Pericles the Athenian

by Rex Warner

  But Athens aimed not only at strengthening herself but at weakening her enemies. The alliance with Argos was already an important step in this direction. Spartan movement was impeded not only by the casualties incurred during the rebellion of the serfs but also by the presence of a hostile power on her eastern frontiers. At about this time the rebellion ended, but it did not end in a manner that was wholly satisfactory to the Spartans, who, after years of effort, had proved themselves quite incapable of subduing the rebel stronghold of Ithome in the mountains of Messenia. Both their security and their military reputation were beginning to suffer and in the end they were glad to claim victory for what was in fact a compromise. The Messenians in Ithome, fine fighting men inveterately hostile to Sparta, surrendered their stronghold on the condition that they were given a safe conduct out of the Peloponnese. In the days of Kimon no other state would have dared to receive them, but now they were welcomed by Athens and later were to be used by her in a most important capacity.

  At about the same time the people of Megara seceded from the Spartan alliance and applied to Athens for protection. They were constantly the victims of attack from the neighboring state of Corinth to their south, and they were indignant that Sparta had done nothing to restrain her Corinthian allies. This appeal from the Megarians was most gratifying to Athenian pride, but what chiefly interested Pericles was that Megara enjoys enormous strategic advantages. This city has not for many years been an important power. It is shut in between Athens and Corinth. But its territory extends from the Saronic to the Corinthian Gulfs. It has seaports on each and is therefore a position from which the whole Peloponnese can be cut off from the north. Here again Pericles found it easy to persuade the people to approve his far-reaching plans. Athenian garrisons were sent at once to the ports of Nisaea on the Saronic Gulf and Pagae on the Gulf of Corinth. Long walls were constructed to link the inland city of Megara with Nisaea, thus blocking the coastal road from Corinth into Attica. At the same time fortified posts were set up to cover the longer stretch of land between Megara and Pagae in the north. And perhaps it was the occupation of Pagae which excited the Athenians more than anything else. With a base on the Gulf of Corinth they now had for the first time in history an outlet to the west, and from here their eager imaginations were quick to range far and wide. Both shores of the Corinthian Gulf were now vulnerable to their sea power; the whole Peloponnese could be safely circumnavigated; beyond the Gulf were the still semibarbarous states of northern Greece; beyond them lay Italy and Sicily; farther still were Carthage and the fabulous wealth of Spain. We Ionians may boast of having the liveliest imaginations and the quickest wits of all men, and in these respects Athens can rightly claim to be our mother city. But the Athenians have other qualities which are peculiar to themselves: if they imagine anything desirable, they will begin immediately to achieve it, and they believe that everything which they imagine can be attained.

  The alliance with Megara was certain to mean war with Corinth. The Corinthians indeed were not only infuriated but astounded at the temerity of the Athenian action. They had believed that so long as the great battle fleet of the Athenian alliance was occupied in Egypt, Athens would hesitate to risk her very existence by confronting Corinthian sea power, which was still considerable. So they put to sea confidently with their whole fleet, and were as confidently defeated by the few squadrons of Athenian ships which had been left behind to guard the home waters.

  Only one enemy position of any strength remained within easy distance of the land and sea frontiers of Attica. This was the island of Aegina. Its long outline and conical mountain is visible from Piraeus and all the coastline as far as Sunium. In speech after speech Pericles had referred to this island as “the eyesore of Piraeus,” and there had been intermittent warfare between Aegina and Athens from the time before the Persian wars. Up to now Corinth and the other Dorian cities of the Peloponnese had given Aegina no help. She was an important trading rival of Corinth and the Corinthians hoped for a situation in which both Athens and Aegina would wear themselves out in their struggle. Now, however, Corinth and every other Peloponnesian state that could provide ships joined forces with Aegina. Athens accepted the challenge without hesitation. She had now been reinforced by contingents of allied ships, and manned still more of her own. One of the greatest sea battles that had ever been fought between Greeks took place off the Aeginetan coast. It was a battle of Ionians against Dorians. Athens was employing less than half of her available naval power against the total sea forces of her enemies. The result was absolutely decisive. The Athenians and their allies captured seventy ships, landed hoplites on the island, and proceeded to set up seige works round the city of Aegina.

