Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  Nothing could be done to get Campbell under way on her own steam. She had to be sunk or towed to Newfoundland. Hirschfield transferred the fifty survivors of the freighter Nielsen Alonso, the five German POWs, and 112 of the Campbell crew to Burza. Although he was low on fuel, Pitulko on Burza volunteered to tow Campbell to Newfoundland. Reluctant to offer the many U-boats present two sitting ducks in a towing operation, Hirschfield declined the offer. Crowded with survivors, Burza then departed the convoy for St. John’s, arriving with very little fuel. The corvette Dauphin came up to stand by Campbell until the tug Tenacity arrived to tow Campbell to St. John’s, protected by yet another corvette. For his cool heroism and for carrying on to sink U-606 in spite of his wounds, Hirschfield was awarded a Navy Cross.

  Convoy Outbound North 166 continued westward. Soon the British corvette Dianthus, critically low on fuel, was compelled to break off for St. John’s, reduced to burning gunnery and mineral oil and paint thinner. Her departure left only the cutter Spencer and four corvettes to deal with the sixteen U-boats tenaciously tracking the convoy.j

  During the night of February 23-24, no less than a dozen boats overwhelmed the thin escort and ran in and shot torpedoes. Horst Höltring in the Knappen VII U-604 sank the 1,700-ton rescue ship Stockport, reducing the ability of the escorts to locate the U-boats by Huff Duff. Partly as a result, the U-boats sank six ships that night:

  • Heinz Hasenschar in the Ritter VII U-628 hit and damaged two tankers in ballast, the 7,000-ton Winkler and the 6,400-ton Glittore.

  • Karl-Jürgen Wächter in the Taifun VII] U-223, on his maiden patrol, finished off the Winkler.

  • Hans-Joachim Bertelsmann in the Ritter boat U-603, finished off the Glittore.

  • Siegfried Hesemann, age thirty, in the Taifun boat U-186, an IXC40 on her maiden patrol, sank the 5,400-ton American freighter Hastings and the 6,200-ton British freighter Eulima.

  • Günther Gretschel in the Taifun VII U-707, also on her maiden patrol, sank the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Jonathan Sturges.

  Convoy Outbound North 166 reached the outer limits of Newfoundland-based ASW aircraft by February 24, and four Cansos (Catalinas) of Canadian Squadron 5 came out to provide cover. One of the planes, piloted by F. C. Colborne, hit and severely damaged the Knappen VII U-604, commanded by Horst Höltring. Another Canso, piloted by D. G. Baldwin, hit the Ritter VII U-621, commanded by Max Kruschka. Höltring in U-604 was compelled to abort to France. Kruschka in U-621 fell out, repaired the damage, and remained on patrol.

  Over the next forty-eight hours, as the weather deteriorated, seven more U-boats got through the thin screen and shot. The Ritter VII U-628, commanded by Heinz Hasenschar, and the Knappen VII U-600, commanded by Bernard Zürmuhlen, both hit the same ship, the 4,400-ton Norwegian freighter Ingria, which sank. Later Hasenschar sank the 7,200-ton British Liberty ship Manchester Merchant. The veteran Gerhard Feiler in the Ritter VII U-653 hit the 9,400-ton Dutch freighter Madoera, which was abandoned, but she survived and was towed to port.* Oelrich in the Knappen VII 17-92, Zurmühlen in the Knappen VII U-600, and Kruschka in the Ritter VII U-621 all missed in second attacks and U-92 aborted to France.

  When the boats crossed the 100-fathom (600-foot) line off Newfoundland in impenetrable fog, U-boat Control canceled operations against Outbound North 166. Admiral Godt proudly logged the reported results: Nineteen boats had chased the convoy westward for six gruelling days over 1,100 miles. Thirteen of the nineteen boats “fired successfully,” sinking twenty-three ships for 132,171 tons and damaging seven others. Only one U-boat, U-606, had been lost.

  The confirmed figures were less impressive, but the total constituted one of the worst fast-convoy disasters of the war: fourteen (of sixty) merchant ships for 78,700 tons sunk by eleven boats; two tankers (TV. T. Nielson Alonso, Madoera) hit for damage, and one escort disabled (the Coast Guard cutter Campbell was laid up for repairs until May 19). Counting the two Ritter boats (U-225 and U-529) sunk on February 15 while awaiting the convoy on the patrol line and U-606 and U-623, not one but four U-boats had been lost, three VIIs and one IX. Only twelve of the approximately two hundred men on those boats survived, all to become POWs.

