Pseudopandemic
Page 35
Nor did David Rockefeller, as evidenced by his 1973 op-ed for the New York Times [20]. He and his Chase Group banking empire delegation had visited Maoist China. In his account of the trip, Rockefeller dismissed the mass murder of millions as "whatever." It was the product of genocide that Rockefeller was interested in:
"One is impressed immediately by the sense of national harmony....There is a very real and pervasive dedication to Chairman Mao and Maoist principles. Whatever the price of the Chinese revolution it has obviously succeeded, not only in producing a more efficient administration, but also in fostering...a community of purpose."
The Trilateralist Rockefeller could see the opportunity the Chinese dictatorship presented the parasite class. In full agreement with Brzezinski, he wrote:
"Too often the true significance and potential of our new relationship with China has been obscured.. In fact, of course, we are experiencing a much more fundamental phenomenon.. The Chinese, for their part, are faced with altering a primarily inward focus.. We, for our part, are faced with the realization that we have largely ignored a country with one-fourth of the world’s population."
The "we" Rockefeller referred to was not us. He meant the GPPP and his fellow stakeholder capitalists.
The totalitarian order in China impressed him as he hoped it would. He wasn't the first Trilateralist to see the technocratic possibilities in China. The sheer scale of the market was an enticing prospect and the promise of the Technetronic Age raised the real potential to build the world's first Technate.
Completely discounting the appalling loss of human life, Rockefeller wrote:
"The social experiment in China under Chairman Mao’s leadership is one of the most important and successful in human history. How extensively China opens up and how the world reacts to the social innovation.. is certain to have a profound impact upon the future of many nations."
The GPP's task was to crack open the Chinese market while maintaining totalitarianism. China would need help with its economic development and technical support to build the technological infrastructure necessary for technocracy to work. This process had already begun, but with Rockefeller, Brzezinski, Kissinger and others committed to the cause, the target of constructing a Technate was firmly in the Trilateralist's sights.
The Trilateralists set about assisting China to develop both economically and technologically, while remaining careful to avoid applying too much pressure for political reform. Totalitarianism was a system they supported and wanted to exploit. In their 1978 Paper No. 15 on East-West Relations [21] they suggested:
"To grant China favourable conditions in economic relations is definitely in the political interest of the West.. there seems to exist sufficient ways for aiding China in acceptable forms with advanced civilian technology."
In the same paper the Trilateralists announced that they weren't entirely averse to helping China modernise their military capability, though they stressed this should only be for defensive purposes. They accepted that a modern, militarised China might turn to expansionism and seek to regain territory it historically claimed as its own, in particular Taiwan. They judged this was a reasonable risk to take.
They were playing the great game. Human lives were of no concern.
Sources:
[1] - https://www.wipo.int/portal/en/index.html
[2] - https://web.archive.org/web/20210404200337/https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/taylor/principles/
[3] - https://technocracy.fandom.com/wiki/Thorstein_Veblen
[4] - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1987.tb01756.x
[5] - https://technocracy.fandom.com/wiki/Technical_Alliance
[6] - https://archive.is/xCRxH
[7] - https://archive.is/jZWyj
[8] - https://web.archive.org/web/20200716210736/https://www.technocracyinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Study-Course.pdf
[9] - https://www.technocracyinc.org/the-monad/
[10] - https://solipsyzm.pl/between2ages.pdf
[11] - https://in-this-together.com/islamist-extremists-proxies-of-the-west-part-1/
[12] - https://bilderbergmeetings.org/
[13] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_border_conflict
[14] - https://archive.is/vBlEw
[15] - https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/globalized-world-order-sovereign-obligations-by-richard-n--haass-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog
[16] - https://archive.is/3y4ua
[17] - https://web.archive.org/web/20210326023500/https://freddonaldson.com/2016/11/15/trilateral-commissions-2016-roster-includes-many-of-the-folks-who-rule-our-nation-behind-the-scenes/
[18] - https://archive.is/8HECF
[19] - https://web.archive.org/web/20210201184426/https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/01/china-great-famine-book-tombstone
[20] - https://web.archive.org/web/20150322100627/http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ns3HYtIdNxo/T6752fbXHQI/AAAAAAAAL3g/pu0n527f7lI/s1600/davidrockefellerChinaMao1973NYTimes.jpg
[21] - https://web.archive.org/web/20130201010655/http://trilateral.org/download/doc/overview_east_west_relations.pdf
Chapter 17 - Constructing The Technate
Just as Ghebreyesus career path to the top of the World Health Organisation (WHO) was shaped by the support of Bill Gates, so Henry Kissinger's relationship with the Rockefellers was conducive to his own advancement. The official story of his secret 1971 discussions with Chairman Mao and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai (officially acknowledged in 2001 [1]) was that President Nixon had sent him to normalise relationships with China as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union [2].
