R N Kao

by Nitin A Gokhale

  However, there was plenty of drama before the actual merger took place. The Chogyal, on a visit to Kathmandu for the coronation of King Birendra in February 1975, tried to internationalise the Sikkim issue by saying he would approach the UN and demand a free and fair referendum to decide the fate of Sikkim. The Chogyal’s behaviour may have finally convinced Delhi to effect the final stage of the plan that had been finalised in December 1972.

  While the PO and the MEA prepared the ground for a resolution to be passed in the Assembly, the R&AW had to work behind the scene to make sure that there was no bloodshed or largescale violence. It was essential, therefore, to disarm the Sikkim guards, the Chogyal’s loyal soldiers, who could create trouble in the highly charged atmosphere in Gangtok.

  Kao left the job to Sankaran Nair.

  He drew up an elaborate plan to prepare the ground for justifying the disarming of the Sikkim guards. The scheme is a classic example of what the R&AW could and can do when required. The plan, broadly, was as follows:

  The disarming of the Sikkim guards should be done on the 8 or 9 of April 1975.

  Before this action is taken, there should be public meetings and processions in Gangtok demanding removal of the Sikkim guards, complete merger with India and removal of the Chogyal.

  It should be possible to involve the Sikkim guards in incidents like firing, throwing of hand grenades, etc. Immediately, after these incidents take place, the chief minister and the Cabinet should send a communication to the Chief Executive stating that the Sikkim guards are terrorising the people, and that unless immediate action is taken for their removal from the palace, they will let lose a reign of terror.

  The news about the incidents by the Sikkim guards and the palace supporters should be on all the ticker tapes at about 8 pm either on 8 or 9 April, for wide publicity in the press.

  At about midnight, there should be a second handout to the press stating that in view of the prejudicial activities of the Sikkim guards, the PO has asked for help of the army for disarming the Sikkim guards.

  Next day, after the disarming of the security guards is complete, news should be flashed publicising that the chief minister and the Cabinet have assured that the pay and allowances of all the members of the Sikkim guards would be fully protected and that the Sikkim Government would utilise their services elsewhere.

  Demonstrations should continue all over Sikkim demanding the full integration of Sikkim with India, and that Sikkim be treated as any other state of India.

  Resolution should be passed asking for the complete abolishment of the institution of the Chogyal.

  The chief minister and the Cabinet should assert in a strongly worded resolution that the accession of Sikkim to India was delayed because of the machinations of the Chogyal, and that the people of Sikkim have waited long enough to achieve their desired goal of being part of the mainstream of the life of the country.

  The Government of India will ask the people of Sikkim to exercise patience. After that, the chief minister should write that he cannot control the upsurge of the people asking for the complete abolishment of the institution of the Chogyal and the complete merger of Sikkim with India.

  Particular care should be taken that incidents should be credible, publicity should be proper and all possible measures be taken to ensure that the Chogyal does not escape from Sikkim. Every route should be properly guarded, and strong barriers put up. All regular traffic should be thoroughly checked and under no circumstances should the Chogyal be allowed to come out of Sikkim. In case the Chogyal asks for asylum, he should be moved to the India House. After some time, he may be shifted to a suitable guest house about 15–20 miles outside Gangtok with a strong CRP guard for a period of 15 or 20 days. After the international publicity has died down, negotiations can take place.

  The script panned out exactly as planned. Kazi wrote two letters to the Indian representatives—first asking the Sikkim guards to be disarmed and the second, requesting for an emergency session of the Sikkim Assembly.

  Accordingly, arrangements were made to employ the army—troops under 64 Mountain Brigade, then Commanded by Brig (later Lt Gen) Depinder Singh—to disarm the Sikkim guards. According to Sidhu, Brig Depinder called the CO of Sikkim guards, Col Gurung, to the 64 Brigade HQ on the morning and kept him there till the end of the operation.

