Countdown to D-Day

by Peter Margaritis

  Yes, things had indeed been brittle for quite a while. The Führer rarely socialized with his officers after that, and continued dining alone in his private blockhouse, seldom leaving it, except after dark.

  ***

  Now, some 14 months later, the episode was behind them, but for Jodl it had indeed been a close call.13 It had also permanently corrupted Jodl’s relationship with the Führer, who even now never shook hands with him, nor ever addressed him by name. Still, Hitler and Jodl were at least back on speaking terms, although their relationship would probably never be as relaxed and affable as it had been before.14 No, Jodl definitely did not want to risk such an episode again for this inspection trip. Someone else would have to go instead. Somebody qualified, whose opinion the Führer would respect.

  When he had first read von Rundstedt’s report, Jodl immediately thought about Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel. He was just recently out of a job, because the Führer had relieved him from the Northern Italian Front, and these days, he was sometimes present at OKW. Once considered likely to become OB Südouest, 15 he had lost out when the Führer had instead decided to give command of the Italian Front to optimistic Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring (“Smiling Albert,” they sometimes called him), whose plans to defend Italy were much more proactively aggressive.

  Now Rommel’s occasional, relatively inactive presence at OKW made for a somewhat awkward situation, especially since the war situation was getting worse. If von Rundstedt’s claims about the Atlantic coastline were right, Rommel was certainly available to go there and make a painstaking inspection to confirm them (and of course, possibly take some of the heat for the bad news) or deny them. In any event, he could then stay to revitalize the defensive effort on the coast along with his also-out-of-work army group staff, which the Führer had insisted remain intact for any unexpected contingencies.

  It all made good sense. By sending Rommel, Jodl would be killing two birds with one stone, so to speak. At the same time, Jodl could later take some credit for getting an accurate assessment of the coastal defenses and of getting Rommel both gainfully employed once more, and back in the Führer’s good graces. Besides, who knew more about fighting the Western Allies (especially the Americans) than Rommel? Well, maybe Kesselring, but he was fully engaged holding them back in Italy.

  Jodl quickly had a proposal drafted up at the end of October that called for Rommel and his staff to become the cadre for an inspection group, 16 which might eventually become a new army group. Its purpose would be to counterstrike against the Western Allies, wherever they chose to invade. This new army group staff would, at least for now, answer directly to OKW

  When Jodl first proposed the idea to the Führer, he did not at first enthusiastically endorse it, although he did find it intriguing. He and Jodl discussed the pros and cons of sending Rommel for a couple days before Hitler finally agreed to it. Rommel would be tasked only with inspecting the Atlantic Wall. Possibly, eventually, he might be given area command of its defense, though the Führer insisted that the initial order should only give him power to make “study assignments.” The theater commander would of course remain von Rundstedt, because putting the junior field marshal over the old Prussian would not be appropriate. And anyway, Hitler was not quite sure that Rommel had overcome his defeatist depression, his Afrikanische Krankheit17 from North Africa. No, let him just go out there for now and look around. Working together with von Rundstedt, his observations would be helpful.

  Consequently, Rommel was to be given the assignment. The Desert Fox would once more be on the move, inspecting and formulating ideas for better defenses against the enemy, only now it would be against the inevitable upcoming invasion in the West. He was to draw up possible plans for a counterattack, based on different scenarios, as well as make suggestions for improving the defenses. He was also to come up with ideas to create additional fighting units out of the reserve or auxiliary units, as well as suggestions for moving troops from quiet areas to those directly threatened. Lastly, he was to provide guidance on the best possible disposition of the panzer forces to allow them the fastest, most powerful reaction to the landing, whenever or wherever it took place.

  At the Führer’s behest, OKW sent for Rommel to report to the Wolfsschanze in East Prussia.18 In the meantime though, Hitler and Jodl realized that the risk of a weak coastal defensive system in the West had to be addressed on a broad spectrum, and without delay. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, they had to assume for the moment that von Rundstedt’s report was accurate. After all, stubborn and rebellious though he might be, the old man usually was usually accurate in his military assessments.