What is mentioned less frequently is that Kissinger was also a Board Trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. His relationship with David Rockefeller stemmed back to 1954 when Kissinger was appointed to run the Rockefeller Brothers study group out of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Kissinger's visits to China also opened up investment banking opportunities for Rockefeller's Chase Group (called Chase Manhattan at the time.)
Following Mao's death in 1976 Deng Xiaoping rose to power, becoming the Paramount Leader [3] of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1978. Just two weeks after assuming power, on January 1st 1979 he became the first communist Chinese leader to conduct a formal state visit to the US.
He was received with full state honours by the Carter administration, as advised by Trilateralist Brzezinski. Deng Xiaoping immediately set about instigating a series of social and economic reforms which were called "reform and opening up" in China and "the opening up of China" in the West.
Deng Xiaoping was one of a group of eight high ranking Chinese officials who had survived the brutal repressions of cultural revolution [4]. The reverently named Eight Immortals were credited with turning the Chinese economy [5] from an unstable mess, riven with extreme poverty, into the thriving economic engine it is today. This would have been impossible without considerable inward investment and the transfer of technology which China received from the GPPP.
This GPPP investment was the initial source of China's economic growth miracle. Immediately prior to the pseudopandemic in late 2019 The World Economic Forum [6] (WEF) reported:
"High levels of government spending and foreign investment have enabled China to roughly double the size of its economy every eight years since the introduction of economic reforms in 1979."
CITIC (China International Trust & Investment Corp - now CITIC Group) was effectively China's state run investment arm [7]. In June 1980 CITIC chairman Rong Yiren attended a meeting with David Rockefeller and the representatives of 300 Fortune 500 companies [8] in the Chase Manhattan offices in New York.
The purpose of the meeting [9] between CITIC and the GPPP was:
"[To] identify and define those areas of the Chinese economy most susceptible to American technology and capital infusion"
Kissinger and Rong reportedly established an investment company [10], with Trilateralist Kissinger appointed as a special advisor to CITIC. The i
nitial phase of China's economic transformation were banking reforms [11] allowing much greater Foreign Direct Investment (FDI.)
FDI's aren't just capital investments. They typically come with a transfer or sharing of expertise, technology and even workforce. Common types of FDI's are mergers, acquisitions, management services, logistical and manufacturing agreements.
The GPPP began to pour into Beijing's Central Business District (CBD) [12]. By 2009 there were 114 Western companies with a substantial presence and investments established in Beijing. By 2020 [13] there were 238 Fortune 500 companies and more than 10,000 foreign-funded enterprises. Beijing CBD now houses the regional headquarters of 89 multinational corporations.
According to Chinese state media [14] between 1983 - 1991 FDI in China went from a value of $920 million to $4.37 billion. By 2019 total FDI had risen to more than $2.1 trillion. At the same time the transition economy of China, just like every advanced economy, rapidly expanded its money supply [15].
All of this monopoly money, a mixture of FDI and domestic (digital) currency printing, fuelled the amazing pace and scale of economic and technological development of China. In exchange for access to their market, China required that investors sign so called Forced Technology Transfer [16] (FTT) agreements. As the western MSM constantly pushed the notion of the rising threat of China, the frequent accusation was of alleged Chinese industrial espionage and "technology theft" [17].
