R N Kao

by Nitin A Gokhale

  The ruler of Sikkim had developed ambitions to gain ‘independence’ for the state. India, sensing the restlessness in the state, had offered an agreement of Permanent Association with India in September 1972 but, according to Sidhu, the Chogyal wanted the offer to include full sovereign rights for Sikkim, a point that India could not have agreed under any circumstances. That is when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi summoned Haksar and Kao to her office. This was end of December 1972. She asked RNK, ‘Can you do something about Sikkim?’ The R&AW chief asked for a fortnight to revert.

  R&AW Gets into Action

  Once again, like in the Bangladesh operation, Kao fell back on P.N. Banerjee in Calcutta. Banerjee met RNK in Delhi and they worked out a plan for Sikkim. The aim was to get the Chogyal to agree to what India had proposed (Permanent Association) or work for the complete merger of Sikkim with India. Banerjee, who clearly loved action, returned to Delhi in 10 days along with Ajit Singh Syali, who was posted as OSD (P) in Gangtok. Syali was assigned to Gangtok as a R&AW officer primarily to collect trans-border intelligence on Tibet.

  The domestic and counter-intelligence duties were left to the IB operatives, after the bifurcation of the IB and formation of R&AW in 1968. Banerjee, as mentioned earlier, continued to hold dual charge on the regional offices of R&AW and IB in Calcutta until his passing away in July 1974.

  Banerjee told RNK on his return to Delhi that the ultimate aim of merging Sikkim with India could be achieved and the plan he had worked needed a time frame. Kao took the matter first to Haksar and then to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who gave instant clearance to start the campaign. The only caveat she put was to take Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh on board without giving away the ultimate objective—Sikkim’s merger. Singh was to be told that R&AW would work towards undermining and weakening the Chogyal through the agitations launched by political parties led by the Kazi and other younger leaders.

  Banerjee and Sayali, who were any way in touch with the political leaders in Sikkim, now had the clearance to encourage them to agitate and demand more powers to the people. Banerjee, with his extensive contacts, and Sayali, because of his familiarity with the situation in Sikkim, rolled out the Operation in early 1973. The timing of launching the operation could not have been better. Throughout 1972 and early 1973, there was heightened unrest in Sikkim because of various local factors. They included massive income inequalities, discrimination against the Nepalese majority and Bhutia-Lepcha highhandedness drawing their strength from proximity to the Chogyal.

  An attempt by the palace or elements supporting it to rig the elections of January 1973 added to the problems. This was perhaps the proverbial last straw.

  The situation was thus ripe for an uprising against the feudal system, especially the Chogyal. The Kazi was the natural leader for the agitation because of his popularity and acceptance across communities. The Kazi-led SNC joined hands with K.C. Pradhan of the Janata Congress to form a united front against the Chogyal in February 1973. The new front was called the Joint Action Committee (JAC).

  It is against this backdrop that Banerjee and Sayali launched their operations. Called ‘Janamat’ and ‘Twilight,’ the two operations, going by some of the internal communication, lasted for over two years. They were perhaps codenames given to agitation leaders K.C. Pradhan and the Kazi respectively.

  The leaders were met by Banerjee’s team in early February 1973.

  An update from Banerjee to RNK in early March 1973 said that for the first time since 1949, Sikkim had become a hotbed of tension because of activities of the JAC. There were large-scale protests in different parts of Sikkim and in front of the palace, and boycott of the council by the elected representatives of the Sikkim National Congress … ‘According to reliable sources, the Chogyal has become very much unnerved by the agitation launched by the joint action committee,’ Banerjee wrote5

  Banerjee alerted Kao that one Peter Burley, political officer at the US consulate in Calcutta—who according to Banerjee’s assessment was actually a CIA operative—visited Sikkim as a state guest of the Chogyal. During Burley’s visit, the Chogyal is reported to have mentioned to him the difficulties being created by the agitators and hinted that he might have to take the help of Government of India to curb the activities of the anti-durbar elements. Another input that RNK received was that the Chogyal was trying to wean away Kazi by negotiating with him after a couple of exclusive, one-on-one meetings with the SNC leader. Banerjee personally was, however, confident that Kazi would not succumb to Chogyal’s entreaties because that would mean frittering away a lifetime of support among the people. Banerjee had nevertheless arranged for one of his deputies to meet Kazi at Siliguri around 10 March 1973 to ascertain Kazi’s political plans.