  Three army battalions under the 64 Brigade were deployed. Troops marched to the palace and despite one sentry at the gate resisting (he was shot dead), it took less than 20 minutes for the Indian Army to disarm the Sikkim guards. The Chogyal was furious but was helpless. The stage was set for the Emergency Assembly session on 10 April. Kao’s Staff Officer, R.T. Nagrani, had meanwhile called Sidhu on telephone to understand how the entire operation was carried out. Events moved fast thereafter.

  As planned, the Sikkim Congress issued a statement in Gangtok saying that ‘it has now become evident that the people of Sikkim can realise their full rights only if Sikkim becomes a unit of Union of India’ The party also called for abolition of the ‘oppressive and undemocratic institution of the Chogyal for all times.’13 On 10 April, correspondence between the Kazi (his telegram to Mrs Gandhi on 9 April and her response to the Kazi) was released to the media. The denouement was near.

  As 10 April dawned, the Assembly met for an emergency session. Twenty-nine Sikkim Congress legislators were in attendance. Two resolutions, one calling for the abolishment of the institution of the Chogyal and Sikkim’s merger with India and the second, to hold a referendum on those issues were passed unanimously. Outside, 3,000 odd supporters from distant places in Sikkim arrived in Gangtok and continued to shout anti-Chogyal and pro-Kazi slogans. Kazi was now the new ‘king’ of Sikkim.

  On 11 April, External Affairs Minister Y.B. Chavan made a statement in Parliament referring to the events in Sikkim and justified what had happened. It read, in parts, ‘… is in the context of the deteriorating law and order situation and the suspicion of the imminent threat to the lives of some leaders in Sikkim that an urgent request was received from the Chief Minister for the immediate disarming and disbanding of Sikkim guards. Even earlier, the Government of India had been approached by the Chief Minister that the Government of Sikkim should not be expected to support with public funds the presence of several hundred armed personnel for the exclusive use of the Chogyal … the evidence of the possible conspiracy against the Chief Minister and his colleagues indicating complicity of some Sikkim guards added urgency to the request, in view of the pressing appeal from the Chief Minister and of the Government of India’s responsibility to ensure law and order in the state, the government took necessary steps to disarm the Sikkim guards on the afternoon of 9 April. Before I conclude, I would like to mention another demand by the political leaders in Sikkim, which has been made earlier on many occasions and has been reiterated in recent weeks, for according to the elected government full rights and responsibilities on par with the constituent unit of the Indian union. It is again being repeated, along with the demand for the abolition of the institution of Chogyal in the resolution passed unanimously by the state assembly at its meeting on April 10, the implications of which are being studied by the Government of India.’14

  Events moved rapidly, and by 15 May—after a Constitutional Amendment Bill incorporating Sikkim as the 22nd state of the Union of India was passed, and after the President gave assent to the bill—Sikkim officially became part of India.

  The R&AW’s 27-month involvement in the special operations for Sikkim merger officially ended in May. The stellar work done by the officers, first led by Banerjee and then by his successor P.K. Sen in Calcutta, and implemented on ground by A.S. Syali and then G.B.S. Sidhu, directed and controlled from Delhi by RNK and Sankaran Nair, was another feather in the R&AW’s cap in less than a decade after it was formed. Kao’s already formidable reputation was enhanced further. But soon, in a couple of years, the R&AW was to face its biggest crisis.

  1 G.B.S. Sidhu, Sikkim—Dawn of Democracy: The Truth
Behind the Merger with India (India: Penguin Radom House, 2018).

  2 Ibid.

  3 Ibid.

  4 P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’ and the Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).

  5 Banerjee’s note to RNK.

  6 Ibid.

  7 Ibid.

  8 Ibid.

  9 Ibid.

  10 Correspondence between RNK and Banerjee.

  11 Correspondence between RNK and Banerjee.

  12 Ibid.

  13 G.B.S. Sidhu, Sikkim—Dawn of Democracy: The Truth Behind the Merger with India (New Delhi: Penguin Radom House, 2018).

  14 Ibid.

  FOURTEEN

  The Final Innings

  In the intelligence game, there is little scope for practitioners to rest on their laurels or bask in past glory. Having achieved spectacular back-to-back successes in Bangladesh and Sikkim, RNK could have taken it easy; but the geopolitical and security situation is never static, and, therefore, organisations like R&AW have to stay on top of their game all the time.

