The Philadelphia Campaign

by Thomas J McGuire

  Farther to the left, the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion found itself facing the same two guns that had the Jägers pinned down below Sandy Hollow. “Some skirmishing begun in the valley in which the enemy was drove,” Captain Montrésor wrote, “upon gaining something further of the ascent the enemy began to amuse us with 2 guns.” The chief engineer praised the stand made by Stephen's Division, as well as the mettle of the light bobs: “The ground on the left being the most difficult the rebels disputed it with the Light Infantry with great spirit, particularly their officers, this spot was a ploughed hill and they covered by its summit and flanked by a wood; however unfavourable the circumstances their ardour was such that they pushed in upon them under a very heavy fire.”141

  The light troops were all now under heavy fire and were stopped in their tracks. “Describe the Battle—’Twas not like those of Covent Garden or Drury Lane,” Lt. Richard St. George of the 52nd quipped, referring to mock battles staged in London theaters. “There was a most infernal Fire of Cannon & musketry—smoak—incessant shouting—incline to the right! incline to the Left!—halt!—charge! &c.,” as the light infantry maneuvered through the abrupt hills and hedges. The two American battalion guns on this hill covered Stephen's right flank, and the crews served them well.

  With their own light 3-pounders stuck in a swamp behind them and out of action, the 2nd Light Infantry and the Jägers were pinned down in the woods at the bottom of a deep ravine, with “the balls ploughing up the ground. The Trees cracking over ones head, The branches riven by the artillery—The leaves falling as in autumn by the grape shot—The affair was general—The Misters on both sides shewd conduct. The action was brilliant.”142 St. George's friend, Lt. Martin Hunter, both of the 52nd Light Company in the 2nd Light Infantry, remembered, “The position the enemy had taken was very strong indeed—very commanding ground, a wood on their rear and flanks, a ravine and strong paling in front. The fields in America are all fenced in by paling.”143

  “We could not see the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry because of the terrain,” the Hessian Jäger Corps Journal stated, “and because we had received only a few orders, each commander had to act according to his best judgment.” Flexible as they were, the light troops had difficulty negotiating their way through the tangled thickets and swampy lowlands. As for the British regular forces behind them, “the 3rd Brigade of Englanders likewise was to support the Jägers and Light Infantry in the second encounter. But, because of the uneven terrain and the movement toward the left by the column, we saw nothing of it during the battle.”144 The only way for the Jägers to break out would be to somehow get around the end of the American flank.

  As all this was transpiring on the American right, Sullivan's Division was still not yet positioned properly on the left. On its first arrival, before the British advance, Sullivan had placed his troops on the front of a large, wooded hill about 400 yards west of Birmingham Meeting, only to find Stirling and Stephen on a ridge behind the hill nearly half a mile to his right. “I then rode up to Consult the other General officers,” Sullivan explained, leaving his two brigades with only one general officer, Brig. Gen. Preudhomme de Borre, a sixty-year-old French general who barely spoke English and was greatly disliked by his troops, especially the officers.145 De Borre wrote to Congress a few days after Brandywine, “I did not know your Language in my arrival in this country, I believed prudently I must Learn it…. I now know enough your Language to Weild my orders & to understand that I read.”146 The Marylanders wanted their native son Gen. William Smallwood to lead them, but he was down in Maryland that day attempting to organize the militia. The brave Col. Mordecai Gist was also away on the same duty, leaving the Maryland Line uninspired; now, at the critical moment, they were virtually leaderless.

  As the British began to advance and their light troops moved quickly ahead toward the American right, Sullivan said that he and the other generals, Stirling and Stephen, “upon receiving Information that the Enemy were Endeavouring to out Flank us on the Right were unanimously of opinion that my Division Should be brought in to Join the others.” Further, with the Jägers trying to extend their left to break the deadlock of being pinned down, Sullivan correctly observed “that the whole Should Incline further to the Right to prevent our being out flanked,” meaning that Stephen and Stirling would have to shift to the right at Sandy Hollow.

