayametaṃ māradheyyaṃ, mārassesavisayo, marassesanivāpo, mārassesagocaro. Etthete pāpakā akusalā mānasā abhijjhāpi byāpādāpi sārambhāpi saṃvattanti. Teva ariyasāvakassa idhamanusikkhato antarāyāya sambhavanti. See also Sn 771–2, 948, 1098.

  54 E.g., MN I.85–6, MN I.507–8.

  55 A good example of this concern is the questions posed to the Buddha by various ascetics in the Sutta Nipāta. They are mainly concerned with abandoning sensual pleasures. E.g., Sn 1071, 1088, 1096.

  56 See, for example, MN I.94, where the Nigaṇṭhas say to the Buddha that ‘pleasure is not to be gained by pleasure; pleasure is to be gained by pain. For were pleasure to be gained through pleasure, then King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha would gain pleasure, since he abides in greater pleasure than the Venerable Gotama.’ See also MN I.307–8.

  57 Olivelle 1992, 144. See also Maitrī Upaniṣad I.3.

  58 In MN I.92, the Buddha describes the Nigaṇṭhas’ practice, as a practice of asceticism which causes pain (opakkamikā dukkha tibbā kharā kaṭukā vedanā vedayanti). See also MN I.246.

  59 E.g., MN I.305–6: sensual pleasures are conceived by recluses and Brahmins to be the reason for a painful rebirth in the future.

  60 MN I.171.

  61 The root tap was used in the Nikāyas with reference to painful ascetic practices, practiced by some samaṇas and brahmanas. See, for example, DN I.161; MN II.199; SN I.29; SN IV.330.

  62 Kaelber 1989, 49.

  63 Note the metaphor the Buddha uses in MN II.225 to describe the right time for ascetic practices that cause pain, and the avoidance of such practices: ‘Suppose, bhikkhus, an arrow smith were warming and heating an arrow shaft between two flames, making it straight and workable. When the arrow shaft had been warmed and heated between the two flames and had been made straight and workable, then at a later time he would not again warm and heat the arrow shaft and make it straight and workable.’

  64 In the Nikāya, self-mortification is described by the Buddha in the phrase attakilamathānuyoga ‘practicing self-exhaustion’. E.g., SN IV.330.

  65 Kaelber 1989, 51.

  66 Kaelber 1989, 45–61.

  67 Kaelber 1989, 57, 58.

  68 Tattvārtha Sūtra 8.2. Contrary to this view, the Buddha internalized and ‘mentalized’ kamma. Kamma was conceived as volition (cetanā) (AN III.414) – a mental attitude and not a physical matter. From that followed the view that the power to eliminate bad kamma and the āsavas is a mental power.

  69 Tattvārtha Sūtra 9.3.

  70 Tattvārtha Sūtra 9.8. Bronkhorst has also pointed out that in early Jainism, one must ‘abstain from food and prepare for death in a position which is as motionless as possible’ (Bronkhorst 1993, 36).

  71 Tattvārtha Sūtra 9.9.

  72 See Tattvārtha Sūtra
9.20–7.

  73 Tattvārtha Sūtra (1994, 232).

  74 E.g., MN I.454, where the Buddha refers to the sensual pleasures (kāma) as filthy, ordinary and ignoble pleasure (mīḷhasukhaṃ puthujjanasukhaṃ anariyasukhaṃ). See also other places where the Buddha states that kāma is a primary fetter: MN I.305–6; MN I.508; MN II.261–2; SN IV.330–1; Sn 50–1, 768, 771–3, 823, 945, 948, 1071.

  75 MN I.454: Yaṃ kho udāyi ime pañcakāmaguṇe paṭicca uppajjati sukhaṃ somanassaṃ, idaṃ vuccati kāmasukhaṃ mīḷhasukhaṃ puthujjanasukhaṃ anariyasukhaṃ na sevitabbaṃ na bhāvetabbaṃ na bahulīkātabbaṃ. Bhāyitabbaṃ etassa sukhassāti vadāmi. See also MN III.233.

  76 MN I.246–7.

  77 Note, however, that in MN II.225, the Buddha permits the practice of asceticism for a certain purpose. But when this purpose is achieved, one should not continue to exert himself in what is painful.

  78 MN I.454.

  79 Sn 436: kāma te paṭhamā senā.

  80 MN III.233–4 : idaṃ vuccati nekkhammasukhaṃ pavivekasukhaṃ upasamasukhaṃ sambodhisukhaṃ āsevitabbaṃ bhāvetabbaṃ bahulīkātabbaṃ. Na bhāyitabbaṃ etassa sukhassāti vadāmi. See also MN I.454; DN III.131–2.

