Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  [62] λέγε τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον.”Νόμος

  ὃς ἂν ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης αἴτιος ᾖ τὸν θεσμὸν συγχυθῆναι τόνδε, ἢ μεταποιήσῃ αὐτόν, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ παῖδας ἀτίμους καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου.”

  ἠκούσατε μὲν τοῦ νόμου λέγοντος ἄντικρυς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ‘ὃς ἂν ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης αἴτιος ᾖ τὸν θεσμὸν συγχυθῆναι τόνδε, ἢ μεταποιήσῃ αὐτόν, ἄτιμος ἔστω καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου.’ ἆρ᾽ οὖν μικρὰν ἢ φαύλην πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὑμῖν ὁ θεὶς τὸν νόμον δοκεῖ, ὅπως κύριος ἔσται καὶ μήτε συγχυθήσεται μήτ᾽ αὖ μεταποιηθήσεται; ἀλλ᾽ Ἀριστοκράτης οὑτοσὶ μικρὰ φροντίσας αὐτοῦ μεταποιεῖ καὶ συγχεῖ. τί γὰρ ἄλλ᾽ ἐστὶν τὸ μεταποιεῖν ἢ ὅταν ἔξω τῶν τεταγμένων δικαστηρίων καὶ ὅρων, ὧν εἴργεσθαι δεῖ, διδῷ τις τὰς τιμωρίας, καὶ τὸ λόγου τυχεῖν ἀναιρῶν ἐκδότους ποιῇ; τί δ᾽ ἄλλο τὸ συγχεῖν ἢ ὅταν ἑξῆς οὑτωσὶ πάντα τἀναντία τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τις γεγραμμένων γράφῃ;

  [62] Read the next statute.”Law

  Whosoever, whether magistrate or private citizen, shall cause this ordinance to be frustrated, or shall alter the same, shall be disfranchised with his children and his property.”

  You have heard the statute, men of Athens, declaring in plain terms that “whosoever, whether magistrate or private citizen, shall cause this ordinance to be frustrated or shall alter the same, shall be disfranchised with his children and his property.” Do you then count this a trifling or worthless precaution taken by the author of the statute to secure its validity, and to save it from being either frustrated or altered? Yet the defendant Aristocrates, with very little regard for the lawgiver, is trying both to alter it and to frustrate it. For surely, to permit punishment outside the established tribunals and beyond the limits of the prohibited areas, or to rob people of the right of fair hearing, and make them outcasts — what is that but alteration? To draft a series of clauses, all of them exactly contradicting the provisions of the statute-book — what is that but frustration?

  [63] οὐ τοίνυν τούτους μόνον τοὺς νόμους, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παραβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς οὓς οὐ παραγεγράμμεθα διὰ τὸ πλῆθος. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ λέγω: ὁπόσοι νόμοι περὶ τῶν φονικῶν δικαστηρίων εἰσίν, καλεῖσθαι λέγοντες ἢ μαρτυρεῖν ἢ διόμνυσθαι τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν προστάττοντες, πάντας ὑπερβέβηκε τούτους καὶ πᾶσιν ἐναντίον εἴρηκεν τὸ ψήφισμα τουτί. οὗ γὰρ οὐ κλῆσις, οὐ κρίσις, οὐ μαρτυρία συνειδότος, οὐ διωμοσία, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αἰτίας εὐθὺς ἡ τιμωρία γέγραπται, καὶ αὕτη ἣν ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις εἴποι; καίτοι ταῦτα πάντ᾽ ἐπὶ πέντε δικαστηρίοις γίγνεται προστεταγμένα τοῖς νόμοις.

  [63] Besides the laws cited, he has violated many other statutes, which we have not put on the schedule because they are so numerous. I offer a summary statement. Take the laws which deal with courts of homicide, and which order the contending parties to summon one another, or to tender evidence, or to take their oaths, or which give them any other direction; he has violated every one of them; he has drafted this decree in contravention of them all. What other account can one give, when there is no summons, no evidence by witnesses of the fact, no oath-taking, — when the penalty follows on the heels of the accusation, and that a penalty forbidden by the laws? Yet all the proceedings I have named are in use, as ordered by statute, at five different tribunals.

