Countdown to D-Day

by Peter Margaritis

  3Foreign Armies West, the German Army’s Intelligence branch. See Glossary.

  4Forty-three-year-old von Roenne was a decorated wounded hero of World War I. His Foreign Armies West was actually a part of the Army High Command, directly responsible for all the military intelligence in the Western Theater. A devout Catholic who despised the Nazi regime, he would later play a part in the July plot of 1944.

  5Von Salmuth, born in Metz, was a stocky, self-confident leader with a reputation for being outspoken. Like most of his peers, he was a veteran of World War I. Now at 55 years old, he had accumulated plenty of wartime experience. When World War II broke out, he initially served as chief of staff to General von Bock commanding Heeresgruppe Nord in the invasion of Poland (Fall Weiss—“Case White”), and then later in the Dutch invasion of 1940. In the spring of 1941, on the Östfront, he took over command of 30th Corps and later served in the opening invasion of Russia and the Sevastopol campaign. The next summer, he was given command of the Second Army, and was part of the drive on Stalingrad, covering the northern flank of von Weich’s army group. He later took part in the fierce Russian counterattack in November.

  Then, in January of 1943, his command was attacked and encircled by a mighty Russian winter counteroffensive. It found itself on the brink of a smaller Stalingrad. Von Salmuth, a practical fellow (who had learned from von Paulus’ fateful decision to hold fast), rejected the Führer’s usual “stand-and-hold” order. Instead, in a daring counterattack, he led his men in a hard-fought breakout that rescued his army. Still, he had disobeyed orders, unfortunately in the same month that von Paulus surrendered to the Russians. Hitler had still not learned the harsh lessons of the Sixth Army’s fate, so in early February, von Salmuth was cashiered, a humiliating experience that left him bitter and resentful. Eventually, OKW begrudged him the possibility that he had done the right thing and he had after all saved his army. So four months later, he was restored to duty and given command of the Fourth Army on the Russian Front while its commander, Gotthard Heinrici, went on sick leave. His previous defiance to orders though, had earned him the disfavor of the Führer and had made him a number of enemies. So after the failed Kurst offensive in July 1943 and after Heinrici had returned from leave, von Salmuth relinquished his command.

  He was eventually reassigned to the West and posted to command the Fifteenth Army on August 1, 1943. His hatred of Hitler and the Nazis though, after being (in his mind) unjustly fired that time in Russia, never left him. Since then, he shared a number of conversations with fellow officers who were a part of the resistance against Hitler.

  6This was a large symposium held by the Allies between October 18 and November 11, 1943. Attending were the senior diplomats, generals, and foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The opening statement called them to “continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender.” The outcome included resolutions to eliminate Italian fascism, the restoration of Austrian, Greek, and Yugoslavian independence, recognition of German atrocities and a resolve to see the perpetrators punished, and the creation of a Big Four postwar organization (The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China).

  An In-depth Inspection of the Coast—The Reluctant Messenger

  With this new and disconcerting study coming from the West, it seemed that someone from the High Command would have to fly to France and verify von Rundstedt’s findings. Alfred Jodl unenthusiastically figured that it would probably end up being him, because this type of task had so many times in the past landed on his shoulders.

  Jodl did not want to take the trip for a number of reasons. First of all, he would have to be away from the critical operational aspects of the High Command for about a month. Without him there, and with Keitel in full charge, his absence might prove to be operationally fatal.

  Second, winter was coming. Jodl had a nice, convenient, comfortable working environment at the Berghof, and in his quarters, a special villa in the Berghof compound, he had all the comforts of home. He wanted for naught.

  In contrast, it would be wet, chilly and blustery walking along that exposed coastline, and there was a great deal of coastline that he would have to cover: realistically, this would not be a short trip. Depending upon how detailed an inspection he made, he could very well be gone for weeks. All that time away from home, and his family; away from High Command operations where he was so badly needed; staying every night in a different set of uncomfortable quarters; walking out in the cold along dreary beaches, and always so near the shores of an active enemy.

