Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  • Directed to provide submarine escorts for the blockade-runner Hohenfriedburg, inbound from the Far East to France, U-boat Control assigned three VIIs: the inbound U-264, commanded by Hartwig Looks; the inbound U-258, commanded by Leopold Koch, temporarily replacing the regular skipper Wilhelm von Mässenhausen, who was hospitalized; and the outbound veteran U-437, commanded by a new skipper, Hermann Lamby, age twenty-seven.

  Based on information from Allied codebreakers, the British heavy cruiser Sussex lay in wait for the Germans about 720 miles west northwest of Lisbon. Adhering to the procedure for protecting the secrets of codebreaking, on the morning of February 26, an American B-24 “found” Hohenfriedburg and its alert ostensibly “brought up” Sussex, which forced the Germans to scuttle. Looks in U-264 boldly attacked Sussex with a full bow salvo, but all torpedoes missed. After Sussex hauled out, Looks rescued the entire crew of Hohenfriedburg and took the men to France.

  One of the boats originally assigned to meet Hohenfriedburg had a difficult patrol. This was Hermann Lamby, new skipper of the VII U-437, who discovered a serious crack in the diesel-exhaust flange, which barred the boat from diving deep, thereby robbing her of the most important means of escaping the enemy. Therefore Control, on April 13, directed Lamby to withdraw southward to “a less dangerous area” near the Azores, where he could serve as a lookout for UG-GU convoys. A week later, the outbound VII U-409 met Lamby in U-437 and gave him some spare parts, but Lamby aborted and returned to France on March 5, completing an utterly frustrating and useless voyage of thirty-one days.

  The VIID (minelayer) U-218, commanded by Richard Becker, found a convoy northeast of the Canaries on February 7. U-boat Control directed five of the new Delphin boats and the new group Rochen to attack. Including U-218, nine U-boats made contact with the convoy, drawing heavy air attacks. Only three could get into position to shoot. Two missed, but the third, Klaus Bargsten in the IXC U-521, claimed sinking a 10,000-ton tanker and a corvette, and damage to an 8,000-ton freighter. Postwar records confirmed only the 750-ton British ASW trawler Bredon.

  The IXB U-108, commanded by Ralf-Reimar Wolfram, reported a convoy north of the Canaries on February 10. U-boat Control rushed seven other boats of group Rochen to join U-108. Responding to the U-boat alarm, a Catalina of the Gibraltar-based British Squadron 202, piloted by William Ogle-Skan, drove U-108 down and bombed her, Wolfram reported, “at great depth.” The bombs disabled U-108’s four bow tubes, rendering the boat incapable of torpedo attacks. She loitered in the area for several days, giving other boats her spare fuel, then aborted to France for the second time in as many patrols. Declared unfit for further combat, U-108 made ready to sail home to Germany for duty in the Training Command. No other boat found this convoy. Owing to the “heavy” Allied air patrols, U-boat Control temporarily suspended anticonvoy operations north and northeast of the Canaries.

  Two days later, on February 12, a VII outbound from France to join group Rochen reported a southbound convoy near Cape Finisterre. She was U-569, a veteran that had come out to the Atlantic in August of 1941, commanded by Peter Hinsch, but had sunk only three ships for 8,800 tons in nearly eighteen months of operations. Deemed to be “too cautious” to be a U-boat skipper, Hinsch had finally been relieved by thirty-two-year-old Hans Johannsen, a prewar merchant-marine officer. The first watch officer, Fritz Otto Paschen, merely twenty-one-years old, had made one prior patrol in that capacity.

  Although U-boat Control expected heavy Allied air cover, it directed the six new boats of group Delphin plus the Americas-bound IXC40 U-185 to home on U-569 and attack the convoy. August Maus in U-185, who was not far away, made contact and reported the convoy was composed of “five large troopships,” heavily escorted by surface ships and aircraft. Maus boldly closed for a daylight submerged attack, but when he ordered “fire,” owing to an error by the first watch officer or a mechanical failure, no torpedoes left the tubes. While maneuvering into position to shoot, Johannsen in U-569 was detected by the alert escorts and driven off. The IXC U-511, under her new commander, Fritz Schneewind, who had been in the area for six weeks, made contact with the convoy, but she too was driven off by escorts who damaged her with depth charges. Owing to the very heavy escort, U-boat Control canceled further operations against this convoy.

