Battlegrounds

by H. R. McMaster

  Cooperation with Saudi Arabia was critical because, for nearly five decades, the kingdom had been the principal funder for mosques and schools that systematically extinguished empathy and removed obstacles to using violence against innocents. Indeed, until the group developed its own curriculum, ISIS used Saudi religious textbooks to preach intolerance and hatred of others.35 Extremist and jihadist ideology is uniquely dangerous as new generations are taught to hate and rationalize the most horrible forms of violence. In 2019, the multinational Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental group devoted to fighting money laundering and terrorist financing, found that Saudi Arabia’s efforts to combat terrorism financing were meager. During his speech at the 2017 Riyadh Summit, King Salman stated that “we have to stand united to fight the forces of extremism whatever their source.” He added that Islam was a “religion of mercy, tolerance and coexistence” and that terrorists were misinterpreting its messages. Hopes rose that Saudi Arabia would become a leader in countering rather than fomenting Islamist ideologies foundational to jihadist terrorism.

  It was past time for the United States to demand more from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in the effort to isolate terrorist organizations from sources of financial and ideological support. The terrible legacy of the Iranian Revolution and the export of Wahhabi and Salafi jihadist ideology set conditions for the horrors that would follow as Iran exported its revolutionary religious zeal to Shia proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and a Shia proxy army fighting to keep Assad in power in Syria. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab States such as the UAE and Qatar, supported Sunni groups in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Support for the more radical elements of both sects had grown over the past four decades.36 For too long, because of the importance of Saudi Arabia to the global economy, as highlighted during the 1973 oil embargo, U.S. leaders looked the other way as the kingdom aggressively exported a puritanical version of Islam. As President Donald Trump, with First Lady Melania Trump, stood alongside King Salman and Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Riyadh at the opening of a center to counter Islamist ideology and placed their hands on a glowing orb that illuminated their faces, the odd scene was meant to communicate a common commitment to combating extremist ideology. If the opening at the center really did represent “a clear declaration that Muslim-majority countries must take the lead in combating radicalization” as President Trump stated in his remarks, the shift from supporting extremist ideologies to combating them could begin the most promising effort to separate jihadist terrorist organizations from sources of ideological support.37

  Hopes rose, but then came disappointments that highlighted limits to the depth of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, especially the absence of common principles that bind the United States to other allies such as Canada, European countries, and Japan. To consolidate power after King Salman announced him as Crown Prince, MBS rounded up potential opponents and imprisoned many of them in Riyadh’s Ritz-Carlton, holding them for months. In November 2017, he detained the prime minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, because MBS thought him too soft on Hezbollah—an illogical conclusion given that Hezbollah had assassinated the prime minister’s father, former prime minister Rafic Hariri. The French secured Hariri’s release and eventual reinstatement. Then, only a year later, in October 2018, MBS’s ruthlessness and poor judgment became impossible to ignore when the journalist and legal U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul while attempting to obtain the documents he needed to get married. It did not seem possible that the murder—Khashoggi was gruesomely dismembered with a bone saw—was carried out without MBS’s direct knowledge. Although Saudi Arabia initially tried to deny that a murder had even taken place, the evidence was overwhelming. The intelligence community unequivocally laid blame at Saudi officials’ feet and Congress denounced the killing, but President Trump failed to condemn MBS or impose any meaningful costs on the Saudi regime.38 Adding insult to injury, the kingdom fostered a cozy relationship with Vladimir Putin even as Russia continued to enable Saudi Arabia’s nemesis, Iran, in Syria. King Salman visited Moscow before the Khashoggi murder and committed to purchases of Russian weapons, including the S-400 air defense system. And after the Khashoggi murder, MBS was filmed fist-bumping Vladimir Putin at the G-20 conference in Argentina. MBS’s actions highlighted that when allies commit barbarous acts, silence does not purchase fealty.

  In the Middle East, partners can be as vexing as adversaries, but sustained engagement and a willingness to sanction human rights abuses or support for extremist and terrorist organizations are foundational to a long-term strategy for the region. That is because the root cause of the Islamist contagion is a split within the world of Islam—between the intolerant, fundamentalist, and purist Salafi view of religion and the competing reformist view that Islam can and should be constantly evaluated and reinterpreted for modern times. The Muslim world will ultimately have to resolve that ideological competition. Our touchstones should be not lecturing or scolding, but rather, articulating and defending (not imposing) our own values and aligning ourselves with those whose views are most consonant with them.

