The Indian Space Programme

by Gurbir Singh

  In 1982, the US’s Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, was established with a remit to provide global war-fighting capabilities. The AFSPC was responsible for space-based capabilities, including secure real-time audio and video communication, navigation and surveillance delivered by an established network of space-based assets. In 1985, acknowledging the increasing value of space for military applications, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff created a new unified command, the US Space Command. Its contribution was credited for the remarkably expeditious military success of the US-led coalition in the Gulf War in 1991. All wars since then have relied heavily on the insights of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) that modern space technology offers.

  Each of the US's military services Army, Navy and Airforce had its own Space Command but merged into a single Strategic Command in 2002. The US Space Command was disbanded, and its responsibilities were passed on to the US Strategic Command. It is one of nine unified commands in the US Department of Defence providing intelligence and cyber support and monitoring spacecraft and debris. It manages the orbit of ISS and triggers spacecraft (including ISS) orbital manoeuvre to avoid space debris when required. The targeted destruction of the satellite USA-193 satellite in orbit was also conducted by the US Strategic Command. Combining “military and space” has been the central, consistent theme as the US military evolved since the first Gulf War. Speaking in 2016, the commander of the US Strategic Command Cecil Eugene Diggs Haney asserted “my mission-space goes from under the sea all the way up to geosynchronous orbit.”[940]

  As the only superpower and with the largest economy, the US can set the international agenda for strategic use of space. It is probably the vision of the US armed forces to extend operations to space that prevents it from making progress with international treaties, such as PPWT and PAROS. The military in China, Russia and India will be pressured to follow, but their economies are not sufficiently large to support this expensive endeavour. One assessment of “Vision 2020” paints a dark picture of the profound loss to all of humanity if war were executed in space. It would include the loss of a global space economy of over $300 billion, end of international cooperation that has taken decades to develop, huge loss of operational satellites and the societal services they provide and undermining the use of LEO for future generations because of the debris generated.

  The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space continues to be a reoccurring CD agenda each year. An amended draft of the PPWT was presented by China and Russia in 2014 making it the basis for further discussions at CD. However, adoption of the amended draft still looks unlikely because most states do not see an acceptable verification mechanism. What constitutes a weapon in space is also a matter of debate. An existing satellite in orbit could act as a weapon. A state, should it wish to, could manoeuvre its own satellite close to another state’s satellite and command it to self-destruct. Russia and China, however, have been pressing hard to get a formal agreement. During the 2016 CD, Venezuela and the Russian Federation declared in writing that they “will not be the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space.”[941] Support for the agreement is also channelled through the increasingly influential BRICS organization. A relatively new phenomenon that brings together India, China and Russia on one side against the US. Apart from the real possibility of challenging the US’s ambitions of militarising space, a more trusting and cooperative relationship between Russia, India and China could be an unexpected outcome of BRICS.

  The BRICS conference in the Russian City of Ufa in 2015 declared "negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space are a priority task of the Conference on Disarmament, and support the efforts to start substantive work, inter alia, based on the updated draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects submitted by China and the Russian Federation.”[942] The CD 2015 report commented on the US’s responses to the 2014 joint draft from China and Russia.[943] A Russian view concludes, “Experts have noticed a positive reaction to the Russian proposal by India, and no objections in principle by other BRICS nations.[944]

  In 2015, India publicly declared its position that “Outer space and celestial bodies were the common heritage of humankind and had to be used for the benefit and interest of all humankind in the spirit of cooperation. The prevention of an arms race in outer space and doing so urgently would avert a grave danger for international peace and security.”[945] While it had ratified ENMOD and accessioned the Seabed Treaty, when the PPWT was established in 2008, India did no sign concerned that it may curtail its future space ambitions.

  Figure 16‑2 Number of tests in India by missile type. Credit Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  In the meantime, India is developing its conventional military capacity informed by its achievements in space. ISRO is a civilian entity and DRDO is not. Since both are funded by central government, it is inevitable that there is a flow of technology, know-how and personnel between them. Abdul Kalam moved to DRDO to develop India's ballistic missiles after leading the development of the SLV-3 in ISRO. Several missiles have been in development since the 1980s. Agni V has demonstrated a range 5,000 km. Brahmos is India's most tested missile developed with collaboration with Russia.[946]

  Russia, China and now through the BRICS membership, India are challenging the US to come to an agreement that will cut back on its ambitions for military superiority in space. In the absence of an agreement, Russia, China and India will be forced to invest in defence infrastructure to keep up with the US. Even with their combined resources, China and Russia cannot financially compete with the US. Just as with the race to the Moon, the US can bring to bear a magnitude of resources that other nations cannot match. Large scale expenditure on defence has been a considerable hurdle for BRICS nations, but historically not for the US. A successful collaboration between the BRICS nations could potentially have an impact on keeping a check on the US’s military expansion in space.