  Hitler’s famous “intuition” led him to believe that the Allies were on the verge of occupying Portugal. To repel this supposed occupation force, Hitler directed Dönitz to rush a group of U-boats to blocking positions directly west of Lisbon. Dönitz doubted that the Allies had designs on Portugal, but he complied with the order by sending the original six Type VIIs of group Delphin plus three of the added Type IXs (U-125, U-511, U-522) to the area, even though all six VIIs and the U-125 were very low on fuel.

  Allied codebreakers detected this redeployment of group Delphin to an area within easy reach of Gibraltar-based British ASW aircraft. Commencing on February 12, Coastal Command saturated the skies with radar-equipped British planes. Two found lively action:

  • On February 12, a Hudson of Squadron 48, piloted by Geoffrey Richard Mayhew, came upon the VIIC U-442, commanded by Hans-Joachim Hesse. May-hew attacked, dropping four depth charges and strafing with machine guns. Savaged, U-442 sank with the loss of all hands.

  • In the early evening of February 14, a Catalina of Squadron 202, piloted by Canadian Harry R. Sheardown, escorting the southbound convoy KMS 9, found and attacked a U-boat with five depth charges. This was the VIIC U-381, commanded by Wilhelm-Heinrich von Pückler und Limpurg, who had sailed from France on December 19. The damage sustained in this attack and a shortage of fuel forced von Pückler und Limpurg to return to France. He arrived on February 19, completing an arduous patrol of sixty-two days without a success.

  Later that evening, pilot Sheardown got another radar contact. He turned on his landing lights and attacked another U-boat with his remaining two depth charges. This was the VIIC U-620, commanded by Heinz Stein, who had sailed from France on December 19. The attack destroyed U-620 with the loss of all hands. Sheardown returned to Gibraltar having been airborne for twenty-two hours and twenty minutes, doubtless a Catalina endurance record.

  Low on fuel, the four surviving VIIs and the IXC U-125 returned to France.* The IXCs U-511 and U-522, which had been detached from group Seehund to reinforce group Delphin’s attack on TM 1, remained in the Portugal-Gibraltar-Azores area to reinforce other newly forming groups.

  Commanded by Herbert Schneider, the IXC U-522, which also had been on patrol in the Azores-Madeira area for six weeks, ran critically low on fuel. Upon learning this, U-boat Control arranged for her to refuel from the newly sailed XIV tanker U-461. En route to this rendezvous on February 17, U-522 made contact with a fast convoy east of the Azores, reported as “five large ships” with three escorts making twelve knots. Schneider shadowed—and reported—but owing to the high speed of the quarry, Control was unable to bring up either group Rochen or group Robbe, and Schneider finally had to give up the chase because of his acute fuel shortage.

  B-dienst reported that a large Torch convoy inbound from the United States was to pass close to the Azores on about February 17. Control made elaborate plans to intercept. It deployed two groups, composed of newly arrived boats and the remnants of group Delphin, some of which had refueled from the XB minelayer U-118: Rochen (ten boats) and Robbe (eight boats). Upon forming patrol lines, the boats were to “lie to” submerged to avoid being spotted by aircraft and attempt to intercept the convoy by picking up its propeller noises on hydrophones.

  Aware of these U-boat formations from breaks in naval Enigma, Allied authorities rerouted this big Africa-bound convoy around groups Rochen and Robbe. By February 19, U-boat Control realized that it had missed the prize and canceled both patrol lines. Declaring with italicized emphasis that Torch convoys “must be stopped,” U-boat Control concluded that the groups could not do so efficiently in the vast and wide-open seas in the Azores area and that therefore they had to operate “much closer�
� to the Strait of Gibraltar.

  Group Robbe was to lead the way eastward. After refueling from U-461, group Rochen was to follow. En route to this hazardous new assignment, on February 22, one of the Robbe IXBs, U-107, commanded by Harald Gelhaus, encountered and sank the 7,800-ton British vessel Roxborough Castle, which was sailing alone. Other than the ASW trawler bagged by Bargsten in U-521, this was the first ship to be sunk in the month of February by any of the dozen and a half U-boats in those waters.

  After refueling from U-461, Herbert Schneider in U-522 received orders to intercept a convoy that was expected to hug the coast of Morocco. En route to that special task on February 22, Schneider happened upon a big British southbound convoy. This was the fast (9.5 knots) oil convoy UC 1, consisting of thirty-two ships —seventeen of them tankers in ballast—en route from the British Isles to Curaçao. It was closely guarded by British Escort Group 42, commanded by L. F. Durnford-Slater, comprised of six warships: the new 1,400-ton frigate Ness, the sloop Folkstone, the former American Coast Guard cutter Totland, and three corvettes. The close escort was backed up by an American hunter-killer group (support group) consisting of four new (1940) fleet destroyers. All ten escorts were equipped with centimetric-wavelength radar and some warships had Huff Duff.

