Pericles the Athenian

by Rex Warner

  When the day of the trial came, Pericles behaved as he had promised. His speech was without bitterness, but was none the less forcible for that. No one, in fact, was likely to believe that Kimon had taken a bribe, but both Ephialtes, in his most emotional manner, and Pericles, with a well-ordered telling sobriety, made damaging attacks on his conduct of the campaign. In particular they claimed to have evidence that Sparta was planning to support the rebels in Thasos. Kimon hotly denied this and once again stressed his belief that the whole security of Greece depended on the Spartan alliance. But this part of his speech fell curiously flat. On this subject the views of Ephialtes and Pericles were beginning to gain ground. It was only when Kimon began to speak of his own achievements in war and of the munificence he had shown in beautifying the city of Athens that the audience became deeply moved. He could also, at the time of the trial, boast of how he had, in the end, conquered Thasos, destroyed her fortifications, taken over her fleet, and acquired for Athens her valuable gold mines on the mainland. There were still some who deplored such treatment of an ally, but Ephialtes and Pericles were not among them. They had favored the campaign from the beginning and had hoped for even greater acquisitions than those which Kimon had made. So Kimon was acquitted, but his prestige had been diminished.

  The struggle between the parties continued, and soon after Kimon’s acquittal there was another debate on his Spartan policy. Sparta had been doing badly in her war with the rebels. Large areas of the country were under rebel control and almost every area was threatened by guerrilla raids. In particular the Spartans found the task of reducing rebel strongholds in the mountains quite beyond their power. In a pitched battle Spartan infantry are incomparable, but in other military operations, where a certain versatility of intelligence is required, they are ill at ease and ineffective. So now Sparta appealed to her allies for help and, in the first place, to Athens, whose troops had had much experience of seige warfare and whose military engineers were the best in Greece.

  Kimon, of course, supported the Spartan appeal, but the debate on this issue was very bitter indeed. It seems that on this occasion Ephialtes spoke with an extraordinary passion and intensity. He treated with contempt all Kimon’s pleas for unity in Greece and for loyalty to allies. These, he said, were abstract and, in this case, almost meaningless notions. There could be no unity between the Athenian democracy and a tyranny. The Spartan serfs were not slaves, though they were often treated worse than slaves. They were free Greeks, fighting for the same liberty the Athenians had gained when, before Marathon, they drove out the tyrants. As for loyalty, when had Sparta shown any loyalty to Athens? The allies of Athens were not slaves; they were bound to her by legal contracts which had been entered into voluntarily. But when one of these allies had broken her contract by revolt, Sparta, so far from giving help, had actually encouraged the revolt.

  All this was denied by Kimon. He too, it seems, made one of the best speeches of his career, and in the end he carried the Assembly with him. Four thousand Athenian hoplites, under his own command, were sent to Sparta. And in my view this decision was taken not so much because the Athenians felt any affection or loyalty towards the Spartans, but because they were greatly flattered at being asked for help by the most powerful state in Greece. The Athenians are more devoted to honor than any other people. They looked forward to being able to say that they, with their superior experience and intelligence, had not only saved Greece in the Persian wars, but Sparta on this occasion. But most of those in the army had listened to the arguments of Ephialtes and had been impressed by them. For once Kimon was in command of a force which was not like-minded with himself.

  Indeed, it seemed that the Athenian people themselves, apart from the diminishing numbers in Kimon’s party, regretted their decision once the army had marched. Ephialtes and Pericles now intensified their attacks on the privileged status of the Council of the Areopagus and this time their attacks were successful. Again the debate was embittered, for though the arguments of Ephialtes and Pericles were from a democratic view unanswerable, the Athenian, as I have said, combines the most thoroughgoing modernity with a deep sense of tradition. Though it seemed right, it seemed also impious to curtail the powers of this venerable body. I remember that the poet Aeschylus felt very deeply on this subject. However, Ephialtes won the debate. The Areopagus was stripped of all political power and of all rights of moral censorship. In future its only function was to act as a supreme court in cases of homicide. In legal and constitutional matters there was now no privileged class in the state. The will of the Assembly was supreme and has remained so ever since.

  Kimon, they say, was horrified when he learned of this decision, and he promised his supporters that when he returned from Sparta he would see to it that it was reversed. It is even possible that he might have done so, if he had returned, as was his habit, with a splendid victory to his credit. But he was ruined by those whom all his life he had most admired.

  It appears that the soldiers of the Athenian army, once they joined forces with the Spartans, found that their allies were everything that Ephialtes had stated them to be. They admired the Spartan discipline and dexterity with weapons, but they also observed a slowness of wit and a kind of brutality which aroused their hatred and contempt. They boasted of their own political achievements and contrasted them with the dull rigid monotony of Spartan life. Many of them indeed sympathized with the rebels, who seemed to them to be more like Greeks than were their own allies and to have every justification to be fighting for their freedom.

