Crusade in Europe

by Dwight D. Eisenhower

  Even if the German had possessed as efficient a supply system as we—which he did not—he would still have found tremendous difficulty in supplying his spearheads over the miserable roads available, which were at the same time, of course, crowded with his reinforcements pushing to the front.

  So we were particularly careful about Liége, where there were vast quantities of every kind of vital supplies, including fuel and food. However, we were determined that the enemy would be stopped short of that point, and in the outcome he never got close to Liége. Subsequently we learned that Brussels and Antwerp were designated by the Germans as the principal objectives for the assaulting troops. Nevertheless, our reasoning was correct because lack of supply did become one of Von Rundstedt’s major difficulties in the prosecution of the offensive.15

  On the seventeenth Bradley ordered the XVIII Airborne Corps from reserve to the front with Bastogne its original destination. General Middleton, then in Bastogne, saw the great importance of the spot and urged preparation to hold it. He conferred with Bradley by telephone, and although he stated that the place could soon be surrounded, recommended that it be held. It became necessary to divert the 82d Airborne Division to the north toward Stavelot, so the 101st, with detachments of the VIII Corps, became the defenders of Bastogne.16

  Developments were closely examined and analyzed all during December 17 and 18. By the night of the eighteenth I felt we had sufficient information of the enemy’s strength, intentions, and situation, and of our own capabilities, to lay down a specific plan for our counteraction. On the early morning of December 19, accompanied by Air Chief Marshal Tedder and a small group of staff officers, I went to Verdun, where Generals Bradley, Patton, and Devers had been ordered to meet me.17 As the conference started, with everyone around a long table, I remarked: “The present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster. There will be only cheerful faces at this conference table.” True to his impulsive nature, General Patton broke out with, “Hell, let’s have the guts to let the ——— — ——— go all the way to Paris. Then we’ll really cut ’em off and chew ’em up.” Everyone, including Patton, smiled at this one, but I replied that the enemy would never be allowed to cross the Meuse.

  The situation was carefully reviewed and it was gratifying to find that every man present, whether a commander or staff officer, was cool and confident. I did not hear any remark that indicated hysteria or excessive fear.

  In a situation of this kind there are normally two feasible lines of reaction for the defending forces, assuming that the high command does not become so frightened as to order a general retreat along the whole front. One is merely to build up a safe defensive line around the general area under attack, choosing some strong feature, such as a river, on which to make the stand. The other is for the defender to begin attacking as soon as he can assemble the necessary troops. I chose the second, not only because in the strategic sense we were on the offensive, but because I firmly believed that by coming out of the Siegfried the enemy had given us a great opportunity which we should seize as soon as possible. This was in my mind when I radioed Montgomery on the nineteenth, saying: “Our weakest spot is in direction of Namur. The general plan is to plug the holes in the north and launch co-ordinated attack from the south.”18 The following day I was more specific in another message to him: “Please let me have your personal appreciation of the situation on the north flank with reference to the possibility of giving up, if necessary, some ground in order to shorten our line and collect a strong reserve for the purpose of destroying the enemy in Belgium.”19

  I had already determined that it was not essential for our counterattack to begin on both flanks simultaneously. In the north, where the weight of the German attack was falling, we would be on the defensive for some days. But on the south we could help the situation by beginning a northward advance at the earliest possible moment. My immediate purpose at the Verdun meeting on the nineteenth was to make arrangements for the beginning of the southern assault.

  It was Bradley’s responsibility to outline the exact unit sectors, together with other local details of direction and co-operation. But because Devers’ forces would have to extend their left in order to take over a part of Bradley’s front and therefore allow him a greater opportunity for concentration, I had to make appropriate decisions, including those of general strength and timing.

  We first determined the point to which we believed Devers could stretch his left without exposing the southern flank injudiciously. The next problem was to determine the amount of force Patton could gather up for a counterattack and the approximate time that it could begin. I did not want him to start until he was in sufficient force so that, once committed, he could continue gradually to crush in the southern flank of the developing salient. Once this was done, the German troops west of our point of attack would be effectively stopped, because east-west communications through the region were relatively meager. We estimated that Patton could begin a three-division attack by the morning of December 23, possibly by the twenty-second.

  I issued verbal orders for these arrangements to be undertaken instantly, with the understanding that Patton’s attack, under Bradley, was to begin no earlier than the twenty-second and no later than the twenty-third. It was agreed further that when Patton’s forces had reached the Bastogne area they would continue on, probably in the general direction of Houffalize. Ample air support was promised the instant flying conditions should improve so that planes could take the air. Moreover, I informed the meeting that I would begin an arrangement for offensive action on the northern flank as quickly as the force of the German blow in that sector had spent itself.

  It was arranged for Patton to concentrate his attacking corps of at least three divisions in the general vicinity of Arlon and from that point to begin the advance toward Bastogne. I personally cautioned him against piecemeal attack and gave directions that the advance was to be methodical and sure. Patton at first did not seem to comprehend the strength of the German assault and spoke so lightly of the task assigned him that I felt it necessary to impress upon him the need of strength and cohesion in his own advance.

