The Idea of Justice
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16. I discussed the distinctions between these four categories in my 1984
Dewey Lectures: ‘Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984’, Journal of Philosophy, 82 (1985). The distinctions and their disparate relevance have been further pursued in my book, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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e q u a l i t y a n d l i b e r t y
1. Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
2. See Robert Nozick, ‘Distributive Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3 (1973), and Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974); James Buchanan, Liberty, Market and the State (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), and ‘The Ethical Limits of Taxation’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 86 (1984). See also James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
3. Richard Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Level, Method and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 26; John Harsanyi, ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour’, in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 47.
4. William Letwin (ed.), Against Equality: Readings on Economic and Social Policy (London: Macmillan, 1983).
5. Harry Frankfurt, ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal’, in Letwin (ed.), Against Equality (1983), p. 21.
6. In his engaging and stronlgly worded attack on mainstream political philosophy, Raymond Geuss points to the important fact that in many 441
n o t e s t o p p . 294 – 310
theories of justice in the past, the need for unequal treatment is enshrined, rather than shunned: ‘The Roman legal code conceptualized with firm and unwavering clarity the almost universally shared ‘‘intuition’’ that to treat a slave as if he or she had any entitlements would be a gross violation of the basic principles of justice’ (Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 74). Geuss’s point is well taken (and his analysis of the relevance of disparities of power points to a significant issue), but it is also particularly important to distinguish between that kind of rejection of equality as a principle and Frankfurt’s argument against equality in some narrowly characterized space for the sake of other impartial values, including equality in what he would consider to be a more significant space.
7. The Marxian perspective on this is well developed in Maurice Dobb’s classic writings: Political Economy and Capitalism (London: Routledge, 1937), and Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). See also G. A. Cohen’s contributions: Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), and History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). I have attempted to scrutinize the labour theory of value in terms of its descriptive and evaluative contents in ‘On the Labour Theory of Value: Some Methodological Issues’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2 (1978).
8. On this, see my ‘Liberty and Social Choice’, Journal of Philosophy, 80
(1983), and Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Clarendon Press, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
9. A discussion of this kind of ‘effectiveness’ and its pervasive relevance in modern society can be found in my ‘Liberty as Control: An Appraisal’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7 (1982).
10. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1869). See also Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
11. See Philip Pettit, ‘Liberalism and Republicanism’, Australasian Journal of Political Science, 28 (1993); Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); and A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); and Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
12. This plurality was defended in my 1984 Dewey Lectures, published as
‘Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984’, Journal of Philosophy, 82 (1985); see particularly the third lecture.
13. This was presented in my ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’, Journal 442
n o t e s t o p p . 310 – 315
of Political Economy, 78 (1970), and in Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day, 1970, and Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979), Chapter 6.
14. See particularly Christian Seidl, ‘On Liberal Values’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie, 35 (1975).
15. See Kotaro Suzumura, ‘On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims’, Reviewof Economic Studies, 45 (1978); and Peter Hammond, ‘Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle’, in J. Cohen, (ed.), Proceedings of the 6th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981), and ‘Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information’, in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
16. See Julian Blau, ‘Liberal Values and Independence’, Reviewof Economic Studies, 42 (1975); Michael J. Farrell, ‘Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice’, Reviewof Economic Studies, 43 (1976); Wulf Gaertner and Lorenz Kruger, ‘Self-Supporting Preferences and Individual Rights: The Possibility of a Paretian Liberal’, Economica, 48 (1981).
17. In what follows, I have used my discussion of this issue in ‘Minimal Liberty’, Economica, 59 (1992).
18. See Roy Gardner, ‘The Strategic Inconsistency of Paretian Liberalism’, Public Choice, 35 (1980); Friedrich Breyer and Roy Gardner, ‘Liberal Paradox, Game Equilibrium and Gibbard Optimum’, Public Choice, 35 (1980); Kaushik Basu, ‘The Right to Give up Rights’, Economica, 51 (1984).
