The Philadelphia Campaign

by Thomas J McGuire

  Gen. de Borre was unable to maintain any sort of control of his force. He told Congress:

  I then am arrived upon the field of battle with about 350 men Who before to be placed, received a Discharge of the enemy. We have come back about 50 steps to be better to receive the ennemy who in that instant Schot a second Discharge. All my half brigade had Discharged also. & run away both oficers and soldiers & I find myself alone. I would rally them it was impossible to me & the same follow them.

  I could not hold that brigade in my hand, I done my Duty to go and fetch them to bring again against the enemy. It is not my fault if the americanes troops run away to first fire of ennemy, it is enough unhappy for me to have had that disordered, the greatest proof of the precipitation with which all the division is run away, nobody of them is killed or wounded. I alone recieved a light wound in the cheek by a bal.164

  De Borre was not entirely credible; Major Stone reported, “I lost 23 privates and 2 sergeants killed, wounded and taken, and one Captain (Ford) wounded; he will recover.”165 De Borre's case grew even more bizarre; later that evening, Col. Sam Smith said that the old French general “showed some scratches on his cheek, which he said had been done by the English firing fish-hooks, but more probably by the briars.”166

  “I gone & fetch them to bring again against the ennemy,” de Borre continued, with an explanation as confused as the maneuvers themselves. “I find in my way some Soldiers, the rest was already upon a hill about a mile of the battle, where was also the Smallwood brigade who has been conducted by the general Sullivan in moving on to the ennemy, in my arrival upon that hill next that Division I moved on with had to go at Left of the ennemy to help our troops Who did made their retreat.”167

  Often more dangerous than well-directed enemy gunfire is friendly fire, especially from poorly led, panicking troops. “Of all the Maryland regiments only two ever had an opportunity to form, Gist's [3rd Maryland] and mine [1st Maryland],” Major Stone wrote, “and as soon as they began to fire, those who were in our rear could not be prevented from firing also.” Some of de Borre's troops began firing into the back of the 1st Brigade. “In a few minutes we were attacked in front and flank, and by our people in the rear. Our men ran off in confusion, and were very hard to be rallied.” Like many others, Stone was thoroughly disgusted with the whole performance caused by the lack of leadership in the Maryland Division: “Although my men did not behave so well as I expected, yet I can scarcely blame them when I consider their situation; nor are they censured by any part of the army. My horse threw [me] in the time of action, but I did not receive any great injury from it.”168

  Sullivan had used Hazen to screen the artillery as the division first moved into position. “Our regiment was posted on the right of the Army [at the fords], and was the first attacked and among the last to leave the field,” Sgt. Maj. John Hawkins of Hazen's regiment wrote with spirit, if not complete accuracy. “A heavy fire of artillery and musketry was carried on by both sides the whole afternoon with scarcely any intermission. The enemy were much superior to us in numbers, as but a small part of our army were engaged, the greater part being away on the left. In justice to the brave officers and men of our regiment, Col. Hazen thought himself obliged to affirm, that no troops behaved better, nor any troops left the field in greater order.”169 Lt. Col. Samuel Smith confirmed, “Colonel Hazen's Regiment retreated in perfect order.”170

  Firing only a few volleys, relying on speed and the threat of the bayonet, the Guards advanced steadily under some musket and cannon fire. “The Guards receiv'd the fire of the Rebels from the Wood at the same time with the two Battalions of British Grenadiers,” Captain Robertson of the Engineers noted, “and immediately charging them the Rebels gave way with the utmost precipitation.”171 On the far right, Sir George Osborn led the flank companies up the hill, but there wasn't much resistance as Sullivan's Division fell apart, with de Borre abandoned by his troops. “We attacked the left flank of the rebel army, and raining upon the brigades of Sullivan, a French General Debore, and Maxwell with an impetuosity really that it would have been scarcely possible for them to resist,” Sir George told his brother, “we saved much loss we might otherwise have sustained, and certainly made the enemy first give way,” referring to the collapse of the Maryland Division. Not surprisingly, casualties in Osborn's command were very light: “I had but one Grenadier wounded, the Light Company who were with me had only three.” At the end of the day, the Guards reported total casualties of one killed, five wounded, and two missing.172

