Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  [73] καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἐλάττω τὴν τιμωρίαν ἢ τῶν ἑκουσίων τάξαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ παρασχόντ᾽ ἀσφάλειαν ἀπελθεῖν οὕτω προστάττειν φεύγειν ὀρθῶς ἐστιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸ τὸν κατιόνθ᾽ ὁσιοῦν καὶ καθαίρεσθαι νομίμοις τισί, καὶ τὸ τοὺς νόμους κυρίους ἁπάντων εἶναι, καὶ πάντα ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει καλῶς. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἅπαντα δικαίως οὕτω διορισθένθ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς νομοθετησάντων παρέβη γράφων τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ οὑτοσί. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ δύο τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα δικαστήρια καὶ νόμιμ᾽ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου παραδεδομένα οὕτως ἀναιδῶς ὑπερπεπήδηκεν.

  [73] It is just to allot a lesser penalty for involuntary than for willful homicide; it is quite right, before ordering a man to go into exile, to provide for his safe departure; and the provisions for the reinstatement of the returning exile, for his purification by customary rites, and so forth, are excellent. Well, everyone of these ordinances, so righteously enacted by the original legislators, has been transgressed by the defendant in drafting his decree. So we have now two tribunals, of great antiquity and high character, and usages handed down from time immemorial, which he has insolently overridden.

  [74] τρίτον δ᾽ ἕτερον πρὸς τούτοις δικαστήριον, ὃ πάντων ἁγιώτατα τούτων ἔχει καὶ φρικωδέστατα, ἄν τις ὁμολογῇ μὲν κτεῖναι, ἐννόμως δὲ φῇ δεδρακέναι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοὐπὶ Δελφινίῳ. δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ζητῆσαι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἁπάντων οἱ περὶ τούτων ἐν ἀρχῇ τὰ δίκαι᾽ ὁρίσαντες, πότερ᾽ οὐδένα χρὴ φόνον ὅσιον εἶναι νομίζειν ἢ τινά γ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ ὅσιον νομιστέον, λογιζόμενοι δ᾽ ὅτι μητέρ᾽ Ὀρέστης ἀπεκτονὼς ὁμολογῶν θεῶν δικαστῶν τυχὼν ἀποφυγγάνει, νομίσαι δίκαιόν τιν᾽ εἶναι φόνον: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τά γε μὴ δίκαια θεοὺς ψηφίσασθαι. ὡς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐνόμισαν, γράφουσιν ἤδη καὶ διορίζουσι σαφῶς ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτιννύναι.

  [74] Besides these two tribunals there is also a third, whose usages are still more sacred and awe-inspiring, for cases in which a man admits the act of slaying, but pleads that he slew lawfully. That is the court held at the Delphinium. It appears to me, gentlemen of the jury, that the first inquiry made by those who originally defined the rules of jurisprudence in these matters was, whether we are to regard no act of homicide as righteous, or whether any kind of homicide is to be accounted righteous; and that, arguing that Orestes, having slain his own mother, confessing the fact, and finding gods to adjudge his case, was acquitted, they formed the opinion that there is such thing as justifiable homicide, — for gods could not have given an unjust verdict. Having formed this opinion, they immediately set down in writing an exact definition of the conditions under which homicide is lawful.

  [75] ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὗτος οὐδὲν ἀφεῖλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον, κἂν δικαίως, κἂν ὡς οἱ νόμοι διδόασιν, ἔκδοτον ποιεῖ. καίτοι πᾶσίν εἰσι πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις δύο προσθῆκαι, ἡ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου: ἃς ἅμα μὲν ταὐτὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὐδὲν ἂν δύναιτο σχεῖν οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδείς （πῶς γὰρ ἂν δίκαι᾽ ἅμα ταὐτὰ καὶ μὴ γένοιτο;） τὴν ἑτέραν δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔχον δοκιμάζεται, κἂν μὲν τὴν ἄδικον φανῇ, πονηρὸν κρίνεται, ἂν δὲ τὴν δικαίαν, χρηστὸν καὶ καλόν. σὺ τοίνυν οὐδετέραν προσέθηκας τούτων, ‘ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ’ γράφων: ἀλλ᾽ ἀόριστον εἰπὼν αὐτὴν τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ εὐθὺς προσγράψας ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, τρίτον τουτὶ δικαστήριον καὶ τὰ τούτου νόμιμα παραβεβηκὼς φαίνει.