  In Delhi, the wheels were turning fast. Having decided to remove the protective shield around the Chogyal and support the pro-democracy parties, the PMO, the MEA and the R&AW were all working towards a plan. In a meeting chaired by the newly appointed Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh and attended by the then Defence Secretary K.B. Lall, Home Secretary Govind Narain, RNK, Sikkim’s Political Officer, K. Shankar Bajpai, L.L. Mehrotra, Director North in the MEA and Banerjee, who had specially come from Calcutta.

  Interestingly, the notes of the meeting, recorded by Banerjee, reveal that the Political Officer had suggested several alternatives to tackle the situation. They included merger with Darjeeling district of West Bengal with some of the districts of Sikkim adjoining Darjeeling and give independence to truncated Sikkim! This was rejected outright.

  The high-level meeting, requested by the R&AW, then decided to adopt several measures in the next few months. They were as the following:

  Strengthen and encourage the agitation till it came to a stage where the Chogyal would be forced to approach Government of India for assistance in dealing with the situation.

  Devise ways and means to give publicity that the current Chogyal actually had no legal rights to be the King. Thondup’s father, Tashi Namgyal, had become King only because his elder brother—the real heir—had voluntarily stepped down. The elder brother’s eldest son—Jigmi Taring—should, therefore, have been the real King.

  Support wide publicity to the agitation throughout Sikkim through local newspapers.

  Once the agitation gained momentum and the lawlessness increased, send Indian Army troops for occasional route marches to remind the people of their presence.

  Organise and support big demonstrations when the Chogyal addresses the meeting of the opening day of the Sikkim Council, which would also be on the 50th birthday of the Chogyal on 4 April 1973.

  Make sure that the anti-Chogyal parties and their leaders, especially the Kazi, were told that they would not be abandoned in favour of the Chogyal as it had happened in 1949 when India backed the King instead of democratic forces.

  And so it began. The local R&AW team got down to the task of instigating and guiding the agitation, kept the anti-Chogyal leaders united and focused and, of course, offered financial help whenever necessary.

  As Sidhu writes, ‘By the middle of March 1973, the R&AW’s special operations team had started guiding the activities of both the anti-Chogyal parties … an important challenge that the R&AW’s special OPS team had to face at that point was to ensure closer coordination in the functioning of the SNC and Janata Congress, with the ultimate aim of securing their merger into a single party headed by the Kazi. In this respect, of the members of the R&AW’s special Ops team, Padam Bahadur, played a significant role. He contacted his old friend SK Rai, general secretary of the Janata Congress, and was finally able to convince him about the virtues of the unity of approach of the two parties to build pressure on the Chogyal to get their demands fulfilled…’6

  On the day of the Chogyal’s 50th birthday, there were clashes on the streets of Gangtok, leading to police firing and a couple of deaths. The Chogyal’s elder son, Tenzing, who had ventured out under the protection of the Sikkim guards, was stopped on his way back to the palace. In
panic, Tenzing’s escort, a captain of the Sikkim guards, opened fire, killing some demonstrators. The Kazi and his party utilised this incident to the hilt by whipping up anti-Chogyal sentiments. By the next day, the tempo of agitation, demonstrations, street marches, some looting and arson had spread across Sikkim.

  Back in Delhi, Kao had briefed the prime minister about the imminent takeover by the Indian Government of administration of Sikkim. On 6 April, Indira Gandhi met Foreign Secretary, Kewal Singh, and her Principal Secretary, P.N. Dhar, to seek instructions from her on the situation in Sikkim. Dhar remembers, ‘The meeting lasted only about half an hour. Kewal was surprised to find that she had already made up her mind before listening to what he had to say. He guessed that the leaders of the anti-Chogyal moment had kept her informed through R&AW. She was brief and told us that she would accept the Chogyal’s request for help as soon as it came…’7