  Here in his first major battle, William Lord Cantelupe, with O'Hara's Company in the 2nd Battalion on the left wing of the Guards, advanced against the American position on Birmingham Hill. In his journal, shortly after the engagement, Cantelupe painted an image titled, A Battery of the Rebels opened on Brandywine heights the 11th of September 1777 in the county of Birmingham. The watercolor depicts the muzzle flashes of three cannons through a thick column of smoke on top of a wooded hill. A long battle line of redcoats behind a fence along a road fires a volley up the hill, and skirmishers from both sides have fanned out across the landscape. In the foreground, on the road behind the line of redcoats, are two sets of horses and wheeled vehicles, accompanied by figures in dark blue—the battalion artillery of the Guards. Farm buildings flank the battle line, and Cantelupe carefully delineated plowed fields, fences, even a haystack. It is the only known contemporary image of the Battle of Brandywine.173

  While his division was collapsing on the left, Sullivan was on the hill where the five guns had pinned down the British light infantry. “I had taken post myself in the Centre with the artillery & ordered it to play briskly to Stop the progress of the Enemy & give the Broken Troops time to Rally & form in the Rear of where I was with the artillery,” he told John Hancock. But repeated efforts on his part failed to bring the Marylanders back to order: “I sent off four Aid De Camps for this purpose & went myself But all in vain: no sooner did I form one party but that which I had before formed would Run off & Even at times when I though on Horseback and in front of them apprehended no Danger.” Finally, with the British grenadiers approaching the center and the Marylanders in hopeless disorder, “I then left them to be Rallied if possible by their own officers & my aid De Camp & Repaired to the Hill where our artillery was which by this time began to feel the Effects of the Enemy's fire.”174

  Sullivan's proper place at that moment was in the center to direct the entire wing. The pounding drums and squealing fifes of the British grenadiers were relentlessly coming ever closer. The Royal Artillery thundered out in support; 6- and 12-pound shot hissed through the air and slammed into tree trunks with bone-shaking concussions, tearing down limbs and knocking men out, or landing among the Continentals with shocking, sickening results. Some were dismembered, others crushed to a pulp. Grapeshot flew in showers from the smaller battalion guns and wrought havoc in the woods, shredding branches and sending splinters ripping through the ranks. Battle smoke, dust, flesh and blood, falling leaves, and debris filled the air, along with the cries of the wounded and shouts of command from the Continental officers, their own fifes shrieking and drums beating out signals between volleys of musketry.

  The Continental Artillery held firm, keeping the light bobs and Jägers at bay while blasting away at the oncoming grenadiers. Switching from round shot to grape, at a range of 600 yards they peppered the grenadier battalions, splintering the fences as they climbed over them and tearing into the hedges. A terrible harvest was gathered that September afternoon in the fertile green fields of Birmingham Township, as swaths of tall, proud men in bearskin caps and crimson uniforms spun and dropped or were violently thrown back, dismembered by showers of iron hail. Officers leading their companies also fell; of the ten British officers known to have been killed at Brandywine, seven were grenadiers, and seven other grenadier officers were wounded.175

  Still the battalions pressed on at the quickstep, leaning forward into the smoke and musketry. The undulating hil
ls occasionally shielded them from the effects of direct fire.

  Just ahead and to the left of the grenadiers, the 17th Light Company was still pinned down in front of the main American battery, along with the 4th Light Company. One of the 17th officers carefully crept up the slope and “by a bend of the hill had a view of part of the enemys line opposite the grenadiers,” though they were still more than a quarter mile away, “and opened a fire from about half the company on it, no more being able to form on the space.” They were “presently joined by the 38th company,” and a debate erupted over what to do next. “Some of their soldiers wanted to ascend the hill immediately,” but the others “objected as too imprudent.” Then “the 33rd company joined immediately afterwards, and the men of the three companies”—the 4th, 38th, and 33rd, perhaps 150 men total—“calling out up the hill, at their cannon, ascended the hill and had a glimpse of the enemys line as far as the eye could reach to the right and left.”176