  [64] νὴ Δία, ἴσως εἴποι τις ἄν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὐδενός ἐστ᾽ ἄξι᾽ οὐδὲ δικαίως εὑρημένα, ἃ δ᾽ ἔγραψεν οὗτος, δίκαια καὶ καλά. ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον τούτου μὲν τοῦ ψηφίσματος οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἴ τι δεινότερον γέγονεν πώποτ᾽ ἐν ὑμῖν, τούτων δὲ τῶν πάντων ὁπόσ᾽ ἐστὶ δικαστήρι᾽ ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲν οὔτε σεμνότερον οὔτε δικαιότερον φανήσεται. βούλομαι δ᾽ εἰπεῖν διὰ βραχέων ἃ καὶ ζῆλόν τινα καὶ τιμὴν φέρει τῇ πόλει ῥηθέντα καὶ ἡδίους ἔσεσθ᾽ ἀκούσαντες. ἄρξομαι δ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν μάλιστα μαθήσεσθε, ἐπὶ τὴν δωρειὰν ἐπανελθὼν ἣ τῷ Χαριδήμῳ δέδοται.

  [64] — Yes, but, — someone will say, — those tribunals are worthless and unfairly constituted, whereas the proposals of the defendant are righteous and admirable. — I deny it. I say that of all the proposals ever laid before you I know of none more outrageous than this decree, and that of all the tribunals to be found in the whole world there are none that can be shown to be more venerable or more righteous than ours. I desire to speak briefly of certain truths, the relation of which reflects credit and honor upon the city, and which you will be gratified to hear. I will begin with a statement which you will find especially instructive, first referring to the free gift which has already been conferred upon Charidemus.

  [65] ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Χαρίδημον ἐποιησάμεθα πολίτην, καὶ διὰ τῆς δωρειᾶς ταύτης μετεδώκαμεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων καὶ νομίμων καὶ πάντων ὅσων περ αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν ἡμῖν. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι τοιαῦθ᾽ οἷ᾽ οὐχ ἑτέρωθι, ἓν δ᾽ οὖν ἰδιώτατον πάντων καὶ σεμνότατον, τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δικαστήριον, ὑπὲρ οὗ τοσαῦτ᾽ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν καλὰ παραδεδομένα καὶ μυθώδη καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ μάρτυρές ἐσμεν, ὅσα περὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δικαστηρίου: ὧν ὡσπερεὶ δείγματος εἵνεκ᾽ ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἓν ἢ δύ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι.

  [65] It was we, men of Athens, who made Charidemus a citizen, and by that gift bestowed upon him a share in our civil and religious observances, in our legal rights, and in everything in which we ourselves participate. There are many institutions of ours the like of which are not to be found elsewhere, but among them one especially peculiar to ourselves and venerable, — I mean the Court of Areopagus. Concerning that Court I could relate a greater number of noble stories, in part traditional and legendary, in part certified by our own personal testimony, than could be told of any other tribunal. It is worth your while to listen to one or two of them by way of illustration.

  [66] τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν τὰ παλαιά, ὡς ἡμῖν ἀκούειν παραδέδοται, ἐν μόνῳ τούτῳ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δίκας φόνου θεοὶ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν ἠξίωσαν καὶ δικασταὶ γενέσθαι διενεχθεῖσιν ἀλλήλοις, ὡς λόγος: λαβεῖν μὲν Ποσειδῶν ὑπὲρ Ἁλιρροθίου τοῦ υἱοῦ παρ᾽ Ἄρεως, δικάσαι δ᾽ Εὐμενίσιν καὶ Ὀρέστῃ οἱ δώδεκα θεοί. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ παλαιὰ ταῦτα: τὰ δ᾽ ὕστερον, το
ῦτο μόνον τὸ δικαστήριον οὐχὶ τύραννος, οὐκ ὀλιγαρχία, οὐ δημοκρατία τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ἀφελέσθαι τετόλμηκεν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἀσθενέστερον ἂν τὸ δίκαιον εὑρεῖν ἡγοῦνται περὶ τούτων αὐτοὶ τοῦ παρὰ τούτοις εὑρημένου δικαίου. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοιούτοις οὖσιν, ἐνταυθοῖ μόνον οὐδεὶς πώποτ᾽ οὔτε φεύγων ἁλοὺς οὔτε διώκων ἡττηθεὶς ἐξήλεγξεν ὡς ἀδίκως ἐδικάσθη τὰ κριθέντα.