  Besides, there was a third reason for not wanting to be the one to go, to him a critically important personal one. He was not sure how the Führer would react to the results he knew in his heart he would probably have to convey. The Führer had acquired a bad habit of sometimes picking on the messenger, and Jodl believed that this might be very well be one of those occasions. The Führer had boasted about the Atlantic Wall publically and privately for well over a year; not just in private circles, but officially, through Goebbels’ propaganda organization. He would be furious to find out that the bristling steel and concrete defense belt along the coast was just a paper tiger. And if that happened, there was a definite chance that the herald would be targeted along with the message.

  It had happened a number of times in the past, as he knew from personal experience. Jodl had made such an inspection trip a year ago, with near-disastrous results to his career and possibly even to his life. The event had certainly changed his once-close relationship with the Führer, as well as with the High Command.

  Jodl thought back…

  In early September of 1942, at Hitler’s insistence, Jodl had flown to southern Russia to scope out the enemy defenses in the area around Tuapse, a strategic port on the Black Sea. OKW was planning a large airborne landing around that area to threaten the Russian rear and to force them back. This operation was designed to motivate Feldmarschall Wilhelm List, the general in charge of that front, to make a move and order his alpine units through the steep passes of the Caucasus mountains and onward, downward, towards the Black Sea. From there, bolstered by an airborne landing, they could easily capture the crucial Maikop and Grozny oil fields, thus bringing welcome relief to the Reich’s critically short petrol supply. Additionally, they would deprive the Russians of important ports. List was to be given his instructions in no uncertain terms. Hitler did not trust the Heeres chief of staff, 59-year-old Franz Halder, to do his bidding for this task. Besides, the Führer and Jodl had worked well together up until now, and he trusted Jodl’s judgment implicitly.

  So Jodl had dutifully left the Werwolf1 and flown out to Stalino very early on the Monday morning of September 7 to study the brutal rocky terrain at first hand. An experienced mountain artillery officer from World War I, he had talked at length to List, his headquarters staff, and to General Konrad, commanding the

  49 Gebirgskorps engaged against the enemy.2 Jodl had found out that, contrary to what Hitler believed (which was influenced by the fact that Hitler had never really taken a liking to List anyway), the field marshal was indeed doing nearly as well as possible, given the enormity of his task and his limited resources.3 Jodl concluded that any strategic air landing would fail, especially in the face of strong Soviet forces in the area. And because of the spread-out deployment of List’s tired and depleted units, they would never be able to relieve the paratroopers.

  Jodl dutifully flew all the way back to the Werwolf that same day, and he reported his findings to the Führer late that evening. Hitler though, expecting to hear good news, did not take the report well. He had assumed that Jodl on his behalf would jump down List’s back and sternly impose the Führer’s will; that the field marshal would do whatever was needed to start making substantial progress in his advance any way that he could. A move forward was critically needed to make sure that t
he upcoming airborne landing would be successful.

  Jodl explained that an airborne landing would be doomed, because List could not at present advance to relieve the paratroopers. Furthermore, there were substantial enemy units in the potential drop zones. In response, Hitler became angry, more than anything because Jodl had taken List’s pessimistic position over his own.

  As Jodl only later found out, the Führer that day was in no mood for what he now considered insolence. He had over the last couple weeks become even more frustrated with the Russian campaign. The enemy was not only stubbornly holding out but apparently actually getting stronger every week, and Hitler had become increasingly impatient, his moods fouler. Only two weeks ago, 4 Army Chief Franz Halder had reported that Walter Model’s Ninth Army near Rzhev5 was battered and tired, had been heavily assaulted by Soviets and was in a state of near collapse. Halder insisted they be allowed to withdraw to defend a shorter line. Hitler had exploded in a fiery temper.

  “You always seem to make the same suggestion—retreat!” he had shouted. “I expect my commanders to be as tough as the fighting troops!”

