Battlegrounds

by H. R. McMaster

  47James Dobbins, Howard Shatz, and Ali Wyne, “A Warming Trend in China-Russia Relations.” RAND Corporation, April 18, 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-russia-relations.html.

  Chapter 3: An Obsession with Control: The Chinese Communist Party’s Threat to Freedom and Security

  1Gerald F. Seib, Jay Solomon, and Carol E. Lee, “Barack Obama Warns Donald Trump on North Korea Threat,” Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones and Company, November 22, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-faces-north-korean-challenge-1479855286.

  2The Obama administration’s China policy is summarized here: Cheng Li, “Assessing U.S.-China Relations Under the Obama Administration,” Brookings Institution, September 5, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relations-under-the-obama-administration/.

  3John Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 9.

  4“Xi Jinping: ‘Time for China to Take Centre Stage,” BBC, October 18, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41647872.

  5On China’s rise, see Gideon Rachman, Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century (London: The Bodley Head, 2016).

  6On MacCartney’s journey to visit Emperor Qianlong, see Howard French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017), 5–8. As Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, observed in 2015, “Ever since the founding of ‘New China’ in 1949 . . . Foreign relations as well as trade and economic policy had to match the narrative of national greatness so the ruler, whether an eighteenth-century Emperor or a modern-day autocrat, could confirm his claim to rule.” Quoted in French, Everything Under the Heavens, 7–8.

  7For China’s sense of insecurity under Xi Jinping, see Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 12–13; Sulmaan Khan, Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 7–8 and 209–35.

  8For example, the future premier, Zhou Enlai, who is best known as the urbane interlocutor of Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, oversaw the murder of his political rival’s family in the 1930s. Benjamin Elman, Civil Examinations and Meritocracy in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 30.

  9The “Century of Humiliation” is remembered in China especially for the following grievances: defeat in the First and Second Opium Wars (1839–42 and 1856–60) by Great Britain; unequal treaties in the mid- to late nineteenth century; the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64); defeat in the Sino-French War (1884–85); defeat in the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1894–95 and 1937–45); the Eight-Nation Alliance suppressing the Boxer uprising (1899–1901); the British invasion of Tibet (1903–4); the Twenty-one Demands by Japan (1915); and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931–32). In many cases, China was forced to pay large amounts of reparations, open up ports for trade, lease or cede territories, and make various other concessions of sovereignty to foreign “spheres of influence” following military defeats.

  10For a history of the Cultural Revolution, see Khan, Haunted by Chaos, 111–26. On Deng’s policies and reforms, see Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2013). The 1981 declaration is found in “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” The Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, June 27, 1981.

  11On Xi’s upbringing of forced labor, see Chris Buckley and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Cultural Revolution Shaped Xi Jinping, From Schoolboy to Survivor,” New York Times, September 24, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html; and Evan Osnos, “Born Red,” The New Yorker, March 30, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red. On how this affects Xi’s policies, see Patricia Thornton, Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence, and State-making in Modern China. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), 168–69.

  12Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-first Century (New York: Random House, 2013), 386.

  13“Xi, unlike Mao, never grew into the Party, but always belonged to it. He has no existence separate from the culture of the Party, and no autonomy from it.” Kerry Brown, CEO, China: The Rise of Xi Jinping (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2017), 230.

  14Timothy Beardson, Stumbling Giant: The Threats to China’s Future (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 435.

  15On China’s growth, see Wei Chen, Xilu Chen, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Zheng Song, “A Forensic Examination of China’s National Accounts,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, March 7, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/bpea_2019_conference-1.pdf. On SOEs, see Greg Levesque, “China’s Evolving Economic Statecraft,” The Diplomat, April 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/world/asia/china-soe-state-owned-enterprises.html.

  16Lily Kuo and Kate Lyons, “China’s Most Popular App Brings Xi Jinping to Your Pocket,” The Guardian, February 15, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/15/chinas-most-popular-app-brings-xi-jinping-to-your-pocket.

  17Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

  18“Mass Rally Thanks U.S. for ‘Supporting Hong Kong,’” Radio Television Hong Kong, November 28, 2019, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1494997-20191128.htm.