  [75] The defendant, however, admitted no exception; he simply makes an outcast of any man who kills Charidemus, even though he kill him justly or as the laws permit. And yet to every act and to every word one of two epithets is applicable: it is either just or unjust. To no act and to no word can both these epithets be applied at the same time, for how can the same act at the same time be both just and not just? Every act is brought to the test as having the one or the other of these qualities; if it be found to have the quality of injustice, it is adjudged to be wicked, if of justice, to be good and honest. — But you, sir, used neither qualification when you wrote the words, “if any man kill.” You named the mere accusation, without any definition, and then immediately added, “let him be liable to seizure.” Thereby you have evidently ignored this tribunal and its usages as well as the other two.

  [76] τέταρτον τοίνυν ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις τοὐπὶ Πρυτανείῳ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τί; ἐὰν λίθος ἢ ξύλον ἢ σίδηρος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπεσὸν πατάξῃ, καὶ τὸν μὲν βαλόντ᾽ ἀγνοῇ τις, αὐτὸ δ᾽ εἰδῇ καὶ ἔχῃ τὸ τὸν φόνον εἰργασμένον, τούτοις ἐνταῦθα λαγχάνεται. εἰ τοίνυν τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ μὴ μετεχόντων τοῦ φρονεῖν οὐδέν ἐσθ᾽ ὅσιον, τοιαύτην ἔχον αἰτίαν, ἐᾶν ἄκριτον, ἦ που τόν γ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα μὲν οὐδέν, ἐὰν τύχῃ, θήσω δ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνθρωπόν γ᾽ ὄντα καὶ μετειληφότα τῇ τύχῃ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμῖν φύσεως, ἀνόσιον καὶ δεινὸν ἄνευ λόγου καὶ ψήφου ποιεῖν ἔκδοτον ἐπ᾽ αἰτίᾳ τοιαύτῃ.

  [76] There is also a fourth tribunal, that at the Prytaneum. Its function is that, if a man is struck by a stone, or a piece of wood or iron, or anything of that sort, falling upon him, and if someone, without knowing who threw it, knows and possesses the implement of homicide, he takes proceedings against these implements in that court. Well, if it is not righteous to deny a trial even to a lifeless and senseless thing, the object of so grave an accusation, assuredly it is impious and outrageous that a man who may possibly be not guilty, and who in any case, — and I will assume him to be guilty, — is a human being endowed by fortune with the same nature as ourselves, should be made an outcast on such a charge without a hearing and without a verdict.

  [77] ἔτι τοίνυν πέμπτον δικαστήριον ἄλλο θεάσασθ᾽ οἷον ὑπερβέβηκε, τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ. ἐνταῦθα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κελεύει δίκας ὑπέχειν ὁ νόμος, ‘ἐάν τις ἐπ᾽ ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ πεφευγώς, μήπω τῶν ἐκβαλλόντων αὐτὸν ᾐδεσμένων, αἰτίαν ἔχῃ ἑτέρου φόνου ἑκουσίου.’ καὶ οὐχ, ὅτι δεῦρ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ ἐλθεῖν αὐτῷ, παρεῖδεν αὐτὸν ὁ ταῦθ᾽ ἕκαστα τάξας, οὐδ᾽, ὅτι καὶ πρότερόν τι τοιοῦτον ἐποίησε, καὶ δὴ τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐποιήσατο πιστὴν αἰτίαν κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ,

  [77] Then there is a fifth tribunal which he has overruled, — and I beg you to take note of its character; I mean the court held in the precinct of Phreatto. In that court, men
of Athens, the law orders every man stand his trial who, having gone into exile on a charge of unintentional homicide, and being still unreconciled to the persons who procured his banishment, incurs a further charge of willful murder. The author of the several rules of court did not let such a man alone, on the ground that he was unable to return to Athens, nor did he, because the man had already committed a like offence, treat the similarity of the accusation as proof positive against him;

  [78] ἀλλὰ τό τ᾽ εὐσεβὲς εὗρεν ὅπως ἔσται, κἀκεῖνον οὐκ ἀπεστέρησε λόγου καὶ κρίσεως. τί οὖν ἐποίησεν; ἤγαγε τοὺς δικάσοντας οἷ προσελθεῖν οἷόν τ᾽ ἐκείνῳ, τῆς χώρας ἀποδείξας τόπον τιν᾽ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ καλούμενον ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ. εἶθ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν πλοίῳ προσπλεύσας λέγει τῆς γῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος, οἱ δ᾽ ἀκροῶνται καὶ δικάζουσιν ἐν τῇ γῇ: κἂν μὲν ἁλῷ, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις φόνοις δίκην ἔδωκε δικαίως, ἂν δ᾽ ἀποφύγῃ, ταύτης μὲν ἀθῷος ἀφίεται, τὴν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ πρότερον φόνῳ φυγὴν ὑπέχει.

