Paddy Mayne

by Hamish Ross

  On 26 September the squadron, whose strength for the operation was 207 all ranks, embarked on the by-now-familiar LCI 179 for Bari. It put into Taranto the following day, where it remained overnight, then sailed to Brindisi, repeating the pattern, and arrived at Bari at 1130 hr on 29 September. There Mayne received new orders and the squadron left an hour and a half later for Manfredonia, where it arrived six hours later. The squadron rested in Manfredonia all day on 30 September and on the LCI on 1 October. It sailed the following day at 1200 hr to begin its part in Operation Devon. Hours before it sailed, however, Mayne unflinchingly returned a man to his unit.

  With only the slight phosphorescence of their bow waves in the darkness, the Special Raiding Squadron on LCI 179 lay off the landing beach, slightly to the west of the town, in the early hours of 3 October. First to go in was No. 3 Commando to establish a bridgehead. Brigade Commander Durnford-Slater and his HQ went with his old Commando. He later described the moment: ‘The night was dead still. This, the moment before a seaborne attack, with the enemy coastline looming up in the night, was the supreme thrill for me.’51 Naval navigation had been very accurate. No. 3 Commando landed on the right beach and quickly established the bridgehead. Again, the enemy had been taken by surprise. At 0245 hr, the Special Raiding Squadron was signalled in. Coordination between the Navy and the Special Service Brigade was said to rest on a clear understanding between the Acting Brigadier and the naval officer52 in charge of the landing, and contingencies, it would appear, were anticipated. About fifty yards out from the shore, LCI 179 grounded, so the squadron quickly transferred to LCAs and landed fifteen minutes later. They advanced as a squadron over the railway and through No. 3 Commando ranks.

  Mayne’s approach to the task had to be different from the fairly deep penetration into enemy-held territory he had carried out at Capo Murro di Porco. Then, he had had to capture and destroy coastal batteries, and he had kept the three troops in close proximity for maximum impact on each target; now he had to capture and hold positions, and his two primary objectives were about five kilometres apart. The terrain was hilly with numerous valleys. There was also a network of roads, and the main railway artery followed the coastline, crossing the Biferno river about two kilometres inland; there was also a single-track line running south from Termoli to Larino to Campobasso. Good radio communications were essential, for the unit’s movements had to be coordinated, not only internally but also with the artillery of 78 Brigade, who were advancing north. However, Mayne had experienced troop commanders and a well-trained unit. The squadron crossed the Termoli to Vasto road running to the north-west. Mayne then ordered a three-pronged advance, with No. 3 Troop, the middle prong, in the lead, No. 1 Troop behind, but slightly north – both taking the same line of advance across country, south-east in the direction of the Termoli to Campomarino road – with No. 2 Troop on the west flank, closest to No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando’s positions.

  At around 0530 hr, the squadron made contact with the enemy. Both sections of No. 3 Troop (it had continued to operate as a troop with two sections) were less than a kilometre apart, with A Section to the west. B Section, commanded by Lt Tonkin, struck Highway 16, the Termoli to Campomarino road, and advanced to a bridge from which they spotted three Germans in a valley. Efficiently, they moved in and captured the three. However, a larger group of the enemy appeared and engaged the section. During the encounter, the enemy group succeeded in ambushing and capturing the section’s sniper. Then they withdrew. But these enemy forces were parachute troops experienced in combat. They re-formed and, under cover, began an encircling movement. As this was happening, the section observed a convoy of five enemy trucks carrying troops approaching along the road. Quickly they set an ambush. And with their 2-inch mortar they succeeded in setting one of the trucks on fire. The occupants of three of the trucks tumbled out and made off across country to the west. But by this time the enemy parachute troops had completed their manoeuvre and surrounded the section. John Tonkin saw that there was no alternative but to surrender. He and most of B Section were taken prisoner. However, six of them escaped into the valley, taking with them the three enemy prisoners they had captured earlier. In the whole engagement, B Section had killed three of the enemy and wounded four.