  Not unnaturally the Spartan authorities became alarmed. They are always alarmed at the slightest sign of any revolutionary spirit, and this is understandable when one considers that they are in their own country a very small minority which exists on the subjection of others far more numerous than themselves. Now they saw among them a large and efficient army of allies who, unlike Sparta’s other allies, not only had no reverence for Spartan ideals but actually despised them. True, this army was commanded by a man who had shown an undeviating loyalty to Sparta and who, in spite of the fact that he was the most distinguished general in the Greek world, was perfectly willing to subordinate himself to the Spartan high command. But Spartans are as a rule neither generous themselves nor quick to accept the generosity of others. They resented Kimon’s distinction, which was well advertised by his men, and they feared his popularity even though he used it to further their own interests. In the end they requested him to leave and to take his army with him. They were perfectly capable, they said, of finishing the war by themselves.

  It was a gesture of almost incredible stupidity and its effects were exploited to the full in Athens by Ephialtes and Pericles. The Athenians can bear any hardship except an insult. This they find intolerable, and when suffering from such a grievance they will take measures far out of proportion to the occasion. So it happened now. The Assembly revoked the alliance with Sparta and proceeded to form new alliances with Sparta’s enemies, Argos and Thessaly, states which had been either neutral or pro- Persian in the period of the invasion. It was a complete break with the past and it was not made without the bitterest personal and political antagonisms. Kimon himself, on his return, did his best to alter what had happened in his absence. He was discredited, but he was still great and still had the support of a large body of opinion which feared the adventurous policies of Ephialtes and had been shocked by his reform of the Areopagus. Indeed, party feeling at this time was more intense then I have ever known it to be in Athens. It was fortunate that the Athenians could have recourse to their device of ostracism, for, clearly, the state could not exist with such division within it. Either Kimon or Ephialtes would have to go.

  There was not much doubt as to what the result would be. Kimon now suffered the same fate as Themistocles and was exiled for ten years. Ephialtes had reached the position for which he had been ambitious since his youth. He was the first man in the state, and his friend Pericles, now in his thirty-fifth year, was not far behi
nd him.

  6

  Success

  Before the end of the year Ephialtes had been assassinated. His murderer was not an Athenian and had no grievance against him, personal or political. He was a man of criminal type with a strong Boeotian accent and had only been in Athens for a few days. quite evidently he had been hired to do the murder and it is possible that he himself did not know who were his employers. Certainly they were never discovered. It was assumed (probably correctly) that they were members of one of those political clubs or secret societies which are numerous in Athens and are usually recruited from members of the richer families who fear the prospect of the increasing power of the democracy and are themselves either unable or unwilling to express their views in the Assembly. As a rule these clubs constitute no danger whatever to the state. The members are content to hold drinking parties at which they air their grievances in private or to celebrate religious ceremonies, often of a peculiarly antiquated kind. Violent measures are sometimes, in the heat of wine, demanded, but they are never carried out. The democracy in Athens has long been secure and most of the aristocracy who possess ability are, whatever their political views, prepared to work within it. Not only Pericles, but Kimon also, was a democrat in this sense.

  It was natural that the people of Athens should be outraged at the assassination of Ephialtes and should clamor for some act of vengeance. Since the murder had taken place so soon after Kimon’s ostracism it was easy and convenient to connect the two events in a causal sense. For some days the partisans of Kimon went about in terror. The feeling of the people was such that if on the merest suspicion any of them had been put on trial, they would have been unlikely to secure justice. Everyone, as a matter of course, looked to Pericles as Ephialtes’s successor, and many of his supporters advised him to make use of the situation in order to get rid of the most powerful of his opponents.

  On this occasion, as on so many others, Pericles showed wisdom, courage, justice, moderation and patriotism. He was aware of the laws of nature and of evidence; he knew the dangers of dissension within the state; the plans which he had for the future, plans which had been concerted with Ephialtes, demanded, above all things, unity. He knew for a certainty (as indeed did everyone else who, in the heat of emotion, allowed himself to think) that Kimon was quite incapable of having instigated a political assassination. So at this time it was Pericles more than anyone else who allayed the people’s fear and anger, guiding them to a right mind and to the proper use of their natural intelligence. For the Athenians are the most intelligent people in the world and they are fully aware of it. They are also volatile and passionate. Often they allow their intelligence to be blinded by sudden passions, but when this happens they are always sorry for it afterwards and bitterly blame their leaders for having acted in a manner unworthy of them. Pericles calmly, firmly and sometimes indulgently treated them as if they were even better than themselves. There were no political reprisals after the death of Ephialtes.

  Pericles emerged from this crisis with the respect of his friends and the gratitude of his enemies. The state was now free of fear, resolute and ready for a new policy of incredible scope and daring. During the next six years Athens appeared always to be operating far beyond the limits of her resources and her safety. Yet Pericles was not foolhardy; he estimated risks, allowed (insofar as anyone can) for fortune, and went into danger with open eyes.

