The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Bodhi

  193 The simile is used for a different purpose at MN I 233,15-23. Spk: As a plantain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many sheaths, each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional formations is an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic.

  194 Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (māyā) in the sense that it is insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more transient and fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a person comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is different in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude like a magical illusion.For a modern parable illustrating the deceptive nature of consciousness, based on this simile, see Ñāṇananda, The Magic of the Mind, pp. 5-7.

  195 See MN I 296,9-11, spoken by Sāriputta. I cannot trace a parallel spoken by the Buddha himself, but see Dhp 41.

  196 Spk explains that māyāyaṃ bālalāpinī, in pāda b, refers specifically to the aggregate of consciousness. The aggregate-mass is a murderer in two ways: (i) because the aggregates slay each other; and (ii) because murder appears in dependence on the aggregates. As to (i), when the earth element breaks up it takes along the other elements, and when the form aggregate breaks up it takes along the mental aggregates. As to (ii), when the aggregates exist such things as murder, bondage, injury, etc., come into being. On the comparison of the aggregates to murderers, see too 22:85 (III 114,20-24).

  197 Read: divā vā yadi vā rattiṃ.

  198 Spk: The holy life of the path arises stilling the formations of the three planes. If even this much individual existence were permanent, though the path might arise it would not be able to still the round of formations. Thus the holy life would not be discerned.

  199 Spk: This is said to show: “If any formations were permanent, then the success I enjoyed as King Mahāsudassana would have been permanent.” On King Mahāsudassana, a past incarnation of the Buddha, see the eponymic sutta, DN No. 17.

  200 The elephant, the steed, the jewel-gem, the beautiful queen, and the commander-gem are five of the seven gems of the wheel-turning monarch (rājā cakkavattī). The other two, which Mahāsudassana also possessed, are the wheel-gem and the steward-gem; for details, see DN II 172-77. The seven gems are mentioned at 46:42.

  201 The passage beginning “Of those 84,000 cities” to the end is also at DN II 197-98, but the latter includes an additional closing paragraph. The homily on impermanence is at 15:20 (II 193,3-6).Spk: Having shown his success at the time when he was King Mahāsudassana, he now shows its impermanence. Just as a man might place a ladder against a campaka tree, climb up, take a campaka flower, and then descend, so the Blessed One has climbed up the story of King Mahāsudassana’s success, taken the characteristic of impermanence at the top, and descended.

  202 I read with Se, khattiyā vā velāmikā vā. Spk explains a velāmika as one born from a khattiya father and a brahmin mother, or a brahmin father and a khattiya mother.

  203 As at 15:1, etc. See II, n. 254.

  204 On the destruction of the world by fire, see Vism 414-17 (Ppn 13:32-41).

  205 The simile of the dog is also at MN II 232,24-233,4. Spk: The foolish worldling is like the dog, his view is like the leash, his personal identity (sakkāya) is like the post. Like the dog’s running around the post is the worldling’s running around his personal identity bound to it by craving and views.

  206 Caraṇaṃ nāma cittaṃ. Citta here is the equivalent of Skt citra, picture. The exact meaning of the picture’s title is obscure. Spk glosses vicaraṇacitta, “the wandering picture” [Spk-pṭ: because they take it and wander about with it], but caraṇa here possibly means conduct, as in other contexts.Spk: The Saṅkha were a sect of heretical brahmins. Having taken a canvas, they had various pictures painted on it of the good and bad destinations to illustrate success and failure, and then they took it around on their wanderings. They would show it to the people, explaining, “If one does this deed, one gets this result; if one does that, one gets that.”

  207 Tam pi … caraṇaṃ nāma cittaṃ citten’ eva cittitaṃ, tena pi … caraṇena cittena cittaññeva cittataraṃ. There are several puns here that cannot be successfully conveyed in translation (nor even in Skt for that matter). Citta is both mind (as in Skt) and picture (= Skt citra). Cittita (Ee: cintita) is “thought out” (related to citta, mind) and “diversified” (related to citra, picture). I have used “designed in its diversity” to capture both nuances. As 64-65 quotes this passage in its discussion of how mind designs the world.

