Codeword Overlord

by Nigel West

  In the long delay which has elapsed since this request was made, fresh and reliable evidence has been brought to our notice to prove conclusively that you have contrived to make possible the activities of a certain agent who has worked on your behalf in the UK. I will in future refer to this agent as ‘X’. The British authorities have reason to believe that the present whereabouts of this individual and his collaborators are known to you.

  So long as Germany and England are at war we can make you no promise of assistance or reward in return for the information you choose to give us, but we should warn you that your future in the post-war may benefit you if you now decide to answer to the best of your ability the questions which we propose to put to you.

  Drastic measures have been taken to ensure that the continued use of ‘X’ or his collaborators are no longer possible thus the replies to the questions we put to you will serve as mainly to clarify certain outstanding or obscure points and will be of academic rather than of practical interest to us. You should not, therefore, feel you will be betraying your colleagues by replying accurately to all the questions.

  We know all about your activities in connection with the enterprise of Piernavieja del Pozo, Alcazar de Velasco, Ejysmont @ KORAP and Calvo. Their activities were promptly brought to an end. We further know that on the withdrawal of Alcazar de Velasco as the chief of the Spanish organisation in the UK a substitute had been sent by you, and we further know from the interrogation of Calvo that this substitute who, it is now clear, is the Spaniard ‘X’, has a trained wireless operator to whom he, Calvo, was commissioned to hand over a wireless apparatus which had previously been brought to the UK by Alcazar de Velasco. This commission Calvo was unable to fulfil due to his detention. It was further known that German espionage in the UK, through Spanish Falangists had, since the time of Alcazar, operated under the cover of Spanish ‘Reds’ and had invariably been linked up in some way or other to the Ministry of Information. In consequence certain Spanish Republicans who had been actively assisting Alcazar de Velasco had been arrested and their activities for Germany likewise brought to an end.

  We are prepared to admit that, with the arrest of Calvo, who, by his own confession had engaged in espionage, we had anticipated all similar activities had come to an end. It was not until the summer of 1943 that it became apparent through the interception of secret correspondence directed to the Peninsula that a branch of this Spanish network was still operative. After extensive enquiries and the bringing to light of new information we were able to break up this station and run the chief of it to ground.

  We now request answers to the following questions:-

  1. The full names of all collaborators in the ‘Spanish’ espionage organization operating in the UK under the direction of ‘X’.

  2. Method of correspondence.

  (a) Over what period was the Ministry of Information bag used for sending secret messages?

  (b) How were they conveyed from the British Embassy in Madrid to you?

  (c) What method of corresponding has been used since the summer of 1943 when the use of the postal service to Lisbon was abandoned?

  (d) Through what channels were packages sent to Lisbon by hand?

  (e) What were the contents of a package mailed to Lisbon, on or about 3 March 1943?

  (f) What were the contents of a square tin delivered by hand to your nominee on, or about, 2 June 1943?

  (g) What was the nature of the package containing a book which was delivered to a nominee in Lisbon on, or about, the 7 June 1943?

  (h) What was the nature of the contents of a small package mailed in Lisbon on, or about, the 22 September 1943?

  (i) What were the contents of a package mailed in Lisbon on, or about, the 18 October 1943? This you should recall since you attached great importance to its safe arrival at that time.

  (j) A framed picture was delivered to your nominee in Lisbon on, or about, 30 December 1943. What was the nature of this picture?

  (k) A package which contained a cloth toy was delivered to your nominee in Lisbon on, or about the 25 February 1944. What was concealed within the toy?

  (l) A tin of curry powder was mailed from Lisbon on or about the 3 March 1944. What was contained within the package?

  (m) A package containing crystalised fruit was delivered to your nominee in Lisbon on, or about, the 9 March 1943. What also did this package contain?

  There is reason to believe that the packages referred to in paras (f) to (m) above were taken from England to Lisbon by Spanish diplomatic couriers and it is known that within those packages secret information was concealed. Will you confirm that members of the Spanish Embassy were responsible for transporting these packages? Will you disclose the nature of their secret contents? Will you disclose whether other independent couriers were also used?