  Upon receiving the report from Schneider in U-522, U-boat Control directed seven boats of group Rochen to cancel the refueling operation and home on U-522 at high speed, without regard for fuel consumption. The VII U-202 of group Rochen, which had already fueled, and three boats of group Robbe, which were close enough to catch the convoy, were also told to join the chase. However, one of these Robbe boats, Gelhaus in the KB U-107, did not receive the message in time and could not join. Thus eleven attack boats (six VIIs; five IXs) pursued this rich but massively guarded target. The XIV tanker U-461 closely trailed the U-boats, prepared to refuel any boat that required replenishment. “The enemy must not be left in peace,” U-boat Control exhorted. “The hardest fighter carries the day. No slacking off!”

  Schneider in U-522 lost contact with convoy UC 1 but regained it at dawn on the morning of February 23. Inasmuch as another boat had reported contact, Schneider attacked and sank the 8,900-ton British tanker Athelprincess sailing in ballast. By noon that day, four other boats were in contact, including the Ritterkreuz holder Günther Krech in the VII U-558. Meanwhile, Schneider had pulled ahead of the convoy and dived to make a daylight periscope attack. He was detected by the escorts, who pounced with great fury and destroyed the U-522. There were no survivors. The Admiralty gave sole credit for the kill to the former American Coast Guard cutter Totland (ex-Cayuga).

  In the afternoon five other U-boats made contact with the convoy, bringing the number of attackers to nine. The other pursuing boat, Richard Becker in the VIID (minelayer) U-218, reported delays due to engine and rudder failures, but he pressed on gamely. That night seven of the nine boats in contact attempted to attack.

  • Günter Poser in the VII U-202 sank the 8,000-ton American tanker Esso Baton Rouge and damaged the British tankers Empire Norseman and British Fortitude.

  • The Ritterkreuz holder Günther Krech in the VII U-558 sank the damaged 9,800-ton Empire Norseman but missed “three destroyers.”

  • In two separate attacks, in which he fired one FAT, one “acoustic,” and two electric torpedoes, Herbert Juli in the VII U-382 claimed sinking two 8,000-ton tankers, but in reality he only damaged the Dutch tanker Murena, which reached port.

  • Hans Johannsen in the VII U-569 fired three torpedoes and claimed hits on as many ships, but none could be confirmed.

  • Attacks by Hans-Joachim Schwantke in the old IX U-43; Wilhelm Luis, age twenty-seven, new skipper of the IXC U-504; and Klaus Bargsten in the IXC U-521 were thwarted by aggressive escorts.

  The boats hung on doggedly for the next two days. Several boldly attempted to penetrate the heavy screen and attack, but only two fired torpedoes: Gunter Poser in U-202, who reported four misses, and Friedrich Markworth in U-66, who claimed a hit on a “destroyer” and possibly hits on two other ships, but no hit was ever confirmed. Becker in the VIID (minelayer) U-218 finally caught up, but his rudder failed again and he was forced to abort to France. Juli in U-382 and Johannsen in U-569 suffered severe depth-charge damage. After pausing at the XIV tanker U-461 for repairs and fuel, they too aborted to France. These three boats were out of action until mid-April.

  Berlin propagandists claimed a smashing victory for the U-boats against UC 1: one “destroyer” and eight tankers sunk. The confirmed score was far less: three tankers (in ballast) for 26,700 tons sunk and two tankers (in ballast) damaged, but both of the latter remained with the convoy and reached port. One U-boat, the IXC U-522, was lost with all hands. Appraising the performance of the four American destroyers of the support group, the commander of British Escort Group 42, Durnford-Slater, paid the Americans a rare compliment: “No escort group has ever been better supported.”

  The British TM 1 and British UC 1 were the only two special tanker convoys to lose ships to U-boats in 1943. The combined loss was ten vessels sunk and two vessels damaged out of 345 sailing east and west on the Middle Atlantic routes. The Americans soon assumed responsibility for escorting all special oil convoys. From mid-year 1943, the CU-UC convoys sailed via the United States East Coast and North Atlantic route. Seven such convoys, comprised of 133 tankers, crossed east and west with no losses to Axis forces.*

  The veteran Joachim Berger in U-87, assigned to group Rochen, developed a lube-oil leak that could not be fixed and crippled his attack on the convoy UC 1. After a brief stop at the tanker U-461, he proceeded to France. On March 4, when U-87 was about two hundred miles west of Portugal, the Luftwaffe reported a convoy en route from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean, designated KMS 10.