  The maneuvers at this stage of the battle became a major source of contention immediately afterward, resulting in a congressional recall of Sullivan (which was refused by Washington) pending an investigation. “There was some great faux-pas on the 11th,” a disgusted Lt. Col. T. Will Heth of the 3rd Virginia wrote to Col. Daniel Morgan. “Our disaster was owing to the confusion Genl Sullivan threw our right wing into—He is calld the Evle-genius of America.” Heth, who was with the Corps of Light Infantry that day, was not enamored with his own commander, Gen. William Maxwell of New Jersey, either, telling his fellow Virginian Morgan, “He is to be sure—a Damnd bitch of a General.”147

  Like Heth's comments, much of the criticism of Sullivan in this particular case was based on hearsay and on a letter published anonymously by Congressman Thomas Burke of North Carolina, who disliked Sullivan, as did many others in Congress. Tactless and ambitious, having been captured by the British at Long Island and used afterward—as a “decoy duck,” in John Adams's words—to deliver a peace overture from Lord Howe, Sullivan was involved in one contentious episode after another, including squabbles about seniority and two threatened resignations. Viewed as a complainer, he was already facing an inquiry for the flash-in-the-pan Staten Island expedition a few weeks earlier. Beginning with the abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga, the military failures of 1777 unleashed storms of congressional criticism and recalls of commanders, and the hapless general became a lightning rod. Or as Sullivan himself put it, “I am the butt against which all the darts are leveled.” He protested to John Adams, “How does this read? How will it sound when ringing in the public ear?”148

  The maneuver here was inaccurately reported at the time and further distorted in the retelling, but the distortion was readily believed because of Sullivan's continuing propensity for disaster and the fact that Burke's letter was quickly published far and wide, within three weeks being printed in a Boston newspaper, copied by others, and even appearing in England in the Gazette and New Daily Advertiser on November 21, 1777—more than a week before Howe's official report of the battle even arrived in London. Through sheer repetition, it has become ingrained in many histories of the battle. “I never yet have pretended that my Disposition in the Late Battle was perfect,” Sullivan lamely admitted to John Hancock. “I know it was very far from it but this I will venture to affirm…it was the best that time would allow me to make.”149

  The first inaccuracy was that Sullivan had “taken too large a circuit,” meaning that in moving toward Birmingham to rendezvous with Stirling and Stephen, his division had somehow widely missed his assigned position. Given the distance, terrain, vague orders, and dismal lack of reconnaissance, the three divisions did remarkably well finding each other. Stirling and Stephen had roads to follow and were in tandem; Birmingham Meeting House, their point of rendezvous, was in plain view to them. By contrast, Sullivan had to move blindly cross-country, for the most part, while finding half of his division posted at the three upper fords three or more miles away, but he was able to find it and arrive within less than a mile of the other two forces.

  “Sullivan to compleat his Blunder made a circuit of two Miles when one quarter in the direct road would have brought him to his ground,” Burke wrote privately to Gov. Richard Caswell of North Carolina. The congressman was ill informed; the only direct road at Brinton's Ford led to Dilworth, two miles east of the ford and a mile away from Birmingham Meeting. Had Sullivan moved this way, he would have found the Birmingham Road congested with the Stirling-Stephen column, possibly causing more delay. He also would not have met up with the other half of his division posted at the three upper for
ds.

  But Burke's criticisms did not stop with Sullivan. “I had an Opportunity of observing that our Troops and Inferior Officers are exceedingly good, but that our Major Generals (one only excepted) are totally inadequate,” the congressman ranted on. “They were so disconcerted by the unexpected attack of the Enemy that they knew not what to do but to permit, (some say to order), a precipitate retreat.”150

  Ironically, a number of British and Hessian sources complimented the American position and the performance of most of the line. “Sullivan shewed a considerable share of judgment and ability in the execution of this commission,” The Annual Register for 1777 went so far as to say. “He took a very strong position on the commanding grounds above Birmingham church, with his left extending towards the Brandywine, his artillery advantageously disposed, and both flanks covered with very thick woods.”151