19. See Brian Barry, ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Doctor Fischer’s Bomb Party: liberalism, Pareto optimality, and the problem of objectionable preferences’, in Jon Elster and A. Hylland (eds), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and R. Hardin, Morality within the Limits of Reason (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
20. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 165–6. The result referred to is the impossibility of the Paretian liberal.
21. See particularly Peter Gardenfors, ‘Rights, Games and Social Choice’, Nous, 15 (1981); Robert Sugden, The Political Economy of Public Choice (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), and ‘Liberty, Preference and Choice’, Economics and Philosophy, 1 (1985); Wulf Gaertner, Prasanta Pattanaik and Kotaro Suzumura, ‘Individual Rights Revisited’, Economica, 59 (1992).
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n o t e s t o p p . 321 – 328
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d e m o c r a c y a s p u b l i c r e a s o n 1. Aldous Huxley, Point Counter Point (London: Vintage, 2004), pp. 343–4.
2. See particularly Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), and Political Liberalism (1993).
3. Ju¨rgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989); The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984), and Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
4. The so-called liberal theory of public reasoning has been very powerfully championed by Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). See also his spiritedly argumentative essay, ‘Why Dialogue?’, Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989).
5. Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), including her exchanges with Bonnie Honig, Will Kymlicka and Jeremy Waldron. See also Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). On related matters, see also Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
6. See Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (eds), On Democracy (London: Penguin, 1983), and Associations and Democracy (London: Ve
rso, 1995).
7. Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
8. James Buchanan, ‘Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets’, Journal of Political Economy, 62 (1954). See also James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
9. John Rawls, Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 579–80. See also his A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001).
10. John Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’, Journal of Philosophy, 92 (March 1995).
11. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK, and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 9.
12. I have discussed these broader connections in ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’, Journal of Democracy, 10 (1999); ‘Democracy and Its Global Roots’, NewRepublic, 6 October 2003; Identity and Violence: The Illusion 444
n o t e s t o p p . 328 – 345
of Destiny (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., and London and Delhi: Penguin, 2006), pp. 51–5.
13. Aldous Huxley himself was evidently quite familiar with this literature on ancient Indian experiments in urban democracy, as is evident from books that Sidney Quarles cites to his wife as objects of his study in his proposed visit to the Library of the British Museum.
14. This issue is more fully treated in my books, The Argumentative Indian (London and Delhi: Penguin, and New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), and Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., and London: Penguin, 2006).
15. For a fuller discussion of these traditions, with the references to the source material, see The Argumentative Indian (2005) and Identity and Violence (2006).
16. See Nakamura Hajime, ‘Basic Features of the Legal, Political, and Economic Thought of Japan’, in Charles A. Moore (ed.), The Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1973), p. 144.
17. See Ramachandra Guha, ‘Arguments with Sen: Arguments about India’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40 (2005), and Amartya Sen, ‘Our Past and Our Present’, Economic and Political Weekly, 41 (2006).
18. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Boston, MA, and London: Little, Brown & Co., 1994), p. 21.
19. Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: HowMuslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (Boston, MA, and London: Little, Brown & Co., 2002), p. 86.
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t h e p r a c t i c e o f d e m o c r a c y
1. For the sources of this and other citations on the Bengal famine, see my Poverty and Famines (1981), Chapter 9 and Appendix D.
2. On the North Korean famines, including the connection with authoritarian rule, see Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 2002), and Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
3. See T. P. Bernstein, ‘Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants’, Theory and Society, 13 (1984), p. 13. See also Carl Riskin, China’s Political Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
4. Quoted in Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, Talks and Letters: 445
n o t e s t o p p . 345 – 361
1956–71, edited by Stuart Schram (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp. 277–8.
5. See, for example, Adam Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert J. Barro, Getting It Right: Markets and Choices in a Free Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
6. On these issues, see my Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Also, Robin Jeffrey, Politics, Women, and Well-being: HowKerala Became a ‘Model’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); V. K. Ramachandran, ‘Kerala’s Development Achievements’, in Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (eds), Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives (Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
7. Condorcet, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilite´ des decisions rendues à la pluralite´ des voix (1785; New York: Chelsea House, 1972), in Oeuvres de Condorcet, edited by A. Condorcet O’Conner and M. F. Arago (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1847–49), vol. 6, pp. 176–7. See also the discussion on this and related issues in Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), chapter 6.