  * * *

  SOME OF the region’s most difficult problems are likely to remain intractable, but without U.S. engagement, they could become unmanageable. One of the most frustrating problems is, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which I will touch on briefly here. America’s ability to help Israel and the Palestinians progress toward an enduring peace agreement depends on our reputation for honesty and competence, as well as our ability to galvanize regional support and move toward normalization of relations between Israel and all its neighbors. Although American support for its ally Israel has been an element of continuity in U.S. policy since Israel announced its independence in 1948, Israelis’ doubts about U.S. reliability grew based on what they perceived as a bad experience during the Obama administration. Trump administration support for Israel, such as approving the long-promised move of the embassy to Jerusalem, support for the permanent annexation of the Golan Heights (strategic terrain that was part of Syria before 1967), and the statement that Israeli West Bank settlements were legal, communicated support for Israel, but also removed incentives that might have been crucial in a future agreement. The February 2020 unveiling of a peace proposal in the White House with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in attendance was dead on arrival due to the lack of Palestinian participation in its development and the persistence of the most difficult obstacles to enduring peace, including Palestinians’ claim to right of return to land lost since 1948; the associated fate of Israeli settlements in the West Bank; and the future of East Jerusalem, with the possibility of a portion of that holy and contested city becoming the capital of a future Palestinian state. Despite the proposal’s detailed security provisions, many Israelis still fear that a peace settlement would allow security in the West Bank to devolve into the terrorist haven that exists in Gaza, which is controlled by groups committed to the destruction of what they call the “Zionist entity.”

  But the February 2020 “Peace to Prosperity” proposal may, at some point, help resurrect the possibility of a two-state solution. For the concept of “two states, Israel and Palestine,” existing in peace “side by side within secure and recognized borders” to become a reality, the Israeli government and Palestinian Authority must be capable not only of agreeing to a deal, but also of enforcing it across their territories and among their people. The personalization and fragmentation of Israeli politics and the shift of political sentiment to the right, along with the growth of ultra-Orthodox populations, make Israeli approval of even the very favorable Peace to Prosperity vision problematic. And U.S. estrangement from the Palestinian Authority based on the Palestinian leadership’s perception that the United States is not a fair interlocutor makes Palestinian assent to meaningful negotiations unlikely. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority’s weakness and its vulnerabilit
y to radical spoilers such as Hamas are likely to remain insurmountable obstacles. If there is a ray of hope, it may be in efforts to galvanize real support from Arab states to lift the Palestinian populations in Jordan, the West Bank, and eventually Gaza out of poverty and convince the Palestinian people that their best hope for a secure and prosperous future lies in support for leaders who will pursue peace rather than perpetual violence. Breaking the cycle of sectarian violence in the region is connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the terrorist organizations (and their sponsors) that are parties to the civil wars in the Middle East both inflame and draw strength from the long struggle for control of the Holy Land.

  * * *

  THE STRATEGY to break the cycle of violence must include multilayered efforts to pressure and impose costs on those who perpetuate wars and state weakness. America’s experience in the Middle East across the first two decades of the twenty-first century revealed lessons that might help guide its approach to the region in coming decades. It is clear that deposing tyrants in the region, whether through foreign invasion such as in Iraq in 2003 or through popular uprising such as during the “Arab Spring” in 2011, does not automatically usher in freedom and enlightened governance. It is also clear that U.S. disengagement from the region can unleash centripetal forces that generate not only more violence and human suffering in the region, but also threats that extend far beyond its geographic confines. The long-term problems of the Middle East require sustainable long-term engagement. The United States and like-minded partners should prioritize actions, initiatives, and programs that, over time, not only break the cycle of violence, but also restore hope through an evolution toward governance based on tolerance rather than hatred, representative government rather than autocracy, and a desire to join rather than reject the modern world. Although the obstacles to achieving peace and prosperity in the Middle East are daunting, there are signs of hope. Nascent reforms in Saudi Arabia and popular demands for an end to corrupt governance in Lebanon and Iraq provide new opportunities for collaboration in education, institutional development, and commerce.

  Pursuing long-term opportunities, however, will require efforts to prevent ongoing crises from worsening and new ones from occurring. Supporting fragile states such as Lebanon and Jordan, which have borne the brunt of the humanitarian catastrophe associated with the Syrian Civil War, should remain a top priority. So should efforts to support governmental reform, education, and economic opportunity in Egypt, a country of 98 million people. The most important near-term effort, however, may be to counter Iran’s effort to fuel sectarian violence to keep the Arab world perpetually weak, push America out of the region, threaten Israel, and extend Iranian influence to the Mediterranean Sea.

