Battlegrounds

by H. R. McMaster

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  DEVELOPING A long-term strategy requires a big dose of strategic empathy and a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics playing out in the region. The problem in the Middle East is, at its base, a breakdown in order associated with the serial failures of colonial rule, postcolonial monarchies, Arab nationalism, socialist dictatorships, and Islamist extremism to provide effective governance and forge a common identity across diverse communities. Decades of conflict fragmented societies along ethnic, sectarian, and tribal lines and perpetuated competitions for power, resources, and survival. The resulting violence strengthens jihadist terrorists and extends Iranian influence.

  The United States and its partners should identify and then strengthen groups that will contribute to enduring political settlements, break the cycle of sectarian violence, and prevent terrorists from establishing support bases. The experience in Tal Afar in 2005 and the Iraq surge are examples of how support for political accommodation among communities and the reform of security forces and local governance can isolate extremists from popular support. By contrast, the Obama administration’s efforts to fight ISIS in Syria and the Trump administration’s announcement of withdrawal from eastern Syria revealed a failure to see military efforts as a means to a political end. Contrary to the belief among some in Washington that there were no Sunni Arab partners to work with, effective support for Sunni anti-Assad opposition early in the Syrian Civil War would have been the best way to fight Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other jihadist terrorist organizations. In January 2014, five months before the Obama administration intervened against ISIS in Syria, Sunni Arab rebels dealt ISIS a devastating blow. Opposition protesters and moderate rebels launched an offensive, expelling ISIS terrorists from Idlib, the Damascus suburbs, and major parts of Aleppo Province. These Arab Sunnis who opposed Assad had suffered greatly from ISIS. The largest ISIS mass atrocity in Syria was its brutal murder of approximately one thousand members of the anti-Assad Al-Sha’itat tribe in one day in August 2014.25

  But the Obama administration’s five-hundred-million-dollar “train-and-equip” program to support Arab opposition forces was disconnected from the political struggle. Assistance focused narrowly on anti-ISIS operations, even though it was Assad’s army’s and Iranian militias’ attacks on Sunni Arab communities that allowed ISIS to portray itself as a protector. Fighters receiving training and assistance had to sign a contract pledging to fight only ISIS and not to attack Syrian or Iranian forces, the people who had driven them out of their homes and killed their families and friends.26 It should have been no surprise when the program collapsed. The Obama administration’s reluctance to support forces that were also in opposition to Assad and his Iranian sponsors was due in part to the fear of spoiling negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Defining the effort in Syria, Iraq, and across the region narrowly as a military campaign against ISIS jihadist terrorists does not address the sectarian conflict that strengthens those very terrorist organizations and helps Iran extend its influence. For example, when Iran placed Lebanese Hezbollah at the vanguard of an offensive against Syrian opposition forces at Al Qusayr in 2013, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, declared that jihad in Syria against Alawites and Shiites was now obligatory, calling Alawites “worse infidels than Jews or Christians.”27

  Curbing Iranian influence requires a multiprong approach and long-term commitment. One key way to limit Iranian influence is to integrate Iraq and, eventually, a post-Assad Syria and a post–civil war Yemen into the region diplomatically and economically. When Prime Minister Abadi visited the White House in March 2017, he had recently hosted Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, in Baghdad.28 In June, Abadi visited Riyadh. Those were important visits because strengthening Iraq’s majority-Shia government’s diplomatic and economic relationships with the Arab world diminishes Iran’s ability to sow division and fuel violent conflict. Peace in Iraq depends on reducing Iranian influence such that Sunni and other minorities no longer feel marginalized and beleaguered. The effort to erode Iranian influence will take far more than a few precision strikes or even the killing of Soleimani and Muhandis.

  Good relations between Baghdad and Riyadh might persuade all Gulf states to build strong diplomatic relations with Iraq rather than support Sunni militias and terrorist organizations that attack the Shia-majority government. Diplomatic engagement with Arab states that have Shia majorities (such as Bahrain and Iraq) and those with significant Shia minorities (such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) should emphasize the importance of equal rights under the law, responsive governance, and the delivery of social services on a nonsectarian basis as essential to forestalling violence and building common identity across communities.