  Post-1962, the Indian intelligence agencies—first the undivided IB and then the R&AW since 1968—had benefitted considerably from their close cooperation with the CIA, especially in strengthening their operational capabilities against China. The setting up of the ARC and the training for SFF were two prime examples; but as the decade of the seventies dawned, the overall relations between India and the US deteriorated. Washington was using Pakistan for its outreach to China. President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger used General Yahya Khan to break the ice with the Chinese leadership in 1972. India was not the most favoured nation in the American capital.

  The Nixon administration also had an intense dislike for Mrs Gandhi. As B Raman wrote: ‘The hostile attitude of the then US President, Richard Nixon, and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to India, their ill-concealed attempts to prevent an Indian victory (in 1971), the perceived collusion with China … convinced Indira Gandhi that after Pakistan and China, the US should receive the priority attention of the R&AW… Despite the resignation of Nixon in 1974 in the wake of the Watergate scandal, she felt there is no change in the US hostility to India… She was further convinced that the US hostility was not only to India, but also to her as the Indian leader. She feared that the US intelligence was trying to destabilise her government as a punishment for action in East Pakistan. She started seeing the hand of the CIA everywhere in the setting aside of her election to the Lok Sabha, in the mass movement against her started by Jai Prakash Narayan, in her defeat in the elections of 1977, in the allegations made by the government of Morarji Desai and in the various enquiries ordered by the Morarji Desai government.’1

  Raman claims that between 1971 and until her death in 1984, the CIA’s Psywar Division had launched a vicious disinformation campaign against Mrs Gandhi by using pliant foreign journalists. She was branded a Soviet stooge. The campaign stopped when she was out of power between 1977 and 1980, Raman noted.

  A review of the 1971 operations made it evident to Kao that India still lacked the capacity to have predictive intelligence in the maritime domain, especially the movement of US Naval ships in the Indian Ocean. And, so he set in motion a plan to overcome this shortcoming. Initially, the R&AW set up new monitoring facilities in India’s island territories and opening new stations in Indian Ocean countries like Mauritius. The KGB of the erstwhile Soviet Union also tried to help; but it had its limitations in the Indian Ocean. Other countries like the UK, Canada, Japan and Australia were of limited utility because they had close relations with the US. Kao had to look for an effective alternative. So he homed on to the French external intelligence agency, the SDECE.

  RNK had correctly assessed that the French, despite their improved relations with the US, continued to be wary of the Americans, and were, therefore, ready to cooperate with the R&AW. The SDECE, then headed by the larger than life personality of Le Comte Alexandre de Marenches, invited RNK to Paris. They hit it off instantly.

  The result—setting up of a liaison network between the SDECE and the R&AW to collect real time intelligence on the movement of not only the US naval fleet but also the Soviet ships passing through the Indian Ocean. Raman claims the French spymaster in fact suggested extension of the cooperation by including the Iranian intelligence agency under the Shah of Iran. SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence agency had a good working relationship with the French. Kao accepted the idea since he also knew the Shah personally.

  Under the new arrangement, the trilateral cooperation would work like this—the funds would come from the Iranians who would give the money to the French to buy the requisite technical equipment, and India would provide the trained manpower to man the TECHINT stations. The output would be shared by the three nations, it was decided.

  Raman said that Kao decided to post him to Paris—under the cover of a journalist for an Indian newspaper—to establish the trilateral network. ‘I was selected for two reasons. I had done a course in journalism in the University of Madras in 1956 and worked in the southern editions of The Indian Express for four years before joining the Indian Police Service in 1961. I studied French for four years in the Alliance Francaise of New Delhi between 1970–74 and acquired a fairly good working knowledge of the language,’ Raman revealed.2

  Ultimately, however, Raman went to Paris under diplomatic cover and worked there between 1975 and 1979 to kick-start the trilateral cooperation. A couple of monitoring stations were set up on the east and the west coast of India under the project, but soon the arrangement fizzled out because the Shah was toppled by the Islamic revolution in 1979.