  Halder for once had lost his temper. He had icily retorted that German Feldgrau and lieutenants were falling by the thousands just because their commanders were not being allowed to make the only reasonable, possible command decisions.

  Hitler, infuriated, had shouted back, “ GeneralOberst! Halder, how dare you use language like that in front of me! Do you think you can teach me what the man at the front is thinking?!? What do you know about what goes on at the front?!? Where were you in the First World War? You were as chairbound in that one as you are in this one! You don’t even have a wound stripe on your uniform! And you try to pretend to me that I don’t understand what it’s like at the front. I won’t stand that! It’s outrageous.”

  He had been referring of course to Halder’s lack of combat experience, Halder having served in World War I first as an ordnance officer, then as a staff officer. Hitler had later remarked, “If I listen to General Halder much longer, I’ll become a pacifist.” And then just a few days previously, the Führer had complained again about Halder, adding, “With Jodl, I know where I stand. He says what he thinks.”

  Now though, it seemed that his own operations chief was turning on him. And now, as he had several times before with other generals in other critical situations, Hitler turned his wrath on a surprised Jodl. He called him a defeatist and bluntly accused him of having wasted their time. Here, like so many other defeatist generals, Jodl too was now presenting him with another “cannot-be-done” attitude, and unlike the Führer’s senior Nazi and SS leaders, was also giving him some Army insolence to go with it—just like Halder had done. Raising his eyes to the ceiling and throwing his arms out dramatically, Hitler declared mordantly, “As soon as one of my senior commanders gets out of my sight, he seems to fall under some sort of alien spell. I can’t count on anyone, unless I’m standing right next to him at all times.”

  In the cold silence following his remark, Hitler paused and then, looking at the map, grumbled that List should never have divided his forces in the first place. In typical blitkrieg doctrine, he should have massed his mobile units at one strategic point and smashed through the Russian lines.

  After a short pause, Jodi pointed out that it was the Führer himself who had ordered List to move forward all along a broader front, forcing him in doing so to spread his men out. The implication was that it had been the Führer’s own hubris that had convinced him to change their grand strategy to try and take both Stalingrad and the Caucasus at the same time. And that is what had put them where they were now—losing the one and failing to take the other.

  Hitler became wide-eyed at this apparent betrayal and had barked “That’s a lie!” He growled that he never had given such an order.

  Jodl, tired and irritated after his long round trip and this unexpected, unfounded indignation in front of the others (including several subordinates), straightened his wiry frame and again coldly defended his assessments. He insisted that List’s performance was as good as could be expected, given the enormity of his task, logistical problems (their supplies had to go over mountain roads by mule), a strong enemy presence, tired resources, and the treacherous mountain terrain he was in.

  Hitler snarled back, “I didn’t send you Jodl, to hear you report on all the difficulties. You were supposed to represent my view that paratroopers were to be landed in Tuapse. THAT was your job!” His eyes blazing, he added, “Instead of that, you come back here, completely under the influence of the frontline commanders. You’re nothing but the megaphone of these gentlemen! I didn’t need to send you there for that.”

  To make matters worse, earlier that day OKW had received a message from that mountain corps that they were starting to withdraw their recon units from the mountain passes. “Apparently,” Hitler concluded spitefully, “that is the only success of your flight.”

  Jodl had a sharp Bavarian temper, and he rarely minced his words. Yet he nearly always had maintained a substantial degree of tact and control in his work, especially to the Führer whom he had until now respected. However, after that last biting remark in this tirade, one aimed directly at him, he tensed up, infuriated at the accusation of being just another Nazi toady.

  Throwing caution to the winds, he replied frostily, “If you want to lose your paratroopers, then drop them on Tuapse. And the same thing will happen to the Alpine troops if they have to move over those mountain passes at this time of year.” Pausing, he had added stonily, “Apart from that, I wasn’t sent down there just to hand over your orders, but to make a study of the situation.”