  At the conclusion of this epic battle, eight of the remaining boats headed directly to France with battle damage or fuel shortages or both. Manhardt von Mannstein in U-753, who had been ordered to make repairs and to attack Outbound North (Slow) 167, was unable to comply on account of battle damage. He and Höltring in U-604 were the most severely damaged boats. Both reached France, but Manhardt von Mannstein did not sail again until May; Höltring did not sail again until late June. The other boats, quickly repaired, all resailed in April.

  Convoy Outbound North (Slow) 167, which followed closely behind the fast Outbound North 166, was comprised of twenty-five ships. It was thinly guarded by British Escort Group B-3, commanded by A. A. Tait, which consisted of two British destroyers (Harvester, Escapade), two Polish destroyers (Garland, Buna), and four corvettes, three Free French and one British. As related, the Buna was detached to reinforce the preceding convoy, Outbound North 166.

  Adolf Graef in the experienced VII U-664 found Outbound North (Slow) 167 on the morning of February 21. The boat was one of five newly arrived to join group Burggraf. Graef shadowed well, bringing up Helmut Manseck in U-758. After Manseck reported contact, Graef attacked and sank two ships, the 4,700-ton American freighter Rosario and the 8,800-ton Panamanian tanker H. H. Rogers.

  To capitalize on this contact, U-boat Control dissolved the embryo group Burggraf and created a new group, Sturmbock (Battering Ram). It was to be comprised of the five newly arrived VIIs of Burggraf, plus two damaged boats from the battle with Outbound North 166, and three homebound ex-Haudegen boats. The plan was that Sturmbock was to shadow and nibble away at the convoy as it waddled west. Then all the boats returning from the chase of Outbound North 166 with sufficient fuel and torpedoes were to be shifted to attack Outbound North (Slow) 167.

  Allied codebreakers learned of this plan from Enigma decrypts and the Admiralty initiated an evasion plan. When the escorts forced Graef in U-664 and Manseck in U-758 under and held them there, the convoy made a radical turn and then followed a more southerly route than had Outbound North 166. As a result of these maneuvers, group Sturmbock lost the convoy and did not regain contact. The boats continued hunting west toward Newfoundland until U-boat Control realized it had been outwitted and canceled the pursuit. The five homebound boats that were diverted to join group Sturmbock were released. These included Ritterkreuz holder Ernst Mengersen in the ex-Haudegen boat U-607. Upon arrival in France, Mengersen left the boat to command the 20th Flotilla in the Training Command.*

  Group Neptun, which assembled between Greenland and Iceland from February 15 to 20, consisted of eleven boats, including three recent transfers from the Arctic. Assailed by hideous winter storms, Neptun patrolled for twelve miserable days without finding anything. Finally on February 27, the new VII U-759, commanded by Rudolf Friedrich, age twenty-eight, came upon Halifax 227, comprised of sixty-two ships. It was thinly guarded by British Escort Group B-6, commanded by R. Heathcote: two veteran destroyers, Fame and Viscount, and four corvettes. The convoy had been routed very far to the north to avoid the U-boats pursuing the more southerly westbound convoys Outbound North 166 and Outbound North (Slow) 167.

  Owing to the wild storms raging through this area, Friedrich in U-759 had difficulty getting his contact report to Berlin. When the message finally arrived (relayed by U-405), U-boat Control directed group Neptun, less the new but tardy VII U-638, commanded by Hinrich-Oskar Bernbfeck, age twenty-eight, to home on U-759’s beacon. By that time, however, Heathcote had detected U-759 by Huff Duff and driven her under. The shadower thus lost contact with the convoy.

  Bucking huge seas and howling winds, group Neptun could not organize for a coordinated attack. Only four boats made contact with the convoy or its stragglers. Rolf-Heinrich Hopmann in the Arctic transfer U-405 found a group of five strag
glers and sank one, the 7,200-ton British Liberty ship Wade Hampton, plus two patrol boats she was transporting on her deck. Regaining contact with the convoy, Rudolf Friedrich in U-759 shot at the straggling 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Meriwether Lewis, but he missed and could not chase further owing to a diesel-engine failure. Another boat newly arrived from Kiel, U-634, was commanded by Eberhard Dahlhaus, age twenty-two, the youngest skipper in the Atlantic force.† Benefiting from Friedrich’s reports, Dahlhaus found and sank the Lewis with three torpedoes. Two Neptun VIIs, Heinz Schütt’s U-135 and another Arctic transfer, Friedrich-Karl Marks’s U-376, were compelled to abort to France, U-135 because of a shortage of fuel and U-376 due to battle damage. The U-135 was out of action until early June; Schütt went to other duty.