  208 Te pi … tiracchānagatā pāṇā citten’ eva cittitā, tehi pi … tiracchānagatehi pāṇehi cittaññeva cittataraṃ. Another series of puns. The point is that the diversity of the creatures in the animal realm reflects the diversity of the past kamma that causes rebirth as an animal, and this diversity of kamma in turn stems from the diversity of volition (cetanā), a mental factor. As 64-65 discusses this passage at length.Spk: Quails and partridges, etc., do not accumulate diverse kamma, thinking, “We will become diversified in such and such a way,” but the kamma arrives at the appropriate species (yoni), and the diversity is rooted in the species. For beings that arise in a particular species become diversified in the way appropriate to that species. Thus the diversity is achieved through the species, and the species reflect kamma.

  209 The simile is also at 12:64. See II, n. 173.

  210 Also at 12:23. The following, through to the end, is also at AN IV 125-27.

  211 Again, these are the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment. The theme of this sutta might be compared with MN No. 126, which deals with the question whether, in living the holy life, it is necessary to make a wish (āsañ ce pi karitvā) in order to achieve the fruit (phalassa adhigamāya). Here the word rendered “wish” is icchā.

  212 The simile of the chicks is applied differently at MN I 104,3-13 and MN I 357,6-358,2. See too Vin III 3-5. Spk elaborates on the comparison of the bhikkhu’s enlightenment to the hatching of chicks: The hen’s preparatory work is like the bhikkhu’s devotion to development. The nonrotting of the eggs is like the bhikkhu’s not falling away from insight knowledge; the drying up of the moisture in the eggs is like the drying up of attachment to the three realms of existence; the thinning of the egg shells is like the thinning of ignorance; the maturation of the chicks is like the maturation of insight knowledge. The time when the chicks break the shells and emerge safely is like the time when the bhikkhu breaks the shell of ignorance and attains arahantship. And as the chicks go about adorning the village field, so the great arahant enters into fruition attainment which takes Nibbāna as its object, and thus adorns his monastery.

  213 Reading palagaṇḍassa with Be and Se. Spk glosses vaḍḍhakissa .

  214 The simile is also at 45:158. I read it as in Se and Ee. Spk develops this simile even more minutely than the simile of the chicks. In brief: Like the wearing away of the rigging by the ocean water is the wearing away of the bhikkhu’s fetters by his going forth (into homelessness), study, and questioning. Like the time the ship is hauled onto dry land is the time the bhikkhu takes up a meditation subject and dwells in the forest. Like the drying up of the rigging by wind and sun during the day is the drying up of craving by insight knowledge. Like the wetting by snow at night is the wetting of the mind by gladness and joy arisen from meditation. Like the rain cloud pouring down is the knowledge of the path of arahantship. Like the decay of the rigging is the attainment of the fruit of arahantship. Like the persistence of the rigging in a decrepit state is the persistence of the arahant as he lives on benefitting the multitude. Like the collapse of the decrepit rigging is the arahant’s attainment of the Nibbāna element without residue.

  215 Sensual lust is eliminated by the path of nonreturning; lust for existence, ignorance, and the conceit “I am” by the path of arahantship.

  216 This simile, and the six to follow, are applied differently at 45:141-47. The simile of the ascending sun is also at 2:29.r />
  217 Spk glosses antā, lit. “ends,” with koṭṭhāsā, and explains that this sutta interprets the five aggregates by way of the Four Noble Truths.

  218 Spk glosses pariññeyya with samatikkamitabba and pariññā with samatikkama; see n. 41. The “person who has fully understood” (pariññātāvī) is a conventional expression; see n. 37.

  219 Spk: By this, Nibbāna is shown.

  220 Woodward, at KS 3:136, says that this sutta is the same as the preceding one, but that is not the case; this one adds samudayañ ca atthaṅgamañ ca.

  221 The stream-enterer (in the preceding sutta) and the arahant share the same understanding of the five aggregates. They differ in that the arahant has used this understanding to extricate all defilements, while the stream-enterer (and higher trainees) have yet to complete this task. Note too that whereas the stream-enterer is explained in terms of a noble disciple, the arahant is always defined as a bhikkhu.