  Anti-Satellite Weapons

  China’s 2007 anti-satellite test (ASAT) was a highly successful demonstration of a technologically complex operation.[947] A missile launched from the ground destroyed one of China’s defunct satellites in Earth orbit. This single event forced India to reconsider its stance on military options in space. If China could do that to one of its own spacecraft, what could it do to India’s ever-increasing space asset inventory? Grounded in social and economic development, India’s space assets are a part of its critical national infrastructure and require protective measures.[948] Further, long distance real-time secure communication is a key military asset. After the Chinese ASAT test, India’s Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor (born 1948) asserted that the “Indian forces should be able to defend their space assets and overcome any threats, particularly as the Army, as well as the IAF and Navy, would depend a lot on satellite communications even in peacetime.”[949] The 1964 nuclear test conducted by China had motivated India’s nuclear weapons programme; that cycle may now be repeated for ASAT weapons.

  ASAT weapons are designed to attack spacecraft for strategic and tactical military advantage. Traditional weapons, such as guns, machine guns and cannons, have been attached to all military vehicles, including ships, helicopters and aircraft. Doing that on a spacecraft in orbit is problematic. The recoil from their use is tantamount to a thrust changing the spacecraft’s attitude or orbit.[950],[951] Several designs of ASAT weapons have been tested since the late 1950s, including high energy ground-based lasers, charged particle beams and the increasingly effective cyber technology that can electronically jam or interfere with a target spacecraft rendering it inoperable without destroying it.

  Most ASATs are technologically advanced versions of missiles originally developed as anti-aircraft missiles that can be launched from land, air or sea. To targ
et a spacecraft in Earth orbit, the ASAT weapon or missile must travel faster, further and higher while navigating to a small target that itself is moving at around 8 km/s. Such a sub-orbital missile does not need to carry an explosive warhead because it can destroy its target by the energy resulting from the high-speed collision, making it a kinetic kill weapon. An ASAT weapon can also be co-orbital, a small explosive carrying satellite delivered to orbit where it approaches its target slowly and explodes when close by.

  China, having publicly and spectacularly made its point, provided assurances to the US that it “will not conduct future ASAT tests in space.”[952] A year after China’s ASAT test, however, the US demonstrated its ASAT capability by destroying its own failed photo reconnaissance satellite, USA-193. It was destroyed in February 2008 using a missile launched from the warship Lake Erie stationed near Hawaii. The satellite USA-193 launched in December 2006 had failed a few months later. It was in a low (around 250 km) and decaying orbit and would have re-entered within a few weeks anyway. Unlike the Chinese ASAT test, the US had announced their intentions before the strike and insisted it was not an ASAT test. It claimed that the action was necessitated by the potential risk from a possible impact should its large fuel tank survive re-entry. Most debris resulting from the destruction of USA-193 burnt up during re-entry within a few weeks and all within a year because of the lower orbit.

  The US, Russia and China have successfully conducted ASAT tests in the past. India is under pressure to do so, too. India’s armed forces have expressed their desire for military capability in space. As part of its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), India has been developing ballistic missiles since 1983, when IGMDP was established. It was headed initially by Abdul Kalam following his work as the project scientist on SLV-3. The primary objective of IGMDP is to counter the threat from hostile neighbours. The programme has developed a series of missiles, including Akash, Prithvi and Agni, which can be used for a variety of military tactical scenarios. These missiles use rocket technology, including one, two or three-stage rocket motors mostly using solid propellant with a short range. Variants that are more recent have evolved to long-range multi stage missiles using a liquid engine and Ramjet technology.

  India’s long-range missiles, Agni-5 and Prithvi-3, have the capability for sub-orbital spaceflight. If India were to develop ASAT capability, it would probably incorporate Agni and Prithvi missile technologies. Following the successful test flight of Agni-V in 2012, the head of DRDO, V.K. Saraswat (born 1949), declared that Agni-V could be modified to deliver “defence satellites into a low Earth orbit during an emergency.”[953] However, as a military programme, the status of India’s ASAT weapon development has not been made public.

  Before the Chinese ASAT test of 2007, formal announcements by the foreign and defence ministers of the government of India had kept its plans for military use of space ambiguous. They reiterated India’s stance on the peaceful use of outer space while keeping the option open for military use of space in the future.[954] As a civilian organisation, ISRO has not historically been involved in developing overt military technology. Given the changing geopolitical landscape and the ISRO chairman’s determination to support India’s strategic objectives, it is inevitable that ISRO will pivot to a more military posture in the future. In 2015, the then director of Sriharikota highlighted ISRO’s existing capability that could be re-tasked in the interest of national security. He pointed out “any country that has the capability to precisely launch a satellite to a precise orbit also has co-orbital ASAT or a Kinetic Kill capability to destroy a satellite.”[955]

  India has also belatedly recognised the significance of cyber security threats to its armed forces and space assets. It has been slow in responding to cyber threats to its terrestrial IT systems, including banks, railways and online services.[956] ISRO may already have been impacted by cybersecurity breaches of its terrestrial and space assets.[957] Recognising the urgency, in 2012, the Indian government committed to training around half a million cyber security specialists dubbing them “cyber warriors.”[958]

  Each of the three services Army, Navy and IAF, has constituted its own space and cyber cell, as well as dedicated special forces, including Para-SF battalions (Army), Marine commandos (Navy) and Garuds (IAF). Their defence-specific space requirements are managed by a small tri-services unit, the Integrated Space Cell, operating under the Integrated Defence Headquarters. Progress on developing a new joint services command for space, cyberspace and clandestine warfare in the form of special forces has been slow and is still awaiting government approval.[959] Most developed nations rely at least in part on space based infrastructure for the security services. As in other countries, a nation turns to its space agency to fulfil its national security needs.