  A reconstituted Neptun remained in the area immediately south of Greenland. Two of its VIIs, Marks’s aborting U-376 and the U-608, commanded by Rolf Struckmeier, found the fast Outbound North 168, fifty-two merchant ships, which had also been rerouted to the north to avoid the U-boats attacking convoys Outbound North 166 and Outbound North (Slow) 167. Two destroyers, Havelock and Volunteer, of the British Escort Group B-5, commanded by Richard C. Boyle, got the boats on Huff Duff and drove them under. No other boats could find convoy Outbound North 168, but on March 7, the new VII U-638, commanded by Hinrich-Oskar Bernbeck, found and shot at a straggler in ballast, the 6,500-ton British tanker Empire Light. He reported that his torpedoes missed, but, in fact, he hit the ship and the crew abandoned her.

  Twelve convoys comprised of about 550 merchant ships crossed the Atlantic between the Americas and the British Isles on the North Atlantic run in February. The falloff in traffic was the result of several factors: the increase in the eastbound convoy sailing schedule from every eight days to every ten days; the short month (twenty-eight days); hostile weather; the transfer of some surface escorts to the Fast and Slow Torch convoys (UG-GU) and to northern Russia convoys (JW-RA); the further diversion of merchant ships to northern Russia via Iceland; the withdrawal of three Canadian MOEF groups (C-l, C-2, C-4) for training at Tobermory and workup on the Gibraltar run.

  The fact that both sides were reading the other’s encoded radio transmissions fairly consistently in February led to a gigantic game of naval chess on the North Atlantic run. The convoys changed routes to avoid U-boat patrol lines. The patrol lines shifted to intercept convoys on the new routes, each side continually reacting to information in enemy decrypts.

  In this perilous game, the U-boats had located about half the Allied convoys and had mounted truly devastating attacks on two of them or their stragglers: the eastbound Slow Convoy 118 (with British escort B-2) and the fast westbound convoy Outbound North 166 (with American escort A-3). The U-boats sank twenty-four confirmed merchant ships from these two convoys, plus eight other ships from five other North Atlantic convoys and three ships (one tanker) sailing alone. Grand total: thirty-five sinkings (nine tankers). About one-third of the lost ships (twelve) were eastbound, loaded with war materiel and food, the rest westbound vessels in ballast.* About 94 percent of all merchant ships and escorts in these convoys reached their destinations.

  German losses on the North Atlantic run in February were very heavy: twelve boats (nine VIIs and three IXs). Aircraft probably accounted for six boats; surface escorts the other six. The “exchange rate” that month in that “decisive” area was thus about one U-boat sunk for three merchant ships sunk, a ruinous trend for the Germans. Of the approximately six hundred Germans serving on the twelve lost U-boats, only twelve men from U-606 survived, all to become POWs.

  When the figures on the North Atlantic run for the months of January and February are combined, there is no convincing evidence that the U-boats were anywhere close to severing this decisive lifeline. Altogether, twenty-five convoys, comprising about 1,100 merchant ships, sailed east and west in those two months.

  The U-boats sank forty ships from those convoys or convoy stragglers (4 percent), half of them eastbound, and seven other ships sailing alone, a total of forty-seven ships. In return, fourteen U-boats on patrol in that area failed to return, an “exchange rate” of one U-boat lost per 3.3 merchant ships sunk.*

  U-BOAT FAILURES AGAINST THE NEW MIDDLE ATLANTIC CONVOY RUNS

  Not including the initial Torch invasion convoys, by January 1, 1943, seven fast and slow convoys had sailed between the United States and Gibraltar (UGS, UGF) and vice versa (GUF). These convoys consisted of 152 merchant ships (including troopships) and sixty-one escorts. As with the initial inbound Torch invasion convoys, no losses were incurred.

  In the year 1943, 106 convoys comprised pf 3,657 merchant ships and 878 escorts crossed east and west via the Middle Atlantic routes. These included twenty-seven slow and nine fast UG convoys, twenty-eight slow and eight fast GU convoys, twenty-four Torch tanker convoys (TM, OT, and TO), and ten tanker convoys between the Caribbean and the United Kingdom (CU, UC). One hundred and fifty-three tankers sailed east and west in the Torch convoys; another 192 tankers in the CU-UC convoys between the Caribbean arid the British Isles.