  222 As at 12:16. See II, nn. 34, 35.

  223 I follow Be, which reads baddho jīyati, as against Se and Ee, which have baddho jāyati, “who is born in bondage.”

  224 The Ee title, Parimucchita, should be amended to Paripucchita.

  225 This list is found elsewhere in the Nikāyas (e.g., at MN I 435,33-35, MN I 500,3-5, AN II 128,16-18, AN IV 422,25-423,1). The eleven terms are expanded to forty at Paṭis II 238, and commented on at Vism 611-13 (Ppn 20:19-20). Spk reduces them to the three contemplations: “impermanence” and “disintegration” represent contemplation of impermanence; “empty” and “nonself,” contemplation of nonself; and the others, contemplation of suffering. Vism 613 and Ps III 146,13, however, assign “as alien” (parato) to the contemplation of nonself, which seems more plausible.

  226 Natthi … arahato uttarikaraṇīyaṃ katassa vā paṭicayo. Spk does not comment on this, but Mp IV 165,3-5 (commenting on AN IV 355,24-25) explains: “There is nothing further to be done, because he has done the four tasks imposed by the Four Noble Truths (see 56:11). And no repetition of what he has already done, for the developed path need not be developed again and the abandoned defilements need not be abandoned again.”On “a pleasant dwelling in this very life,” just below, see II, n. 332.

  227 Kukkuḷa. See I, v. 824. Spk: A great conflagration, hot and blazing. In this sutta the characteristic of suffering is discussed.

  228 See 22:39 and n. 52.

  229 The next three suttas correspond to 22:40-42. Ee has omitted the text of 22:148, apparently by oversight as the title is correct while the text is that of 22:149. Accordingly, in this saṃyutta all the following sutta numbers in Ee are short by one.

  230 Spk glosses kiṃ upādāya with kiṃ paṭicca, but a word play is probably involved; see n. 146. The double sense would then be that pleasure and pain arise because one clings to the five aggregates with desire and lust, and they arise in dependence on the five aggregates as their support and object.

  231 Kiṃ abhinivissa. Spk: Kiṃ abhinivisitvā; paccayaṃ katvā ti attho. Spk, it seems, does not see abhinivissa as contributing anything more to the meaning than a synonym for upādāya, but the question then arises why it should be added in the case of views but not in the case of pleasure and pain. Abhinivissa is an absolutive related to the noun abhinivesa, “adherence,” which implies an element of interpretation, namely, interpretation of experience through the lens of a wrong view. When this is acknowledged, we can then see that abhinivissa suggests the imposition of a cognitive interpretation on the aggregates, which goes beyond the bare conative clinging implied by upādāya.

  232 This is the full eternalist view; see 22:81 and n. 134.

  233 The annihilationist view; see 22:81, and nn. 75, 135.

  234 Micchādiṭṭhi. In the Nikāyas usually explained as the nihilist view, e.g., at MN I 287,12-18. For text, see 24:5.

  235 Sakkāyadiṭṭhi. See n. 5.

  236 Attānudiṭṭhi. At Paṭis I 143 defined by the formula for the twenty kinds of sakkāyadiṭṭhi.

  237 Spk-pṭ explains adherences (abhinivesa) as craving, conceit, and views, and shackles (vinibandha) as the mental shackles of not being devoid of lust for form, etc. (see MN I 101,28-102,16). Holding (ajjhosāna), in the next sutta, is defined by Spk-pṭ as craving and views.

  238 Spk: Ānanda had seen other bhikkhus receive from the Buddha a meditation subject based on the five aggregates, attain arahantship, and declare final knowledge in the Teacher’s presence. He thus approached thinking to do the same. The Buddha knew he would not attain the three higher paths during his own lifetime, but he gave him instructions to satisfy him. Ānanda would attend to his meditation subject for one or two turns before going to serve the Teacher, and it became one of the factors that matured in his liberation.23. Rādhasaṃyutta

  239 DPPN 2:730 explains that he was a brahmin of Rājagaha who had become a monk in his old age. The Buddha declared him the foremost of those who could inspire ingenuity in others (etadaggaṃ paṭibhāṇakeyyānaṃ; AN I 25,15). He has two verses at Th 133-34 (= Dhp 13-14).Spk: Whenever the Tathāgata saw this elder, a subtle topic occurred to him. Thus the Blessed One taught him the Dhamma in various ways. In this saṃyutta, two vaggas have come down by way of questions, a third by way of request, and a fourth by way of intimate discourse (upanisinnakakathā , lit. “sitting nearby talk”).

