Crusade in Europe

by Dwight D. Eisenhower

  Consequently the 101st Division prepared for all-round defense, and although the assaulting armored divisions of the Germans bypassed it to participate in the attack to the northwest, the division was under constant pressure from other German units from that moment onward until relieved.

  The situation on the northern front of the German attack remained critical for some days. On December 21 the remnants of the 7th Armored Division and its supporting detachments were withdrawn from their exposed position near St. Vith after they had withstood the day before a terrific assault from overwhelming forces. Fighting on the northern flank continued desperate on the succeeding days. As soon as Montgomery took charge he began to organize an American force to lead a later counteroffensive on that flank.

  General Collins, with his VII Corps, was selected for this task but, for some days, as rapidly as divisions could be assigned to him they were sucked into the battle to prevent enemy advances at critical points.

  Fighting kept up on this scale until the twenty-sixth, and from all available evidence it appeared that the German was going to make at least one more great effort to break through our lines in that region.

  On the south Bradley had gotten off his attack on the morning of December 22. Progress was extremely slow and because of the snow-choked roads and fields maneuvers were difficult. The initial attack was made by the III Corps, in which were the 4th Armored Division with the 80th and 26th Divisions. It was the kind of fighting that General Patton distinctly disliked. It was slow, laborious going, with a sudden break-through an impossibility. Several times during the course of this attack General Patton called me to express his disappointment because he could go no faster; at the Verdun conference on the morning of the nineteenth he had implied, or even predicted, that he would get into Bastogne in his first rush. I replied that as long as he was advancing I was quite satisfied. He was doing exactly what I expected, and although I knew that his early attacks were meeting only the defensive divisions of the German Seventh Army, terrain and climatic conditions were so bad that a faster advance could not be expected.29

  One of the breaks in our favor occurred December 23. This was a sudden, temporary clearing of the weather in the forward areas which released our air forces to plunge into the battle. From that moment onward, with some interruptions owing to bad weather, our battle-tested ground-air tactical team began again to function with its accustomed efficiency. The air forces bombed sensitive spots in the German communications system, attacked columns on the road, and sought out and reported to us every significant move of the hostile forces. German prisoners taken thereafter invariably complained bitterly about the failure of their Luftwaffe and the terror and destruction caused by the Allied air forces.

  On the twenty-sixth Patton at last succeeded in getting a small column into Bastogne but he did so by a narrow neck along his left flank that gave us only precarious connection with the beleaguered garrison. It was after that date that the really hard fighting developed around Bastogne, both for the garrison itself and for the relieving troops.

  I had planned to go to see Montgomery on the twenty-third but air travel in the rear areas was still not advisable and travel by road was slow and uncertain. It was unwise for me to leave headquarters on a trip that might keep me absent for several days. Fortunately telephone and radio communications with both him and Bradley remained satisfactory and I was able to keep in close touch with the situation. Nevertheless, I decided to make a night run by railway to Brussels to see Montgomery and to return immediately upon completion of the conference. The train I expected to use was bombed by the Germans on the night of the twenty-sixth, but another was hurriedly made up and I got away on the twenty-seventh.

  The trip was further complicated by the extraordinary fears entertained by the Security Corps that enemy murderers were circulating in the area with the hope of killing Montgomery, Bradley, and me, and possibly others.30 The report was astonishing. For several months I had been driving everywhere around France with no more protection than that provided by an orderly and an aide who habitually rode in the car with me. The story was brought to me on December 20 by a very agitated American colonel who was certain that he had complete and positive proof of the existence of such a plot. He outlined it in great detail and his conclusions were supported by other members of the Security Staff. I discounted the murder theory but agreed to move my quarters closer to headquarters. I had been living in the town of St. Germain, in a house which Von Rundstedt had previously occupied. I was convinced that the Germans had too much need of their men to use them in roaming over a wide area in search of their intended victims, each of whom could presumably be replaced. I was irritated at the insistence of the Security Corps that I definitely circumscribe my freedom of movement, but I found that unless I conformed reasonably to their desires they merely used more men for protective measures.

  Consequently I promised to move out of headquarters only when necessary, provided they would cut down protective detachments to the utmost, so that soldiers could be used on the battle line and not in trailing me around. They promised that this period of watchfulness would terminate December 23, but when I started to Brussels on December 27, I found the railway station swarming with Military Police and armed sentries. I sharply queried the security officers about this use of men but they assured me that they had merely assembled in the station individuals who were normally on duty in that vicinity. However, after we were well started on our journey I found that a squad of soldiers was accompanying me. At every stop—and these were frequent because of difficulties with ice and snowbanks—these men would jump out of the train and take up an alert position to protect us.