  We discussed the advisability of attempting to organize a simultaneous attack somewhat farther to the east, against the southern shoulder of the salient. It was concluded that future events might indicate the desirability of such a move but that for the moment we should, in that locality, merely insure the safety of the shoulder and confine our attacks to the sector indicated.

  The directive issued at Verdun on December 19 established the outline of the plan for counteraction on the southern flank and was not thereafter varied.20 When Patton issued his own attack order, he, as was customary with him, set an impossibly distant objective for his forces.21 However, this hurt nothing because both Bradley and I were concerned only with a methodical advance to the Bastogne area, after which Bradley would determine the particular moves to follow.

  The Colmar pocket had a definite and restrictive influence on the plans made that morning. Had that pocket not existed, the French Army could easily have held the line of the Rhine from the Swiss border northward to the Saar region, which would have released all of the American Seventh Army for employment northward of that point and so provided much greater strength for Patton’s attack. However, the Colmar pocket stood as a threat to our forces in the Rhine plain east of the Vosges and it was consequently unwise and dangerous to take from that area all the troops that otherwise could have been spared.

  Devers was instructed to give up any forward salient in his area that would permit saving troops and in case of an attack to give ground slowly on his northern flank, even if he had to move completely back to the Vosges. The northern Alsatian plain was of no immediate value to us. I was at that time quite willing to withdraw on Devers’ front, if necessary, all the way to the eastern edge of the Vosges. But I would not allow the Germans to re-enter those mountains, and this line was definitely laid down as the one th
at must be held on Devers’ front.22

  These instructions were of course communicated to the French Army, since they implied the possibility of retrograde movement, and if this became extensive, even the city of Strasbourg might have to be temporarily abandoned. The French commander eventually relayed this information to Paris, where it caused great concern in military and governmental circles. General Juin, Chief of Staff of the French Army, came to see me and urged all-out defense of Strasbourg. I told him that at that moment I could not guarantee the city’s security but would not give it up unnecessarily.23 The Strasbourg question was, however, to plague me throughout the duration of the Ardennes battle.

  By the night of the nineteenth, at headquarters at Versailles, reports showed that the German attack was making rapid progress through the center of the salient and that the spearheads of the attack continued to swing to the northwest. The direction of the attack seemed more and more to indicate that the German plan was to cross the Meuse somewhere west of Liége and from there—we thought after surrounding Liége—to continue northwestward to get on the main line of communications of all our forces north of the breakthrough. The northern flank was obviously the dangerous one and the fighting continued to mount in intensity. Moreover, it appeared likely that the German might attempt secondary and supporting attacks still farther to the north in an effort to disperse our forces and accomplish a double envelopment of our entire northern wing. The Intelligence Division had some evidence that such supporting attacks were planned by the enemy.

  The German attack had quickly gained the popular name of “Battle of the Bulge,” because of the rapid initial progress made by the heavy assault against our weakly held lines, with a resulting penetration into our front that reached a maximum depth of some fifty miles.

  This kind of battle places maximum strain upon an army in the field, from the highest general to the last private in the ranks. Its destructive moral effect falls most heavily, of course, upon the troop units that are struck by the attack. Confronted by overwhelming power, and unaware of the measures that their commanders have in mind for moving to their support, the soldiers in the front lines, suffering all the dangers and risks of actual contact, inevitably experience confusion, bewilderment, and discouragement.

  In a different way, the pressure upon higher commanders is equally great. No matter how confident they may be of their ultimate ability to foil the enemy and even to turn the situation into a favorable one, there always exists the danger, when the enemy has the initiative, of something going wrong. The history of war is replete with instances where a sudden panic, an unexpected change of weather, or some other unforeseen circumstance has defeated the best-laid plans and brought reverse rather than victory. It would be idle and false to pretend that the Allied forces, in all echelons, did not suffer strain and worry throughout the first week of the Ardennes attack. It would be equally false to overemphasize the extent and the effect.

  No responsible individual in war is ever free of mental strain; in battles such as the one initiated by the German attack in the Ardennes, this reaches a peak. But in a well-trained combat force, everyone has been schooled to accept it. Hysteria, born of excessive fear, is encountered only in exceptional cases. In battles of this kind it is more than ever necessary that responsible commanders exhibit the firmness, the calmness, the optimism that can pierce through the web of conflicting reports, doubts, and uncertainty and by taking advantage of every enemy weakness win through to victory. The American commanders reacted in just this fashion.

  Early in the battle, on December 22, I issued one of the few “Orders of the Day” I wrote during the war. In it I said:

  By rushing out from his fixed defenses the enemy may give us the chance to turn his great gamble into his worst defeat. So I call upon every man, of all the Allies, to rise now to new heights of courage, of resolution and of effort. Let everyone hold before him a single thought—to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere—destroy him! United in this determination and with unshakable faith in the cause for which we fight, we will, with God’s help, go forward to our greatest victory.24

  North of the break-through three Allied armies and part of another occupied a great salient, extending in a rough semicircle over 250 miles of front. In the extreme north was the Twenty-first Army Group, facing northward and eastward along the lower Rhine and the Maas River. Next to the south was the U. S. Ninth Army, facing east. Next in line was that part of the U. S. First Army, now facing southward, which remained north of the penetration.