  The new policy may be described as a reversal to the policy of Themistocles, though under different conditions. In internal affairs the people, whether as the Assembly, as magistrates or as jurymen in the law courts, were to be given a greater and greater share in the government and organization of the state. Athenian sea power was to be strengthened and enlarged, not only by the building of more ships and fortifications but by the acquisition of naval bases in any part of the world where they seemed useful or desirable. The Persian war was to be prosecuted with energy. And, above all, Athens was to take over from Sparta the leadership of Greece. She was already independent; she must be made first secure and then dominant. It was in this respect (and also in internal affairs) that the policy of Pericles differed radically from that of Kimon. He did not anticipate war with Sparta immediately. Sparta was still fully occupied with the revolt of her subjects. But in the interim Pericles determined that Athens should be as secure by land as she was already by sea.

  During these six years Pericles was often, but not always, a member of the board of the ten generals who, in Athens, though they are under the general control of the Assembly and have to submit to a thorough examination of their conduct during their periods of office, have almost unlimited powers when they are engaged on a campaign and great authority in the direction of policy. And in these years the most spectacular victories were won not by Pericles but by others — Myronides, for example, who as a young man had held command in the Persian war, and Tolmides, a man of about Pericles’s own age, who in daring and impetuosity was often compared with Kimon. But though in these years Pericles did not play the major part in the field, it was he who more than anyone else planned and even directed the whole grand plan of conquest and expansion.

  Here, as in every other department of life, Pericles thought with logic and precision. The aim was the greatness of Athens; the obstacles in the way were Persia abroad and, in Greece, Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. At the moment there was little to fear from Persia. Her fleets had withdrawn from the Aegean and no one could envisage the possibility of another invasion like that of Xerxes. In the light of later events it may be argued that with regard to Persia the Athenian action was too ambitious and that the interests of the state would have been better served by concentrating all power against the Peloponnese. But this argument takes no account of the realities of the time. The war with Persia was to the Athenians a prized inheritance from their fathers. Through this war the Athenian alliance had come into being and still, officially, existed for its prosecution, though, as in the case of Thasos, it had already been turned against member states. Pericles and his party had supported the war no less ardently than had Kimon. Moreover, there were still Greek cities to be liberated, particularly in Cyprus. The cities there were rich and prosperous. If they joined the Athenian alliance, Athens would be strengthened in ships, manpower and wealth. No one at the time questioned the decision to send a large battle fleet of two hundred triremes to Cyprus.

  Soon a still more splendid and promising opportunity presented itself. In Lower Egypt a native prince, Inaros by name, started a revolt against the Persian government and appealed to Athens for help, promising them every sort of advantage in the country once the Persians were driven out of it. It was obvious that such advantages would be very considerable. Athenian trading posts and cities could be established on the coast and on the banks of the Nile, and since Egypt is a rich country these trading connections could be of the greatest importance to the Athenian economy. Moreover, the Persian navies consisted now almost entirely of Phoenician and Egyptian ships. With Egypt detached from Persia and allied with. Athens, Athenian sea power would be irresistible in every part of the world. Prospects such as these are the lifeblood of an Athenian and there was little doubt as to how the Assembly would behave. Orders to sail to the Nile were sent to the Athenian generals of the great allied fleet operating off Cyprus, and everyone in Athens waited impatiently for news of the expected victory, for Athenians do not expect defeat.

  The news was not long in coming. The allies had sailed to the mouth of the Nile, where they engaged and defeated a large Phoenician fleet, sinking or capturing fifty ships. They had then sailed up the Nile, joined forces with Inaros and fought a great battle by land. In this battle the Greek hoplites who had been landed from the ships again proved their superiority over all other types of infantry. The Persian army was routed and its commander, a brother of Xerxes, killed. The Egyptian capital of Memphis was occupied by Inaros and the Greeks. Only one center of resistance was left, the citadel of Memphis itself, a place known as th
e White Castle, into which the remains of the Persian army and garrison had fled. This place was now under seige by Greek and Egyptian troops, while a large detachment of the allied fleet was sailing unopposed along the coasts of Phoenicia, burning dockyards, sinking or capturing enemy ships and making raids on towns within access of the sea. The victories seemed as great and as decisive as had been those of the Eurymedon. In Athens even the most loyal supporters of Kimon had to acknowledge that others besides their leader could show the same daring and rapidity in action. We expected to hear soon that the campaign was over and Egypt open to Athenian enterprise. We waited for six years, and when the news came it was of disaster.

  However, even before the Egyptian expedition had set sail, Athens had taken up great commitments elsewhere in pursuance of the anti-Spartan policy which was peculiarly that of Ephialtes and Pericles and had been that of Themistocles. The fundamental aim of this policy was to secure Athens against any invasion by land. The city itself was already protected by its fortifications, but she could never be perfectly safe while her communications with the great port of Piraeus were vulnerable. It was on the motion of Pericles that the Athenians now began to build their famous long walls, one of five and one of three miles in length, which provided a fortified corridor between the city and the sea. Like every building operation undertaken by Pericles, the work was splendid. Anyone who sees these fortifications today will regard them as not only impregnable but magnificent. Their effect was to give Athens all the advantages of an island, and indeed Pericles used often to say that even if Athens were to lose everything by land, she would still be, with the city itself and Piraeus and the possessions overseas protected by an irresistible navy, the strongest power in Greece.