Codeword Overlord

by Nigel West

  The development of a viable double-cross organisation in liberated France led to the establishment in August 1944 of a XX Committee sub-group in Paris, designated the 212 Committee, to manage controlled enemy agents across the territory in the hands of the 21st Army Group and the US Twelfth Army. As neither Frutos nor Gabas were entirely trusted, they were manipulated for largely counter-espionage purposes, to flush out additional stay-behind spies, rather than be employed for strategic deception.

  When Allied intelligence officers seized the Abwehr offices in the Hotel Lutenia in Paris on 25 August 1944 they encountered a German NCO, later code-named JIGGER, who volunteered his services to the SCI and described many of the Abwehr’s stay-behind sabotage networks. He also accompanied SCI officers to various arms caches, which had been left to equip these networks, and supplied several batches of files.

  A few days later, on 28 August, a French SD agent surrendered and was operated as KEEL, but just a month later he was lynched by a French revenge squad. However, instead of terminating KEEL, the SCI unit concerned pretended that he had hurt his wrist in an accident (to explain the change in his Morse technique) and maintained contact with the Abwehr for a further seven months.

  By the end of September 1944 the 212 Committee was running six Abwehr wireless sets when SKULL himself resumed contact with the Abwehr on 27 November and was appointed Kaulen’s paymaster in northern France. Ironically, one of the first of SKULL’s payments was to DRAGOMAN in Cherbourg.

  The principal value of these post-invasion counter-intelligence operations was the confidence it gave the 21st Army Group that the enemy’s stay-behind preparations had been neutralised, and that any fear of a sophisticated organisation that might derail certain aspects of the continuing Allied deception campaign was unfounded. The SCI interventions, coupled with the exploitation of defector information and ISOS, ensured that the 212 Committee emulated the success of its London parent, the XX Committee.

  POSTSCRIPT

  ‘The scale of the invading forces was not a surprise –

  in fact we had imagined that they would be larger,

  because we had received exaggerated reports of the

  number of American divisions in England. But that

  overestimate had an indirect effect of important

  consequence, by making us more inclined to expect

  a second landing in the Calais area.’

  Gerd von Rundstedt

  The Other Side of the Hill, 1948

  The unexpected, continued success of FORTITUDE SOUTH in persuading the Axis that a further attack should be anticipated in the Pas-de-Calais retained its currency even beyond the liberation of Paris, but the entire enterprise was put at risk in August when an Abwehr asset and Spanish DGS officer, Roberto Buenaga, approached the SIS station in Madrid and offered to trade valuable information in return for a large financial consideration. Top of the list on his ‘meal ticket’ was ALARIC’s (GARBO’S) true identity. The Section V officer, Jack Ivens, stalled for time while he consulted headquarters, which passed the problem to MI5’s B1(g), the section that only recently had been wrestling with the challenge of dealing with Hans Ruser, whose defection was now definitely known to the Germans.

  Although the news from Spain was unwelcome, it was not entirely unexpected, and both the Lisbon and Madrid SIS stations had reported hints of the existence of the ARABEL network, so it was accepted as inevitable that as Germany’s military situation deteriorated, defectors from the enemy camp would materialise. Some comfort was taken that the source of the information was a Spaniard and not a potential German defector, who would have been infinitely more difficult to handle. Indeed, a contingency plan had been prepared for just such an emergency, and it called for GARBO to remove himself from the scene and appoint his deputy, BENEDICT, notionally a wealthy Venezuelan student at the University of Glasgow, to replace him. BENEDICT could not be compromised because he was imaginary, and GARBO had told the Abwehr almost nothing about him, and certainly not enough to identify him beyond that vague description.

  MI5’s high-risk strategy, while Buenaga waited patiently for a response from Ivens, was for GARBO to signal FEDERICO that he had just received a warning from his courier, an unnamed airman who regularly visited Lisbon, who allegedly had learned that Buenaga was seeking to betray the entire ARABEL network. Fearing for his life, so the story went, ALARIC said he was fleeing London for a secluded farm in south Wales, the same refuge taken by another subordinate, CHAMILLUS, when the Gibraltarian waiter had deserted his post in April 1944. Astonishingly, the Abwehr received the news with unjustified equanimity and attempted to reassure ALARIC that he was in no danger as Buenaga could not possibly be in possession of any compromising information. However, when Ivens met Buenaga to continue the negotiations and haggle on his price, the DGS officer volunteered Pujol’s full true name, and his wife Araceli’s home address at Rua Nova 22 or 24, in Lugo. These details were duly relayed by GARBO back to Madrid and, when confronted with this evidence, his Abwehr controller was obliged to admit the security lapse and praise ALARIC for his prompt action.

  Somewhat improbably, ALARIC claimed that his principal Lisbon courier was trading in black market currency with a partner who worked at the British embassy and was acquainted with the SIS officer who was in contact with Buenaga. This was the supposed source of the leak to ALARIC, and the tale was accepted by the Germans who, hitherto, had been sending money and letters to ‘Mr Joseph Smith-Jones JP’ at the Espirito Santo Bank in Lisbon. On the assumption that this address had been compromised by Buenaga, ALARIC produced a new cover address in Lisbon that was actually supplied by SIS’s Gene Risso-Gill.