  Another light infantry officer recalled, “The Inspiration & Courage of both Officers & Men inducing them to ascend the Height, the whole Rebel Line presented itself to View & so close that those who compos'd this spirited Attack had nothing to Expect but Slaughter.”177 The remaining ten companies of the 1st Light Infantry Battalion were 100 or so yards away to the left and rear, behind the fence on the northern side of the Birmingham Road just east of where it turned left at the Y. “Some firing might have taken place on the left, but as yet the heavy fire of musketry was not begun,” one of them wrote. Here the light infantry tactics played a crucial role for the four companies on the front of the hill, as the “enemys guns were too far back on the height to annoy us, but their line advancing on us we were compelled to throw ourselves on our knees and bellies, and keep up a fire from the slope of the hill.”178

  “This Hill Commanded both the Right & Left of our Line & if carried by the Enemy I knew would Instantly bring on a Total Rout & make a Retreat very Difficult,” said Sullivan. He told John Hancock, “I therefore Determined to hold it as Long as possible to give Lord Sterlings & General Stephens Divisions which yet stood firm as much assistance from the artillery as possible & to give Colo Hazens, Daytons [1st New Jersey] & Ogdens [3rd New Jersey] Regiments which Still Stood firm on our Left the Same advantage & to Cover the Broken Troops of my Division & give them an opportunity to Rally & come to our assistance which Some of them did & others could not by their officers be brought to do any thing but fly.”179

  On the hill that afternoon near the main battery was thirty-year-old Capt. Joseph McClellan, a native of nearby Middletown Township. The son of a Chester County farmer and tavern keeper, McClellan commanded a company in the 9th Pennsylvania Regiment in Conway's Brigade, Stirling's Division. “The position which his company occupied on the left wing of the line when formed, south of Birmingham Meeting-house. It was on the eminence immediately south of where the road turns at right angles to the east and west, about a quarter of a mile south of the meeting-house.” McClellan recalled a particular episode involving a Highlander, probably from McPherson's 42nd Light Company in the 1st Light Infantry opposite them:

  He said when the British approached them, a stout man whom he took to be a Scotchman, and who was evidently under the influence of liquor, advanced recklessly and placed himself behind a little mound, made by the root of a tree which had been blown down. From this position, which was within pistol-shot of McClellan's company, the British soldier fired, and killed the sergeant, who was standing by Capt. McClellan's side. This, of course, attracted McClellan's notice.

  As with British officers, many Continental officers carried and used firearms in battle, whether muskets, “fuzees,” or in McClellan's case, a carbine.

  The American captains at that time were armed with carbines; subsequently they carried spontoons. Capt. McClellan, seeing his sergeant fall, and observing whence the fatal missile came, perceived that the man was reloading his piece as he lay crouched behind the mound, and partially protected by it, and determined to anticipate him. He discharged his carbine with deliberate aim, and said he saw the soldier roll over, evidently disabled, if not killed.180

  The light bobs on the front of the hill could expect no immediate help from the other light troops on the left, for “the Yagers and 2nd L. I. having swampy and broken Ground to go over and besides oppos'd with great Number retarded their Advance.” In the center, where Stirling's men held firm, “the British Grenadiers were likewise strongly oppos'd, & impeded by sev'ral Rail Fences.”181

  As they came closer, Stirling's infantry opened up on the grenadiers. “The fire of Musquetry all this time was as Incessant & Tremendous as ever had been remember'd,” a British officer wrote.182 Dr. Lewis Howell, a surgeon in the 2nd New Jersey Regiment, told his father that Stirling's Division had marched “to oppose Lord Cornwallis.” He remarked, “We had been there but a short time when they appeared, and the heaviest firing I ever heard began, continuing a long time, every inch of ground being disputed.”183 On Stirling's left, the Jerseymen dug in their heels and held firm.