  Allied ship losses to Axis forces in the Middle Atlantic convoys in 1943 were practically infinitesimal. Axis submarines and air attacks in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea sank altogether nineteen merchant vessels, seven of them in the hapless British tanker convoy TM 1 in early January. Thereafter Axis forces sank only a dozen more merchant ships from Middle Atlantic convoys during the rest of the year.†

  The overwhelming strength of the Atlantic U-boat force sailed against the North Atlantic run in January and February 1943. However, U-boat Control could not ignore their new Middle Atlantic routes, j

  In the three months from January through March, Control sent thirty-six fresh U-boats to the Gibraltar-Azores area. These consisted of twenty-one Type IXs‡ that were unsuitable for hard anticonvoy operations, thirteen VIIs, and two XB minelayers, U-117 and U-118. These thirty-six joined two IXCs, U-511 and U-522, which had sailed on the last day of December 1942 for the second Cape Town foray, Seehund, had then been diverted to attack the tanker convoy TM 1, and were subsequently held in the Gibraltar-Azores area.

  Owing to the shortage of XIV tankers, only one, U-461, could be spared to support the boats in the Gibraltar-Azores area. She sailed on February 13. Since this was not sufficient tanker support for the thirty-eight boats operating in that area, U-boat Control diverted the XB minelayers U-117 and U-118 to serve as provisional tankers upon completion of their primary tasks. In addition, Control directed that all attack boats homebound from this area with surplus fuel, including VIIs, were to give all they could to those boats remaining in the combat zone.

  The first half dozen of these attack boats relieved the boats of the original group Delphin. These first boats, together with the IXs U-511 and U-522, and the boats to follow in January and February, were variously organized into a second group Delphin, and two other groups, Rochen (Ray) and Robbe (Seal).

  Seven of the newly sailed boats had first to conduct special missions:

  • The IXC U-66, commanded by Friedrich Markworth, was directed to land a “French saboteur,” Jean Marie Lallart, on the coast of Spanish Sahara near Mauritania-Rio de Oro oh January 20. Two crewmen put Lallart ashore in U-66’s dinghy, but the boat overturned in the surf and the crewmen were unable to recover from the mishap and return to the U-boat. Subsequently, French military personnel captured the two U-66 crewmen in Port Etienne, Morocco, and turned them over to the British. The fate of Lallart has not come to light.

  • The XB minelayer U-118, commanded by thirty-eight-year-old Werner Czygan, laid a field in an Allied safe lane at Gibraltar on the night of February 1. In a hair-raising few hours, Czygan planted sixty-six SMA mines. The field proved to be one of the most fertile of the war. The mines sank three British freighters for 14,000 tons and the Canadian corvette Weyburn and damaged a 10,000-ton Norwegian tanker and (awkwardly) a 2,000-ton neutral Spanish freighter. While attempting to assist the sinking Weyburn at close quarters, the
British destroyer Wivern was damaged either by another mine or (more likely) by several of Weyburn’s depth charges, which detonated as she went down stern first. Afterward, U-118 served as a provisional U-tanker, providing fuel for nine boats.

  • The veteran Type VII U-455, commanded by a new skipper, Hans-Martin Scheibe, laid a minefield in the Allied safe lanes at Fedala (Casablanca), Morocco, on April 10. The twelve TMB mines sank one 3,800-ton French freighter.

  • The XB minelayer U-117, commanded by Hans-Werner Neumann, was also directed to lay mines at Fedala. While approaching the harbor, Allied ASW patrols detected and hunted Neumann. Nonetheless, on the night of April 11, U-117 planted sixty-six SMA mines. These mines damaged two 7,200-ton Liberty ships, one American, one British. Afterward, U-117 also served as a provisional U-tanker, providing fuel for nine boats.

  The IXC U-163, commanded by Kurt-Edward Engelmann, was assigned to meet the inbound blockade-runner Regensburg and give her instructions. On March 13, while making his way out of the Bay of Biscay, Engelmann responded to a Luftwaffe convoy sighting—Outbound South 44—and attempted to run in and attack. One of the seven escorts, the Canadian corvette Prescott, picked up U-163 on radar and sank her with depth charges.* There were no survivors. When U-boat Control realized that U-163 had been lost, it temporarily diverted the Americas-bound U-161, commanded by Albrecht Achilles, to carry out the rendezvous.