Like so much propaganda aimed at us, this was just a story. In truth no one was forcing anyone to transfer technology to China. In fact, Trilateralists like US President Bill Clinton went to considerable lengths to make sure China could get hold of the technology, including military technology, it needed.
In 1994 the Clinton administration scrapped cold war export controls [18] thereby enabling more sensitive technology to be transferred to China. Claiming that they would not allow defence technology, such as supercomputer or potential uranium enrichment technology to go to China (or Russia), they soon lifted this restriction by shifting oversight from the State and Defense Departments to the Commerce Department.
Another half truth was that manufacturers took advantage of cheaper labour costs in China leading to job losses [19] in more advanced economies. While it is true that the practice of offshoring jobs had been ongoing for decades, many to China, the focus of GPPP investment in China was frequently Research and Development (R&D).
In 1994 China ranked 30th [20] in terms of US overseas R&D investment, by 2000 it was 11th. Between 1994 to 2001 multinational corporation (MNC) investment in China quadrupled. As a ratio of overseas R&D investment, the GPPP were providing 3 times the amount of technology infusion to China than anywhere else.
While the pseudopandemic sharpened the decline in total global FDI, it continued to rise in China [21]. The 4% increase of FDI into China saw it surpass the US as the world's leading recipient of direct investment. In 2020, while FDI into other advanced economies collapsed, China received FDI valued at $163 billion.
In addition to the huge growth stimulus, pumped into the Chinese economy over the last four decades, a significant number of foreign / Chinese industrial R&D alliances were established. These were separate business organizations that targeted specific research or technological development projects. They were formed through collaboration between academic & scientific research establishments, NGO's, government institutions and private enterprise.
Between 1990 and 2001 the US established 105 such alliances. Japan had the second largest number of R&D partnership alliances (26), followed by Germany (15), the United Kingdom (14), Singapore (12), and Canada (11). The overwhelming majority of these R&D collaborations operated in China.
The US National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics issued a report in 2001 in which they stated:
"A substantial number of MNCs from advanced economies have established R&D or technical centers in China in recent years.. in key industrial sectors, such as telecommunications, electronics, chemicals, and auto manufacturing. U.S. companies with major R&D activities or facilities in China include DuPont, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, IBM, Intel, Lucent Technologies, Microsoft, Motorola, and Rohm & Haas."
Between 2001 to the financial crash in 2008, both FDI in R&D and Chinese R&D investment really took off. While the pace of FDI dropped off from 2010 onward, by 2016 China's own outward foreign investment had surpassed the FDI they received. An astounding economic turn around in less than 40 years. A 2019 report by the World Bank [22] stated:
"China’s spending on research and development (R&D) rose to 2.18 percent of GDP in 2018, up from 1.4 percent in 2007.. Its spending on R&D accounts for around 20 percent of the world total, second only to the United States. Its number of patents granted annually for inventions increased from 68,000 in 2007 to 420,000 in 2017, the highest in the world.. China is also a hotbed for venture capital in search of the next technology.. China has evolved from being a net importer of FDI to a net exporter.. Despite experiencing a sharp decline in 2017, China’s outbound investments were the third-largest in the world.. China remains an attractive destination for foreign investments due to its large domestic market. Foreign enterprises such as BASF, BMW, Siemens, and Tesla have recently announced new or expanded investments in China."
A focus for apparent western concern [23] has been China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI.) This enormous infrastructure project (known in China as One Belt, One Road - OBOR) is establishing a network of modern trade routes across Eurasia linking Asia, Africa, Europe, South East Asia and Australasia, easing both international trade and, in particular, Chinese exports.
Beyond China's borders there are 140 countries involved in the BRI [24] to a varying degree. In its 2018 research paper [25] looking at Foreign Direct Investment in the BRI project, the World Bank refers to those directly involved in its construction as BRI nations. While China's direct investment in BRI nations has grown, the majority of its FDI goes to non-BRI nations. These are nations which are not in the scope of the infrastructure project.