  Almost every man of military age was now engaged in action either in Egypt, or in the fortifying of the Megarid, or in this expedition. To many Athenians and certainly to all the enemies of Athens it seemed that exertions on this scale could not long last and could not possibly be increased. Corinth unwisely acted on this assumption and with a large land army marched against Megara. It was a campaign which appeared well thought out and certain of at least some success. Athens would either have to abandon Megara or else withdraw her army from Aegina in order to defend the still unfinished fortifications. At the first news of the invasion there was alarm in Athens itself. But there was more enthusiasm than alarm. Pericles, in one of those speeches of his which combined extreme logical clarity with the utmost emotional fervor, explained what must be done. Athens, he said, would abandon neither her gains nor her allies. This was an occasion when those thought too young to fight could show their promise and those thought too old could add one more achievement to their great record of the past. The young had heard often enough of the Persian wars; now they could see with their own eyes how their fathers fought in them. It was the time for sons to show that they were worthy of their fathers and for fathers to challenge the emulation of their sons.

  I have seldom known in Athens a day of such general enthusiasm as that on which the new army, the last manpower of the state, was called up for action. It was an army consisting of boys of eighteen and nineteen and men between fifty and sixty, and there were many either above or below these age groups who contrived to find places in the ranks. The army was put under the command of the experienced general Myronides and marched immediately to join forces with the garrisons in Megara. After the army had set out there was indeed anxiety in Athens, but there was more hope than anxiety, and when the news came it was news that had been expected. Myronides had met the full force of Corinth and her allies. He had driven them from the field; they had taken up their dead and retired to Corinth; the Athenians had set up a trophy on the battlefield.

  Within a fortnight came news of a still more glorious victory on this front. It seems that the Corinthian army, all men in the prime of life, had found it impossible to bear the reproaches of their elders and juniors in Corinth for having retreated from a force of Athenian boys and grandfathers. They attempted to explain that in spite of their retreat it was they who had had the advantage in the battle; such is the ability of man to believe in what at any time he finds it convenient to believe that they may actually have convinced themselves that they were speaking the truth. They marched out again from Corinth and began to setup a trophy of their own near the place where the Athenians had already set theirs. This time their defeat was decisive. A very large section of their army was surrounded and destroyed to the last man. Since then no Corinthian army or navy has gone into action unless with the support and under the command of Spartans.

  All these events had taken place within two years, and in the following year Athens had to fight again more desperately than ever to retain the position which she had won.

  The Spartans are slow to move and very reluctant to undertake campaigns outside the Peloponnese. This sluggishness of theirs is due partly to lack of imagination and partly to arrogance. They seldom see that they are in danger until the last moment, and they believe that in any mi
litary action they are certain to prove superior to their opponents. Their recent experiences during the serf revolt had not altered their habits of thought. Indeed, some Spartans are incapable of thinking except in terms of military tactics, a subject which they have learned thoroughly and by heart. Even when they do take the field they behave with extreme caution, carefully safeguarding themselves against any attack which might be of an unorthodox kind. They are only at ease when they find themselves drawn up in full line of battle against an opposing army. In such conditions they believe, not without reason, that they are irresistible.