  In the fall of 2019, protests in Lebanon and Iraq demonstrated that Iranian influence in pursuit of Iran’s nefarious designs for hegemony in the region was unnatural. But it also revealed the hunger people have for competent, fair governance. In Lebanon and Iraq, people were asking for representative government to meet their basic needs and allow them to build a better future for their children. The models for postcolonial governance in the Middle East failed. Therefore, the United States and other nations should support the development of representative governance consistent with the culture and traditions of the peoples of the region. That includes supporting reforms necessary to establish rule of law and improving the state’s responsiveness to the needs of all peoples, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or tribe.

  Haider al-Abadi once told me that, after his time in the United Kingdom, he wanted to foster in Iraq democratic processes that permitted the anticipation and resolution of problems before they became crises. Because the Arab and North African states that experienced the Arab Spring of 2011 lacked legitimate opposition parties or civil society organizations, previously clandestine Islamist organizations (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood), criminal organizations (e.g., human trafficking and transnational organized crime networks in North Africa and the Maghreb), militias (e.g., Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq as well as Khalifa Haftar’s and various Misratan militias in Libya), terrorist organizations (e.g., ISIS, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and al-Nusra Front in Syria), and foreign intelligence operators (e.g., IRGC in Syria and Iraq) were in the strongest positions after the collapse of authoritarian regimes. That is why the long-term strategy for ending the sectarian and tribal conflicts in the region begins with strengthening governance and democratic institutions and processes.

  Tunisia was a success story that deserves more attention as the Al-Nahda Party there is Islamist and transitioned power peacefully to a rival party after elections. In countries such as Egypt, where an authoritarian Islamist leader replaced a nationalist dictator and then, in turn, was replaced by a general in a military coup, long-term security and stability will not be possible unless the government, which claims that it is transitioning to representative government, encourages rather than discourages the development of legitimate opposition parties and civil society organizations to participate in the political process.

  Support for minority religious sects and ethnic groups across the Middle East (such as the Druze and the Baha’i) is also important to enduring peace in the region. Because minorities have often been a force for tolerance and moderation, protecting minorities and the participation of minorities in political processes, security forces, and government institutions can act as a buffer on extremism or help foster the accommodation between communities necessary to end religious and ethnic warfare. Since the 1980s, the growth of Islamist politics and parties; political instability; war; and the rise of jihadist terrorists have encouraged indigenous religious minorities of the Middle East to flee the region. ISIS’s genocidal campaign against the Yazidis and mass murder of Christians in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt victimized communities that have promoted moderation through diversity for thousands of years. Minorities such as Yazidis in Iraq, Baha’i in Iran, and Druze in Lebanon faced violence as traditions of tolerance co
llapsed. The United States and its allies should encourage and incentivize policies and actions that protect minorities across the region. Special attention is due to the needs of the 25 million to 35 million Kurds spread across northern Syria, eastern Anatolia, northern Iraq, and northwestern Iran. Persecution of the Kurds and a growing sense of ethnic nationalism among their diverse tribes has been a source of conflict for decades. And the Kurds have been long victimized by external repression. Despite tremendous gains in Iraq, prospects for a sovereign Kurdish nation are dim due not only to opposition from the countries in which Kurds live, but also to their own tribal and ideological differences.