  I remarked to the junior officer in charge of the detail that I would consider it miraculous if any ambitious German murderer could determine in advance that he would find his prospective victim on a particular railway train, at a given moment, at a given spot in Europe. I told him to keep his men inside and to avoid exposing them to the bitter cold. He agreed in principle but so greatly impressed was he by the strictness of the orders he had received that I doubt that I saved any of the men from useless and futile activity.

  It was almost noon on the twenty-eighth before I made contact with Montgomery. Roads were so bad that automobile travel was impossible and our train had to proceed by a long, roundabout, secondary line all the way to Hasselt, where I met Montgomery. He gave me the details of the recent attacks against the northern line, showed me the position of his general reserve, and said that he was again beginning to assemble Collins’ corps, with which to initiate the Allied offensive from the northern flank. He intended to drive in the general direction of Houffalize.

  At that meeting we had no positive information that indicated a German intention to cease his attacks in the north. Montgomery was certain from information available to him—and this information was correct at the time it was received—that the German intended to make at least one more full-blooded attack against the northern line. Montgomery was confident of beating off this attack and he wanted to get his reserve ready to follow in on the heels of the Germans as they were repulsed. This plan, of course, would seize the best possible conditions under which to initiate a great counterblow, the only difficulty with it being that its timing depended upon the action of the enemy. I discussed with him the possibility that the German might not attack again in the north but he felt that this was a practical certainty. If the enemy should not renew the assault, Montgomery said, he could use the time in reorganizing, re-equipping, and refreshing his troops. At that time the first task was to make sure of the integrity of our northern lines. The German was still far south of any area in which he could cause us major damage and the only thing we had to fear was a clean break-through by fresh troops arriving on that front.

  We agreed that the best thing to do in this situation was to strengthen the front, reorganize units, and get thoroughly ready for a strong counterblow, in the meantime constantly preparing to beat off any Ger
man attack that might be launched. We agreed also that if no such German attack was launched Montgomery would begin his own offensive on the morning of January 3.

  In the outcome there was no further German attack because of a change in enemy plans which concentrated his troops in the Bastogne area. The Allied troops on the northern flank used the intervening time to good advantage and on the morning of January 3 passed over to the offensive, in accordance with the plan adopted December 28.31

  I returned to my own headquarters on the twenty-ninth. By that time the security people were beginning to believe that their fear of the murder scheme had been exaggerated. While they continued to surround me with greater security measures than they had employed before the beginning of the offensive, I could at least now depart from my headquarters without a whole platoon of MPs riding in accompanying jeeps and scout cars.

  On December 26, Patton had established tenuous contact with the garrison of Bastogne, while on the north the Germans had just been repulsed from a very determined, and what proved to be their final, major attack on that flank. By this time the garrison at Bastogne was proving to be a serious thorn in the side of the German high command. As long as it was in our hands, the German corridor to the westward was cut down to the narrow neck lying between Bastogne on the south and Stavelot on the north. Through this neck there was only one east-west road that was worthy of the name. On the twenty-sixth the German began to concentrate strong forces for an attack upon the Bastogne area. Enemy troops were shifted from the northern front and additional strength was brought up from his rear areas.32

  In the meantime, however, we had brought up the 11th Armored Division and moved the 17th Airborne Division to the Continent. These, with the 87th Division, were stationed close to the Meuse and held in position to determine their area of greatest usefulness. Because of the continued attacks of the Germans on the northern flank between December 20 and 26 it appeared possible that our new formations would be best used on that flank. However, during the twenty-seventh it became clear that the German was now throwing his principal effort against Bastogne, and on the twenty-eighth I released the new divisions for Bradley’s use. The 11th and 87th were used to support Patton’s left flank just to the westward of Bastogne, but so difficult were the icy, snowy roads that these new troops accomplished little. By the end of the month Middleton’s VIII Corps was reconstituted and back in the fight, joining in the northward attacks toward Bastogne. The Germans persisted in their attacks against the Bastogne area from the north and never ceased their assaults until the night of January 3.33

  During the progress of the December fighting there was no letup in our planning for the resumption of the general offensive. On December 31, I forwarded to Montgomery and Bradley an outline plan to cover operations until we should reach the Rhine all along the front from Bonn to the northward.34

  As the Battle of the Ardennes wore on the Germans began diversionary attacks in Alsace. They were not in great strength but because we had weakened ourselves in that area the situation had to be carefully watched. I told Devers he must on no account permit sizable formations to be cut off and surrounded.35

  The French continued to worry about the safety of Strasbourg. On January 3, De Gaulle came to see me. I explained the situation to him and he agreed that my plan to save troops in that region was militarily correct. However, he pointed out that ever since the war of 1870 Strasbourg had been a symbol to the French people; he believed that even its temporary loss might result in complete national discouragement and possibly in open revolt. He was very earnest about the matter, saying that in extremity he would consider it better to put the whole French force around Strasbourg, even at the risk of losing the entire Army, than to give up the city without a fight. He brought a letter saying that he would have to act independently unless I made disposition for last-ditch defense of Strasbourg. I reminded him that the French Army would get no ammunition, supplies, or food unless it obeyed my orders, and pointedly told him that if the French Army had eliminated the Colmar pocket this situation would not have arisen.