  Sure enough, it came on 8 April. That day, the Political Officer, K.S. Bajpai, sent one of his First Secretaries, Gurdeep Bedi, to the palace with a draft for the Chogyal. The letter, to be typed on the Chogyal’s letterhead, was to be a request by the Chogyal to the Government of India to take control of the administration of Sikkim since there was a complete breakdown of law and order. The letter was to further state that the Chogyal was placing the Sikkim guards and the Commissioner of Police under the Command of GOC, 17 Mountain Division of the Indian Army. As Bedi reached the palace, he could see that the Chogyal was sitting in the garden and was conferring with his advisers. Sidhu describes the development thereafter. Soon after, Bedi handed over the draft letter to the Chogyal and explained the purpose of his visit. After reading the draft carefully, the Chogyal exploded, ‘Never! I would never place my Sikkim guards under the command of the GOC. He went inside the palace without uttering a single word…’8

  Chogyal’s advisers then went in and out of the palace twice and finally came out to tell Bedi that the Chogyal was ready to sign the draft letter provided he was allowed to retain control of the Sikkim guards. Since telephone lines were dead, Bedi accepted the Chogyal’s precondition without being able to take clearance from his boss, Political Officer Bajpai. As the letter was readied, the noise of the anti-Chogyal demonstrations outside the palace was rising by the minute. Bedi, armed with letter, drove out of the palace, lucky not to be stopped or attacked by the crowd since he was in a jeep that had the special number plate assigned to Indian officers and was easily identifiable. Bedi reached the India House at 8 PM and handed over the letter signed by the Chogyal.

  The Indian Government had succeeded in its first objective.

  The administration was now under Indian control. On 9 April, the Indian Parliament was informed by then minister of state for external affairs, Surenderpal Singh, that ‘India would now make every effort to ensure that the interests of the people are served and safeguarded and that Sikkim marches on the road to political stability, security and prosperity’.9

  In Gangtok, satisfied with having achieved his first aim, Kazi called off the agitation.

  The Next Phase

  The MEA selected B.S. Das, an IPS officer of the 1948 batch from the Uttar Pradesh cadre to become the Chief Executive of Sikkim. He was briefed thoroughly and told of India’s ultimate objective in Sikkim—the merger of the state to the Indian Union. The Foreign Secretary told Das that the anti-Chogyal leaders had to be given full support and assurance that India was determined to set up a popularly elected government in Sikkim, and that if the Chogyal resisted, New Delhi was prepared for a showdown. Das took charge on 10 April.

  Within a week, Kewal Singh was in Gangtok, meeting all sides. The Foreign Secretary met the Chogyal, the prominent political leaders and, of course, Bajpai and Das. According to Sidhu, Singh assured the Chogyal of three things:

  Continuation of the institution of the Chogyal and his dynasty with related privileges

  Parity between Bhutia-Lepchas and the Nepalese

  Maintain the sanctity of the 1950 treaty

  To the JAC leaders, the Foreign Secretary assured continuation of India’s support. He came back again on 7 May to clinch a tripartite agreement the next day.

  Signed by Kewal Singh, the Chogyal and the political parties led by the Kazi and K.C. Pradhan, the 8 May agreement essentially left the Chogyal with control over the Sikkim guards and the administration of the palace. The centre of gravity had clearly shifted from the Chogyal to Delhi. More importantly, however, it was decided that a legislative assembly to be called a council was to be elected every four years ensuring that no single ethnic group—Nepalese and Bhutia-Lepcha—would have a dominant position. The biggest change was that the Chief Executive, an Indian official, became the virtual chief minister, having the final say in the appointment of ministers and the allocation of their portfolios.

  The situation was still fluid though. Banerjee’s note to RNK in early May and Kao’s own comments on the way forward, sent to Kewal Singh and Dhar, are revealing. Banerjee’s note pointed out that the anti-Chogyal movement was continuing in many parts of Sikkim. Processions in the last week of April at several places in South and West Sikkim and a big meeting at Melli by the All Sikkim Youth Congress ‘proved the preparedness of the JAC and also its organisational ability,’ Banerjee stated. This ended the first phase of the Special Operations launched by the R&AW.

