Paddy Mayne

by Hamish Ross

  On 17 July, the unit next moved into camp in the area of Augusta. Lt Col Lumsden of No. 41 (Royal Marine) Commando loaned them two other ranks and two trucks. This was to be the first of a series of moves, as the unit was to be held close to the front in anticipation of further operations in support of the 8th Army. After a second move two days later, training began again in earnest. Each day, unless there was another move to a new camp, the unit trained. The basic foundation was physical training and cliff work.

  With the arrival in late July of No. 2 Commando in Sicily, Brig Laycock saw an opportunity to operate two Special Service Brigades. He himself intended to carry out operations with Nos 2 Commando and 41 (Royal Marine) Commando on the west coast of Italy, and he wanted Lt Col Durnford-Slater of No. 3 Commando appointed to command a brigade consisting of Nos 3 Commando, 40 (Royal Marine) Commando and the Special Raiding Squadron. This arrangement was duly confirmed by Gen Dempsey.39 Durnford-Slater thought that he had a strong force. He described the Special Raiding Squadron as composed of veterans of the desert war under the command of Paddy Mayne, who had been an Irish rugby international and ‘had been with the Commandos in the early days.’40

  One pattern of working adopted by the Special Service Brigade and XIII Corps was that ideas for a projected raid be first developed by the brigade and then submitted to XIII Corps for approval. But another method was the corps commander meeting, in the first instance, with the officers commanding the individual units to discuss possible raids. Final approval for a planned operation depended on a number of factors – not least of which was whether the Army could reach the raiders in time to take over from them. However, not all the proposed raids were of the nature of holding a position until relieved by the advancing army.

  For example, a hit-and-run raid was discussed with Mayne. On 5 August, to the west of the town of Augusta, a rehearsal took place, attended by Brian Franks, Brigade Major of the Special Service Brigade. The raid was mooted for the night of 6/7 August.41 In the west of the island, the US 7th Army had continued its thrust and had reached Palermo; the encircling movement on the east flank began to have results and the enemy started withdrawing north. The opportunity that had presented itself was to support the 8th Army’s push up the coast by demolishing a road over the railway at Capo d’Alì, blocking both road and rail communications and hampering the enemy’s retreat. The code name given to the operation was ‘Walrus’ and Mayne was briefed for it on 6 August. The plan was for Nos 2 and 3 Troops plus the mortar detachment to land by LCI (Landing Craft Infantry), which would remain beached during the operation, for the raid was envisaged to last between an hour and an hour and a half. One officer and three other ranks of the Royal Engineers were attached to the squadron for the raid. On 5 August, the acting brigadier of the Special Service Brigade attended a conference with Gen Dempsey, who agreed the plan provided the Army Commander sanctioned it. However, the same day, at 1430 hr, the decision was taken to cancel.

  On 17 August, Mayne, along with Maj Young, who was acting commanding officer of No. 3 Commando in Durnford-Slater’s absence, was called to a meeting with Gen Dempsey to discuss possible operations.42 None was imminent and Mayne saw an opportunity for widening the range of training activities. He was determined that all members of the unit should maintain a high level of fitness for the next operation. This was to be achieved through constant training. It could not be otherwise for the unit was relocated as the 8th Army and the front moved northwards. The day after his meeting with Gen Dempsey, Mayne sent No. 1 Troop to climb Mount Etna. It departed at 1000 hr and returned two days later. When a projected move east of Palermo was cancelled on 21 August, he sent No. 2 Troop to climb Etna the following day. Constant, demanding training produced injuries, and a steady trickle of men, in ones and twos, being admitted to or discharged from hospital was part of daily administrative routine from mid-July until the end of August.