  At first glance De Gaulle’s argument seemed to be based upon political considerations, founded more on emotion than on logic and common sense. However, to me it became a military matter because of the possible effect on our lines of communication and supply, which stretched completely across France, from two directions. Unrest, trouble, or revolt along these lines of communication would defeat us on the front. Moreover, by the date of this conference the crisis in the Ardennes was well past. We were now on the offensive within the salient, and while I wanted to send to Bradley’s front all the troops we could spare elsewhere, the motive was now to increase the decisiveness of victory, not to stave off defeat. I decided to modify my orders to Devers. I told General de Gaulle that I would immediately instruct Devers to withdraw only from the salients in the northern end of his line and to make disposition in the center to hold Strasbourg firmly. No more troops would be taken away from the Sixth Army Group. This modification pleased De Gaulle very much, and he left in a good humor, alleging unlimited faith in my military judgment.36

  Mr. Churchill was, by chance, in my headquarters when De Gaulle came to see me. He sat in with us as we talked but offered no word of comment. After De Gaulle left he quietly remarked to me, “I think you’ve done the wise and proper thing.”

  During the battle the Luftwaffe attempted to operate on a more intensive scale than at any time since the early days of the campaign. On January 1 the German Air Force came out in the strongest attack it had attempted against us in months. Its principal targets were Allied airfields, particularly those lying near the Bulge and to the northward thereof. During the course of the day the Germans destroyed many of our planes, most of them on the ground. Reaction of our own fighter planes was swift, and although we took quite a severe, and partially needless, loss the enemy paid with almost half of his entire attacking force.37

  Two days later, January 3, the First Army, spearheaded by the VII Corps, began its attacks on the northern flank and all danger from the great German thrust had disappeared. From that moment on it was merely a question of whether we could make sufficient progress through his defenses and through the snowbanks of the Ardennes to capture or destroy significant portions of his forces.

  From both flanks we continued attacks in the direction of Houffalize, where we joined up January 16. However, the advance had been so slow and so intensely opposed by the enemy that most of the enemy troops to the westward of the closing gap had succeeded in withdrawing. Upon arrival at Houffalize both armies turned generally eastward to drive the Germans beyond their initial lines. At this time the First Army again came under General Bradley’s command. The U. S. Ninth Army on the left flank of the American forces I assigned temporarily to Twenty-first Army Group because of a plan we were developing for the crossing of the Roer and for a converging operation against the Rhine crossing in the northern sector.38 I hoped to launch this assault by February 8–10, and since Montgomery’s forces were still stretched back along the line to the vicinity of Antwerp the only way I could provide the necessary two armies for the assault was to employ the U. S. Ninth Army.

  The losses on both sides in the Battle of the Ardennes were considerable. Field commanders estimated that in the month ending January 16 the enemy suffered 120,000 serious casualties. In view of the fact that after the war German commanders admitted a loss of about 90,000, this estimate of our own would seem to be fairly accurate. In addition to personnel losses the enemy suffered serious casualties in tanks, assault guns, planes, and motor transport. These we estimated at the time as 600 tanks and assault guns, 1600 planes, and 6000 other vehicles.39 In the Ardennes battle our ground forces employed, for the first time in land battles, the new “proximity fuse.” It was an invention that added immensely to the effectiveness of our artillery.

  Our own losses were high, with the 106th Infantry Division suffering the worst. Because of its exposed position it was not only in the fi
ght from the start, but many men were isolated and captured. The 28th Division was likewise roughly handled and the 7th Armored took serious losses during its gallant defense of St. Vith. Altogether, we calculated our losses at a total of 77,000 men, of whom about 8000 were killed, 48,000 wounded, and 21,000 captured or missing. Our tank and tank destroyer losses were 733.40

  The projected attack for February 8–10 was to be merely the beginning of a series of blows that we were planning to complete the destruction of the Germans west of the Rhine. I wanted to pass to the general offensive as quickly as possible because I was convinced that in the Battle of the Bulge the enemy had committed all of his remaining reserves. I counted on a greatly weakened resistance from that moment onward, both because of losses suffered by the Germans and because of the widespread discouragement that I felt sure would overtake his armies. Moreover—and this was very important—the Russians had opened their long-awaited and powerful winter offensive on January 12. Already we had reports that it was making great progress and it was obvious that the quicker we could attack the more certain we would be that the German could not again reinforce his west front in an effort to avoid defeat.