  All the troops that could be spared from the First and Ninth Army fronts were being assembled to build up an east-west defensive line against the German assault. These two armies could, at that moment, provide no mobile reserve whatsoever.

  There was, however, an available reserve in Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group. It was the British 30 Corps, then out of the line and available for duty anywhere on our great semicircular line in the north, any part of which might be attacked by the enemy. Very definitely that salient had become one battle front, with a single reserve which might be called upon to operate in support either of the British and Canadian armies or of the American Ninth and First Armies. The depth of the German advances on the eighteenth and nineteenth had broken all normal communications between Bradley’s headquarters at Luxembourg and the headquarters of the Ninth and First Armies. For this reason it was completely impossible for Bradley to give to the attack on the southern shoulder the attention that I desired and at the same time keep properly in touch with the troops in the north who were called upon to meet the heaviest German blows.

  To this whole situation only one solution seemed applicable. This was to place all troops in our northern salient under one commander. The only way of achieving the necessary unity was to place Montgomery temporarily in command of all the northern forces and direct Bradley to give his full attention to affairs on the south. Because of my faith in the soundness of the teamwork that we had built up, I had no hesitancy in adopting this solution. I telephoned Bradley to inform him of this decision and then called Field Marshal Montgomery and gave him his orders.25

  Late that evening Mr. Churchill telephoned to ask how the battle was going. I gave him the outline of the countermeasures already directed and informed him of the temporary command setup. He remarked that my plan would make the British reserve instantly available for use wherever needed, regardless of previously defined zones, and said, “I assure you that British troops will always deem it an honor to enter the same battle as their American friends.”

  The command plan worked and there was generally universal acceptance of its necessity at the time.

  Unfortunately, after the battle was over a press conference held by Montgomery, supplemented by a number of press stories written by reporters attached to the Twenty-first. Army Group, created the unfortunate impression among Americans that Montgomery was claiming he had moved in as the savior of the Americans. I do not believe that Montgomery meant his words as they sounded, but the mischief was not lessened thereby.

  This incident caused me more distress and worry than did any similar one of the war. I doubt that Montgomery ever came to realize how deeply resentful some American commanders were. They believed that he had deliberately belittled them—and they were not slow to voice reciprocal scorn and contempt. However, the accusations and recriminations that flew about the command for a period were directed not at the military soundness of the original decision but at the interpretations the Americans placed upon Montgomery’s press conference and the news stories out of his headquarters. It was a pity that such an incident had to mar the universal satisfaction in final success.26

  At the same time a portion of the British press revived the old question of a single ground commander. Field Marshal Montgomery believed in this as a matter of principle; he even offered to serve under Bradley if I would approve. I was opposed as a matter of principle and continued to reject the proposition. Even General Marshal
l, on December 30, telegraphed me on this point, saying:

  They may or may not have brought to your attention articles in certain London papers proposing a British deputy commander for all your ground forces and implying that you have undertaken too much of a task yourself. My feeling is this: under no circumstances make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. I am not assuming that you had in mind such a concession. I just wish you to be certain of our attitude. You are doing a grand job, and go on and give them hell.27

  On New Year’s Day, I replied:

  You need have no fear as to my contemplating the establishment of a ground deputy. Since receipt of your telegram I have looked up the articles in the British papers to which you refer. Our present difficulties are being used by a certain group of papers and their correspondents to advocate something that they have always wanted but which is not in fact a sound organization. In the present case the German attack did not involve an army group boundary but came exactly in the center of a single group command. The emergency change in command arrangements, that is, the placing of one man in charge of each flank, was brought about by the situation, since the penetration was of such depth that Bradley could no longer command both flanks, while the only reserves that could be gathered on the north flank had to be largely British. Consequently single control had to be exercised on the north and on the south.28

  The defense of Bastogne was not only a spectacular feat of arms but had a great effect upon the outcome of the battle. Bastogne lay in the general path of the sector of advance of the German Fifth Panzer Army. The orders of that army, we later found, directed that Bastogne be by-passed if defended and that the leading troops rush on to the west and then swing north to join in the major attack.

  When on December 17 the XVIII Airborne Corps with its two divisions had been released to General Bradley and directed toward Bastogne, it was not in anticipation of the battle that developed in that area but merely because Bastogne was such an excellent road center. Troops directed there could later be dispatched by the commander on the spot to any region he found desirable. These troops were pushing toward the front on the eighteenth when the situation became so serious on the northern front that General Bradley diverted the leading division, the 82d, toward the left, but the 101st continued on to its original destination in Bastogne. It began closing in there on the night of December 18. During that night and on the nineteenth, while the Germans were occupying themselves with isolated detachments of the troops that manned the original defensive line, the division prepared to defend Bastogne. At the time of the Verdun conference on the morning of the nineteenth we did not know whether Bastogne was yet surrounded, but the strength and direction of advance of German troops in that area indicated that it quickly would be.