  19Benjamin Lim and Ben Blanchard, “Xi Jinping Hopes Traditional Faiths Can Fill Moral Void in China: Sources,” Reuters, September 29, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-vacuum/xi-jinping-hopes-traditional-faiths-can-fill-moral-void-in-china-sources-idUSBRE98S0GS20130929.

  20Christian Shepherd, “Disappearing Textbook Highlights Debate in China over Academic Freedom,” Reuters, February 1, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-law/disappearing-textbook-highlights-debate-in-china-over-academic-freedom-idUSKCN1PQ45T.

  21On China’s tributary system, see Christopher Ford, The Mind of Empire: China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 92–96; and French, Everything Under the Heavens, 10–12, 244. See also David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 107.

  22U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” July 25, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.

  23Jun Ding and Hongjin Cheng, “China’s Proposition to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind and the Middle East Governance,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 4 (2017): 3.

  24On One Belt One Road, see Audrye Wong, “China’s Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping,” Brookings Institution, January 22, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-economic-statecraft-under-xi-jinping/#footref-1; and Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China-IMF Cooperation Across the Belt and Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 17, 2018, https://www.csis.org/npfp/its-debt-trap-managing-china-imf-cooperation-across-belt-and-road.

  25On China’s efforts to influence the Maldives election, see Brahma Chellaney, “Beijing Loses a Battle in the Maldives—but the Fight for Influence Goes On,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 25, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Beijing-loses-a-battle-in-the-Maldives-but-the-fight-for-influence-goes-on; Oki Nagai and Yuji Kuronuma, “Maldives Election Marks Setback for China’s Belt and Road,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 25, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Maldives-election-marks-setback-for-China-s-Belt-and-Ro
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  26Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, “WSJ Investigation: China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2019.

  27David Ndii, “China’s Debt Imperialism: The Art of War by Other Means?” Elephant, August 18, 2018, https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2018/08/18/chinas-debt-imperialism-the-art-of-war-by-other-means/.

  28Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, “It Doesn’t Matter if Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid,” New York Times, December 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html.

  29On the Maldives, see Simon Mundy and Kathrin Hille, “The Maldives Counts the Cost of Its Debts to China,” Financial Times, February 10, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/c8da1c8a-2a19-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8. On Malaysia, see Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, “WSJ Investigation: China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-flexes-its-political-muscle-to-expand-power-overseas-11546890449.

  On Ecuador, see Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, “It Doesn’t Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid,” New York Times, December 24, 2018.

  On Venezuela, see “China to Lend Venezuela $5 Billion as Maduro Visits Beijing,” Bloomberg, September 13, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-13/china-to-give-venezuela-5-billion-loan-as-maduro-visits-beijing.

  30Erik Sherman, “One in Five U.S. Companies Say China Has Stolen Their Intellectual Property,” Fortune, March 1, 2019, https://fortune.com/2019/03/01/china-ip-theft/.

  31William Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 165–71, 216–25, 230.

  32On nontraditional intelligence collection, see Hearing on China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Congress (2018) (statement of John Demers, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/chinas-non-traditional-espionage-against-the-united-states-the-threat-and-potential-policy-responses. For more on CRI, see Greg Levesque, “Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on What Keeps Xi Up at Night: Beijing’s Internal and External Challenges,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Levesque_USCC%20Testimony_Final_0.pdf.

  33“PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology,” U.S. National Security and the People’s Republic of China, GovInfo, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/html/ch1bod.html; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, “Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request,” February 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/FY2019-Budget-Request-Overview-Book.pdf.

  34On the Department of Energy, see Department of Justice, “Former Sandia Corporation Scientist Sentenced for Taking Government Property to China,” United States Attorney’s Office, District of New Mexico, November 24, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/usao-nm/pr/former-sandia-corporation-scientist-sentenced-taking-government-property-china. On forced technology transfer, see Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, January 2018, 19, https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf. On the Kuang-Chi Group, see Greg Levesque, “Testimony.”

  35On the African Union, see John Aglionby, Emily Feng, and Yuan Yang, “African Union Accuses China of Hacking Headquarters,” Financial Times, January 29, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/c26a9214-04f2-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. For General Alexander quote, see Claudette Roulo, “Cybercom Chief: Culture, Commerce Changing Through Technology,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 12, 2012, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118201. The study was conducted by the Council of Economic Advisors, “The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy,” February 2018, 36, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/The-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf.