  In the early days of training, before the squadron moved into the theatre of operations, while Mayne was still building up the kind of unit he wanted, he returned to unit any who were not up to the level of physical fitness that he required. It was a hard policy, but it had to be if the unit was to perform as he thought it should. Then there came a point when the required level was achieved. However, another powerful factor was also at work: Mayne demanded a very high standard of discipline. In this he was utterly uncompromising: he returned to unit anyone who breached it and he maintained this stance throughout. For example, on 2 July when they were in Port Said, just three days before leaving for Sicily, Mayne had a sergeant sent ashore under escort to be placed under close arrest and subsequently returned to his unit. Then, after the two operations in Sicily, he returned to unit for disciplinary reasons three other ranks during the first week of August and seven more for the same reason nine days later. The Army Commandos, composed as they were of volunteers, also had a ‘return to unit’ policy. However, by 1943 they were finding difficulty in implementing it because they were very short of men. Because a balance of some kind had to be drawn, the Commando Commanding Officers’ Conference (of those Commandos still in the UK) chaired by Lord Lovat discussed the problem on 21 July 1943. Lord Lovat declared that those who merited the RTU chit be given menial tasks – a punishment by which they could make amends.43 That was not the way of it in the Special Raiding Squadron.

  As resistance in Sicily crumbled and the German Army skilfully withdrew across the straits of Messina, the squadron made the first of a series of preliminary moves to Capo Sant’ Alessio, from where it would be launched on its first raid on the mainland of Italy. The code name for the landings in Calabria was Operation Baytown. The Special Raiding Squadron’s role was to land ahead of the other units. Its objective was to capture, occupy and hold the ancient coastal town of Bagnara Calabra in support of the advancing 8th Army, which would push northward from Reggio. Mayne had a reduced complement – 243 all ranks for the raid. The plan was to land them from one LCI and five LCAs (Landing Craft Assault). On 1 September, two days before the 8th Army crossed the straits of Messina, the unit moved; it would be an inauspicious beginning. They were to proceed first to Riposto and then to Alessio in two LCIs. The LCI could carry almost 200 fully armed men; the LCA around thirty-five men equipped for battle. The squadron embarked at Catania on two LCIs, 179 and 274, at 1400 hr on 1 September. They sailed to Riposto and disembarked four hours later without incident. However, next day only LCI 274 was able to sail: its retaining cable had snagged the propeller of LCI 179. It was the following day before the cable was freed and the two LCIs got underway to join the flotilla. The squadron was again composed of three troops plus mortar detachment and HQ. The final reallocation into the LCI and LCAs had to be carried out on the evening of 3 September, and then the fun really began: for two hours the squadron played musical landing craft, men shuttling rapidly from one to another. Part of the squadron on 274 embarked on 179 (the remainder were to be transferred to six LCAs), but after that was accomplished LCI 179 was unable to get off the beach,44 so the group had to re-embark in 274. However, it, too, was unable to move and so they again boarded 179, which, in the meantime, had got off the beach. Over two hours late, the Squadron got underway for the assault, but only five LCAs accompanied the LCI: the sixth had broken down in Alessio. The final ignominy for the senior service was when one of the five LCAs broke down at sea. Its fighting occupants had to transfer to the LCI, but the remainder of the flotilla sailed on.

  Their objective, Bagnara Calabra, was a well-known resort before the war, but in medieval times it had been a town of strategic importance. The land rises steeply from the coast and the town is situated high above the beach. Some of its approach roads are tunnelled through rock. At 0445 hr on 4 September – two and a half hours late – only a little over half of the Squadron touched down in four LCAs on Bagnara Calabra’s northern beach. Their landing was unopposed. Quickly they occupied the beach and the road. Thirty minutes later, the LCI beached with the remainder of the raiders. Mayne pos
itioned No. 3 Troop at the town’s northern extremity; No. 1 Troop in a valley to the east; and No. 2 Troop, the mortar detachment and HQ in a small settlement near the beach. Then he moved No. 1 Troop’s A Section up to the town where it located an enemy position on the main road in the lower town. With the element of surprise on their side, they set up the Bren gun and fired a series of short bursts into the enemy position, allowing the remainder of the section to overrun it. Taken by surprise, five Germans were wounded and twenty-eight were captured. The section also netted three Spandau machine-guns.