8. Gandhi wrote on this subject; see The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi: Government of India, 1960). See also my Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., and London and Delhi: Allen Lane, 2006), especially pp. 165–9.
9. On this see my Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (2006).
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h u m a n r i g h t s a n d g l o b a l i m p e r a t i v e s 1. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued during the French Revolution (1792); republished in J. Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. II (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 501.
2. Discussion and defence of this claim can be found in my ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32 (2004), and
‘Human Rights and the Limits of Law’, Cardozo LawJournal, 27 (April 2006). Those essays also present a general framework for the basis, reach and implications of seeing rights as, ultimately, ethical claims satisfying the basic demands of impartial reasoning.
3. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies (1792); in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. II, p. 523.
446
n o t e s t o p p . 362 – 374
4. Accepting a general contrast between the respective categories of ethical assertions and legal pronouncements does not, of course, deny the possibility that ethical views may contribute to the interpretation and substantive content of laws. The recognition of that possibility may go against a strictly positivist theory of law (on which see Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). But it does not obliterate the considerable difference that exists between primarily ethical claims and principally legal proclamations.
5. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution (1791); second part, Combining Principle and Practice (1792); republished, The Rights of Man (London: Dent, and New York: Dutton, 1906). Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, in a Letter to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke; occasioned by his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects (1792); both included in Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, edited by Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
6. H. L. A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, The Philosophical Review, 64
(April 1955), reprinted in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 79.
7. See also my ‘Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984’, Journal of Philosophy, 82 (April 1985); Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); and Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999).
8. Robert E. Goodin and Frank Jackson, ‘Freedom from Fear’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35 (2007), p. 250.
9. For a fuller exploration of the distinction and its far-reaching implications, see my Kenneth Arrow Lectures, ‘Freedom and Social Choice’, included in my Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), essays 20–22.
10. See Chapter 11.
11. The relevance of a consequence-sensitive framework for this type of ethical reasoning is investigated in my essay ‘Rights and Agency’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11 (1982), ‘Positional Objec
tivity’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), and ‘Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy, 97 (2000).
12. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); republished edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and 447
n o t e s t o p p . 374 – 381
Critique of Practical Reason (1788); republished edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
13. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by William David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3.
14. On this, see Andrew Ashworth and Eva Steiner, ‘Criminal Omissions and Public Duties: The French Experience’, Legal Studies, 10 (1990); Glanville Williams, ‘Criminal Omissions: The Conventional View’, LawQuarterly Review, 107 (1991).
15. The connection of rights with obligations – both imperfect and perfect
– was briefly explored and scrutinized in an earlier paper, ‘Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy, 97 (September 2000), and in the introductory chapter to the United Nations’ Human Development Report 2000 (New York: UNDP, 2000), which was based on an essay I wrote for that special issue, ‘Human Rights and Human Development’.
16. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 180.
17. See Ivan Hare, ‘Social Rights as Fundamental Human Rights’, in Bob Hepple (ed.), Social and Labour Rights in Global Context (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
18. Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution; Reconceiving the Regulat-ory State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
19. See, for example, Andrew Kuper’s analysis of Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); see also the collection of essays edited by him, Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human Rights?
(New York and London: Routledge, 2005).
20. The works of Thomas Pogge, along with those of his collaborators, have opened up many areas of policy analysis broadly based on the idea of human rights and the demands of justice. See particularly Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002; 2nd edn, 2008); Andreas Føllesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds), Real World Justice (Berlin: Springer, 2005); Thomas Pogge and Sanjay Reddy, HowNot to Count the Poor (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); Elke Mack, Thomas Pogge, Michael Schramm and Stephan Klasen (eds), Absolute Poverty and Global Justice: Empirical Data – Moral Theories – Realizations (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009).