The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Bodhi

  151 His position is not quite the same as that of the common annihilationist, since he does not hold that all beings are annihilated at death. He seems to hold an eternalist view in regard to unenlightened beings (since they have a lasting self which transmigrates) and annihilationism in regard to the arahant (since he utterly perishes at death).Spk: If he had thought, “Formations arise and cease; a simple process of formations reaches nonoccurrence,” this would not be a view (diṭṭhigata) but knowledge in accordance with the Teaching. But since he thought, “A being is annihilated and destroyed,” this becomes a view. What follows is paralleled by MN I 130-31 and I 256-57.

  152 Spk: At the end of this teaching on the three characteristics Yamaka became a stream-enterer. Sāriputta asks the following questions to examine him and to get him to show that he has given up his wrong view.Spk glosses tathāgata here as “a being” (satta), which I think does not quite hit the mark. I take the subject of the discussion to be, not a being in general, but the arahant conceived as a being, as a substantial self. Thus the catechism will show that Yamaka has abandoned his identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) regarding the arahant, and therewith his view of the arahant as a self that undergoes annihilation. We find a similar transition from the arahant (vimuttacitta bhikkhu) to the Tathāgata at MN I 140,3-7 and I 486-88.

  153 The first three alternatives—conceiving the aggregates individually as the Tathāgata, the Tathāgata as within the aggregates, and the Tathāgata as apart from the aggregates—correspond to the first three modes of conceiving in the Mūlapariyāya Sutta (MN I 1), which are set in relation to the sense bases at 35:30, 31. The fourth position conceives the aggregates collectively as the Tathāgata (perhaps a view of supervenience); the fifth conceives the Tathāgata as entirely transcendent, without any essential relation to the aggregates. These modes of conceiving can also be correlated with the twenty types of identity view.

  154 Diṭṭh’ eva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgato anupalabbhiyamāno. Cp. MN I 138,5-6: Attani ca bhikkhave attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne. MN I 140,6-7: Diṭṭh’ evāhaṃ bhikkhave dhamme tathāgataṃ ananuvejjo ti vadāmi.

  155 See n. 147.

  156 This passage can be read as a gloss on the Buddha’s famous dictum, “I make known just suffering and the cessation of suffering” (see end of 22:86).

  157 Ee daheyya may be better than saddaheyya, in Be and Se.

  158 Spk: The uninstructed worldling attached to the round is like the gullible householder, the five fragile aggregates like the murderous enemy. When the enemy comes up to the householder and offers to serve him, that is like the time the aggregates are acquired at the moment of rebirth. When the householder takes the enemy to be his friend, that is like the time the worldling grasps the aggregates, thinking, “They are mine.” The honour the householder bestows on the enemy, thinking, “He is my friend,” is like the honour the worldling bestows on the aggregates by bathing them, feeding them, etc. The murder of the householder by the enemy is like the destruction of the worldling’s life when the aggregates break up.

  159 The next four paragraphs are also at 22:55.

  160 As in 12:15; see II, n. 31, n. 32.

  161 This last sentence is not in Be.

  162 This sutta also occurs at 44:2, with the questionnaire given in full (though abridged in this translation).

  163 Tathāgato uttamapuriso paramapuriso paramapattipatto. This should establish that “the Tathāgata” here is not just “a being,” but a Buddha or an arahant; the expression recurs at 44:9. The four theses are all rooted in a conception of the Tathāgata as a self. The commentaries explain the first as eternalism, the second as annihilationism, the third as a syncretic view (partial-eternalism), the fourth as evasive scepticism. Two whole chapters in SN deal with these issues, the Vacchagottasaṃyutta (SN 33) and the Abyākatasaṃyutta (SN 44). See too 16:12.

  164 Spk: It is said that he thought, “These are hostile enemies of the Teaching. The Teacher would not describe (the Tathāgata) as they say. He must have described him in some other way.”

