Paddy Mayne
Page 13
Re-enter Laycock. He had successfully argued that there would be four Commandos in the theatre of war, and, in terms of the policy which had evolved in Combined Operations, four Commandos constituted a brigade. So he ‘obtained permission to control the destinies of all the Commando units taking part in the Sicilian expedition.’23 He sailed to North Africa on 27 June 1943 with Nos 40 and 41 (Royal Marine) Commando; No. 3 Commando was already in training in Egypt. However, No. 2 Commando was on duty in Gibraltar, where it was to remain until 22 July. Thus the units of the Special Service Brigade under Laycock in early July, at the favourable period for the invasion, consisted of Nos 40 and 41 (Royal Marine) Commando, No. 3 Commando and the Special Raiding Squadron.
Sicily and Italy 1943
The final plan for the invasion of Sicily was based on two Allied armies on the island: the US 7th Army landing on the southwest of the island at Gela and the 8th Army on the south-east at Pachino and Cassibile. Airborne troops would land ahead of the invasion armies, who would be preceded by seaborne raiders assigned to deal with the coastal batteries. The 8th Army’s left flank comprised III Corps, ahead of whom Nos 40 and 41 (Royal Marine) Commandos were to attack batteries at Pachino. The right flank consisted of XIII Corps. No. 3 Commando’s objective was the battery near Cassibile. Furthest to the east would be landed the Special Raiding Squadron on the south-east point of the Penisola della Maddalena, south of Siracusa. About five kilometres in length, the peninsula’s defences were of strategic importance, protecting to the north the approach to the vital port facilities of Siracusa and to the south the beaches where an army might land. For these raids, the elements of the Commando Brigade came directly under the command of the respective corps commander – in the case of Mayne’s squadron, under Gen Dempsey, XIII Corps.
The Special Raiding Squadron boarded two ships: Nos 1 and 2 Troops and Squadron HQ HMS Ulster Monarch, No. 3 Troop and the mortar detachment, HMT Dunera. They docked at Port Said on 1 July. On 3 July, Mayne ordered a short route march, which lasted about five hours. Next day a church service took place on board Ulster Monarch conducted by Capt Lunt; the following day the unit sailed for the open sea.24 They came within sight of Sicily at about 1930 hr on 9 July. The Squadron’s objective was to capture and destroy the coastal defence battery at Capo Murro di Porco at the south-east of the peninsula: ‘Subsequent action at discretion of OC Squadron’.25 There were thus two components in Mayne’s orders: the first was the capture and destruction of the battery; the second empowered Mayne to take what further action he felt could be achieved in the circumstances. Gen Dempsey had phrased his order in the light of having seen the unit in training. He was impressed by what he saw and realised that even more might be achieved by empowering its commander. The objective was situated closest to the strategically important port of Siracusa, and there were known to be other coastal batteries on the peninsula.
Mayne had divided the squadron into three troops each composed of four officers and roughly seventy other ranks. In addition to Squadron HQ, he had a 3-inch mortar detachment of an officer and twenty-eight other ranks. As the night of 9 July wore on, however, the weather conditions changed abruptly for the worse as strong winds arose. Their effects on the air armada were grievous: a number of the gliders crashed into the sea; others were scattered. But then, as the invasion fleet closed to the beaches, as suddenly the winds abated. Nonetheless, there was a heavy swell running at 0030 hr on 10 July as the squadron prepared to disembark in the landing craft. Overhead, more clearly heard now, came the drone of aircraft towing gliders. From this point on, the squadron’s training had been designed to prepare them, but, even so, in the heavy swell the conditions were unpleasant. Nine landing craft cast off, six from Ulster Monarch and three from Dunera, and wallowed their grim way towards the beach. At between 0315 and 0330 hr, the squadron touched down on the right beach. Their landing was unopposed.