  240 Spk: Here “Māra” is a metaphor for death and the aggregates (maraṇa-māra, khandha-māra).

  241 Māro vā assa māretā vā yo vā pana mīyati. Spk glosses māretā with māretabbo, but the word is clearly an agent noun with an active sense.

  242 Vimutti kho Rādha nibbānatthā. Spk: This “liberation of the fruit” is for the purpose of Nibbāna without clinging (phalavimutti nām’ esā anupādānibbānatthā).

  243 This paragraph is also at 48:42 (V 218,19-21) and MN I 304,20-22. Be consistently reads the verb as accayāsi (aorist of atiyāti), Se as accasarā (aorist of atisarati). Ee’s assa here and ajjhaparam below must stem from faulty manuscripts.The last sentence is: Nibbānogadhaṃ hi Rādha brahmacariyaṃ vussati nibbānaparāyanaṃ nibbānapariyosānaṃ. Many translators take nibbānogadha to mean “the plunge into Nibbāna” or “merging with Nibbāna,” which the commentaries encourage by connecting ogadha with ogāha, a plunge (from the verb ogāhati, to plunge into). But ogadha is actually a by-form of ogādha, from the verb ogādhati, which the commentaries treat as synonymous with patiṭṭhahati, “to be established.” They confirm this link by consistently glossing ogadha with patiṭṭhā, support; hence my rendering “ground.” For the references, see CPD, s.v. ogadha, ogādhati, ogāha, and the use of the word gādha, both literal and metaphorical, in I, v. 263. MW defines gādha (from the root gādh, to stand firmly) as a ground for standing on in water, a shallow place, a ford.

  244 This reply hinges on a pun between satta as the Pāli equivalent of Skt sattva, “a being,” and as the past participle of sajjati (= Skt sakta), “attached.”

  245 I read dhanāyanti with Be and Se, glossed dhanaṃ viya maññanti by Spk.

  246 I follow Se. Be reads bhavanetti-nirodho twice, Ee bhavanetti bhavanetti-nirodho. Bhavanetti, lit. “what leads to existence,” is glossed bhavarajju, “rope of existence,” by Spk. The expression is a synonym of bhavataṇhā, craving for existence, and often occurs in verse.

  247 A partly similar series of terms is met at 12:15. See II, nn. 31, 32.

  248 Māradhamma. Spk glosses with maraṇadhamma, “subject to death.” In some of the suttas that follow (namely, in relation to impermanence, suffering, and nonself), I translate the suffix -dhamma as “nature” rather than “subject to.”24. Diṭṭhisaṃyutta

  249 This strange view seems to be a poetic statement of the illusory nature of change. The compound esikaṭṭhāyiṭṭhita, “stands as steady as a pillar,” occurs in the statement of the eternalist views at DN I 14-16 and in the doctrine of the seven bodies just below (24:8; III 211,8). A doctrine holding time and change to be illusory (avicalita-nityatva) emerged later in the histo
ry of the Ājīvika school and may have been brought into the system from the school of Pakudha Kaccāyana, the propounder of the “doctrine of the seven bodies.” See Basham, History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, p. 236. At Mvu III 317 a similar view, stated in nearly identical terms, is cited as an example of the “wicked and wrong beliefs” that were circulating in Magadha before the Buddha arrived on the scene; see Jones 3:306.Spk: This, it is said, was their view: “Although winds blow breaking the branches of trees, etc., these are not (really) winds; they are facsimiles of wind (vātalesā; Spk-pṭ: vātalesā ti vātasadisā). The wind stands as steady as a pillar and a mountain peak. [Spk-pṭ: The phrase ‘as a pillar’ shows its immobility (niccalabhāva); ‘a mountain peak,’ its eternality (sassatisama).] Similarly with water. Though it is said that pregnant women give birth, the fetuses do not (really) emerge; those are facsimiles of fetuses. Though the sun and moon rise and set, they do not (really) do so; those are facsimiles of the sun and moon, which stand as steady as a pillar and a mountain peak.”