  36United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong, 2018 S.D.N.Y. (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1121706/download.

  37A partial list of confirmed transfers and attempts includes: radiation-hardened microchips and semiconductor devices, military technical data for navigation and precision strike capabilities, technical specifications for the B-2 Stealth Bomber and cruise missiles, electronics used in military radar, and military encryption technology. For more details, see “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and Embargo-Related Criminal Cases,” Department of Justice, February, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/file/347376/download.

  38China Power Team, “Is China at the Forefront of Drone Technology?” China Power, May 29, 2018, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-drones-unmanned-technology/.

  39On China recruiting spies, see Mike Giglio, “China’s Spies Are on the Offensive,” The Atlantic, August 26, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/595747. On Hong Kong protests, see Steven Myers and Paul Mozur, “China Is Waging a Disinformation War Against Hong Kong Protesters,” New York Times, August 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-china.html; and Tom Mitchell, Nicolle Liu, and Alice Woodhouse, “Cathay Pacific Crisis Ushers in Nervous New Era for Hong Kong Inc.,” Financial Times, August 28, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/cb6f5038-c7ac-11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f.

  40On China’s influence campaigns, see Tara Francis Chan, “A Secret Government Report Uncovered China’s Attempts to Influence All Levels of Politics in Australia,” Business Insider, May 28, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/secret-australian-government-report-uncovered-china-influence-campaign-2018-5; David Shullman, “Protect the Party: China’s Growing Influence in the Developing World,” Brookings, October 4, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-party-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-developing-world/.

  41More information on all quotes and claims in this section is taken from Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), 20, 60 63–68, 146–51, and 169–73. For more on Chinese influence, see John Garnaut, “How China Interferes in Australia,” Foreign Affairs, March 9, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-09/how-china-interferes-australia.

  42Hardina Ohlendorf, “The Taiwan Dilemma in Chinese Nationalism,” Asian Survey 54 no. 3 (2014): 471–91.

  43On Taiwan’s exports, see Da-Nien Liu, “The Trading Relationship Between Taiwan and the United States: Current Trends and the Outlook for the Future,” Brookings Institution, November 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-trading-relationship-between-taiwan-and-the-united-states-current-trends-and-the-outlook-for-the-future/; and “TW’s Top 10 Export Destinations,” Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, https://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeID=94&pid=651991&dl_DateRange=all&txt_SD=&txt_ED=&txt_Keyword=&Pageid=0.

  44Jason Li, “China’s Surreptitious Economic Influence on Taiwan’s Elections,” The Diplomat, April 12, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/chinas-surreptitious-economic-influence-on-taiwans-elections/.

  45Chris Horton, “China, an Eye on Elections, Suspends Some Travel Permits to Taiwan,” New York Times, July 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/world/asia/taiwan-china-tourist-visas.html.

  46For Wang Yi quote, see Thomas Wright, “Taiwan Stands Up to Xi,” The Atlantic, January 15, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/taiwans-new-president-is-no-friend-of-beijing/605020/.

  47For Xi quote, see “Xi Jinping Says Taiwan ‘Must and Will Be’ Reunited with China,” BBC, January 2, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-467331
74. On China’s military preparations, see the Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 15, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.

  48Andreo Calonzo, “Duterte Will Ignore South China Sea Ruling for China Oil Deal,” Bloomberg, September 11, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-11/duterte-will-ignore-south-china-sea-ruling-for-china-oil-deal; Cliff Venzon, “Duterte Struggles to Sell His China Pivot at Home,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 9, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Duterte-struggles-to-sell-his-China-pivot-at-home.

  49Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, “Total Competition: China’s Challenge in the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, January 8, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/total-competition.

  Chapter 4: Turning Weakness into Strength

  1Donovan Chau and Thomas Kane, China and International Security: History, Strategy, and 21st-Century Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2014), 64.

  2Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014).

  3On this point, see Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), and John Pomfret, The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present (New York: Henry Holt, 2016), 570–71.

  4Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 12: Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d12.