  Berger found this slow convoy. It was guarded by Canadian Escort Group C-l, which had just completed two weeks of intense training at the Royal Navy’s ASW school at Tobermory. Escort Group C-l was comprised of a British destroyer, the four-stack Canadian destroyer St Croix, and four Canadian corvettes, including Shediac, all newly equipped with centimetric-wavelength radar. Berger in U-87, who had a full load of torpedoes, boldly attempted to attack the convoy all alone, but the escorts detected him and counterattacked with skill and tenacity, destroying U-87 with the loss of all hands. The Admiralty credited the Canadian vessels St. Croix and Shediac with the kill.

  Several boats of group Robbe took up the hunt for convoy KMS 10. Three found it: Harald Gelhaus in U-107; the veteran U-410, commanded by a new skipper, Horst-Arno Fenski, age twenty-four; and the U-445, commanded by Heinz-Konrad Fenn. Escorts thwarted Gelhaus and Fenn, but Fenski got in and hit two 7,100-ton British freighters. One sank but the other, Fort Paskoyac, equipped with a net defense, survived. The Canadian escorts counterattacked Fenski and forced him to haul to westward to repair damage.

  Based on intelligence from B-dienst, U-boat Control formed a new group, Tümmler (Porpoise) on March 1 to intercept a convoy about six hundred miles southwest of the Azores. Comprised of seven boats (five IXs, two VIIs), Tümmler waited on a patrol line for three days but saw nothing. Very likely Allied code-breakers decrypted the formation orders to this group and the convoy authorities rerouted the ships to evade the boats.

  U-boat Control abandoned the search for this convoy on March 3 and shifted group Tümmler, less Ritterkreuz holder Hermann Rasch in U-106, to the narrow waters between the Canaries and the mainland of Africa. While proceeding to this new area, Hans-Joachim Schwantke in U-43 came upon a lone ship, which he took to be a British freighter. In actuality it was the 5,200-ton German raider-minelayer Doggerbank (ex-British Speybank), returning to France after a round-trip voyage of thirteen months to the Orient and Japan. Loaded with seven thousand tons of rubber and other scarce raw materials, Doggerbank was inexplicably sailing well ahead of the moving safety grid for her homebound leg. Schwantke hit Doggerbank with three torpedoes; she blew up and sank in about three minutes. Later, when U-boat
Control learned of this terrible mistake, all mention of the sinking was expunged from the log of U-43.

  A twenty-four-year-old survivor of Doggerbank, Fritz Kurt, climbed into a skiff that had floated free. He then rescued a dog, “Leo,” and fourteen survivors, including Doggerbank’s captain, Paul Schneidewind. The survivors fashioned a sail and in order to take fullest advantage of the trade winds, set a course westerly to the Caribbean. Eleven days later a gale capsized the skiff and eight of the fifteen men and the dog drowned. Subsequently, four of the seven survivors, crazed by thirst, asked to be shot. Schneidewind reluctantly complied with these requests, Kurt said later, then shot himself, leaving Kurt and one other survivor alive. On March 20 the latter died, leaving only Kurt, who was found unconscious and “near death’- on March 29 by the Spanish tanker Campoamor, bound for Aruba. Upon arrival at that island, Kurt, by then recovered from his ordeal, was turned over to American naval intelligence officers, who took him to the States for exhaustive interrogation.*

  As group Tümmler was occupying its new positions, U-boat Control released the remaining boats of group Robbe, which had been patrolling off the mouth of the Strait of Gibraltar under heavy air attacks. While they were withdrawing westward to less dangerous waters, the Luftwaffe reported a convoy. This was Outbound South 44, consisting of forty-six ships and eight escorts en route from the British Isles to Sierra Leone. Harald Gelhaus in U-107, Horst-Arno Fenski in U-410, and Heinz-Konrad Fenn in U-445 raced to the reported position. Gelhaus in U-107 got there first and attacked, firing all six torpedoes in his tubes at multiple targets.

  With this single, well-executed salvo Gelhaus hit and sank four freighters for 17,400 tons. Harassed by surface and air escorts, neither Fenski in U-410 nor Fenn in U-445 could get in to shoot. Gelhaus pursued and attempted a second attack the next day, but aircraft drove him off. In return for past victories and claims and for sinking five ships for 25,000 tons on this patrol, Gelhaus earned a Ritterkreuz*