China is the largest single nation investor in OBOR / BRI. This transition occurred after the 2008 financial crisis saw non-BRI nations (such as the US and the UK) pull back on their FDIs into the BRI countries.
This non-BRI nation investment picked up again as quantitative easing (money printing) monetary policies in western nations took effect after 2010. The World Bank report:
"The majority of BRI countries’ FDI inflow comes from non-BRI countries."
In other words, neither China nor the higher income countries that are involved in the BRI are providing the bulk of FDI. BRI nations [26] such as Italy, Saudi Arabia, Austria, New Zealand, South Korea and Singapore are net recipients of FDI from non-BRI nations like the US, UK , France and Germany.
The majority of the investment, expertise and technology that is building the BRI infrastructure is coming from the GPPP. The notion that western politicians, corporations and financial institutions are worried about the Belt and Road Initiative is just an MSM fable. In reality they are working hard to construct it in partnership with China.
Economic reform, digital money printing and GPPP investment has certainly increased wealth in China. According to the World Bank [27] GDP per capita grew from $156 per person in 1978 to more than $10,000 in 2019. This has moved China to the status of an upper - middle income country.
By June 2020 [28] there were 358 US billionaires with a mean net worth of of $83.1 Bn each. In China there were 142 with a mean net worth of $103 Bn each. At the end of 2019 more than 100 million Chinese people were in the top 10% of the worlds wealthiest. An estimated 850 million people had seemingly been lifted out of absolute poverty.
In 2000 total household wealth in China stood at $3.7 trillion, by the end of 2019 it had reached nearly $64 trillion. Of this net wealth 23% of it was owned by 142 people among a population of 1.4 billion.
While income had improved for millions, like every crony capitalist nation, wealth inequality h
ad become much worse [29]. In 1978 the top 10% of Chinese citizens possessed about 22% of total wealth in China, the bottom 50% possessed approximately the same. By 2015 The top 10% held an estimated 42% while the lower 50%'s share of China's total wealth had plummeted to below 15%.
President Xi Jinping's claim that China had eradicated extreme poverty [30] involved some slight of hand. Constructing the Technate led to the mass urbanisation of the Chinese population, leaving many rural areas with ageing populations and significant unemployment. China defines the absolute poverty income threshold as less than $1.70 per day. The World Banks defines it as less than $1.90 per day.
However, that threshold is for low-income nations which China is no longer [31]. For middle income nations, with higher prices, the World Bank defines relative poverty as living on less than $5.50 per day, leaving an estimated 373 million Chinese in abject poverty.
A major caveat to all the figures we are discussing is their frequent disassociation from reality. In 2007, over dinner with the US ambassador, the current premier of the State Council of the PRC Li Keqiang told the ambassador [32] that China's GDP figures were "man-made" and unreliable. He suggested a better measure, subsequently named the Li Keqiang index, should be based upon energy consumption, rail freight and loan dispersal.
We shouldn't imagine this is a uniquely Chinese problem. Global markets are hopelessly corrupt [33] and all financial and State franchise fiscal claims should be read with a healthy degree of scepticism.
Hedley Donovan, one of the founding members of the Trilateral Commission alongside Brzezinski and Rockefeller, was the former editor in chief of Time Magazine. In his editorial Made in China: The Revenge of the Nerds [34] he wrote about what the Trilateralists had achieved in China:
"In the twenty years since Deng Xiaoping's reforms kicked in, the composition of the Chinese leadership has shifted markedly in favor of technocrats.. Now they hold sway in the Politburo, the Central Committee, the National People's Congress, and even provincial, municipal, and county governments. It's no exaggeration to describe the current regime as a technocracy.. You might say that technocratic politics is a natural fit with the Chinese political culture.. During the 1980s, technocracy as a concept was much talked about, especially in the context of so-called 'Neo-Authoritarianism.'.. The basic beliefs and assumptions of the technocrats were laid out quite plainly: Social and economic problems were akin to engineering problems and could be understood, addressed, and eventually solved as such.. Scientism underlies the post-Mao technocracy, and it is the orthodoxy against which heresies are measured."