  In addition to whole volleys, the troops on both sides engaged in what was known as “platoon-firing,” where each regiment or battalion was divided into sections called, confusingly enough, grand divisions, subdivisions, and platoons. Rather than having the whole line empty its weapons at once, each section was to fire in sequence so that “a constant and perpetual fire” would be kept up. According to the rules of the day, “The first fire is from the…platoon on the right; the second fire, from the left; the third fire, from the right again; and so on alternately until the firing comes to the centre platoon.” In this type of firing, both front and rear ranks of each section fired together, providing a solid burst of musketry from each. “The platoon-firing is such as must necessarily produce a general confusion, as well by the noise of those who command,” meaning that shouted commands could get confused in the din of firing. The difficulty was in timing and coordination; some Continental units were able to execute “platoons” well, but many were not. “Even the king of Prussia himself,” referring to Frederick the Great, an eighteenth-century military genius, “is of the same opinion; for he says, ‘the platoon fire would, no doubt, be the best, if it could be executed.’”184

  The peculiar sounds of this firing sequence were also called “platoons,” and on a large scale, from a distance, they provided a seemingly endless ripping or crackling roar of musketry that carried for miles. The effect was not unlike the sound of sudden heavy, wind-driven rain on a window or hail on a metal roof.

  At Chads's Ford, James Parker wrote, “I visited my friends of the Queens Rangers who had Suffered wounds, when I was delighted with the platoons of Genl. Howe on the rebels’ right.”185 Across the creek, Col. James Chambers of the 1st Pennsylvania commented that on the right wing, “The cannonade commenced about three o'clock, but soon gave way to small arms, which continued like an incessant clap of thunder, till within an hour of sunset.”186 Ten miles away, at the Seven Stars Tavern near Chester, Cornet Baylor Hill of Bland's Dragoons noted, “This day was the greatest Cannonade I ever heard, & greatest rore of Small Arms.”187

  In Philadelphia, the people and Congress could hear the battle. “It began a little before Nine in the Morning with a heavy Cannonade, which was very distinctly heard in Our State House yard about 30 miles from the Place of Action,” Henry Marchant told the governor and Assembly of Rhode Island, “it lasted till dusk.” Elbridge Gerry wrote of “a Cannonade, which We distinctly heard at this place & which was returned by our Army,” and said that “a very warm engagement ensued, in which was as heavy a Fire from the Musketry as perhaps has been known this war in America.” William Williams told his father-in-law, “A very heavy & tremendous Fire took place for considerable time; old officers & all I have seen say beyond what they conceived possible from Musquetry.”188

  The British grenadiers were now less than 100 yards away from Stirling's line. The drummers and fifers dispersed behind their companies to provide sig
nals as well as a cadence and to assist the wounded when the time came. The two battalions, displayed in a long battle line, continued forward, clambering over fences and re-forming under fire. “When we got close to the rebels, they fired their cannon; they did not fire their small arms till we were within 40 paces of them, at which time they fired whole volleys and sustained a very heavy fire,” von Münchhausen wrote. “The English, and especially the English grenadiers, advanced fearlessly and very quickly; fired a volley, and then ran furiously at the rebels with fixed bayonets.”189

  “The two Battalions of British Grenadiers got up to the Rails,” Captain Robertson of the Engineers noted on his map, “when they received a heavy Fire from the Rebels in their Front; after crossing the Rails they immediately charged and drove the Rebels before them.”190 Captain Montrésor observed from an artillery position, “The British Grenadiers and Guards at the same time labouring under a smart and incessant fire from the Rebels out of a wood and above them, most nobly charged them without firing a shot and drove them before them,” noting that as Stirling's Continentals withdrew, “they [were] covering their retreat with their Light Troops from one patch of woodland to another firing upon us, as we advanced into the cleared intervals until our Cannon surmounted the summits from one to another which effectually drove them beyond its Posts.”191

  On the right, at the head of the 1st Grenadier Battalion, “Lieutenant Colonel Medows distinguished himself most particularly on that day in leading on his grenadiers on horseback, with the intention of charging the enemy's line without firing,” Capt. George Harris of the 5th Grenadier Company recalled. “In this situation he received a shot, in the act of waving his sword-arm just above the elbow, that went out at the back, knocking him off his horse, and the fall breaking his opposite collar-bone.”192 Medows toppled out of his saddle and fell hard to the ground, crumpled in a bleeding heap. Capt. Henry Lee of Virginia wrote, “The opposing enemy was severely handled; and the leading officer of one of the columns, with several others, was killed.”193