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  ADDRESSING ALL these regional issues would be much easier with the cooperation of Turkey. Our halting disengagement from the Middle East has created space for Russia and Iran to accelerate Turkey’s drift away from NATO, Europe, and the United States. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) are increasingly authoritarian and anti-Western, so improved cooperation may not be possible. A strategy for the region should therefore consider how to mitigate the loss of Turkey as an ally while moving toward a transactional relationship. After a 2016 coup attempt failed to oust Erdogan, he consolidated power and drifted further away from his NATO allies. The AKP conducted massive purges of the military, judiciary, law enforcement, the media, and universities. Most of those purged were sympathetic to the pillars of Kemalism—the philosophy of modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: secularism, Westernism, and nationalism.29

  As Erdogan accused the United States of complicity in the coup, it became clear that Erdogan and the AKP were ideologically opposed to Kemalism. The AKP, founded by Erdogan himself in 2001, has roots in conservative Islamist ideology connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and has fostered a form of anti-Western nationalism. The Turkish government even resorted to a form of hostage taking, imprisoning on baseless charges U.S. citizen Rev. Andrew Brunson and Turkish citizens who worked for the U.S. embassy.30 Trump tried to develop a positive relationship with Erdogan, but grew frustrated over the Turkish president’s intransigence, especially with respect to Reverend Brunson. In August 2018, the Trump administration levied sanctions and doubled tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum, causing the value of the Turkish lira to plummet. Erdogan released Brunson on October 12, 2018, but it was clear that the relationship had become transactional; the alliance with Turkey seemed to be in name only.

  But a smarter U.S. strategy should recognize that Turkey’s interests do not naturally align with those of Russia and Iran. Russia will not be a trustworthy partner in Erdogan’s effort to make Turkey part of an alternative world order. Decisions to import Russian arms and deepen Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy will give Moscow leverage to use against Ankara that is likely to cause resentment and revive memories of Turkey’s unhappy historical experience with Russia and Iran’s hegemonic aspirations in the region. The early 2020 Russian- and Iranian-backed offensive in Syria’s Idlib Province killed approximately sixty Turkish soldiers and drove nearly one million refugees toward the Turkish border.31

  One wonders if, as Turkish soldiers died in the Russian-backed onslaught, Erdogan, or even those around him, felt at least a twinge of buyer’s remorse for those S-400s. In the near term, the United States and Europe should try to avoid a complete rending of the alliance with Turkey while developing relationships outside the AKP, including an effort to reach the Turkish people outside their state-controlled media. Diplomats might help Turkish leaders realize that their long-term interests run counter to those of Russia and Iran. Although the AKP dreams of a post-Western international order, Turkey needs the transatlantic community to overcome its formidable economic challenges. Despite Erdogan’s purges of institutions and his assault on freedom of the press and freedom of expression, elections still matter in Turkey. By 2020, the AKP had been in power for eighteen years and was struggling to maintain its hold. It lost the mayoral race in Istanbul in 2019 by an even greater margin in a revote that Erdogan ordered because he was unhappy with the initial results. Americans and Europeans should try to encourage Turkish leaders to reverse course and reestablish close relations in recognition that Turkey’s European and transatlantic relationships are vital to its overcoming the humanitarian, geopolitical, and economic challenges it faces.

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  JIHADIST TERRORIST organizations remain the major destabilizing force in the region, and defeating them will require new thinking and renewed efforts. Our strategies should begin with broad questions, such as what is the identity of the group and how does it fit into the constellation of other terrorist organizations? What are the organization’s goals and more specific objectives? What is its strategy? What are its strengths and its vulnerabilities? And finally, how can intelligence, law enforcement, military, financial, informational, cyber, and economic efforts be integrated and isolate the organization from sources of strength and attack vulnerabilities? The failure to ask and answer those questions sometimes leads to rushed actions that are inadequately coordinated and not clearly connected to objectives.

  Terrorist organizations need to mobilize support. They become more dangerous when they acquire funds from states, from control of territory, from illicit activities, or from wealthy individuals such as Osama bin Laden. That is why integrated intelligence, law enforcement, and financial actions are important to restrict terrorist organizations’ ability to move and access their money. Strategies should ensure that short-term efforts such as intelligence, military, or law enforcement pursuit of terrorist leaders or facilitators are aligned with long-term efforts such as building local intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, supporting educational and economic reform, and expanding communications efforts to discredit terrorist organizations, especially in communities from which they recruit.