  A bigger challenge awaited RNK since Indira Gandhi had made it clear that she wanted a complete merger of Sikkim with India, and in the shortest time possible. RNK’s assessment dated 7 May 1973, cautioned everyone, especially the MEA, about the pitfalls of going forward. He noted that the leaders of ‘JAC felt that unless constant pressure on the Chogyal is kept up till he goes to the conference table, he may change his attitude any moment’10. The Chogyal is bound to exploit differences and mutual suspicion among the political parties, RNK warned and stressed that ‘it is therefore necessary that the JAC leaders do not become victims of the Chogyal’s machinations’. Kao pointed out that the assurances given by the Foreign Secretary and the Political Officer had raised high hopes in the JAC leaders, and unless a reasonable settlement was arrived at, they may feel frustrated and accuse the Government of India of betrayal.

  RNK then goes on to instruct Banerjee about the steps to be taken in the next few months and overcome opposition from within the Indian Government. The task, he said, should be as follows:

  To give all possible encouragement to the JAC to carry on protracted agitation by staging anti-Chogyal demonstrations and holding big rallies in different parts of Sikkim. Unfortunately, both the PO [Bajpai] and the Chief Administrator [Das] are opposed to this view and both of them are persuading the leaders of the JAC to stop all agitations, and to allow the administration to function normally.

  It would not be in our interest to allow the Nepalese or other extremist elements of Darjeeling district to join hands with the JAC.

  We must ensure that in any agreement reached among the various political parties, India’s special position in Sikkim is further strengthened.

  Neither the Durbar, nor the preponderant Nepalese community, nor the Bhutias/Lepchas should dominate the future set-up of Sikkim. There should be ample scope for us to play one group against the other in future so that no one group becomes too powerful.

  The negotiations should start, and final settlement must be reached before the restoration of complete normalcy in Sikkim so that we may negotiate with the Chogyal from an advantageous position.11

  Three days later, Kao, after a long meeting with the Foreign Secretary, sent a long letter to Banerjee tasking him with a few jobs and asking for his opinion on some other measures. ‘The intervening period is of critical importance, because every effort should be made meanwhile to keep up and increase the tempo of support for India, and the agitation against Chogyal,’ RNK wrote to Banerjee. He also reminded Banerjee that it was necessary to ensure that the Chogyal gets no chance to restart his machinations. ‘Our attempt should be to build up such a strength that we are sure
of having our candidates returned to at least 70 per cent of the seats in the Assembly,’ RNK said.

  Kao also instructed Banerjee to ensure that people must be made aware of the disparity in development and progress between Sikkim and the neighbouring districts of West Bengal like Darjeeling so that they start demanding direct representation in the Indian Parliament. Then RNK went on to add, ‘I need hardly say that during the ensuing months and until the elections are held, our friends should be given assurance of generous financial support.’

  As Sikkim appeared headed for more chaos before elections were held over the next six months, RNK wanted to ensure that the momentum of the agitation was maintained. Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh was equally supportive and was ruthless in implementing India’s eventual plan to merge Sikkim with India. In response to PO Bajpai’s inputs about some inimical activities by the Chogyal’s sister Coocoola and her children who were using their contacts in the US and UN circles in New York, ‘spreading abusive charges against the Government of India’, and their attempts to instigate Bhutia-Lepcha students studying in Delhi against the Government,’ Kewal Singh told Bajpai that at ‘some stage, she must be made to realise that if she continues to work against India’s interests, we shall have to resort to some drastic steps against her.’12 One of the drastic steps that was thought about was to reopen a case of attempted illegal export of an idol by Coocoola, which was confiscated by the Customs at the Delhi airport. The Indian state, as is well known, can be quite merciless as this case illustrates.

  Over the next six months, the R&AW, through Sidhu (who was posted to Gangtok as OSD (P) from August 1973), gradually implemented the next phase of the planned operations. First, elections were held in April 1975. The Kazi won a landslide victory, winning 31 of the 32 seats, going beyond RNK’s expectations of winning at least 70 per cent seats! The Kazi now had a legitimate right to go beyond the 8 May 1973 agreement and establish a closer relationship between Sikkim and India. Soon, after much manoeuvring and manipulation, the Kazi could get a new Act—the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974—passed in the Assembly giving Sikkim the status of an associate state. It was now only a matter of time before Sikkim became a full-fledged state of India.