  So Hitler directed Jodl to draft a general directive for the Western commanders to follow, stressing the need for preparation to meet the expected invasion. The order, Führerweisung Nr. 51, 19 was dated November 3, 1943. It essentially accepted most of the field marshal’s conclusions and acknowledged the presence of this new threat from the Western Allies. Unlike the Eastern Front, where any setback could be partially offset by a modest retreat, a breakthrough in the West would have immediate, dire consequences on the direction of the war. Thus, a solid Western shield had to be developed quickly.

  The directive went on to list specific instructions to all commands and all the different branches of service (including the Waffen-SS) on steps to take to build the defenses in the West. Details included unit types, movement policies, buildup plans, and general battle strategies to be followed. Also, no unit could be transferred out of Western Europe without Hitler’s permission. At the same time, OB West was directed to minimize garrisons in areas of low threat and to improve the counterattack capabilities of his forces (including all the static units) by somehow improving their mobility through internal resources.

  The directive cited the strong evidence that the Allies would invade France in the upcoming year, most likely by spring, and that the most likely area was the Pas-de-Calais.

  Should the enemy, by concentrating his armed might, succeed in landing, he must be hit by the full fury of our counterattack. The problem will be, by the rapid concentration of adequate forces and material, as well as intensive training, to form available large units into an offensive reserve of high fighting quality, attacking power and mobility. The counterattack of these units will prevent the enemy from exploiting the landing, and throw him back into the sea.

  I can therefore no longer take responsibility for further weakening the West, in favor of other theaters of war. I have therefore decided to reinforce its defenses, particularly those places from which the long-range bombardment of England will begin. For it is here that the enemy must and will attack, and it is here—unless all indications are misleading—that the decisive battle against the landing forces will be fought…

  [Therefore] all persons in authority will guard against wasting time and energy in useless quibbling about jurisdictional matters and will direct all efforts toward strengthening our defensive and offensive power.

  1Hitler’s Werewolf headquarters, located in a dense pinewood area, about 15km northeast of the central Ukrainian town of Vinnitsa, and abut 260km from its capital, Kiev. Started in December 1941, it was finished the next June under a mantle of secrecy. (Rumors had spread that the site was to be a sanatorium for officers.)

  2General der Gebirgstruppe Rudolf Konrad, commanding the XLIX Mountain Corps. Konrad was eventually relieved of his command in the late spring of 1944 for losing the Crimea and Sevastopol.He was given a number of lesser commands for the rest of the war, until he was captured in May 1945 and spent two years in prison.

  3Wilhelm List, who had played a major role in both the French campaign of 1940 and the invasion of Greece in 1941, had been recalled to active service as recently as late June to command this front. Hitler split Army Group South into two smaller groups: Army Group A and Army Group B. List was given Army Group A and charged with taking the critical port of Rostov, capturing the oilfields, and then taking Baku. The offensive had
started in July, but had bogged down. In late August, List gave a lackluster report to Hitler at his Werewolf headquarters in Vinnitsa, and, while the Führer was pleasant enough to the field marshal, he afterwards complained about he had been duped into appointing this man to the position.

  4Field Marshal Halder and historian John Toland put the date as August 24. Irving put it at September 7.

  5A Russian city on the Volga, about 183 kilometers northwest of Moscow.

  6One source quoted Jodl as saying, “If you had wanted a mere messenger, why hadn’t you sent a young lieutenant?”

  7Irving writes that it was Hitler who first “stalked out,” but other sources (including Jodl himself) claim otherwise.

  8One time Hitler, consumed by a wild rage, had thrown a file down onto the floor in the presence of Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont. Keitel, frozen with fear, had just stood there, a look of terror on his face.