  Part V

  Iran

  TEHRAN STUDENTS SEIZE U.S. EMBASSY AND HOLD HOSTAGES . . . Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, that evil traitor, has gone . . . KHOMEINI’S FORCES RULE IRAN . . . What do we need a relationship with America for? . . . OPEN WAR AS IRAQ BOMBS IRAN . . . The road to Jerusalem passes through the Iraqi city of Karbala . . . CARNAGE IN BEIRUT . . . 241 AMERICAN CASUALTIES EXCEEDS ANY SINGLE VIETNAM INCIDENT . . . I did not trade arms for hostages. TANKER WAR SHIP LOSSES TOTAL 8 MILLION TONS . . . Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on . . . TRUCK BOMB KILLS 19 AMERICANS AT AN AIR BASE IN SAUDI ARABIA . . . The use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything . . . IRAN KILLED 608 AMERICAN TROOPS IN IRAQ WAR . . . We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist . . . Even the Iranians have to acknowledge that their economy is in shambles . . . MAJOR BANKS HIT WITH BIGGEST CYBERATTACKS IN HISTORY! . . . this can still be resolved diplomatically . . . DEAL REACHED ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM . . . America is the number one enemy . . . “DECAYING AND ROTTEN DEAL” WITH IRAN . . . the people of America stand with you . . . Iran is playing with fire . . . IRAN SHOOTS DOWN AMERICAN DRONE . . . Iran made a mistake . . . URANIUM ENRICHMENT RESUMES IN FORDOW . . . Hezbollah are terrorists! Here is Lebanon, not Iran! . . . PROTESTS ROCK BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT . . . 1,500 killed in protests by Iranian security forces . . . AMERICAN CONTRACTOR KILLED . . . PROTESTERS STORM U.S. EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD . . . Death to America! . . . This is not a Warning, it is a Threat . . . You cannot do a damn thing . . . US KILLS IRAN GENERAL QASSEM SOLEIMANI . . . A #Severe Revenge awaits the criminals . . . IRAN BRACES FOR PROTESTS AFTER ADMITTING PLANE SHOOTDOWN . . . Clerics get lost! . . .

  Chapter 9

  A Bad Deal: Iran’s Forty-Year Proxy Wars and the Failure of Conciliation

  America can’t do a damn thing.

  —KHOMEINI, 1979, AND KHAMENEI, 2020

  THE JCPOA were initials likely to trigger an animated conversation with President Trump. Negotiated in a multinational forum comprising Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, was, to him, an example of an agreement in which the United States forfeited its bargaining power and gave away too much for too little.

  I was sympathetic to the statement candidate Trump made many times during his presidential campaign characterizing the JCPOA as “the worst deal ever.” I believed that the JCPOA had both strengthened an adversary and undermined U.S. interests because of fundamental flaws in two areas. First, there were practical problems. In an agreement designed to prevent Iran from threatening other nations with nuclear weapons, the omission of nonnuclear capabilities relevant to deployable nuclear weapons, such as missiles, and the inclusion of a “sunset clause,” which would relax and then terminate restrictions on nuclear development after 2025, cut against the deal’s purpose.1 Second, the agreement was divorced from the very nature of an Iranian regime that was fundamentally untrustworthy and hostile to the United States. Inadequacies in the deal and the unwavering hostility of Iranian leaders made it likely that the JCPOA would succeed only in providing cover for a clandestine nuclear program while sanctions relief gave Iranian leaders more resources to fight Iran’s proxy wars against the United States, Israel, and Arab states that opposed its ambition to extend its influence across the Middle East. Because monitoring and enforcement mechanisms were far from foolproof, the absence of evidence that Iran was breaking the agreement was not reassuring to those familiar with the regime’s long record of hostility and duplicity.

  Iranian leaders did not make it difficult for others to discern their intentions. President Obama declared that signing the “strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated” would give the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “access where necessary, when necessary.”2 But before the ink on the agreement was dry, the spokesman for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization stated that “in the inked roadmap, no permission has been issued for the IAEA’s access to any military centers and the nuclear scientists.”3 Iran’s leaders constantly contradicted their diplomats, which should have raised doubts about trusting them to uphold any of the deal’s stipulations.

  The JCPOA was an extreme case of strategic narcissism based on wishful thinking—wishful thinking that led to self-delusion and, ultimately, the deception of the American people. It was wishful thinking to trust an openly hostile regime to adhere not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the deal. It was self-delusion to indulge in the conceit that lifting sanctions against Iran might evolve the regime into a responsible nation that no longer supported terrorist organizations. And it was deceptive to portray the flawed deal as unrelated to Iran’s destructive behavior in the region and as the only alternative to war.

  Far from persuading the Iranian regime to abandon its sponsorship of militias and terrorist organizations, the JCPOA had the opposite effect. The deal gave the regime a cash payment of $1.7 billion up front and a subsequent payout of approximately $100 billion in unfrozen assets.4 Even more cash flowed to the regime after sanctions relief. Iran used the windfall to intensify its proxy wars and expand sectarian conflicts in the region.5 In the words of former U.S. Central Command commander Gen. Joseph Votel,
Iran grew “more aggressive in the days [after] the agreement.”6

  Although President Trump was eager to get out of the “terrible deal,” I wanted to give him comprehensive options to address the broad range of challenges that the Iranian regime presented to U.S. security and prosperity. And it was important to consider the effects of pulling out. If other nations regarded the U.S. departure from the deal as unjustified, for example, efforts to impose costs on the regime might be diluted. Although the reimposition of U.S. sanctions alone would deliver a significant financial blow, we might stay in the deal and sanction Iran for behavior not covered in it, such as missile development and support for terrorists. Staying in the JCPOA despite common knowledge of President Trump’s inclination to get out would create leverage for us to isolate the regime diplomatically as well as economically. The president might use that leverage to get others to support fixing the deal’s flaws, insisting on robust inspections, and applying additional sanctions. Why not see how much we might accomplish before pulling out?