  Meanwhile, Mayne moved B and C Sections of No. 1 Troop up from the valley. The enemy was now alerted; and from higher ground to the east, which provided good cover, opened heavy fire with machine-guns and mortars on both Sections. Two of the squadron were killed and several were wounded. While C Section remained in position and gave covering fire, B Section was able to move further to the south-east.

  From the beach area, Mayne brought No. 2 Troop south and into the town. They got as far as the main road and reached the bridge, which the enemy had earlier demolished, before they were fired on from long range. They spotted enemy soldiers in the lower town and opened fire, killing two Germans by the clock tower. Then A Section took up position while B Section pushed on before being pinned down by machine-gun and sniper fire. They were unable to move until darkness fell, but C Section was able to advance further uphill and take up position. Mayne consolidated by moving No. 3 Troop through the town to adopt a covering position on its southern boundary to the west. The troop located an enemy post by the road and returned fire after coming under mortar attack. Suffering casualties, the enemy troops retreated to a point where the road entered a tunnel, thereby losing the use of their mortar. In this engagement, ten Germans were killed and five wounded. Thus far, the enemy soldiers they had encountered were Germans, not Italians.

  At noon, Mayne reviewed the situation. The objective was secured. Squadron HQ was set up in the town; slightly west of it was the mortar detachment, and A Section of No. 1 Troop was also in the town guarding prisoners. No. 1 Troop’s B Section was in a position furthest to the north-east; C Section was further back, to the east of HQ and on a northern line with the mortars. No. 2 Troop’s three sections were to the east and south of the town, and No. 3 Troop’s A and B Sections were in a position to the south-west. But there were problems communicating by radio. Radio communication with XIII Corps was carried out through a two-stage process: Squadron HQ radioed to an LCI which lay some way offshore; the LCI then relayed the signal to XIII Corps. The arrangement had been that the squadron provided its own personnel and radio sets for communicating with the LCI. However, in the fiasco of changing landing craft that the squadron was caught up in, the 48 set was left on the craft. Nonetheless, the town was theirs and they were prepared for the enemy to counter-attack. While they were so positioned, advance elements of the Yorks and Lancs Regiment of 15 Infantry Brigade made contact with the squadron.

  The anticipated counter-attack did not come, however, and for the next few hours all was quiet. As darkness approached, Mayne’s only changes to their midday positions were to withdraw No. 2 Troop’s B Section from its easterly position to join A Section; to move No. 3 Troop’s B Section to a more southerly position; and to encamp HQ in a large house slightly closer to the mortar detachment’s position. Night fell but there was still no enemy activity.

  Day began with the squadron taking the offensive. At 0700 hr, the mortar detachment opened up with great accuracy on the same positions that they had targeted the day before, silencing machine-guns and scoring hits on the road and a bridge. Enemy movement was then detected by B Section of No. 1 Troop, which was at the south-eastern edge of the town: an Italian patrol was making its way along the main road. When the patrol reached a range of six hundred yards, the section opened fire, killing two of the enemy. Shortly after this, Mayne received orders that the squadron was to leave its positions and embark at Favazzina. However, an hour earlier Mayne had ordered C Section of No. 2 Troop to carry out an extended patrol of the western ridge of the escarpment to the east. The section passed through a small village and on the way came in contact with the advance elements of the Green Howards, who were part of 15 Infantry Brigade. On their return following the main road, the section captured four Italians at Pellegrino and rejoined Squadron HQ in the afternoon. Along with B Section of No. 1 Troop and Squadron HQ, the section then spent the night in Bagnara. An additional piece of information, which the war diary does not record, is contained in the unit’s chronicle and refers to an endeavour by Mayne’s batman, Cpl Corps. ‘On the night of September 5 Corporal Corps carried out a demolition scheme on the post office but failed to open the safe.’45

  Mayne found it difficult to estimate the enemy’s strength. There was good cover, and enemy positions were well sited: around fifty per cent of the squadron’s casualties were caused by accurate mortar fire; around thirty per cent of its casualties came about from machine-gun fire and another twenty per cent from sniper fire.46 Most of their opponents were German. They were generally of good physique and they were experienced troops – some had fought in Africa and some on the eastern front – drawn from Grenadier and Jaeger regiments. But the prisoners who were questioned acknowledged that the unit’s landing had taken them by surprise. Mayne caustically recorded that if the landing had taken place at 0200 hr as intended, the unit’s casualties could have been fewer. Overall, however, the unit’s total casualties amounted to twenty-two while the enemy casualties were eighty-two all ranks, German and Italian.