  Although U.S. government agencies and multinational efforts have expanded counterterrorism cooperation dramatically since 2001, there are still opportunities for improvement. One person in the U.S. bureaucracy should be responsible for integrating intelligence with all the U.S. and international tools available for use against particular terrorist organizations. The mentality of that person and all persons engaged in the fight must be offensive, due to the unscrupulousness of the enemy and the inability to defend everywhere.

  Preventing and preempting attacks at their origin is the most effective approach; terrorists under relentless pressure have to prioritize their own survival over planning and preparing for attacks or developing new, more destructive capabilities.

  Despite calls to bring American troops and intelligence and law enforcement officials home from the “wars of 9/11,” working with partners overseas reduces the cost and increases the effectiveness of sustained offensive efforts to disrupt jihadist terrorists. For example, African Union troops in Somalia complement the small U.S. force there that relentlessly attacks not only Al-Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, Al-Shabaab, but also Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen. AQAP is determined to attack Americans and U.S. interests abroad. From 2017 to 2019, U.S. operations killed two leaders of AQAP as well as the expert bomb maker involved in at least three plots to destroy U.S. airlines.32

  Military operations overseas will remain important not only for attacking terrorist leadership when forces have legal authority to do so, but also for denying terrorist organizations safe havens and support bases. Control of territory, populations, and resources was important to ISIS’s psychological and physical strength. And ISIS consolidated this control through not only intimidation, but also the establishment of governance, the provision of basic services, and the preemption of internal threats by a sophisticated internal security organization, Amniyat. ISIS generated revenue through a wide range of criminal activities, including illicit trafficking (mainly of oil), theft, and extortion. Jihadist terrorism is a multigenerational threat. Recall that it was in Pakistani safe havens that the “alumni” of the resistance to Soviet occupation in Afgha
nistan learned the skills and were indoctrinated with the ideology that would later give rise to Al-Qaeda. The threat from ISIS alumni is orders of magnitude larger. Breaking up a would-be caliphate militarily is important for destroying the perception of its invincibility and reducing its ability to attract recruits.

  There must also be an unwavering focus to prevent successor groups from emerging. In October 2019, when President Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria and U.S. Army special operations forces killed ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and its spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir, the group was reeling from battlefield defeats. But ISIS endured. The release of some ISIS prisoners due to the unanticipated and uncoordinated withdrawal increased the chances for ISIS’s or a successor organization’s renewal just as the release of Al-Qaeda prisoners, jailbreaks in Iraq, and Assad’s release of jihadist terrorists in Syria were foundational to the resurgence of Al-Qaeda and the rise of ISIS and other terrorist organizations.33 Isolating terrorists from sources of strength includes ensuring that committed jihadist terrorists are incarcerated under humane conditions until they are no longer a threat.

  A long-term counterterrorism strategy must prioritize separating terrorists from the ideology that attracts people to their cause. In 2017 the Trump administration had high hopes for Saudi Arabia as Prince Mohammad bin Salman, also known as MBS, was named Crown Prince and began to exercise power. At thirty-one years old, MBS seemed like a reformer. He advocated for women having the right to work, drive cars, and travel without male chaperones. Even more significant were statements downplaying the importance of Wahhabism and Salafism (puritanical interpretations of Sunni Islam) and admitting to mistakes the Saudi kingdom had made in supporting radical ideologies.34 Before King Salman switched the planned succession from his nephew Prince Muhammed bin Nayef (MBN), to MBS in May 2017, President Trump made Saudi Arabia his first overseas visit. The Saudis put on a tremendous show of hospitality, playing to the new president’s ego and affinity for pageantry. But the trip was substantive as well. President Trump and King Salman oversaw the signing of an arms deal worth $110 billion at signing and $350 billion over ten years, alongside the signing of a number of agreements with American companies worth tens of billions of dollars. The two countries vowed to work with other Gulf states to dry up the funding for not only designated terrorist organizations, but also extremist organizations who brainwash young people and incite hatred of Jews, Christians, and any Muslims who do not adhere to their ideology.