  81 MN I.246.

  82 See DN III.131–2.

  83 I agree with Wynne’s observation that there were different early Brahminic and Jain notions of the spiritual path, and that the meditation of the early Upaniṣads and Mokṣadharma were not part of the extreme asceticism of Jain (and the Ājīvika) practices. However, in the preceding examples (and in the Buddha’s own spiritual journey), it is clear that in the Buddha’s spiritual milieu, these ascetic notions and practices were not marginal but quite central. Thus, his own teaching was a rejection of asceticism and also of other ideas and practices, such as the ones taught by Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta (Wynne 2007, 111–13).

  84 MN I.341. These four kinds of persons appear also in MN I.411–2, while in MN I.342–4 the Buddha gives a detailed account of these types of persons.

  85 MN I.341: so anattantapo aparantapo diṭṭheva dhamma nicchāto nibbuto sītībhuto sukhappaṭisaṃvedī brahmabhūtena attanā.

  86 MN I.93: atthi vo nigaṇṭhā, pubbe pāpaṃ kammaṃ kataṃ taṃ imāya kaṭukāya dukkarakārikāya nijjaretha. Yaṃ panettha etarahi kāyena saṃvutā vācāya saṃvutā manasā saṃvutā taṃ āyatiṃ pāpassa kammassa akaraṇaṃ. Iti purāṇānaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyantībhāvā, navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā āyatiṃ anavassavo. Āyatiṃ anavassavā kammakkhayo. Kammakkhayā dukkhakkhayo. Dukkhakkhayā vedanākkhayo. Vedanākkhayā sabbaṃ dukkhaṃ nijjiṇṇaṃ bhavissatī”ti. Occur also in MN II.214 and AN I.220.

  87 MN I.94: sukhena sukhaṃ adhigantabbaṃ, dukkhena kho sukhaṃ adhigantabbaṃ. sukhena cāvuso gotama, sukhaṃ adhigantabbaṃ abhavissa, raja māgadho seniyo bimbisāro sukhaṃ adhigaccheyya, raja māgadho seniyo bimbisāro sukhavihāritaro āyasmatā gotamen ti. See also MN II.36.

  88 E.g., MN I.341: so anattantapo aparantapo diṭṭheva dhamma nicchāto nibbuto sītībhuto sukhappaṭisaṃvedī brahmabhūtena attanā. This description occurs in various places in the Nikāyas; see, for example, MN I.413; DN III.233; AN I.197; AN I.181; AN II.206. In AN IV.14 sukhappaṭisaṃvedī is also connected to nibbāna.

  89 AN I.221: catutthaṃ jhānam upasampajja viharati. So navañca kammaṃ na karoti purāṇañca kammṃ phussa phussa byantīkaroti.

  90 See SN IV.209: tassa kāmasukhaṃ nābhinandato yo sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo so nānuseti.

  91 DN III.131–2.

  92 DN III.132: ime kho cunda cattāro sukhallikānuyogā ekattanibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattanti.

  93 MN III.234: sukhavinicchayaṃ jaññā, sukhavinicchayaṃ ñatvā ajjhattaṃ sukhamanuyuñjeyyā’ti. The pleasure that needs to be cultivated is the pleasure of the jhānas, which are ‘the pleasure of renunciation, the pleasure of peace, the pleasure of awakening’.

  94 The Kīṭāgiri Sutta from the MN further elucidates of the role of certain kinds of feelings in the process of liberation and purification of mind. In this sutta the Buddha declares that ‘when someone feels a certain kind of pleasant feeling, unwholesome states increase in him and wholesome states diminish; but when someone feels another kind of pleasant feeling, unwholesome states diminish in him and wholesome states increase’. After this statement, the Buddha encourages his disciples to ‘enter upon and abide in such a kind of sukha-vedanā’ (MN I.475–6).

  95 See also MN I.464.

  96 The Visuddhimagga enumerates five kinds of pīti. When the five types of pīti mature, there is bodily and mental tranquillity. When this is matured it perfects the threefold concentration – momentary (khaṇika-samādhi), access (upacāra samādhi) and absorption (appaṇā samādhi/jhāna) (Vism IV.99). For a detailed discussion of pīti in the commentarial tradition see Cousins 1974, 120–1.

  97 SN IV.236: katamā ca bhikkhave nirāmisā nirāmisatarā pīti: yā kho bhikkhave khīṇāsavassa bhikkhuno rāgā cittaṃ vimuttaṃ paccavekkhato dosā cittaṃ vimuttaṃ paccavekkhato mohā cittaṃ vimuttaṃ paccavekkhato uppajjati pīti. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave nirāmisā nirāmisatarā pīti. The same is said about nirāmisā nirāmisataraṃ sukha in SN IV.237.