  Meanwhile, the R&AW had expanded its scope and role rapidly in the wake of the 1971 triumph. New stations were opened abroad despite bureaucratic resistance, operatives were placed in important Indian cities like Madras, Bombay, Calcutta (now Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata) and in remote border towns and outposts in Ladakh, Sikkim and NEFA (later Arunachal Pradesh). RNK and R&AW were at the zenith. Mrs Gandhi trusted Kao implicitly. Haksar, her Principal Secretary, also supported the newly created organisation, which justified his trust in both 1971 and in Sikkim. Many young men, and, in later years, women, were attracted to the organisation, since it was considered to be an honour to serve in the R&AW.

  Kao also started the system of recruiting young men and women directly from colleges and universities post-1971. Four fresh candidates were taken in in 1971—mainly those who were children of known friends and acquaintances, leading to a joke in official circles that R&AW was actually Relatives and Associates Welfare Association.3

  However, by 1973 it was decided that if the R&AW wanted to pick diverse talent, it needed to have a system of assessing candidates on various parameters before they were recruited. Therefore, from 1973, the second batch of the direct recruits had to undergo a series of tests, interviews and psychiatric evaluation before they could be selected.

  Candidates had to fill an exhaustive 35-page form. Thereafter, each candidate was thoroughly investigated: relatives, friends and college teachers, influence, habits—everything was checked out. Then they were called for a series of tests. The first one used to be a psychiatric test. Candidates were called to a place at 3 am or 4 am. It was not the kind of test where all the candidates were tested en masse. Once the candidate reached there, he was given an objective type test. Thereafter, whoever cleared the test, was called for an individual interview conducted by the Joint Secretary in charge of operations. The next round of interviews, as Jayadeva Ranade (currently, President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy and a former Additional Secretary of the R&AW, recruited in 1973) remembers, was with senior officers like NF Suntook and Sankaran Nair who did individual assessments. Once found suitable, they had to face a six-member interview board comprising among others, the Foreign Secretary, the R&AW Chief (Kao) and a psychiatrist. ‘I was interviewed for about 45 minutes. The questions were varied and followed no particular sequence: What kind of government India shoul
d have; what is the balance of power in the world, etc. Any way, I didn’t know how I did, whether I would qualify. I came back to Bombay, where my father was posted. In any case, I had been selected for the Customs Service, so I said to myself, if this doesn’t work out, there’s always the customs department,’ Ranade, who rose to become a China specialist in the R&AW, recalled.

  After a couple of months of wait, Ranade was asked to join. Apart from him, three others—Pratap Heblikar, Chakru Sinha and Bidhan Rawal—were part of the 1973 batch of direct recruits. The young officers, after the mandatory training became part of the organisation quickly. ‘Kao and Sankaran Nair used to know each and every officer and their background. The organisation had started a “Club 71”, where once a month every one used to get together. There was much camaraderie, a sense of belonging. We always felt special. Mr and Mrs Kao were great hosts. Often we youngsters used to double up as bartenders,’ Ranade recalled.

  Apart from learning the usual craft and science of espionage, each new officer had to learn a foreign language, much like the Foreign Service recruits. Ranade specialised in Mandarin, and is today recognised as one of the foremost Indian experts on China.

  R&AW, despite its small size, was seen as a high-performing organisation, important for India’s national security. The future looked even brighter. But trouble was lurking round the corner.

  The Difficult Years

  1975 turned out to be a landmark year in R&AW’s history. Having achieved the merger of Sikkim through a meticulously planned operation, R&AW’s stock was as high as it could be. In less than four months, after one of its major success stories, R&AW’s prowess, came under scrutiny. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed leader of Bangladesh, was assassinated by a group of junior officers of the Bangladesh Army on 15 August 1975. Almost his entire family, barring the youngest daughter, Hasina, was wiped out in the massacre. India’s goodwill in Bangladesh which was at its peak as the immediate aftermath of the liberation of Bangladesh, waned and R&AW came under severe criticism for failing to anticipate or prevent Mujib’s killing.