  165 This oft-quoted dictum can be interpreted at two levels. At the more superficial level the Buddha can be read as saying that he does not make any declaration about such metaphysical questions as an afterlife but teaches only a practical path for reaching the end of suffering here and now. This interpretation, however, does not connect the dictum with the Buddha’s previous statement that the Tathāgata is not apprehended in this very life. To make this connection we have to bring in the second interpretation, according to which the “Tathāgata” is a mere term of conventional usage referring to a compound of impermanent formations, which are “suffering” because they contain no permanent essence. It is just these that stand while the Tathāgata lives, and just these that cease with his passing away. The context in which the dictum occurs at MN I 140,14-15 also supports this interpretation.

  166 Vakkali was declared by the Buddha the foremost bhikkhu of those resolved through faith (etadaggaṃ saddhādhimuttānaṃ ; AN I 24,15).Spk: After completing the rains residence, the elder was on his way to see the Blessed One when he fell ill in the middle of the city. He could not walk, so they put him on a stretcher and carried him to a potter’s shed.

  167 Samadhosi. Spk: He showed his respect by making a movement; for, it is said, even a patient is obliged to show respect to a superior by making a gesture of rising.

  168 Yo kho Vakkali dhammaṃ passati, so maṃ passati. Yo maṃ passati, so dhammaṃ passati. Spk: Here the Blessed One shows (himself as) the Dhamma-body, as stated in the passage, “The Tathāgata, great king, is the Dhamma-body.” For the ninefold supramundane Dhamma is called the Tathāgata’s body.I cannot trace a statement that corresponds exactly to the one cited by Spk. Spk may be misquoting DN III 84,23-24, which actually reads: “For this, Vāseṭṭha, is a designation of the Tathāgata, that is, the Dhamma-body …” (tathāgatassa h’ etaṃ Vāseṭṭha adhivacanaṃ dhammakāyo iti pi …). On the ninefold supramundane Dhamma, see n. 51. Though the second clause seems to be saying that simply by seeing the Buddha’s body one sees the Dhamma, the meaning is surely that in order to really see the Buddha one should see the Dhamma, the truth to which he awakened. Hence the following catechism, intended to guide Vakkali towards that realization.

  169 It was here too that the Venerable Godhika expired by his own hand; see 4:23.

  170 Vimokkhāya ceteti. Spk: For the sake of the deliverance of the path (magga-vimokkhatthāya). Although vimokkha and vimutti are derived from the same prefixed root (vi + muc), they usually appear in different contexts. To avoid confusion I have rendered the former as “deliverance,” the latter as “liberation.” Here they are synonymous.

  171 Suvimutto vimuccissati. Spk: He will be liberated as one liberated by the liberation of the fruit of arahantship. Those devas spoke thus because they knew, “By whatever method he arouses insight, he will attain arahantship immediately.”

  172 Vakkali’s message to the Buddha implies that he already considered himself an arahant. Spk, however, explains: “The elder, it is said, overestimated himself. As he had suppressed the defilements by concentration and insight, he did not see himself assailed by them and thus thought he was an arahant. Disgusted with his miserable life, he cut his jugular vein with a sharp knife. Just then, painful feelings arose in him. Realizing he was still a worldling, he took up his main meditation subject, explored it with knowledge, and attained arahantship just as he died.” On the basis of the sutta alone it is impossible to tell whether the commentary is right. For another account of a monk who took his life while thinking he was an arahant, see 35:87. Godhika (in 4:23) did not have this conviction, but took his life from despair due to his illness. He too, however, attained arahantship at the time of death. The sequel is as at 4:23; see I, nn. 313, 314.

  173 I read with Be: gelaññe passambhetvā passambhetvā kāysaṅkhāre viharāmi, so ’haṃ samādhiṃ nappaṭilabhāmi. The “bodily formations” are in-breathing and out-bre
athing (assāsa-passāsa); see MN I 56,20-22 and MN I 301,20-21 (= 41:6; IV 293,16).Spk: He kept tranquillizing in-and-out breathing when he dwelt in the fourth jhāna, where breathing ceases (36:11; IV 217,8-9). Because he had fallen away from all the meditative absorptions that he had previously attained, he thought, “Let me not fall away from the Teaching.”