  Less than a kilometre away, their comrades in A Section heard the firing from the encounter, veered east, advancing along the line of the valley, and came in contact with a fresh body of enemy troops (not those who had captured their comrades) at some farm buildings. A fierce battle followed before the section overwhelmed the defenders. In the fighting, Bob Melot, by now a captain, was wounded. Continuing its line of advance towards B Section’s position, the section’s scouts came across some more enemy soldiers and fired on them, killing one and wounding one. By this stage, they had taken nine prisoners, killed five and wounded four enemy troops at the cost of an officer and another rank wounded. At about 0800 hr, A Section reached the bridge, the site of B Section’s fight and capture, and found their comrades’ equipment. It was here too that they re-established contact with the advance elements of No. 1 Troop.

  Already, it too had been in contact with the enemy. Having to make the deepest penetration to reach its objective – the southernmost bridge – No. 1 Troop advanced as a troop as opposed to separate sections. Striking the Termoli to Campomarino road, they pushed on in the direction of Campomarino until at a bend in the road they successfully ambushed an enemy track vehicle armed with a short-barrelled 10.5-cm gun, which Mayne thought may have been a close-support howitzer. The firing alerted enemy troops in position at some nearby farm buildings, and they gave battle. Within minutes, however, the concentrated firepower of No. 1 Troop began to tell and some of the occupants of one of the buildings surrendered, though their comrades did not – they withdrew to another building some little distance away. The next move took both the squadron and the enemy in the second building by surprise: the first house became the target of a mortar attack, but not by the squadron’s mortars. Mayne thought that it may have been from No. 3 Commando’s positions on the southern perimeter of Termoli, or from an enemy mortar section who in turn were later engaged by Squadron HQ to the west of No. 1 Troop. The enemy in the second farm building contested strongly until about 0700 hr. It was only when they were flanked by two of the troop’s sections that they surrendered. The bare statistics of the encounter left fourteen of the enemy prisoners of war and ten dead against one man in No. 1 Troop wounded. Proceeding on its advance, the troop moved out, C Section patrolling forward, and made contact with No. 3 Troop’s A Section, who were already positioned at the bridge where B Section had fought.

  Furthest west, No. 2 Troop provided cover. Mayne ordered A Section to secure high ground almost three kilometres to the east of a position No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando was to hold. And he ordered B Section to take a position on rising ground further back and to the east of a road junction, and C Section to advance southward with the mortar detachment. At 0615 hr, as they moved forward, the section and mortar detachment were fired on from some farm buildings about a kilometre south of A Section’s position. They responded with small-arms fire and mortar, forcing the occupants to surrender. Withdrawing with their nine prisoners, C Section then took up a position on high ground slightly to the west of the same buildings.

  Six hours after landing, Mayne reviewed progress. Both No. 1 Troop and A Section of No. 3 Troop were poised to make separate lines of advance on their respective objectives. His No. 2 Troop was deployed further west, its three sections dispersed: A Section on high ground it had occupied for the previous three hours; B Section on the western perimeter of the movement forward but to the east of a road junction; C Section furthest forward covering the mortar detachment. The loss of almost one half of a troop which was to take one of the twin objectives was a blow. But he could not safely switch one of No. 2 Troop’s sections, for it was from the west that the most substantial threat lay. However, he ordered A Section of No. 3 Troop to move south-east towar
ds the easterly objective, the bridge on Highway 16, the Termoli to Campomarino road, and he moved his HQ party closer to it to provide support. Unchallenged, the section made good progress and two hours later contacted advance elements of the 8th Army’s 11 Infantry Brigade at a road and rail bridge about two kilometres short of its objective. Here it was ordered to take up position and remain. At the same time as No. 3 Troop’s A Section moved off, Mayne directed No. 1 Troop to the more southerly of the two objectives. Advancing along Highway 87, the Termoli to Larino road, it reached a railway station a kilometre north of its objective. It was discovered that their objective, the bridge, had been blown up and the enemy had withdrawn. So the troop deployed and took up a defensive position.

  Earlier, Squadron HQ had moved to the east of the three troops and engaged a group of about forty Germans armed with mortars in a gully at a bend in the road. One group of the enemy attempted to surrender but was fired on by the remainder. Then the enemy withdrew up the gully unwittingly moving within range of No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando’s activities. The Commando made rapid movement forward, capturing the whole party. By late morning, Mayne had moved his HQ south-east, close in with No. 1 Troop’s advance, and taken up position at a road junction.