  In 2015, a decade after it was first proposed, the defence minister Manohar Parrikar (born 1955) directed the integrated defence staff to “work out and fine-tune” the “basic structures” for the Cyber, Aerospace and Special Operations Commands.[960] As with its potential ASAT response, India has not formally announced plans for a large-scale space command capability. ISRO operates its space programme under domestic policies and laws, primarily the Satellite Communication Policy published in 2007 and Remote Sensing Data Policy published in 2011. India is in the early stages of developing its policies for space security and military. Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Senior Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, asserts “India must take steps to declare a space policy, or at least its key aspects.”[961] When the organisational structures are finalised, ISRO will have to reconcile its primary objective of providing space-based services for national development with its commercial, scientific and strategic capabilities.

  Space Debris

  The Chinese ASAT carried out in 2007 generated one of the largest pools of space debris ever recorded, including 3,000 trackable fragments (10 cm or larger). Space debris is defined as any non-functional man-made object that could pose the risk of unintended collision to operational spacecraft in Earth orbit or those transiting that region to or from an interplanetary mission.

  The high-velocity impact between Fengyun-1C at 954 kg and the ground-launched missile (catalogued as SC-19 by the US military) at 600 kg took place within a popular 863 km SSPO. Over time the 1.5 tonne of debris, including fragments of solar panels, antennae, batteries, sensors and transmitters, formed a vertical, pole to pole ring around the Earth. Only l0% of the around 30,000 fragments are sufficiently large to be tracked.[962] During a statement at the UNGA, one scientific assessment concluded that the number of catalogued objects larger than 1 cm “which accounts for more than 25 percent of all catalogued objects in low Earth orbit, will stay in orbit for decades, and some for more than a century.”[963] Around 80% of the debris from the Chinese ASAT will remain in Earth orbit for the next century. Had the collision taken place at a lower altitude, the lifetime of the debris would have been significantly shorter.

  Two years later, on 10 February 2009, an inactive 900 kg Russian Cosmos 2251 satellite and an active 700 kg Iridium 33 satellite unintentionally collided generating around 2,000 fragments larger than 10 cm and many smaller will stay in orbit for decades. This was the first unintended collision between spacecraft in Earth orbit and took place at an altitude of 800 km at a speed of over 10 km per second at almost 90º to each other; one was in an equatorial and the other in a polar orbit. Spacecraft have been leaving Earth for space for nearly 6o years, but most of the space debris is a product of the last decade. The two events of 2007 and 2009 generated two-thirds of the space debris that is regularly monitored to mitigate the potential risk posed to operational spacecraft in orbit.

  Figure 16‑3 Accumulation of space debris Jan 1960 – Jan 2017 in all orbits. Credit ESA

  Space debris, especially that is small and untraceable, is a hazard for all users of space, no matter who was responsible for creating it. The speed in LEO of even small obj
ects is around 7.5 km per second a resulting collision is a very energetic event. Such an impact could damage or destroy a spacecraft leading to loss of the service it was providing or even loss of life in the case of crewed spacecraft. The risk is not limited to space. It can extend to life, property and environment on the ground if the debris in orbit is sufficiently large, it could survive re-entry and reach the surface. The ISS that orbits at around 450 km undergoes space debris avoidance manoeuvre typically once a year, but in 2015, there were five. Usually, this involves an increase in ISS orbital altitude to prevent a potential impact.

  Space debris is not just a danger to spacecraft in orbit. Uncontrolled re-entry is a hazard to life and property on Earth. Historically spacecraft have not had a built in de-orbit function and consequently, once the fuel ran out a spacecraft would simply be abandoned in orbit. New private operators such as OneWeb with plans to deliver broadband services from space with large constellations of around 900 satellites build in a de-orbit function at the outset. That will not only ensure that LEO is cleared of non-function spacecraft, but a controlled re-entry will take place over uninhabited parts of the Earth.[964] Space debris has been increasing ever since the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as the number of spacecraft and nations that rely on them have increased. Humans have continuously been in space since October 2000 with a maximum of 13 (in 2009) at any one time. The number of operational spacecraft in orbit is around 1,500. More countries are demanding greater space-based services including navigation, communication and meteorology and more countries are developing the capability to build, launch and operate spacecraft. As the number and density of spacecraft in orbit increase so does the risk of collision. The runaway effect of debris from one collision causing another, generating more debris and further collisions, the Kessler Syndrome is now considered as a serious threat.