  9Nearly a dozen stenographers arrived from the Reichstag 48 hours later. They were at once put in uniform, ordered to take the oath of allegiance to the Führer (given by Hitler personally), and set up in a wooden hut nearby. They were then given a rotation schedule in which two of them would be present to record proceedings at each conference.

  10List spent the remainder of the war at his home near Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

  11Jodl had indeed been slated to be replaced by General von Paulus as soon as the Sixth Army took Stalingrad. Von Paulus of course had never made it out of Stalingrad, and the change had not occurred.

  12General Walter Scherff, the chief OKW historian, appointed by Hitler in 1942 to document the Reich’s war history.

  13Warlimont later wrote that both Keitel and Jodl now seemed to be able to find the time to confide in him and to seek his opinions, something they had haughtily never bothered to do before. Keitel had once despondently asked him how he could possibly continue as Wehrmacht Chief of Staff and still keep his self-respect. Warlimont had responded by telling him that only he could answer that.

  14See daily entry for January 30, 1944.

  15The army group in Italy had been designated in 1941 as Heeresgruppe Süd. In 1943, it was redesignated Heeresgruppe Südwest to avoid confusion with Heeresgruppe Süd in Russia.

  16Jodl’s initial entry on October 28 for the idea first referred to Rommel’s staff as Eingreifsstab Rommel (Intervention Staff-Rommel). Its purpose would be twofold: to act as Inspector-General for coastal defenses, and to command defenses in Western Europe if the enemy invaded,

  17“African sickness.” It was a term coined by Hitler in reference to Rommel’s pronounced change in attitude into a seemingly pessimistic, defeatist mood during his last few months in North Africa.

  18“Wolf’s Lair,” the Führer’s first, advanced strategic headquarters on the Eastern Front, designed so that he could better direct the Eastern Front operations. Surrounded by mines and barbed wire, it was a 1.5 ×2km compound, surrounded by a breezeless, dense pine forest, about 8km east of Rastenburg, East Prussia (now Ketrzyn, Poland). Hot and humid in the summer and cold and damp in the winter, it was isolated from the pulse of the Reich’s daily governmental and military functions. Jodl once referred to it as “a mixture of cloister and concentration camp.”

  Most of his major advance headquarters bore the word “wolf” in their title.

  19War Directive No. 51. The War Directives (Führerweisungen) were strategic orders issued by Hitler himself. Covering an assortment of topics, each was written to provide instructions for an upcoming campaign, strategic direction, political policy, or management of occupied territories. A total of 80 were issued. A Weisung was not to be confused with a Direct Order (Führerbefehl) which was a special instructive edict, more immediate and imperative in nature.

  Rommel is Given His Assignment

  Generalfeldmarschall Johannes Erwin Eugen Rommel, a week and a half away from his 52nd birthday, reported to the Wolfsschanze in Bavaria on November 5, 1943. Together with General Jodl and Field Marshal Keitel, the Führer himself began their proposal by first reviewing the situation in the West. Hitler told Rommel about OB West’s troubling summary of October 25, which stated that their celebrated Atlantic Wall was anything but formidable. And Army Intelligence had confirmed that the invasion of Western Europe was only a matter of months away.

  The field marshal listened attentively as the Führer went on. Until such time as the new Wunderwaffe (miracle weapons)1 came into full production, the Reich simply had to hold off the Allies. Unfortunately, most of their armies were committed to stemming off those accursed Russians. The few units in Italy were just barely holding their own. If a third front were opened now in the West, it would finish them off. And von Rundstedt’s recent assessment indicated that they were wide open out there. Hitler needed a reliable, competent officer to assess the situation locally and come up with a badly needed plan to shore up their defenses if they were to have any hope at all of repulsing the British and the Americans.