Well rehearsed, they quickly cleared the beach and began to scale the cliff. At the top, they rapidly formed into their troops and located the objective. A technique had developed in the Commandos for the assault on a battery involving first illuminating the target by flare and pouring in small arms and mortar fire, followed by a period of darkness and silence as the unit crept in closer for the final attack.26 Mayne did not do it that way. He immediately ordered the mortar detachment to engage the coastal defence battery and it succeeded in scoring hits and starting fires. Mayne then directed a converging assault on the battery, No. 1 Troop attacking in a northerly direction and No. 2 Troop, first making a flanking movement, attacking it on a southerly bearing. At the same time, he deployed No. 3 Troop to attack the defended farm Damerio in order to prevent enemy reinforcements getting through to the battery. The attack was completely successful. Under concentrated fire the battery was captured at 0430 hr and destroyed half an hour later.27 It had taken the squadron one hour from running ashore to overrunning the battery. They had killed or wounded around fifty enemy soldiers, captured between fifty and sixty prisoners, destroyed four coastal defence guns, three light anti-aircraft guns, and several light and heavy machine-guns at no cost in casualties to themselves. After the attack on the battery, they made contact with several 1st Airborne Division personnel, including Brig Hicks. The next move was for Mayne to decide.
He did not hesitate. Another coastal defence battery three kilometres to the north-west had opened fire on the Allied fleet. Mayne ordered the squadron to assemble at the farm Damerio and from there, at 0600 hr, he advanced north-west. The peninsula’s defences included defended farms armed with machine-guns, a number of which lay in their path. The squadron overwhelmed each of these in turn. At one of them, Massa Alcona, they found some civilians, a few of whom were badly wounded, as well as airborne troops who had been captured earlier. As Mayne’s slightly archaic phrasing in his report put it, ‘[we] delivered several other prisoners of the enemy.’ They also flushed out a series of sniper posts that staggered the intervening farmland.28 However, as the squadron approached its next objective, Mayne realised that there was yet a third battery two kilometres north of the second. When they were deployed in position, Mayne again ordered Nos 1 and 2 Troops to make a two-pronged attack on the second battery. Both troops fought their way forward against strong opposition, this time taking casualties, before No. 2 Troop captured the position. Maintaining the momentum, Mayne then ordered No. 1 Troop forward to the north to make the primary attack on the third battery. The speed and intensity of its assault quickly broke the defenders’ resistance. The squadron’s tally for the second and third batteries stood at six heavy anti-aircraft guns, two light anti-aircraft guns, three coastal defence guns, mortars and machine-guns. In addition, the Battery Commander and his personnel had been captured. Meanwhile, the Mortar Detachment engaged a fourth battery, which was situated one kilometre south-west of the third, scoring direct hits, setting it alight and blowing up an ammunition magazine.
Such was the speed and depth of penetration the squadron had achieved – five kilometres – having traversed almost the whole length of the peninsula, that Mayne had now to guard against having his line of withdrawal compromised in the event of an enemy counter-attack against the invading army. The squadron had landed to the right of 5th Division, which was to thrust north-east towards Siracusa. Mayne therefore wheeled the squadron round on a bearing to the south-west. Exhausted, the unit gathered at the farm Alcona, ate their forty-eight-hour rations and rested. At about 1600 hr, Mayne moved them out and advanced towards the main road where he intended linking up with 5th Division. On the way, however, were several defended farms. These they stormed, and they also mopped up some snipers, before making contact with 5 Division and resting for the night. Next day, 11 July, Mayne moved the squadron up to some defended farms, which they occupied, taking about fifty more prisoners. The following day, 12 July, the squadron was ordered to move to Siracusa and at 1200 hr it re-embarked on the Ulster Monarch.
Operation Husky was an impressive debut. At a cost of
one killed, Geoff Caton, and two wounded, the squadron had, in a matter of fifty-seven hours, captured and destroyed three coastal batteries and partially destroyed a fourth, taken a large number of prisoners and killed or wounded an estimated two hundred of the enemy. And this was a type of warfare very different from the stealth attacks by night on desert airfields at which Mayne had so excelled. Mayne’s Commando background had served him well and he showed the grasp of tactics, flexibility in the situation and flair for swift assault that he had first demonstrated as a troop commander at the Litani river action. More than that, however, he had proved that he was a leader of men – not only small groups, but a battalion, a Commando. Yet his leadership was not only charismatic; he was a thoughtful commander. The assault on the first battery showed the extent of careful planning; his inordinate emphasis on training had paid off handsomely.