  98 In the Theravāda view this will be the experience of lokuttara jhānas.

  99 Vism IV.100. See also the article by Tse-Fu Kuan that makes the observation that the Sarvāstivādins also distinguish the sukha faculty from sukha as a jhāna factor, but in a different manner from the Theravādins. The Vibhāśa śāstra refers to the sukha of the first two dhyānas as tranquillity (prasrabdhi-sukha), while the Dharmaskandha, a canonical Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma text, understands sukha of the third jhāna as feeling (vedanā), not as prasrabdhi. Note that the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins distinguish between the sukhi- indriya and the sukha of the jhānas. For a detailed discussion of sukha and pīti in Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda and Sautrātika, see Kuan 2005, 295–300.

  100 MN II.203: taṃ kiṃ maññasi māṇava, yaṃ vā tiṇakaṭṭhūpādānaṃ paṭicca aggiṃ jāleyya, yaṃ vā nissaṭṭhatiṇakaṭṭhūpādānaṃ aggiṃ jāleyya, katamo nu khvāssa aggi accimā ca vaṇṇimā ca pabhassaro cāti?

  101 MN II.203: imehi kho māṇava, pañcahi kāmaguṇehi brāhmaṇo pokkharasāti opamañño subhagavaniko gathito1 mucchito ajjhopanno anādīnavadassāvī anissaraṇapañño paribhuñjati.

  102 See also the Pīti Sutta, where the Buddha describes what it is like when one dwells in the ‘pīti of solitude’ (pavivekaṃ pītiṃ) that presumably is pīti of the first jhāna (also according to AA III.303). On such an occasion, there is no physical or mental pain (dukkhaṃ domanassaṃ) or pleasure (sukhaṃṃ somanassaṃ) associated with desire for sense pleasures (kāmūpasaṃhitaṃ); physical or mental pain associated with the unwholesome (akusala); physical or mental pleasure associated with the unwholesome; and physical or mental pain associated with the wholesome (AN III 207).

  103 SN III.232: yo bhikkhave, cakkhusmiṃ chandarāgo, cittasse’so upakkileso. yo sotasmiṃ chandarāgo cittasse’so upakkileso yo ghānasmiṃ chandarāgo cittasse’so upakkileso yo jivhāya chandarāgo cittasse’ so upakkileso yo kāyasmiṃ chandarāgo, cittasse’so upakkileso, yo manasmiṃ chandarāgo cittasse’so upakkileso. yato kho bhikkhave, bhikkhuno imesu chasu ṭhānesu cetaso upakkileso pahīno hoti, nekkhammaninnaṃ cassa cittaṃ hoti. Nekkhammaparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ kammaniyaṃ khāyati abhiññā sacchikaraṇiyesu dhammesūti. See also DN III.239–40.

  104 It is interesting to mention AN IV.415, where Udāyin asks Sāriputta about happiness that is not felt (sukhaṃ yadettha natthi vedayitaṃ). As an explanation, Sāriputta describes a situation in which one attains the first jhānas but is beset by attention and perception accompanied by sensual desire. This seems to contradict the various references that describe the attainment of the first jhāna as a state devoid of these very mental states. It seems that this is an ‘unworthy jhāna’, sin
ce in a ‘worthy jhāna’ there is no perception (saññā) of kāma, byāpāda and vihiṃsa. In a private correspondence, Peter Harvey has suggested to me that perhaps an ‘unworthy jhāna’ ‘is an unstable state in which the mind is still flipping in and out of jhāna’. For the former possibility see DN I.182, which states that ‘quite secluded from kāma and unwholesome states (probably perceptions of ill will and cruelty), he enters and abides in the first jhāna… and whatever perceptions of kāma that he previously had disappeared’ (so vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. Tassa yā purimā kāmasaññā sā nirujjhati).

  105 Note that pīti is a ‘factor of awakening’ (bojjhaṅga).

  106 MN I.91.

  107 It seems that something more peaceful than (mental) joy and (bodily) pleasure, and not sensual pleasures (i.e., jhānic pīti and sukha) is the attainment of liberation. It is not probable that the Buddha refers here to the arūpa samāpatti since they are mostly referred to as ‘those peaceful liberations that transcends forms, the formless attainments’ (te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā). See, for example, SN II.123.

  108 MN I.91: yato ca kho mahānāma ariyasāvakassa appassādā kāmā bahudukkhā bahūpāyāsā, ādīnavo ettha bhiyyoti evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya sudiṭṭhaṃ hoti, so ca aññatreva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi pītisukhaṃ adhigacchati aññaṃ vā tato santataraṃ, atha kho so anāvaṭṭī kāmesu hoti.

  109 E.g., SN IV.70–1.

  110 E.g., MN I.141. Note that according to the commentary, Mahānāma was a ‘oncereturner’ [MA II.61].

  111 Only a ‘non-returner’ eradicated the desire of sense pleasures and aversion according to Buddhist theory of liberation.

  112 See, for example, Hamilton’s argument that ‘knowing and seeing this process as it really is enable one to “uproot” the binding continuity tendencies of desires coupled with ignorance – both aspect of bondage’ (Hamilton 2000, 122–3).

 

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