  3. For information supplied in connection with the Dieppe Raid ‘X’ was paid £2,500. How was this payment made? What other payments were made to him and by what method?

  4. We know through KORAP that phenolphthilene [sic] was used for corresponding between him and ‘X’. We know that ammonium vanadate was used in correspondence between the UK and the Peninsula. We know that a quinine tipped match was also used. What other methods were used for secret writing?

  5. To what addresses were incoming communications sent after ‘X’ abandoned the address at Hendon?

  6. Were there meetings held my members of the organization after abandoning meetings at Hendon?

  7. Apart from the information received about the Dieppe Raid, about shipping in the Clyde, troop movements in the Southampton area, etc. what other areas, in particular were covered by the organization?

  8. About a year and a half ago you sent two agents to the United States as members of the crew of the SS Cabo de Cosmos. One was a male nurse, the other a doctor. What are their names? Where are they now?

  9. You had an agent in Casablanca. What is his name? Where is he now?

  10. You had two agents working in Canada. They used the cover names James Baddow and Fred Stone. What are their real names? Where are they now?

  11. What was the delay in transit in sending:-

  (a) Letters from the UK to Lisbon by special courier?

  (b) Packages " " " " " " " "

  12. Were the secret contents passed to Berlin?

  (a) Direct from Lisbon?

  (b) Via you in Madrid?

  In the case of (a) who was responsible for conducting these activities in Lisbon?

  13. In view of the fact that ‘X’ was unable to get access through Calvo to the wireless set brought to London by Alcazar de Velasco, from whom at the Spanish Embassy in London did he collect it? Which members of the embassy staff were aware of ‘X’’s true mission? Did they facilitate secret communications through the Spanish Diplomatic bag? Was the Spanish Diplomatic cipher ever used for passing urgent communications?

  14. What ciphers were supplied to ‘X’ for use with transmitting?

  15. What frequencies did he use?

  16. What precautions did he take to avoid detection?

  17. What power apparatus did he use?

  18. Is any other member of the organization able to operate a wireless set?

  19. What is the present whereabouts of the apparatus which ‘X’ abandoned?

  20. What was the average length of the message he sent? Were two-way contacts made by wireless? Or were ‘incoming’ communications sent blind on pre-arranged days and times?

  21. With what regularity were messages sent out by W/T from England?

  22. Was the wireless apparatus installed in the centre of London? If so, where?

  23. Did a member of this organization recently go to France? What do you know about him?

  24. Did you receive reports about damage caused by V.1 activity through the head of this organization? If so who, in addition to the head of the organization, was engaged in collecting information?

  25. Documentation in the possession of ‘X’ proved that prio
r to working for you he was an active supporter of the Spanish Republican cause, and was furthermore closely associated with the Communists. Have any other members of his organization a similar Left Wing record? Did he change sides to gain favour with the present regime in Spain for monetary considerations, for adventure, or was it due to a change in his political outlook?

  26. What can you tell us about the following people:

  (a) Dorothy Thompson

  (b) Richard Anderson

  (c) Anthony Gordon-Bright

  (d) Frank Dobson

  (e) George Storrup

  (f) Antonio Catso de la Torre

  (g) Onofre Garcia Tirairo

  (h) Ramiro Ruiz Pinedo

  (i) Juan Alponso y Lugo

  (j) Garcia Castello

  (k) Pedro Garcia Armas

  (l) Pedro de Hidalga

  (m) Luis Ferrara

  27. ‘X’ was described as a writer. Did he have any dealings with the English Press Department at the Spanish Embassy in London or with the press attaché, Senor Brugada?

  28. When did you last see ‘X’?

  29. There are indications that at the time his arrest was imminent you sent him a warning by wireless that he should get out of London. Since then, apart from certain indications we have received as to his present whereabouts, they have been carefully concealed. Will you tell us:-

  (a) How you got to learn in advance that we were on the track of ‘X’.