  Although supposedly in hiding on a remote Welsh farm, 10 miles from the nearest village, accompanied only by an elderly Welsh Nationalist, his wife and a simpleton Belgian lodger, ALARIC’s ingenious solution to the problem was to instruct the Abwehr to tell Buenaga that Pujol had fled his London home just ahead of the arrival of the police who had quizzed his distraught wife, and then to circulate the story that he had escaped to Spain. This narrative, backed by letters provided by ALARIC to the Abwehr that were mailed from towns in Spain addressed to Araceli in London, neatly eliminated the value of Buenaga’s information and allowed Ivens to plausibly drop the contact with the Spanish officer. Disappointed, and presumably worried by the leak, and even a potential threat from the Abwehr, Buenaga discreetly withdrew from the scene.

  While this drama played out, Pujol and his wife remained in London, pretending to communicate via a series of trusted ‘cut-outs’, and MI5 and SIS decided to turn the incident to their advantage. This was accomplished by a bizarre plan to have Sir Sam Hoare, the British ambassador in Madrid, lodge a formal protest to the Spanish government about Knappe-Ratey’s continuing involvement in espionage. The proposal was made by SIS’s chief, Stewart Menzies, to Peter Loxley at the Foreign Office on 28 November 1944:

  I understand that MI5 wish to strengthen the position of their most important deception agent who is working in this country under the nominal direction of the German agent Friedrich Knappe in Madrid. They are the more anxious to do this in as much as inopportune and embarrassing attempts to blow this agent to us have recently been made in Lisbon by a former member of Knappe’s organization.

  As Knappe has for long figured on the list of candidates for expulsion, against whom the Spaniards have delayed taking action, and as arrangements have been made whereby his removal from Spain would not prejudice the effectiveness of its agent, MI5 have asked whether H.M. Ambassador could approach the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs with an urgent request on the following lines:

  1.‘Information has reached us through a former member of Friedrich Knappe’s organisation that Knappe is still actively engaged in espionage against the U.K.

  2.‘The long delay on the part of the Spanish authorities in expelling Knappe is believed to have made possible the activities of a certain espionage agent working on his behalf in the U.K.


  3.‘As the British Security Authorities consider it urgent that these hostile activities directed from Madrid should cease, it is requested that facilities be granted for questioning Knappe before his expulsion from Spain since the exact location of the agent in question is believed to be known only to Knappe himself.’

  I should explain that all that Knappe knows of the agent’s present whereabouts is a general location as vague as to be obviously useless for the purpose of investigation. Whether or not the Spaniards permit, and the Germans accept, this challenge to interrogate, it will have the effect of strengthening German belief in the authenticity and elusiveness of their notional agent, and it will be in accord with H.M. Ambassador’s efforts to activate the expulsion of German agents from Spain.

  If you approve of action on the foregoing lines, I would suggest that provisional authorization be granted for the arrangement, at the Ambassador’s discretion, of one interview with Knappe, at which questions prepared by MI5 could be put. Given the delicate nature of the case, I would also suggest that all details of it should be passed through my own channels of communication; and that my representative in Madrid should be responsible for explaining the case to H.M. Ambassador. It would then only be necessary for the latter to be asked by the Foreign Office to make representations for the expulsion and prior interrogation of Knappe, on the basis of particulars to be furnished by his PCO.

  I am sending a copy of this letter to Guy Liddell.

  On 7 December Tommy Harris drew up a questionnaire in preparation of Knappe’s interrogation, and sent it to Section V, together with instructions for the Madrid station:

  I attach a letter for Ivens as well as my suggestions for the interrogation of Friedrich Knappe.

  These have been prepared against the eventuality that the Germans should accept our challenge to interrogate Knappe which is, as we have agreed, highly improbable. Subject, therefore, to your approval of the enclosures, I would be grateful if you could pass them to Ivens so that they can be forwarded to Madrid to be held there in reserve. Should they not be used I would be grateful if you would instruct that they should be destroyed.

  If Knappe subjects himself to interrogation it will mean that the unexpected has happened. I think that providing the suggestions which I have set out are followed we cannot come to any harm and should in fact benefit through this manouevre. I appreciate, however, that it will be extremely confusing for our representatives on the spot to cope with the situation without a full background of the GARBO case which it would be impossible to coach them in.

  I feel that in as delicate a manoeuvre as this it would be a great advantage to all concerned if, during the period of the interrogation, there was someone in Madrid, standing by, who was versed in the intricacies of the GARBO case. I would be prepared to go myself to Madrid for this purpose subject to the necessary approval of both our offices.

  I do not know whether the Germans get our passenger lists. If they do and they checked up on my presence in Madrid as a Government official and they were aware of my long association with Spain, they would probably draw the conclusion that I was working for some Government Department in London and connected with Spanish affairs, and they might go as far as to suspect that I had been sent over on account of Knappe’s interrogation.