  For some time the allies of Sparta in Aegina and Corinth had been urging her to act. Now, at long last, her government decided to do so. They acted in a characteristically circuitous manner. There was no declaration of war against Athens. The pretext for bringing an army north of the isthmus was found in a minor quarrel between two states of central Greece, one of which, Doris, claimed to be the motherland of the Spartans. But the army mustered in the Peloponnese was far larger than anything that would be required for so trivial an affair. At the news of its preparation and its size the Athenians strengthened their defenses in the Megarid, making it clear that they would allow no armed force to pass through territory under their control. The Spartans, however, had no intention of fighting a battle in mountainous country and in a position chosen by the Athenians. They took their army across by sea to the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth, quickly settled the affairs of Doris, and then moved eastwards into the large, well-populated territory of Boeotia, which lies along the northern frontier of Athens. Here they enrolled more troops and set up in the cities governments favorable to themselves. In particular they strengthened the authority of Thebes, the city which had collaborated with the Persians. Soon, with a greatly increased army, they were in a position to invade Athens from the north, and if their action was to be effective it would have to be rapid. The long walls were nearly finished. Aegina was under close seige and evidently could not resist much longer.

  Athens acted with her customary daring and resolution. Pericles was one of the generals in this campaign and I have heard from him a full account of it. It was decided that there must be no relaxation of the grip on Aegina, but many of the troops from the Megarid were withdrawn in order to strengthen the army on the northern front. Of the new allies, Argos sent a thousand hoplites and Thessaly provided fine force of cavalry. The heavy infantry alone amounted to fourteen thousand men. It was the largest field force that Athens had ever mustered, and at the same time a squadron of fifty ships was sent to the Gulf of Corinth — a sufficient force to make it impossible for the Peloponnesians to retreat by sea.

  The Athenians always prefer attack to defense. So on his occasion they were not content to guard the northern passes. They advanced into Boeotia and took up positions near the frontier town of Tanagra. Here they came in contact with the large army of the Spartans and their

  On the eve of the battle the generals were confronted with a difficult personal and political problem. For these last years the exiled Kimon had been living in Euboea. Now he crossed over to the mainland and, keeping his identity secret, since he wished to avoid any appearance of illegality, he sought an interview with the generals. Pericles has often described to me the mixed feelings of surprise, fear and admiration — of the Athenian generals at the sight, after so long, of the great commander with his well-known energetic bearing, his curly hair now turning gray, that expression of resolution which they had all seen already and on many occasions in Kimon’s eyes when on the point of action. He had come to beg them to be allowed to fight in the ranks as a common soldier. He knew, he said, that he and his party had been often accused of sacrificing the interests of Athens to those of Sparta. Indeed, there were actually people who believed, or pretended to believe, that it was he who was behind the present Spartan invasion and that he planned to regain power with Spartan assistance and at the price of dismantling the long walls and the defenses in the Megarid. Now he wished to make it clear that he was as ready to die for Athens when she was fighting against Sparta as he had shown himself ready to die in battle after battle against the Persians.

  Neither Pericles nor any other of the generals doubted Kimon’s sincerity. They had never believed the malicious rumor that he had been in communication with the enemy. On the other hand there was evidence that some Athenians, possibly the same small clique of reactionaries who had organized the assassination of Ephialtes, had certainly made contact with the Spartan command and had, in all probability, made use of the name of Kimon in order to further their own plans of overthrowing the democracy. There were also political considerations. In the event of victory, Kimon’s prestige would be enormously increased; in the event of defeat the generals would be accused of having illegally allowed an exile to fight in an Athenian army. They themselves might even be prosecuted for collusion with the enemy. The Athenians have naturally a great respect for law; the whole fabric of their state is sustained by it. And most Athenian generals not only respect the law but fear it. They know that the people expect, invariably, success and are apt, often unreasonably, to disgrace any commander who has failed to achieve it. In all my time at Athens I have known only two men who were not afraid of the people. One was Pericles and the other was Kimon himself.

  So on this occasion the generals refused Kimon’s request. Pericles was the only one who supported it. Bitterly disappointed, Kimon withdrew again into exile, though first he sent a message to his friends in the army, asking them to fight on the following day as though he were with them.