  So to that effect, the Führer told Rommel in his best encouraging tone that he had an inspiring answer to their dilemma: he wanted his best western commander to go to France and ascertain the situation himself by thoroughly inspecting the Channel coast. He wanted Rommel to verify or disavow von Rundstedt’s troubling report, and in any case, provide logical and effective suggestions to improve their defenses. Rommel was to take his now-displaced army group staff and extensively tour the entire western coastline, from Denmark down to the southwestern French seashores, and across to the French Mediterranean coast. The Führer of course put his best spin on the idea and stressed how critical a task this was. The fate of the Reich, he concluded solemnly, depended on what Rommel could do.

  At the end of their discussion, the Führer decided to give him some more incentive. He indirectly suggested that perhaps, just perhaps, Rommel himself might be given tactical command of the battle when it began; under the Führer’s guidance, of course. He had not entirely accepted Jodl’s objections after all.

  This series of meetings had a profoundly positive impact on the field marshal, who had by now begun to wonder how badly he had fallen in favor. Now though, he was relieved that he was still critically needed.

  The operational orders were drafted and officially issued the next day, November 6. Rommel was appointed Befehlshaber, Heeresgruppe B.z.b.v.2 This army group would be answerable directly to the Führer and receive its instructions through Jodl’s Operational Staff at OKW.

  Rommel’s group was given two directives:

  •Study the defense preparedness of the coasts occupied by the Reich and then submit proposals for improvement

  •Create options for offensive operations against an enemy landing.

  The operational orders called for his first tour to start in Denmark; he should evaluate the defenses there, and submit his findings. Similarly, he was to check out the Artois, the Netherlands, Normandy, the Cotentin peninsula, and then Brittany. All commands in the area were to be instructed to fully cooperate with him.

  As Rommel began his planning though, his new enthusiasm seemed to fluctuate. A day or so after the appointment, he attended another conference. He, Jodl, and the Führer further discussed the situation in the West, and how best to defend against the inevitable landing that would come next year. Rommel, considered by most as an expert in techniques for fighting the Western Allies, was convinced that the enemy had to be defeated right on the coast.

  The Führer, bolstered by the theories of the General Staff and his experiences in Italy, was not so sure. He questioned putting all their units right up front, where the enemy could easily batter them with their command of the sea and air. Rommel was irritated that the Führer sided on this matter with the General Staff (which in his mind, had been traditionally antagonistic towards him). What had happened to his confidence in Rommel’s judgment?

  The meeting finally ended, the issue unsettled, and Hitler accompanied him outside the bunker. Rommel heard strains of music coming from one of the nearby quarters. Alth
ough he could not hear the needle scratches, it was probably a record: the Führer did not encourage much radio listening, especially from enemy broadcasts. Churchill’s speeches in particular rankled him.

  They continued talking as they walked, the Führer’s overinflated optimism about repelling the invasion clearly evident as he talked. Rommel was still somewhat frustrated over the unresolved general strategy. And some analysis of von Rundstedt’s report pointed to the probability that the old Prussian’s assessment was accurate, and so this new assignment would be a losing proposition. The Atlantic coast seemed woefully ill-prepared to meet any sort of major landing. He tried gently but firmly to point this out. Then he again tried to win his point on general strategy.

  “Mein Führer, we must repulse the enemy at his first landing site. Those pillboxes around the ports don’t do the trick. Only primitive but effective barriers and obstacles all along the coast can make the landing so difficult that our countermeasures will be effective.” The Führer said nothing. Reacting to this, Rommel pushed further. Maybe a low dose of reality here.

  “If we don’t manage to throw them back at once, the invasion will succeed, in spite of der Atlantikwall.”

  “Perhaps when we mount an effective counterattack—”

  Rommel interrupted him. “We won’t be able to. Overwhelming enemy airpower will take care of that. I know. I’ve seen it.”

  “You know, Rommel, we’ve seen before that airpower does have its limitations. Even our mighty Luftwaffe was stopped in 1940 by that pitiful RAF.”

  “Yes, but large numbers make a big difference,” replied Rommel patiently, omitting the “mein Führer” he so regularly used. He was trying hard to be polite, but his frustration was welling up inside.