  [78] he found a way of satisfying the requirements of religion without depriving the culprit of a fair hearing and a trial. How did he manage it? He conveyed the judges who were to sit to a place to which the accused was able to repair, appointing a place within the country but on the sea-coast, known as the precinct of Phreatto. The culprit approaches the shore in a vessel, and makes his speech without landing, while the judges listen to him and give judgement on shore. If found guilty, the man suffers the penalty of willful murder as he deserves; if acquitted, he goes his way scot-free in respect of that charge, but still subject to punishment for the earlier homicide.

  [79] τίνος οὖν ποθ᾽ εἵνεκα ταῦθ᾽ οὕτω διεσπούδασται; ἴσον ἡγεῖτ᾽ ἀσέβημ᾽ ὁ ταῦτα διαιρῶν τόν τ᾽ ἀδικοῦντ᾽ ἐᾶν καὶ τὸν ἀναίτιον ἐκδιδόναι πρὸ δίκης. καίτοι εἰ περὶ τῶν ἀνδροφόνων τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων τοσαύτη σπουδή, ὅπως λόγου καὶ κρίσεως καὶ πάντων ὁπόσ᾽ ἐστὶ δίκαια τεύξονται περὶ τῶν ὕστερον αἰτιῶν, ἦ που περί γε τοῦ μήθ᾽ ἑαλωκότος μήτ᾽ ἐγνωσμένου πότερον δέδρακεν ἢ οὒ καὶ πότερ᾽ ἄκων ἢ ἑκών, πάνδεινον γράφειν ὡς ἐκδοτέον τοῖς ἐγκαλοῦσιν.

  [79] Now with what object have these regulations been made so carefully? The man who drew them up accounted it equally irreligious to let slip the guilty, and to cast out the innocent before trial. But if such great pains are taken in the case of persons already adjudged to be homicides, to ensure for them a hearing, a trial, and fair treatment in every respect upon any subsequent accusation, surely it is most outrageous to provide that a man who has not yet been found guilty, and of whom it is still undecided whether he committed the act or not, and whether the act was involuntary or willful, should be handed over to the mercy of his accusers.

  [80] ἔτι τοίνυν ἔσθ᾽ ἕκτη τιμωρία πρὸς ἁπάσαις ταύταις, ἣν ὁμοίως παραβὰς γέγραφεν τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ οὑτοσί. εἰ πάντα ταῦτά τις ἠγνόηκεν, ἢ καὶ παρεληλύθασιν οἱ χρόνοι ἐν οἷς ἔδει τούτων ἕκαστα ποιεῖν, ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι οὐχὶ βούλεται τούτους τοὺς τρόπους ἐπεξιέναι, τὸν ἀνδροφόνον δ᾽ ὁρᾷ περιιόντ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἀπάγειν ἔξεστιν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, οὐκ οἴκαδ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅποι βούλεται, ὥσπερ σὺ δέδωκας. κἀνταῦθ᾽ ἀπαχθεὶς οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, πρὶν ἂν κριθῇ, πείσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν ἁλῷ, θανάτῳ ζημιωθήσεται, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων ὁ ἀπαγαγών, χιλίας προσοφλήσει.

  [80] In addition to all these provisions for legal redress there is a sixth, which the defendant has equally defied in his decree. Suppose that a man is ignorant of all the processes I have mentioned, or that the proper time for taking such proceedings has elapsed, that for any other reasons he does not choose to prosecute by those methods; if he sees the homicide frequenting places of worship or the market, he may arrest him and take him to jail; but not, as you have permitted, to his own house or wherever he chooses. When under arrest he will suffer no injury in jail until after his trial; but, if he is found guilty, he will be punished with death. On the other hand, if the person who arrested him does not get a fifth part of the votes, he will be fined a thousand drachmas.