  For the next two hours there was no contact with the enemy. But that did not mean there was no enemy movement. Provided they kept off the roads, small groups, making use of the terrain, were able to move westward or north to regroup. No. 2 Troop’s A Section, on high ground, observed enemy movement to the south. About 200 of the enemy, along with tracked vehicles, were on the move. However, the enemy’s movement was also spotted by a troop of No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando, operating to the west of the squadron. The Commando opened up with its mortars and knocked out one of the tracked vehicles. This attack was followed up by the squadron’s A Section of No. 2 Troop sending forward a patrol. They found that the enemy had left one of their number who had been wounded, but they had also left with him a member of the squadron: the sniper who had been captured from John Tonkin’s section seven hours earlier. After the Commando’s intervention with mortar fire, the most westerly of the Squadron’s Sections, B Section of No. 2 Troop, moved south-west and contacted the Commando. They then patrolled towards San Giacomo. However, they were radioed to return, as San Giacomo was about to be shelled by 78th Division’s artillery. They moved east to a position between two to three kilometres south-west of Termoli and remained there until they moved back into the town the following morning. In the meantime, C Section had advanced west and observed the enemy digging in on a ridge about eight hundred yards west of San Giacomo. Then, swinging south-east to the edge of a wood, they spotted a German dispatch rider moving between pillboxes on the road to Guglionesi, north-west of No. 1 Troop’s position. There they remained observing enemy movement until finally ordered back to link up with A Section. On the way, they established contact with 11 Brigade, who had been advancing steadily north-west.

  From the radio reports of the troop sections’ commanders, Mayne had received enough indications to form some views on the enemy’s calibre and morale. First, the enemy had been taken completely by surprise: that was evident from its reactions in Termoli. Second, their opponents were experienced troops who, whenever contact was made, gave battle. However, at the sub-unit level something else was discernible: a reluctance to be isolated and trapped as two Allied armies moved up both coastlines of Italy. The psychology of their place and role in that country had undergone a profound change in the previous few days, for the Reich’s principal Axis partner in Europe had not only capitulated to the Allies, but joined them. And from the prisoners they had taken – other than officers – there was a readiness to give information about location of mines, enemy battalions and even their deployment. Third, the enemy troops who had captured B Section’s sniper earlier in the morning had moved westward about four kilometres. Doubtless, these small groups anticipated reforming as part of a counter-attack to the Allied thrust up the east coast. But there did not appear to be any coordinated opposition to the squadron’s penetration south.

  Nothing further happened during the early afternoon of that first day, and the squadron was relieved at 1630 hr by the Lancashire Fusiliers, 11 Brigade. The squadron had again effectively executed its tasks. No. 1 Troop was in position at a railway station on the Campobasso to Termoli road a kilometre from the destroyed bridge that had been one of the squadron’s two principal objectives at the outset. No. 3 Troop’s A Section held the high ground at a railway junction furthest east, its primary objective having been taken by the advance of 11 Brigade in the late morning: Mayne’s HQ was situated at a road junction between Nos 1 and 3 Troops, but closer to the depleted No. 3 Troop. No. 2 Troop’s A and C Sections had come together about a kilometre from the mortar detachment, and B Section was further west at a road junction.

  The brigade commander ordered the squadron and No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando back to Termoli to rest and refit. Although it was a risk – in that it left the western perimeter undermanned – he wanted those units to be fit in case they were needed.53 Weary, the squadron went into billets for the night. Mayne counted the cost of the day’s work: L/Cpl Fassam had been killed and buried by the road junction where Squadron HQ was set up in the afternoon; three were wounded and twenty-three missing, presumed captured. At the squadron’s hands, the enemy had suffered twenty-three killed, seventeen wounded and thirty-nine captured. A team of surgeons had accompanied the raiders; they took over Termoli hospital, and casualties were brought into the town and treated there rather than having to wait to be transported back to the rear of 78th Division.54 Mayne had some difficulty in persuading Bob Melot to go into hospital. The bullet had entered his chest and exited from his back. But, in much the same way that he had remonstrated with Pleydell against receiving medical care after being wounded in the Benghazi raid, so he resisted the idea of hospital treatment at Termoli.55