  Bad timing and poor training, compounded by low morale resulting from a lack of inspirational brigade-level leadership, were the main problems here, not “too large a circuit.” In refuting this accusation made by the southern congressman based on hearsay, the New England general wrote:

  Sullivans division did not take too Large a Circuit as he Suggests but went on to meet the Enemy agreeable to their orders & were obliged to fall back, upon finding that the other Divisions which proceeded by Different Routs had taken ground & formed half a mile to the Rear of where that Division had advanced. They were under a necessity of falling back & Filing off to the Right in order to form a Junction with the other Troops & before this could be completed They were attacked & Thrown into Confusion from which they never fully Recovered.152

  Sullivan also had to gather as much of his division together as possible, since about half of his forces were posted at the upper fords. Hazen's Regiment, officially called the 2nd Canadian and also known as Congress's Own Regiment, was functioning as a light infantry unit for Sullivan, first by holding the upper fords, then by screening the division's movements. Hazen's experience as a Ranger officer in the French and Indian War followed by two years in the regular British Army, taken together with the composition of his unit, mostly Canadian frontiersmen, would qualify the 2nd Canadians as such. The day before Brandywine, Gen. de Borre protested that Sullivan “detached of my brigade the Congress regiment Who alone is the greatest half part of my brigade. I would go with them, general Sullivan Would that I remain With the 2. 4. & 6 mariland regiments Being other part of my brigade in all about 350 men.” Then, as Sullivan moved toward Birmingham, de Borre again complained, “In our way I met the Congress regiment and Sent So Soon my brigade major to general Sullivan to have ordered for that regiment to join my brigade. The general has refused.”153

  After finding Hazen and the Delaware Regiment, and then spotting Ewald, Sullivan had immediately directed his division to the front of Birmingham Hill. “I ordered Colo. Hazens Regiment to pass a Hollow way, File off to the Right & face to Cover the Artillery while it was passing the Same Hollow way, the Rest of the Troops followed in the Rear to assist in Covering the Artillery.” He added, “The Enemy Seeing this did not press on but gave me time to form my Division on an advantageous Height in a Line with the other Divisions but almost half a mile to the Left.”154 Then, after leaving his division to consult with the other generals, he sent orders to de Borre to shift the division to the right to come closer into line with the others.

  The second and most often repeated inaccuracy is that Sullivan insisted his division be placed on the right of the battle line because he was the senior general, blindly preferring military protocol to the realities of a dangerous situation. Though it is true that his division was entitled to hold the position of honor on the right, he did not insist on this precisely because of the circumstances. “If part of the Division was not formed completely before the Engagement, The fault can not be imputed to Genl Sullivan,” Brig. Gen. Thomas Conway testified, “who although he had a right to take the right of the Line, took the Left, in Order to save time, a proof that the Division of the Right, had full time to form.”155

  Sullivan, in fact, ordered his division to fall in on Stirling's left. In order to make room for the Marylanders, Stephen and Stirling had to shift their position to the right a few hundred yards. This they seem to have accomplished with little difficulty in the face of the British and Hessian light troops, who were still pinned down on the American right.

  Watching Sullivan shift, apparently strengthening his right flank, “the sharp eye of General Howe noticed this as the firing started, and at once ordered the 4th Brigade to advance from the second line to the first line, on the left wing,” von Münchhausen stated, where they would come up in support of the 2nd Light Infantry. “At the same time, the 3rd Brigade, which at first was in reserve, was ordered to take the place of the now advanced 4th Brigade.” The shift caused a slight change in the British battle line; “the new front was somewhat more sloping.”156

  The British grenadiers were coming steadily across the Street Road at this point, half a mile away from Stirling, and the Guards were swiftly advancing on the American left. “While my Division was marching out & before it was possible for them to form to advantage,” Sullivan stated, “The Enemy pressed on with Rapidity & attacked them, which threw them into Some kind of Confusion.”157