  [66] First, then, in ancient times, as we are told by tradition, in this court alone the gods condescended both to render and to demand satisfaction for homicide, and to sit in judgement upon contending litigants, — Poseidon, according to the legend, deigning to demand justice from Ares on behalf of his son Halirrothius, and the twelve gods to adjudicate between the Eumenides and Orestes. These are ancient stories; let us pass to a later date. This is the only tribunal which no despot, no oligarchy, no democracy, has ever dared to deprive of its jurisdiction in cases of murder, all men agreeing that in such cases no jurisprudence of their own devising could be more effective than that which has been devised in this court. In addition to these great merits, here, and here alone, no convicted defendant and no defeated prosecutor has ever made good any complaint against the justice of the verdict given.

  [67] ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ τὰς ἐν ταύτῃ νομίμους τιμωρίας παραβὰς ὁ γράφων τὸ ψήφισμα τοδὶ ζῶντι μὲν ἐξουσίαν γέγραφεν τῷ Χαριδήμῳ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, παθόντος δέ τι τοῖς οἰκείοις συκοφαντίαν δέδωκεν. σκέψασθε γὰρ οὑτωσί. ἴστε δήπου τοῦθ᾽ ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, οὗ δίδωσ᾽ ὁ νόμος καὶ κελεύει τοῦ φόνου δικάζεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν διομεῖται κατ᾽ ἐξωλείας αὑτοῦ καὶ γένους καὶ οἰκίας ὅ τιν᾽ αἰτιώμενος εἰργάσθαι τι τοιοῦτον,

  [67] And so, in defiance of this safeguard of justice, and of the lawful penalties that it awards, the author of this decree has offered to Charidemus a free licence to do what he likes as long as he lives, and to his friends the right of vindictive prosecution when he is dead. For look at it in this light. You are all of course aware that in the Areopagus, where the law both permits and enjoins the trial of homicide, first, every man who brings accusation of such a crime must make oath by invoking destruction upon himself, his kindred, and his household;

  [68] εἶτ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα τιν᾽ ὅρκον τοῦτο ποιήσει ἀλλ᾽ ὃν οὐδεὶς ὄμνυσ᾽ ὑπὲρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου, στὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τομίων κάπρου καὶ κριοῦ καὶ ταύρου, καὶ τούτων ἐσφαγμένων ὑφ᾽ ὧν δεῖ καὶ ἐν αἷς ἡμέραις καθήκει, ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἐκ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων ἅπαν, ὅσον ἔσθ᾽ ὅσιον, πεπρᾶχθαι. καὶ μετὰ ταῦθ᾽ ὁ τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅρκον ὀμωμοκὼς οὔπω πεπίστευται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἐξελεγχθῇ μὴ λέγων ἀληθῆ, τὴν ἐπιορκίαν ἀπενεγκάμενος τοῖς αὑτοῦ παισὶν καὶ τῷ γένει πλέον οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἕξει.

  [68] secondly, that he must not treat this oath as an ordinary oath, but as one which no man swears for any other purpose; for he stands over the entrails of a boar, a ram, and a bull, and they must have been slaughtered by the necessary officers and on the days appointed, so that in respect both of the time and of the functionaries every requirement of solemnity has been satisfied. Even then the person who has sworn this tremendous oath does not gain immediate credence; and if any falsehood is brought home to him, he will carry away with him to his children and his kindred the stain of perjury, — but gain nothing.

  [69] ἂν δὲ δόξῃ τὰ δίκαι᾽ ἐγκαλεῖν καὶ ἕλῃ τὸν δεδρακότα τοῦ φόνου, οὐδ᾽ οὕτω κύριος γίγνεται τοῦ ἁλόντος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνου μὲν οἱ νόμοι κύριοι κολάσαι καὶ οἷς προστέτακται, τῷ δ᾽ ἐπιδεῖν διδόντα δίκην ἔξεστιν, ἣν ἔταξ᾽ ὁ νόμος, τὸν ἁλόντα, πέρα δ᾽ οὐδὲν τούτου. καὶ τῷ μὲν διώκοντι ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, τῷ δὲ φεύγοντι τὰ μὲν τῆς διωμοσίας ταὐτά, τὸν πρότερον δ᾽ ἔξεστιν εἰπόντα λόγον μεταστῆναι, καὶ οὔθ᾽ ὁ διώκων οὔθ᾽ οἱ δικάζοντες οὔτ᾽ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς κύριος κωλῦσαι.