  (b) Whether he has returned to Spain? And if so, how?, and if not, his present whereabouts?

  With the benefit of hindsight, the strategy adopted by Harris seems quite bizarre as his questionnaire would effectively reveal to the enemy the very considerable extent of MI5’s knowledge of the ARABEL network, and identify the alleged ‘true’ names of its membership. Far from proving that MI5 had learned next to nothing about the spy ring from Buenaga and Ruser, the detail must have seemed a little too accurate. In any event, two days later, on 9 December, Guy Liddell referred to the plan in his diary and appeared to endorse it:

  Tommy Harris talked to me about the protest that the Foreign Office are making on our instigation about Knappe, codenamed FEDERICO. We are drawing the attention of the Spaniards to this individual and asking for the opportunity to question him as he has information as to the whereabouts of an important agent in this country, namely GARBO. In fact, Federico does not know GARBO’s whereabouts although, of course, he knows about his work. It is not the least likely that we shall have the chance of talking to him but if we do we have a questionnaire which should give the impression that we are bluffing and that, in fact, we do not know very much. We feel it desirable to make this protest since it must be assumed that through Roberto Buenaga and others we know about Knappe and about GARBO. If, therefore, we do not register some protest it would appear rather unusual in the present atmosphere. If there is an interrogation it will be conducted by the military attaché, with Tommy Harris in the offing to give him advice.

  Naturally, Knappe-Ratey never submitted himself for an encounter with the British military attaché but, however fanciful the prospect, the slim chance of confronting GARBO’s handler, and offering him the opportunity to switch sides, must have appeared attractive. In reality, Knappe-Ratey remained loyal to the Reich and determined to remain in Spain with his family, with absolutely no inclination to go to Germany, even with the inducement of lenient treatment by the Allied post-war occupation forces.

  One unexpected consequence of Harris’ scheme was concern expressed by the FBI, which had been running its own double agent, ASPIRIN, against Knappe-Ratey. The FBI Legal Attaché at the US embassy in Madrid, Frank G. Siscoe, contacted MI5, as Harris reported on 11 December, having worried that his spy might be blamed for compromising Knappe-Ratey:

  Since the request to protest against Knappe’s activities were signalled out by Section V to their Madrid representative there has ‘been an exchange of telegrams’ between the Madrid and London offices.

  The Madrid representative telegraphed to say that the local FBI man in Madrid was aware that Knappe had trained GARBO in codes and before making the protest he wished to be authorized to assure the FBI that the protest against FEDERICO could not be attributed to Aladren. He telegraphed back to the effect that it would be quite clear to the Germans that the source of the denunciation against Knappe was an ex-German agent in Lisbon. We asked him how far FBI had been put into the picture about this protest in view of its delicate nature, and also asked for further clarification of his statement that Knappe had trained GARBO.

  A clarification has now come in by telegram which states that the local FBI man in Madrid had brought back from Washington a note on the German agents which, it appears, includes the statement ‘Knappe trained GARBO’. He found this trace in FBI records when looking up Aladren. He assumes GARBO is a double agent but does not know who or where he is. In view of Aladren’s visit to Madrid he suggests it would be advisable to include some other names in the expulsion list. He further adds that he wants to be sure of his ground since all protests registered by the Ambassador against Germans in Spain are eventually passed to the Americans.

  I have requested Section V to reply to say that it would be inadvisable to include any other names in the protest as this would only tend to confuse the issue. They should tell their representative that the Germans know an ex-member of their organization in Madrid has now came over to us in Lisbon and has given us information about Knappe. Should we therefore fail to make this protest it might tend to show that either Aladren or other agents in our territory who had been trained by FEDERICO were under control.

  The Madrid representative should be authorized to pass this information to the FBI man before proceeding in accordance with the original instructions.