  An eyewitness to all of this was Gen. Thomas Conway, the contentious, Irish-born French general in command of the 3rd Pennsylvania Brigade in Stirling's Division. Conway, who was greatly disliked by many other American generals for a variety of reasons—one being the fact that he embarrassed them by regularly drilling his Pennsylvanians—was outspoken in his criticisms about the lack of coordination among Continental troops. “Genl Sullivan having come up with his division, when the Enemy was within half a mile of our front,” Conway wrote, “the short time left to his troops in order to Form, was hardly sufficient, for well disciplined troops, and well exercised,” meaning well-drilled troops, “and by no means sufficient for the troops of this Army, who appear to me to maneavre upon false Principles, and where I cannot discover as yet, The least notion of displaying Columns, and forming briskly upon all Emergencies.”158

  Another French general who was an eyewitness was Lafayette, here coming under severe fire for the first time. “M. de Lafayette, as a volunteer, had always accompanied the general [Washington] but since the left was quiet and the major thrust would come on the right, he obtained permission to join Sullivan,” Lafayette wrote later. “At his arrival, which the troops appeared to appreciate, he found that the enemy had crossed the ford, and Sullivan's corps’ had scarcely had time to form one line in front of a thinly wooded forest.”159

  With only one general actually present on the left of the wing, Chevalier Preudhomme de Borre, who commanded little, if any, respect from anyone, the Maryland Division executed a strange and confusing maneuver. This was probably the “too large a circuit” that was the basis for the rumors and accusations, but because it involved Sullivan's Division and he was overall commander of the right wing, the onus for the maneuver was placed on him, even though he was not personally leading it. Instead of a straightforward march to the right, the troops countermarched to the left and swung around the west side and back of the hill toward the ridge where Stirling's troops were positioned.

  “Our division marched to join Lord Stirling who was on the ground where the enemy appeared, and where they seemed to intend their attack,” Maj. John Hawkins Stone of the 1st Maryland Regiment in the 1st Brigade told William Paca. “By the time we reached the ground they had to cannonade the ground allotted to us, which was very bad, and the enemy within musket shot of it, before we were ordered to form the line of battle.”160

  Once in the valley between the hills, the 1st Brigade—Smallwood's, which had no general officer at that moment—was ordered to wheel to the left up the back of the hill and then countermarch into position. Essentially, most of the division seems to have moved in a complete circle, needlessly marching almost a mile and ending up with the
1st Brigade only a handful of yards from where it had started and the 2nd Brigade behind it in the valley, effectively cutting the division's front and firepower in half. All this occurred in the face of a large and well-organized attacking force.

  The Guards appeared in front of the Maryland position, coming out of the light woods along the Street Road and supported by two medium 12-pounders. “Lord Cornwallis's men suddenly emerged from the woods in very good order,” Lafayette observed. “Advancing across the plain, his first line opened a very brisk fire with cannon and muskets. The American fire was murderous, but both their right and left wings collapsed.”161

  Major Stone described his experience:

  I marched in front of Gen'l Sullivan's Division, when I received orders from him to wheel to the left and take possession of a rising ground about 100 yards in our front, to which the enemy were marching rapidly. I wheeled off, but had not reached the ground, before we were attacked on all quarters, which prevented our forming regularly, and by wheeling to the left it doubled our division on the brigade immediately in the rear of the other. Thus we were in confusion, and no person to undue us to order, when the enemy pushed on and soon made us all run off.162

  “Sullivan's Division, on the extreme left, were marched through a narrow lane,” Lt. Col. Samuel Smith of the 4th Maryland in de Borre's Brigade related. “The First Brigade of it counter-marched through a gateway, to the top of a hill, under a galling fire from the enemy—thus bringing the rear to the front. Pressed by the enemy, they had no time to form, and gave way at all points.” Smith's regiment was in the next line: “The Second Brigade was formed in a valley in its rear. It was said a retreat had been ordered; but Colonel Smith not knowing it, found himself, to his surprise—being on the left of the Regiment—with only Lieutenant Cromwell and about thirty men. Seeing no enemy, he retired deliberately.”163