  It was the squadron’s third seaborne operation – again characterised by its highly effective performance. Mayne, in his report, only acknowledged its good shooting: there had been many ‘spectacular results’, he reported. However, there were also lessons to be learned. The first was something the Royal Navy had to take to heart. Mayne indicted the naval officer in charge of the landing, who appeared to have little experience of navigation far less night raiding.47 But what the unit had to take to heart for the future concerned radio communications. There were three factors that made up an inadequate situation: bad batteries, weakness of the 38 sets in hilly terrain, and the loss of the 48 set, which had been left on the LCI. Two of these factors had to be addressed by better training and more resources for the signallers.

  Gen Dempsey had been encouraged by the success of the raid. His idea had been to land units of the brigade ahead of the advancing 8th Army and speed the rate of its advance. Dempsey believed that the enemy was able to slow the Army’s advance because there was only one coastal road, which could be defended at strong points. However, if a raid took place behind those positions, the enemy, Dempsey postulated, would tend to withdraw. The raid on Bagnara Calabra had confirmed his view.48

  Apart from directing training for the next operation, around this time Mayne began a personal administrative file, which he simply referred to as a ‘Personal File’ and in which he assembled file copies of some official correspondence, first drafts of letters he was going to send and letters he received. He was in an anomalous position: a major commanding a unit smaller than a battalion, responsible to the brigade commander of the Special Service Brigade and the Officer Commanding XIII Corps. Having made himself aware of the relevant parts of the regulations, on 22 September he wrote to the 8th Army claiming the criteria for command pay. In due course this was passed to Allied Force Headquarters, who responded on 13 October 1943 (reference G1/B/3064/30/A3), with a copy to Mayne confirming that,

  Authority is given for the grant of command pay at the rate of 3/- a day to the above-named officer, w.e.f. 25 Jul 43, provided that

  a) he is not serving under the command of a Lt-Col., and that he exercises the powers of a commanding officer under King’s Regulations 1940 para 590; and

  b) that the total strength of the Special Raiding Squadron exceeds 250 all ranks.49

  So in refusing to agree to a renaming of the unit as a Commando, Mayne was certainly not motivated
by self-interest or the advancement of his own military career. If he accepted the idea and the unit became a Commando, he could anticipate the benefits of its structure: an increased complement to bring it up to full Commando strength, and a Lt Colonelcy. On the other hand, if he held out, he could not assume that there would even be a future for the unit. Yet hold out he did. So while the squadron was brigaded with the Commandos, the recorder on Mountbatten’s staff at Combined Operations HQ scrupulously distinguished it as, ‘Not in itself a Commando but including many who had served in their ranks.’50

  As the 8th Army consolidated its hold on Calabria, moving east and slowly north, it began the long march through the Italian peninsula, impeded by blown bridges and mined roads. Then on 9 September the Allied landing, under American command, took place at Salerno. From sea to sea, the Allied armies advanced. The Allies realised that on the Adriatic coast, the River Biferno, which meets the sea south of Termoli, would make a good defensive position, where the retreating German Army could make a stand. If, however, the enemy could be outflanked by a landing on the coast north of the river, it could greatly accelerate the 8th Army’s progress up the east of the country. And the idea took shape as Operation Devon. The chosen site for a seaborne assault was Termoli; all three units of the brigade would take part: Nos 3 Commando, 40 (Royal Marine) Commando and the Special Raiding Squadron. The plan was that No. 3 Commando would establish a beachhead, then No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando and the Special Raiding Squadron would land and pass through No. 3 Commando to their allotted tasks: No. 40 to take the town and harbour, the SRS to move inland and seize road bridges.