  A counter-attack was inevitable: the loss of the defensive line offered by the Biferno river was a serious setback for the German High Command. The questions pondered by the Allies were, when would it come and could the gains achieved by the landings be held. The following day, 4 October, began quietly enough, but the afternoon turned ominous: there was considerable sniping in the town. The brigade commander spoke by phone to the mayor of Guglionesi – although the phone lines from Termoli to the town ran through enemy-held territory, they had not been cut – who told him that German tanks were massing. There was little contribution that the Special Raiding Squadron could make in armour and artillery duels, but they were quickly deployed to prop up weaknesses in the front line. At 1730 hours on 4 October, Mayne was ordered to provide one troop from the squadron to hold a gap. He made up the equivalent of a troop from A and C Sections of No. 2 Troop and C Section of No. 1 Troop and placed them under Maj Poat. They left and took up position on the ridge east running from the beach along the line of an olive grove at Torrente Sinarca, which was one kilometre west of the original landing site.56 A group from 2 SAS under Roy Farran had been ordered to Termoli. It was the first time that elements of both SAS regiments had come together. Farran wrote, ‘It was good to see our own winged dagger flaunted on the sand-coloured berets of the SAS in the town.’57 That evening, Farran’s group were entertained to dinner by their comrades in 1 SAS.

  However, though the night brought no enemy activity, the elements were hostile: heavy rain had continued throughout the day and the rivers rose in spate. The German build-up was gradual and methodical. Their supply lines were unimpeded, while the Allies had to contend with blown bridges, and the pontoon bridges they had thrown across the river were being swept away by the rising water levels. And that night a German artillery observer, equipped with a radio, infiltrated the town and succeeded in setting up an observation post in the tower of a church – and bided his time.

  Next morning, 5 October, opened with an air attack on the town. Durnford-Slater sent a message to the Special Raiding Squadron and No.
40 (Royal Marine) Commando to stand to and be prepared to man a tight perimeter around the town.58 Enemy troops were spotted at 0900 hr near the railway on the west ridge and then a heavy artillery barrage began to fall on the town. The remainder of the squadron, which amounted to No. 3 Troop, B Section of No. 2 Troop and two Sections of No. 1 Troop, were summoned to take up positions facing south, defending the left flank. This movement had to be carried out swiftly using transport, which, of course, was a prime target for the unseen enemy artillery observer. And as one truck carrying personnel from No. 1 Troop had loaded up and was preparing to move out, the enemy artillery observer in the tower directed fire on its position. The truck received a direct hit, causing eighteen casualties and almost wiping out the remainder of No. 1 Troop.59 Not long afterwards, part of the Commando Brigade HQ was also hit by shellfire and again there were casualties. The brigade commander later reasoned that the enemy observer – whose presence they assumed, but whose location was unknown at the time – had pinpointed Brigade HQ by the mast of aerials protruding from its position.60

  Meanwhile, the SRS Troop holding positions further west, composed of sections of Nos 1 and 2 Troops under Maj Poat, was ordered to withdraw to a wood to bolster groups from a Reconnaissance regiment. Poat sent C Section of No. 2 Troop, who found that the regiment personnel were not only leaving the position, but abandoning their carriers and anti-tank guns. One interpretation put forward later for the Reconnaissance regiment’s actions was that they were inexperienced troops whose officers had been wounded.61 But, according to Durnford-Slater, there was a real problem with the support troops, who felt that they were being overwhelmed by a superior enemy; he had to threaten ‘many officers and men’ with shooting before they pulled themselves together.62

  The battle had now entered a critical point: the enemy had superior firepower, the lightly armed squadron and Commando having no adequate weapons against armour (although, in the early afternoon, one Bofors gun and six anti-tank guns were placed under Mayne’s command). Meanwhile, the detached portion of the squadron to the west of the town was also under tremendous pressure and at 1700 hr, C Section of No. 2 Troop closed back to A Section, who were still in their original position, and slowly both sections began to withdraw. But the movement was observed, the enemy concentrated fire on A Section’s position and pinned them down in a culvert about nine hundred yards east of a bridge. Movement was impossible; they had to stay in that position until dark. However, in Termoli it was about this time that No. 3 Commando spotted the enemy artillery observer in the church tower. Troops climbed the tower and called on the man to surrender, but his response was revolver fire. He was shot by Bren-gun fire as he scaled the roof.63