  [81] ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὗτος ἔγραψε ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἀθῷον αἰτιᾶσθαι, τὸν δ᾽ ἄκριτον παραχρῆμ᾽ ἐκδίδοσθαι. ἂν δέ τις ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ ὅλη πόλις τοσούτοις νομίμοις ἀναιρουμένοις ὅσοις ἐγὼ διεξελήλυθα, καὶ τοσούτοις δικαστηρίοις καταλυομένοις ὅσοις εἴρηκα, ἃ θεοὶ κατέδειξαν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται πάντα τὸν χρόνον, βοηθήσῃ καὶ τὸν ὑβριζόμενον καὶ παρανομούμενον ἀφέληται, ἔκσπονδον ἔγραψεν εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲ τούτῳ λόγον οὐδὲ κρίσιν πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον εὐθὺς ἄνευ κρίσεως κολάζει. πῶς ἂν ἢ δεινότερον γένοιτ᾽ ἢ παρανομώτερον τούτου ψήφισμα;

  [81] The proposals of the defendant are quite different: the accuser is to prosecute without risk, the culprit to be given up incontinently and without trial; and if any person, or indeed any entire city, shall intervene to prevent the destruction of all those usages which I have described and the overthrow of all the tribunals I have mentioned; tribunals introduced by the gods and frequented by mankind from that day to this, — and to rescue the victims of outrage and lawless violence, he proposes that any such person shall be banned; for him also he allows no hearing and no trial, but punishes him instantly and without trial. Could any decree be more monstrous and more unconstitutional?

  [82] ἆρά τις ἡμῖν ἔτι λοιπός ἐστι νόμος; δεῖξον. οὑτοσί. λέγε τοῦτον.”Νόμος

  ἐάν τις βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῖς προσήκουσιν εἶναι τὰς ἀνδροληψίας, ἕως ἂν ἢ δίκας τοῦ φόνου ὑπόσχωσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας ἐκδῶσι. τὴν δὲ ἀνδροληψίαν εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν, πλέον δὲ μή.”

  πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς ἐχόντων νόμων οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἴ τινος ἧττον οὗτος ἔχει καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὁ νόμος. σκέψασθε γὰρ ὡς νομίμως καὶ σφόδρ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνως κεῖται.

  [82] Have we any statute left? . . . Let me see it. . . . . Yes, that is the one; read it.”Law

  If any man die a violent death, his kinsmen may take and hold hostages in respect of such death, until they either submit to trial for bloodguiltiness, or surrender the actual manslayers. This right is limited to three hostages and no more.”

  We have many well-conceived laws, men of Athens; but I am inclined to think that this statute is as wise and just as any of them. Observe the spirit of equity and the remarkable humanity with which it is drawn up.

  [83] ‘ἐάν τ�
�ς βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ,’ φησίν. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτο προσγράψας τὸ ‘βιαίως,’ σύμβολον πεποίηκεν ᾧ γιγνώσκομεν ὅτι, ἂν ἀδίκως, λέγει. ‘ὑπὲρ τούτου’ φησὶ ‘τοῖς προσήκουσιν εἶναι τὰς ἀνδροληψίας, ἕως ἂν ἢ δίκας τοῦ φόνου ὑπόσχωσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας ἐκδῶσιν.’ σκοπεῖσθ᾽ ὡς καλῶς. πρότερον μὲν ὑποσχεῖν δίκας ἀξιοῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα δέ, ἂν τοῦτο μὴ βούλωνται, προσέταξεν ἐκδοῦναι: ἐὰν δὲ μηδέτερον τούτων ἐθέλωσι, ‘τὸ ἀνδρολήψιόν’ φησιν ‘εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν, πλέον δὲ μή.’ παρὰ τοίνυν ὅλον τοῦτον τὸν νόμον εἴρηται τὸ ψήφισμα.

  [83] “If any man die a violent death,” says the legislator. First, by adding the epithet “violent,” he has given an indication by which we understand his meaning to be, “if a man die wrongfully.” “His kinsmen may take and hold hostages in respect of such death, until they either submit to trial for bloodguiltiness, or surrender the actual manslayers.” You will note what an admirable provision this is. He requires the hostages, in the first instance, to stand trial; and then if they refuse, he enjoins them to give up the murderers; but, if they decline both these duties, he adds that the right to hold hostages is limited to three and no more. The whole of this statute is defied in the wording of the decree.