  Even should they draw these conclusions I cannot see that it would necessarily be harmful, as it would, I feel, be most natural that somebody from London should be sent out were the GARBO investigations genuine. This person would necessarily be someone connected with Spanish affairs and from many points of view, I would, in their eyes, be an appropriate person to be sent on such a mission.

  I would be grateful if you would give this point your consideration, as should you think it advisable that I should go we would have to make the necessary preparations without delay. In this event it would be necessary, when forwarding the papers to Madrid, to notify them that I would be coming out prior to the interrogation and that sufficient delay should be made when making the appointment with Knappe to enable me to arrive in Madrid at least 24 hours before the interrogation is to take place. I would, of course, not be present at the interrogation.

  Harris’ second letter was addressed directly to the Madrid station and provided the suggested questionnaire, which had been tailored, without too much subtlety, to ram home the message that GARBO was an espionage mastermind who had skilfully eluded the British authorities. Other embedded messages stressed some detailed knowledge of package deliveries by couriers, manifested obvious ignorance of GARBO’s wireless procedures, and acknowledged that CARELESS (referred to by his Abwehr code name KORAP) had made a confession in which he had disclosed his secret ink formula.1 Of course, the carefully choreographed confrontation never happened, but Harris certainly intended to ensure that Knappe-Ratey was left in no doubt that GARBO was a fugitive:

  Thank you for your CX/[XXXXXX] of 4 December 1944. I attach herewith my proposal for the interrogation of Knappe.

  1. It is very unlikely that this will have to be used as it is almost inconceivable that the Germans should accept our challenge and allow Knappe to be interrogated. There are, I foresee, two circumstances against which we should be on our guard:-

  2. (a) that the Germans accept our challenge believing that Knappe will under interrogation be able to mislead me as to the true significance of GARBO and his networks.

  (b) That Knappe will make a genuine, or inspired, attempt to come over to us and tell us all he knows.

  In the event of (a) above we should endeavour to counter any misleading information which Knappe tries to give us by our passing to him similarly misleading information. The form of interrogation has been worked out with this object in view and if he digests the questions which are asked him it is hoped that he will draw the conclusions that:-

  (a) Following the information given to us by Buenaga and unable to catch him we have decided to make the diplomatic protest against him in order to doubly ensure through his expulsion that GARBO’s activities will be brought to an end.

  (b) We are anxious to discover the present whereabouts of GARBO and this we believe is only known to Knappe.

  (c) We have a very confused picture of GARBO’s activities since he has been operating in the UK.

  (d) Our knowledge of German espionage activities through Spanish nationals in the UK is by no means complete or accurate.

  Should Knappe present himself for interrogation he will know that we realize we cannot force answers out of him neither can we be expected to rely on his replies. I therefore suggest that the interrogation should be conducted in a reasonably friendly atmosphere. Knappe should be put at his ease as much as possible and be given the impression in interrogation that we are trying to make him believe that we know more about the case than in fact we do. He should be made to feel that we are trying to induce him to give us his reluctant cooperation.

  3. Knappe will expect us to realise that his prospects in Germany after expulsion from Spain to Germany are gloomy. He will be uncertain as to what his punishment at our hands will be in the post-war for the harm which he has done this country. He might be encouraged to believe that his cooperation in answering the questionnaire would stand to his credit with the Allies in the post-war.

  4. If we are to succeed in misleading Knappe as to our true knowledge of the GARBO situation it will be essential to ask Knappe a great number, if not all, of the questions prepared in the questionnaire. Assuming that Knappe will not attend a meeting for interrogation unless it is his intention to answer questions which are put to him it would be most advantageous if the Military Attaché should make it clear that he proposes to confine his interrogation to a list of questions which have been supplied to him by London. The Military Attaché could not, in his position, be expected to have a great deal of background information which would call for his asking questions beyond those listed in the questionnaire. I would suggest that Knappe’s replies should be taken down in shorthand and that no endeavour should be made
to cross question him on his replies unless a lack of cross questioning should at any time become apparent.

  5. In the event that at the meeting Knappe should express his willingness to betray his masters and make a clean breast of all he knows his statement (which may well be inspired) should be taken in full. Even in these circumstances it would be preferable that the Military Attaché should, after taking this statement, continue by putting the questionnaire to him as if to ensure that answers to all the questions contained therein had been supplied. The nature of a voluntary statement might make this impossible.

  6. I think that it is essential that even should Knappe genuinely attempt to betray his masters and show signs that he is willing to cooperate fully with me that we should firmly refuse to give him any reward or promise of asylum in return for his collaboration.

  7. Should Knappe volunteer to obtain further information about GARBO or other agents who have operated for the Madrid Stelle or endeavour to arrange subsequent secret meetings, these offers should be turned down on the basis that we do not negotiate with our enemies and that we propose to confine ourselves to the limits of the statement which we made to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

  The Interrogation of Friedrich Knappe

  He should first be told:-

  Your hostile activities directed from Madrid against Great Britain have been known to the British authorities for a number of years. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the past requested to expel you from Spain.