  The FBI was anxious not to compromise the Spanish journalist José Aladren, their star double agent code-named ASPIRIN who had been recruited by Alcazar de Velaso. A year earlier ASPIRIN, directed by his handler, Special Agent John Williams, had been deployed against an important target, Fernando Kobbe, code-named FISHERMAN, the Spanish consul in Vancouver, who was suspected of spying for the Japanese and was therefore of great interest to the FBI.

  Even before his arrival in Canada, Kobbe, who was a widower, formerly married to a German woman, had been compromised by Japanese decrypts, suggesting he had been recruited as a Japanese spy, perhaps by his mistress, Marichu Amenza. Initially, some consideration was given by Peter Wilson of SIS’s Section V to making a pitch in the hope of turning Kobbe into a double agent, but it was decided that such a move might compromise ASPIRIN.

  There was also some worry about the codebooks that Kobbe had carried to the United States on the SS Marques de Commilas, which had been subjected to a surreptitious inspection in Trinidad. While en poste Kobbe had been kept under the most intense surveillance by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, encouraged by MI5’s liaison officer in Montreal, Cyril Mills. In August 1943 ASPIRIN returned to Madrid, apparently in an effort to be recruited by the Japanese, and he was the source of an incriminating letter, sent through the regular mail, which contained $1,000 and a Japanese code concealed in secret writing. Naturally the RCMP copied the contents, and this and other items, including a microfilm sent from an unknown contact, became the basis of an official protest to the Spanish Foreign Ministry from the British ambassador in January 1944, complaining about the employment of Spanish diplomats as Japanese agents. Rather unexpectedly, the Spanish government had reacted swiftly to Hoare’s démarche by recalling Kobbe to face a judicial tribunal in Madrid. Accordingly, he sailed back to Europe from New Orleans on the SS Megalles, accompanied by his daughter, Beatrix, in February 1944.

  This unexpected turn of events effectively put an end to Kobbe’s espionage, but ASPIRIN remained in play, under the FBI’s direction. Meanwhile, GARBO having been protected, elaborate measures were taken to ensure that the German intelligence personnel who underwent post-war interrogation by Allied authorities should never be given the sli
ghtest hint that might allow them to guess the scale to which their networks had been controlled. Even when Winston Churchill and General Eisenhower embarked on their post-war memoirs, they were individually persuaded to omit all mention of the ‘special means’ that had been developed to deceive the enemy so comprehensively. The former prime minister dined with the SIS chief, Sir Stewart Menzies, on 9 June 1948 as part of an effort headed by the Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook, to sanitise his first draft of The Second World War and remove passages deemed indiscreet. Similarly, Eisenhower’s plans for Crusade in Europe caused consternation in Whitehall, as Guy Liddell documented on 12 February 1946, following a visit from FORTITUDE’s architect, Roger Hesketh:

  Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh came over to discuss the paragraphs on deception contained in General Eisenhower’s despatch. The paragraphs give the whole business away. Our grounds for objection are (a) that this constitutes a reversal of the decision by the Chiefs of Staff that strategic as opposed to tactical deception should remain in Top Secret level, (b) that we think on general grounds this principle should be maintained since if it becomes known that a major deception had been executed successfully in the battle of Normandy everybody would be on their guard in the future. (c) that recent disclosures make it perfectly clear that the Germans ran the battle of Normandy on the information supplied by GARBO and BRUTUS and that their reports were passed to Colonel Friedrich-Adolf Krummacher, Hitler’s personal intelligence officer, by Jodl. Many of the reports were actually initialled by Hitler himself. If therefore the world is to be told that the Germans were deceived through emphasis being laid on an attack from the Pas-de-Calais this disclosure will certainly point the finger at GARBO and BRUTUS. A principle here is involved in giving away an agent. No government that gets this reputation will be able to get agents in the future. Apart from this, GARBO’s own safety is at stake and his usefulness is by no means ended. We have devised a form of words which draws the whole operation factually and more or less describes how the Germans made a miscalculation by thinking that we should attack by the shortest route to the Ruhr. We have in fact given them the explanation that Jodl believes himself. Whether this will be acceptable to Eisenhower I don’t know.