Brig Laycock and Gen Dempsey both wrote about that first raid by the Special Raiding Squadron. Laycock’s 500-word appreciation was very detailed. In his report to Gen Sturgess of Combined Operations HQ, he alluded to Mayne’s Commando credentials – ‘The Commander (Major Mayne DSO ex 11 Cdo)’ – and he expressed his evaluation of the operation by letting the results speak for themselves.29 In contrast, Gen Dempsey’s assessment of the operation at Capo Murro di Porco, which is taken from a longer address, was brief and concise: ‘That was a brilliant operation, brilliantly planned and brilliantly carried out.’30
Immediately following it, however, there was to be little time for rest and refitting and none for planning the next raid, which had to be carried out that same day. An enemy counter-attack on the left flank had been repulsed and Gen Dempsey saw an opportunity to take the town and port of Augusta in his drive north-east towards Catania and its group of important airfields. Augusta was situated in the northern part of the bay of Augusta; its port facilities would augment those of the key objective, Siracusa, which was now in Allied hands. However, Dempsey was all too aware that a raid to seize the town of Augusta had not been planned, but he judged that a well-trained unit supported by naval gunfire could do it. So that afternoon, on board Ulster Monarch, Mayne was summoned to conference.
The squadron’s strength for the raid amounted to 285 all ranks. Mayne’s orders were to capture and hold the town. Yet there was no time for detailed planning for this operation: all they could do was rearm. But there were assumptions Mayne could make about the calibre of his men and the quality of their training. Again Ulster Monarch steamed towards the enemy coast and manoeuvred into position to lower the landing craft two miles east of the town at 1930 hours. But an old bogey of Combined Operations raids reappeared: it was still broad daylight and the Navy advised against proceeding until dark.31 Mayne recalled a similar experience two years earlier at the Litani operation in Syria. Then, responsibility for components of the operation had been distributed among the services; now there was a more unified command and responsibility was his. And he was in no doubt that they lay off the right beach; this could not be guaranteed if they returned under cover of darkness. His decision was to go. The flotilla of nine landing craft made directly for the shore on the northern peninsula to the east of the town and immediately came under heavy machine-gun fire from that northern peninsula and from a coastal defence battery to the west. However, this was counteracted by landing-craft machine-gun and gun fire from Ulster Monarch and the Navy support ships.32 In the face of heavy fire from the inner perimeter defences, the assault craft touched down and Mayne took the lead, forcing the pace. A fierce battle followed, the raiders fighting their way forward until they were inside the outer perimeter. It had been the first daylight amphibious landing of the campaign and this part of it was carried out very successfully.
The enemy had not expected a seaborne assault on the town at this juncture: the northerly thrust of the right flank of the Allied army presented the main threat. Consequently, when the raiders penetrated the peninsula’s defences, they found that the town was only lightly defended. There was some opposition from snipers, but the squadron soon captured the town. Mayne, however, had now to hold the prize, and he wanted to ascertain the enemy’s strength and its preparedness to launch a counter-attack. He ordered No. 3 Troop to move up towards an enemy strongpoint to the north-west, in the area of the railway. As both sections of No. 3 Troop moved up, taking an oblique approach, they came under fire from a battery which was situated further west. One section took up a position north-west of the other and both sent out probing patrols. At this the enemy opened up with heavy machine-gun and 4-inch mortars. These in turn were engaged by the squadron’s mortar detachment. But the patrols spotted that the enemy had three light tanks in attendance. Having found out what they needed to know, the troop withdrew.