  And this indeed they did. In the long battle more than a hundred of them lost their lives, and all are agreed that as a body they fought with outstanding gallantry on that day. Pericles too was one of those of whom men spoke with a kind of awe after the battle. He had, of course, already a great reputation both as a soldier and as a commander, but it seems that on this day he fought with a ferocity that astonished even those who knew him best, seeking out danger rather than guarding against it. Perhaps he had become determined to demonstrate that it was not only the friends of Kimon who could be reckless with their lives. Or perhaps his lack of caution was the result of an overmastering passion of imagination as he saw the possibility of defeating, for the first time in history, a Spartan army on land. When I used to question him afterwards, he would smile and make little of his exploits. No one in the army, he said, had taken undue risks.

  The fighting went on all day and there were very heavy casualties on both sides. By late afternoon neither army could claim any advantage over the other. The issue was determined not by military prowess but by treachery. Toward evening the whole of the Thessalian cavalry deserted the Athenians and went over to the enemy. The movement was no doubt prearranged, but the Thessalians had probably delayed it in case, by too precipitate action, they might find themselves on the losing side. These Thessalians are, in comparison with the Athenians and other Ionian cities, still in a rudimentary state of political development. Their leaders and magistrates are not elected; they are simply large landowners who are used to the society of their equals and the subservience of their vassals. In this rather primitive sense they constitute an aristocracy and, being alarmed and dismayed by the wholly different spirit that is to be found in an Athenian army, they considered that both their interests and their nature were more akin to those of Sparta than those of Athens. Here they were mistaken, for the Athenians are capable of showing flexibility and understanding in their relations with others; the Spartans are astonished by the Athenians, but despise almost everyone else.

  The defection of the Thessalian cavalry and their subsequent attack on the Athenian baggage train forced the Athenians to retire to new positions, and many casualties were inflicted on them and their allies during the retreat. The retreat, however, was made in good order, and though the Spartans could claim a tactical victory they did not feel strong enough to exploit it. The Athenians expected an immediate attack on the long walls or on A
thens itself, so they withdrew their army to a position covering the city. But the Spartans would take no more risks. Without having attained any of the objects of their campaign, they considered that their honor was satisfied, marched quickly back through the Megarid, which was still unguarded, and dispersed to their homes.

  The Athenians had, in fact, won a strategic victory, but being used to extravagant success, they regarded it as a defeat. There was a demand for further and more decisive action, and this demand was soon met. First, however, Pericles performed an act of personal generosity and political wisdom which strengthened both the resolution and the resources of the state. It was he who proposed, in this moment of emergency, that Kimon, whose friends had amply demonstrated their patriotism on the battlefield, should be recalled. He reminded his audience that his own father, Xanthippus, had been recalled from exile during the crisis of the Persian invasion. The decree was passed with very little opposition, and Kimon came back to Athens no longer as an enemy but as a friend of the new democracy. He was immediately employed in negotiations with Sparta, and the Spartans, relieved to find that it was with him rather than with Pericles that they had to deal, agreed to an ignominious treaty providing for a four months’ truce. In this treaty no mention was made of Aegina, Megara or of Sparta’s new allies in the north. Perhaps the Spartans imagined that Athens was exhausted and would make no move until the following spring. If so, they were profoundly mistaken. Within two months of the battle of Tanagra Myronides led the army northwards for the second time. He met the large Boeotian army at a place called the Vine Groves, not far from the scene of the first battle. His victory was complete and decisive and he followed it up with energy. He dissolved the Boeotian League, which under the leadership of Thebes had been so recently organized by the Spartans, and set up in all the cities democratic governments loyal to Athens. Nor was this the end. The people of Phocis in central Greece, who had been angered by the Spartan intervention in Doris, were also received within the Athenian alliance. So too were the eastern Locrians on the coast. Thus within three months of their defeat at Tanagra the Athenians had gained control of the whole of eastern and central Greece as far north as the Pass of Thermopylae. By the end of the year the long walls had been completed and Aegina forced to surrender. Her fleet was handed over to Athens, her fortifications were razed, and her celebrated coinage was no longer issued. She was forced to join the Athenian League and to pay an exceptionally heavy annual contribution to the treasury at Delos. It was in these ways that Athens reacted to a single defeat.