  174 Spk: Samādhisārakā samādhisāmaññā ti samādhiṃ yeva sārañ ca sāmaññañ ca maññanti. “In my Teaching that is not the essence; the essence is insight, path, and fruit.”

  175 Spk says that at the end of the Buddha’s exposition of the three characteristics, Assaji attained arahantship. Spk explains that the Buddha introduces the following passage to show the arahant’s constant abiding. See too 12:51, where the same text is coupled with a different simile. The present version is also at 36:7, 36:8, and 54:8.

  176 Although all three eds. of SN and both eds. of Spk read asmī ti adhigataṃ, this is probably an old corruption. I propose reading asmī ti avigataṃ; see my argument in support of this amendation at n. 61. Spk: Craving and conceit are found occurring in the mode “I am.”This passage clarifies the essential difference between the sekha and the arahant. While the sekha has eliminated identity view and thus no longer identifies any of the five aggregates as a self, he has not yet eradicated ignorance, which sustains a residual conceit and desire “I am” (anusahagato asmī ti māno asmī ti chando) in relation to the five aggregates. The arahant, in contrast, has eradicated ignorance, the root of all misconceptions, and thus no longer entertains any ideas of “I” and “mine.” The other elders apparently had not yet attained any stage of awakening and thus did not understand this difference, but the Venerable Khemaka must have been at least a stream-enterer [Spk-pṭ: some hold he was a nonreturner, others a once-returner] and thus knew that the elimination of identity view does not completely remove the sense of personal identity. Even for the nonreturner, an “odour of subjectivity” based on the five aggregates still lingers over his experience.

  177 I prefer vaṇṭassa, found in SS, over vaṇṇassa in all three printed eds.

  178 Spk: The worldling’s mental process is like the soiled cloth. The three contemplations (of impermanence, suffering, and nonself) are like the three cleansers. The mental process of the nonreturner is like the cloth that has been washed with the three cleansers. The defilements to be eradicated by the path of arahantship are like the residual smell of the cleansers. The knowledge of the path of arahantship is like the sweetly scented casket, and the destruction of all defilements by that path is like the vanishing of the residual smell of the cleansers from the cloth after it has been placed in the casket.

  179 Spk identifies this Channa with the Bodhisatta’s charioteer who led him out of the palace on the night of his great renunciation. He had received ordination as a monk but, because of his former close relationship with the Buddha, he became proud and domineering and spoke harshly to the other bhikkhus. Shortly before his parinibbāna the Buddha had instructed the Saṅgha to impose on him the brahmadaṇḍa, “the silence treatment” (DN II 154,18-23). When Channa realized he was being treated as a pariah by the Saṅgha, he was shaken by a sense of urgency (saṃvega). It is at this point that the sutta opens.

  180 Spk: All formations of the three planes (sabbe tebhūmakā saṅkhārā) are impermanent; all phenomena of the four planes (sabbe catubhūmakā dhammā) are nonself. Why didn’t those bhikkhus mention the characteristic of suffering? Because they thought, “This bhikkhu is argumentative. If we mention suffering he will quarrel with us, saying, ‘If form, etc., are suffering, the path and fruit too are suffering, so you monks have attained nothing but suffering.’” Thus they answered in a way that could not be faulted.See too MN I 228,10-14, 230,5-8, where only impermanence and nonself are mentioned in the explicit context of debate. The commentary to this passage gives a similar explanation of the omission of suffering.

  181 Atha ko carahi me attā. Spk: It is said that this elder had started to practise insight meditation without having done discernment of conditions. His weak insight could not eliminate the grip of self (attagāha), and thus when formations appeared to him as empty, agitation arose in him along with the annihilationist view, “I will be annihilated, I will be destroyed.” He saw himself falling into an abyss. [Spkpṭ: Agitation through fear (bhayaparitassanā) and clinging to views (diṭṭh’ upādāna) arose in him over the thought, “If phenomena are nonself, then what self can deeds done by what is nonself affect?” (see 22:82 (III 104,1) and n. 142)].Discernment of conditions (paccayapariggaha) is a stage in the development of insight in which the meditator explores the conditions for the five aggregates (see Vism, chap. 19). In the proper sequence of development this stage should precede investigation of the aggregates as impermanent, suffering, and nonself.