Mayne reviewed the situation. Some have claimed that he was heedless of risk. This is not so; had it been, he would not have won his men’s trust. He weighed up risk judiciously. Successful as before, the squadron was variously: unable to make radio contact with the warships – most of the radio sets were out of action as a result of landing conditions, and the smaller sets lacked sufficient range; running short of ammunition of all kinds; up against an enemy with armoured firing vehicles; and unaware of 17 Brigade’s position. Mayne therefore reasoned:
This being so it was obvious that any offensive action on our part would have been unduly risky, without there being any definitive objective of value to secure and in view of the impossibility to hold any new gains against enemy counter-attacks.33
Consequently, Mayne decided that the squadron should establish a defensive position on the outskirts of the town behind two bridges which led to it. There they prepared for whatever the night might bring. Slowly the hours of darkness dragged by. The enemy, however, did not attempt a counter-attack, nor did it send out patrols that night. And in the early morning, elements of 17 Brigade made contact with the squadron.
This second operation in Sicily, like the first, had been very successful; and the assault on the town had been carried out in daylight. The cost to the unit in casualties amounted to two killed, Cpl Bently and L/Cpl Shaw, and eight wounded. Recognition for the squadron’s actions in both raids came in two stages. On 20 August, Mayne noted that immediate awards had been announced of ‘a Bar to [the] DSO.’ The citation specified that it was for both operations:
In both operations it was Major Mayne’s courage, determination and superb leadership which proved the key to success. He personally led the men from the landing craft, in the face of heavy machine-gun fire, and in the case of Augusta raid – mortar fire. By this action he succeeded in forcing his way to ground, where it was possible to form up and sum up enemy defences.
Wiseman received the MC, five other ranks the MM – Frame, Dalziel, Jones, Noble, Skinner – and Sillito a bar to the MM he had won for his march in the Sand Sea the year before.34 Then on 21 September Mayne wrote that awards had been announced for Murro di Porco. The MC went to Maj Poat and MM to Sgt Seekings.
Further raids in support of the 8th Army’s drive north to Catania seemed imminent. According to Saunders, who had been Recorder on Mountbatten’s staff at Combined Operations HQ, Laycock had been busy with plans for a raid north of Catania which was to have involved Royal Marine Commandos and the Special Raiding Squadron. The project had got to the stage of troops embarked on landing craft in Augusta harbour. Indeed, according to Saunders, there was a German air attack while they were in Augusta harbour which caused some casualties.35 This may have been on 17 July when the unit sailed into Augusta harbour. But whenever it was, Mayne did not rate the incident or the intention worthy of mention in the war diary. The raid was called off: Laycock had been ordered to hold the Commando Brigade in readiness for the invasion of Italy.36 In his account of the SAS in the Second World War, Kemp refers to plans for a raid north of Catania and suggests that its cancellation reawakened old resentments of cancelled raids during Layforce days.37 However, this is unlikely. In Operation Husky, the Special Raiding Squadron was used in a manner co
nsistent with an understanding of its potential – as Gen Dempsey would make clear to the squadron later. Capo Murro di Porco had been judiciously chosen as the site for the first raid, but thereafter they would be used as the front progressed and the situation merited. Such had been the case at Augusta and, it seems, would have been the case at Catania. However, what had brought about the cancellation of the intended raid was a change of tactic on the part of the 8th Army. In its drive north to Catania, it had encountered very strong enemy resistance; the advance slowed; and it was finally checked. To break the impasse, Montgomery changed the direction of his thrust and swung to the left round Mount Etna. Here there was no role for seaborne raiders.
Leadership of the unit revealed another quality in Mayne – a quality not readily associated with the offensive spirit, and one which few beyond his family and the mother of his friend Eoin McGonigal divined – for which growing evidence was to accumulate from this period and over the years: the extent of his sensitivity to the death of those for whom he was responsible. He had lost three men in the operations at Capo Murro Di Porco and Augusta. But he was a man who was not given to expressing his feelings. Shortly after those two operations, in a letter to his family written in July, he referred to the death of Geoff Caton who had been killed in the assault on the second battery at Capo Murro di Porco: ‘and he, poor chap, had been with me right since the time we started as a Commando in Galashiels. I was very fond of him.’38 Certainly, Pleydell had been aware in the desert war of the great care Mayne took of his men, and clearly they themselves had been aware of it because he had early on won their trust. But nothing was known of his feelings about their loss. However, the following year, when the unit’s first padre, Fraser McLuskey, was appointed, he deduced that this was a burden Mayne carried.