  The room had become deathly quiet as he concluded, “If all you want is an orderly, then you don’t need me, when you can use any rank-and-file private.”6

  The Führer, already fuming, became livid at this outright insolence in front of the others. He yelled back, “You should have forced them to accept my orders in spite of all their objections, which I so often get. That was your mission, General Jodl, and you have failed to carry it out. Thank you. You are dismissed.”

  Glaring, Jodl curtly turned and stormed out of the room, slamming the door behind him.7 He found out later that Hitler turned to his army adjutant, Rudolf Schmundt, and growled that he would never again eat at the same table with Jodl and Keitel. He then stalked out of the room himself. Several senior officers present quietly shook their heads. It was soon reported that Hitler after the meeting bitterly remarked that not since World War I had an army been so betrayed.

  Hitler from then on ruthlessly and coldly excommunicated all of his generals and admirals—officially, emotionally, and of course, socially. The atmosphere at the forest headquarters for the next week or so was icy. Hitler holed himself up in his dark blockhouse and never emerged until late at night, not to be seen, and definitely not to be approached. Conferences were conducted only in his hut, and with only a few individuals.

  At these small subsequent staff meetings, Hitler pointedly ignored both Jodl and Keitel, his superior, as if they were not there. He no longer addressed Jodl by name as he had before, and would not shake hands with him, or with any other general for that matter. And he never again took his meals in the headquarters mess hall.

  The ever-loyal, acquiescent Keitel, who was totally taken in by the Führer and had catered to his every whim for years, 8 took this rebuke hard. For days on end, he would walk about the headquarters, brooding and sulking.

  A short time later, Hitler ordered Martin Bormann (who now arrogantly sat in Jodl’s chair at meals) to get a half-dozen or so stenographers to be present at each conference to record the proceedings. That way, the Führer could never again stand accused of saying something not written down, and in turn, those present could be held accountable for everything that they said or were told.9

  As expected, General List had been sacked soon afterward—two days later, on September 9, getting the dismissal by telephone from Keitel.10 It was assumed that Jodl wou
ld shortly follow suit, although no one had the faintest idea of who they would or even could get to replace him. Jodl had been a critically important, central part of OKW operations since before the war had begun. And yet, to openly defy the Führer like that—no, essential or not, Jodl’s days at OKW would soon end.11

  Jodl himself told his operations deputy chief Walther Warlimont about the incident the next day. After summing up the main points of what had happened, he admitted somewhat ruefully that he had been wrong to react to the Führer as he had. He added in a fairly embarrassed tone, “You should never try to point out to a dictator where he has gone wrong, because this will shake his self-confidence; which is the main pillar upon which his personality and actions are based.”

  They had then discussed his replacement at length. Jodl had concluded, “I just hope he’ll try to find a successor for me among the army generals!” He had paused and then added bitterly, “But he will never again have such staunch National-Socials as me and Scherff.”12

  He and Warlimont continued to discuss the matter for a while, Jodl now regretful over losing his temper the way he had. He finally looked at Warlimont and said, “Keep yourself out of the briefing conferences from now on. It’s too depressing having to go through that.”

  Indeed to Jodl, his days at OKW indeed seemed numbered, like those of General Halder, who had been sacked just a week before. Surprisingly though, Jodl was not dismissed. Hitler, egotistical as he was, had the common sense to realize how indispensable Jodl was to his staff. Naturally though, having exchanged such harsh words with the leader (and especially in the presence of others), Jodl continued to be on his bad side from then on, the common fate of most military commanders who dared question the Führer, much less argue with him. Certainly no Nazi party member or SS leader would ever dream of doing such a thing.

  Jodl found out six months later that Keitel had been slated to be dismissed as well, to be replaced by Kesselring. Jodl himself was to have been replaced by General von Paulus as soon as the Sixth Army had taken Stalingrad. Von Paulus though, had of course ultimately surrendered his forces and had shamefully been taken prisoner, so the change never occurred.