  [69] If, on the other hand, he is believed to be laying a just charge, and if he proves the accused guilty of murder, even then he has no power over the convicted criminal; only the laws and the appointed officers have power over the man for punishment. The prosecutor is permitted to see him suffering the penalty awarded by law, and that is all. Such are the prosecutor’s rights. As for the defendant, the rules for his oath are the same, but he is free to withdraw after making his first speech, and neither the prosecutor, nor the judges, nor any other man, has authority to stop him.

  [70] τί δήποτ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει; ὅτι οἱ ταῦτ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ νόμιμα διαθέντες, οἵτινές ποτ᾽ ἦσαν, εἴθ᾽ ἥρωες εἴτε θεοί, οὐκ ἐπέθεντο τοῖς ἀτυχήμασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνως ἐπεκούφισαν, εἰς ὅσον εἶχε καλῶς, τὰς συμφοράς. ταῦτα μέντοι πάνθ᾽ οὕτω καλῶς καὶ νομίμως ἔχονθ᾽ ὁ γράφων τὸ ψήφισμα τουτὶ παραβεβηκὼς φαίνεται: ἓν γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἔνι τούτων ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι τῷ τούτου. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν παρ᾽ ἑνὸς τούτου δικαστηρίου καὶ παρὰ τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους καὶ τἄγραφα νόμιμα τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ εἴρηται.

  [70] Now why is that so, men of Athens? Because they who originally ordained these customs, whoever they were, heroes or gods, did not treat evil fortune with severity, but humanely alleviated its calamities, so far as they honestly could. All those regulations, so nobly and equitably conceived, the author of the decree now in question has manifestly infringed, for not a single shred of them is to be found in his decree. — That is my first point: here is one tribunal whose written laws and unwritten usages he has contravened in drafting his decree.

  [71] δεύτερον δ᾽ ἕτερον δικαστήριον τὸ τῶν ἀκουσίων φόνων φανήσεται συγχέων, τοὐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τούτῳ νόμους παραβαίνων. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθ᾽ ὑπόκειται πρῶτον μὲν διωμοσία, δεύτερον δὲ λόγος, τρίτον δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ δικαστηρίου, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τούτου ψηφίσματι. ἂν δ᾽ ἁλῷ καὶ δοκῇ τοὔργον εἰργάσθαι, οὔθ᾽ ὁ διώκων τοῦ δεδρακότος κύριος οὔτ᾽ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὁ νόμος.

  [71] Secondly, there is another tribunal, the court by the Palladium, for the trial of involuntary homicide; and it shall be shown that he nullifies that tribunal also, and transgresses the laws there observed. Here also the order is first the oath-taking, secondly the pleadings, and thirdly the decision of the court; and not one of these processes is found in the defendant’s decree. If the culprit be convicted, and found to have committe
d the act, neither the prosecutor nor any other person has any authority over him, but only the law. And what does the law enjoin?

  [72] τί οὖν ὁ νόμος κελεύει; τὸν ἁλόντ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ ἔν τισιν εἰρημένοις χρόνοις ἀπελθεῖν τακτὴν ὁδόν, καὶ φεύγειν ἕως ἂν †αἰδέσηταί τινα† τῶν ἐν γένει τοῦ πεπονθότος. τηνικαῦτα δ᾽ ἥκειν δέδωκεν ἔστιν ὃν τρόπον, οὐχ ὃν ἂν τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ θῦσαι καὶ καθαρθῆναι καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα διείρηκεν ἃ χρὴ ποιῆσαι, ὀρθῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντα ταῦτα λέγων ὁ νόμος.

  [72] That the man who is convicted of involuntary homicide shall, on certain appointed days, leave the country by a prescribed route, and remain in exile until he is reconciled to one of the relatives of the deceased. Then the law permits him to return, not casually, but in a certain manner; it instructs him to make sacrifice and to purify himself, and gives other directions for his conduct. In all these provisions, men of Athens, the law is right.