  182 Khilaṃ pabhindi. MN I 101,9-27 mentions five types of mental barrenness (cetokhila). Channa’s problem seems to have been the fifth, anger and contemptuousness towards his fellow monks.

  183 Ānanda’s choice of the Kaccānagotta Sutta is especially apt, as this sutta teaches how dependent origination counters the two extreme views of eternalism and annihilationism and replaces the view of self with the realization that it is only dukkha that arises and ceases.

  184 This sutta and the next are identical with 18:21-22 and 22:71-72.

  185 This portion of the sutta offers an important counterpoint to the message of the Kaccānagotta Sutta (12:15). Here the Buddha emphasizes that he does not reject all ontological propositions, but only those that transcend the bounds of possible experience. While the Kaccānagotta Sutta shows that the “middle teaching” excludes static, substantialist conceptions of existence and nonexistence, the present text shows that the same “middle teaching” can accommodate definite pronouncements about these ontological issues. The affirmation of the existence of the five aggregates, as impermanent processes, serves as a rejoinder to illusionist theories, which hold that the world lacks real being.

  186 Lokadhamma. Spk: The five aggregates are called thus because it is their nature to disintegrate (lujjanasabhāvattā). Loka is derived from lujjati at 35:82. The etymology cannot be accepted literally but serves a pedagogic purpose.

  187 Spk: In this sutta three types of world are spoken of. When it is said, “I do not dispute with the world,” it is the world of beings (sattaloka). “A world-phenomenon in the world”: here, the world of formations (saṅkhāraloka). “The Tathāgata was born in the world”: here, the geographic world (okāsaloka). Ee has omitted loke jāto, no doubt by oversight. The simile is also at AN II 38,30-39,3; see too AN V 152,12-16.

  188 Spk: One evening, while dwelling in that abode, the Blessed One came out from his fragrant cottage and sat down by the bank of the Ganges. He saw a great lump of foam coming downstream and thought, “I will give a Dhamma talk relating to the five aggregates.” Then he addressed the bhikkhus sitting around him.The sutta is one of the most radical discourses on the empty nature of conditioned phenomena; its imagery (especially the similes of the mirage and the magical illusion) has been taken up by later Buddhist thinkers, most persistently by the Mādhyamikas. Some of the images are found elsewhere in the Pāli Canon, e.g., at Dhp 46, 170. In the context of early Buddhist thought these similes have to be handled with care. They are not intended to suggest an illusionist view of the world but to show that our conceptions of the world, and of our own existence, are largely distorted by the process of cognition. Just as the mirage and magical illusion are based on real existents—the sand of the desert, the magician’s appurtenances—so these false conceptions arise from a base that objectively exists, namely, the five aggregates; but when seen through a mind subject to conceptual distortion, the aggregates appear in a way that deviates from their actual nature. Instead of being seen as transient and selfless, they appear as substantial and as a self.

  189 Spk explains at length how form (i.e., the body) is like a lump of foam (pheṇapiṇḍa). I give merely the highlights: as a lump of foa
m lacks any substance (sāra), so form lacks any substance that is permanent, stable, a self; as the lump of foam is full of holes and fissures and the abode of many creatures, so too form; as the lump of foam, after expanding, breaks up, so does form, which is pulverized in the mouth of death. Spk’s commentary is also at Vibh-a 32-35.

  190 Spk: A bubble (bubbuḷa) is feeble and cannot be grasped, for it breaks up as soon as it is seized; so too feeling is feeble and cannot be grasped as permanent and stable. As a bubble arises and ceases in a drop of water and does not last long, so too with feeling: 100,000 koṭis of feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap (one koṭi = 10 million). As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises in dependence on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact.

  191 Spk: Perception is like a mirage (marīcikā) in the sense that it is insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a pitcher. As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, which entices people with the idea that the colourful object is beautiful, pleasurable, and permanent.

  192 Akukkukajātaṃ. Spk: There is no pith growing inside (anto asañjātaghanadaṇḍakaṃ).